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Abstract
Background
Medicines that are of poor quality present a challenge to many countries
especially the developing countries. Many interventions against medicines
counterfeiting are often not evaluated and qualitative fieldwork to find how
stakeholders perceive the problem of poor quality medicines is currently lacking.
Aims
1) To conduct a systematic review of the literature 2) To validate the Mobile
Authentication Service (MAS) 3) To explore stakeholder experiences and
perceptions of the current situation of medicines counterfeiting and quality of
medicines distributed in Nigeria.
Methods
1) A quantitative study involving Short Message Service (SMS) authentication of
tagged Glucophage® (metformin) samples, packaging and chemical (Near
Infrared spectroscopyand High Performance Liquid Chromatography) analysis
of metformin samples, randomly selected from retail outlets in Lagos, Nigeria 2).
A qualitative study involving semi-structured interviews with different
stakeholders.
Results
The results of the SMS authentication agree with that of packaging and
chemical analyses. The Glucophage® samples were significantly different in
quality from the generic versions in terms of the concentration of active
ingredient with a p value of 0.006. This difference in quality was in favour of the
innovator brand, Glucophage® and it is similar to the findings from the
qualitative interviews where majority of the participants perceived innovator
brands better in quality than their generic versions.4
Majority of the participants felt that the problem of poor quality medicines in
Nigeria is decreasing.
Increase in cost of medicines, poor dispensing practices, poor phone network,
time constraints, consumer trust in medicine sellers, low level of awareness and
complacency by the consumers were identified as factors that may be a barrier
to the use of MAS.
Conclusion
MAS seem to be successful in helping consumers authenticate their medicines.
However, recommendations arising from this study should be adopted to
overcome barriers to its use. Substandard medicines may present a greater
challenge than medicines counterfeiting and should therefore not be neglected.5
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Chapter 1
Introduction to the thesis
1.1 Introduction to the chapter
This chapter is an introduction to the PhD research. This study seeks to
present a systematic review of the literature on quality of medicines, validate the
Mobile Authentication Service (MAS) as an anti-counterfeiting intervention
aimed at improving the quality of medicines distributed in Nigeria and to explore
stakeholder perceptions on issues relating to accessibility to good quality
medicines in Nigeria. It was anticipated that the findings of this research will for
the first time present a holistic independent evaluation of the utility, capacity and
effective mass replication of MAS in Nigeria as well as stakeholder perceptions
on how accessibility to good quality medicines can best be ensured. This
research employed a quantitative research approach which involved random
sampling and analysis of metformin tablets from Lagos, Nigeria and a
qualitative research approach which involved semi-structured interviews with
different stakeholders (consumers, medicine sellers such as community
pharmacists, patent medicine vendors and traders as well as policy makers in
pharmacy).
This chapter begins by giving the context in which the research was carried out
which includes an overview of current health situation in Nigeria. This is
followed by a discussion of drug supply, distribution and regulation in Nigeria,
presenting a background to the research. Definition of terms and history of
medicines counterfeiting is presented towards the end of the chapter followed
by a detailed illustration of the structure of the thesis.27
1.2 Background and context
Nigeria is located in West Africa. It is Africa’s most populous country (about
177 million people); accounting for a quarter of the population of Africa. It is
divided into 6 geopolitical regions namely; south-south, south-east, south-west,
north-east, north-west and north-central (see figure 1). The 6 geopolitical
regions are further divided into 36 states with Abuja as the federal capital
territory and Lagos state as the most populated and ethnically diverse (Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2014).
Figure 1: The 6 geopolitical zones of Nigeria (Adapted from Federal
Ministry of Health and World Health Organisation, 2010)28
1.3 Overview of Current Health Situation in Nigeria
The results of the World Health Organisation (WHO) report on monitoring the
world’s health system performance which was last released in 2000 ranked the
Nigeria’s overall health system performance 187
th among the 191 member
states (WHO, 2000). More recent data from the Nigerian National Health Policy
(Federal Ministry of Health, 2004) did not indicate any significant improvement
in this position. The Nigerian National Health Policy (NNHP) of 2004 indicated
that the nation’s poor health state is as a result of communicable (for instance
Malaria, Tuberculosis (TB) and Human Immuno deficiency Virus (HIV) and non-
communicable (for instance Hypertension and Diabetes) diseases accounting
for 72% and 23% of annual deaths respectively while other unknown causes
account for the remaining 5%. Recently, Nigeria has been ranked 11th among
the 22 countries with high TB burden (WHO, 2013). Malaria in Nigeria accounts
for more deaths than it does in any other country globally with about 100 million
cases and over 300, 000 deaths per year (United States Embassy in Nigeria,
2011). HIV is also a major public health problem in Nigeria with Nigeria
accounting for the second highest number of new infections each year (Avert,
2014). About 3.7% of the population live with HIV (Avert, 2014). According to
the Federal Ministry of Health, (2004), these communicable and non-
communicable diseases in addition to other factors relating to the poor health care
system such as poor ante-natal care have led to an increase in infant and
maternal mortality rate and a decrease in life expectancy from 51.01 years in 2003
to 46.94 years in 2010 (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2010).
Table 1 summarizes the key health indicators of Nigeria.29
Table 1: Health Indicators of Nigeria
Key Health Indicators Value
Total Population (2006 census) 144, 720, 000
Annual growth rate 3%
Fertility rate 5.84
Crude death rate per 1000 16
Annual per capita income $260
Gini index 37.5
Life expectancy at birth 48 years
Healthy life expectancy 42 years
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) 122
Maternal mortality (per 100, 000 live births) 1000
Contraceptive prevalence rate 6%
Under five mortality per 1000 191
Average rate of immunisation 18%
(Adapted from World Bank, 2000 cited in United Kingdom Department of International Development Health
Systems Resource Centre (DFID HSRC), 2000; Federal Ministry of Health and World Health Organisation,
2010; Ogbonnaya, 2009)
Note: Gini index is the extent of inequality among individuals of households
within an economy in terms of their income or their consumption expenditure. A
Gini index of 0 means a perfect equality while a Gini index of 100 means a
perfect inequality (World Bank, 2014). Nigeria has a Gini index of about 37.5
suggesting a high level of income inequality, which is common in many other
countries in Africa. The median Gini index value for Africa is 41.5% (Wolfram
Alpha, 2014).
The health indicator values presented above are indicative of the poor health
status of majority of people living in Nigeria. These figures are even of greater
concern when compared to other countries in the West African region that are
faced with similar disease burden as Nigeria but has significantly better health
indicator values. One of such countries is Ghana. Comparing the health
indicator values of Nigeria above with the health indicators of Ghana as
published by Ghana Health Service, (2012); Ghana has a life expectancy at
birth of 60 years compared to Nigeria with a life expectancy at birth of 48 years.
The under-five mortality per 1000 in Ghana is 80, a figure less than half of the30
under-five mortality in Nigeria. Infant mortality per 1000 live births in Ghana is
50 compared to 122 in Nigeria and the crude death rate per 1000 in Ghana is
9.4 compared to Crude death rate per 1000 of 16 in Nigeria. Although this
comparison of health indicators made here is between Nigeria and Ghana, it
mirrors the situation of Nigeria when compared to majority of other countries in
sub Saharan Africa.
Furthermore, the National Health Policy revealed that there has been a
downward trend in health development since 1993 (Federal Ministry of Health,
2004). This downward trend was among other factors attributed to irregular
supply and non-availability of good quality essential medicines. It therefore
appears that the National Drug Policy which was adopted and launched in 1990
is yet to achieve its goal of ensuring access to safe, effective and affordable
good quality drugs at all levels of health on the basis of health care needs
(Federal Ministry of Health, 2003). This failure of the National Drug Policy
(NDP) can be attributed to a lot of factors among which include the failure of the
National Health Policy (NHP), smuggling and dumping of medicines as well as
illegal sourcing of medicines which encourages sale of fake, substandard,
adulterated drugs and unregistered drugs, lack of political will and law
enforcement, poor funding and poor development of the local pharmaceutical
industries (Peterson and Obileye, 2002). Presently local drug manufacturing
accounts for about 25% of Nigeria’s pharmaceutical markets while the
remaining 75% are mainly imports from Asian countries (United Nations
Industrial Development Organisation, 2011).
Additionally, it is worthy of note that about 60-80% of health service provision
comes from the private sector and the traditional medicine providers whose
activities are often unregulated and not standardised (DFID HSRC, 2000). Drug
hawkers are found in many places in Nigeria selling medicines that may be
fake, adulterated or degraded. Patent medicine shops (PMS) are owned by
non-professionals and may operate illicit activities such as unsafe abortions,31
injections and unnecessary administration of intravenous (IV) fluids (Dahiru,
2009). The majority of substandard and counterfeit medicines circulating in
Nigeria are believed to come from the open markets and these unregulated
patent medicine shops (PMS) in the country (Peterson and Obileye, 2002).
According to Pharmaceutical Society of Nigeria (PSN), (2001) cited in Peterson
and Obileye, (2001), about 49.6% of counterfeit medicines come from the open
markets while about 32.8% come from the patent medicine stores.
Interestingly, about 58.8% of physicians in Lagos prefer to purchase their
medicines from these open markets (Peterson and Obileye, 2002). This shows
that these markets may have good patronage by both the illiterates and health
care professionals.
Another common feature in most streets and markets in Nigeria are traditional
medicine healers (herbalists) who make claims of curing almost all diseases
and sell concoctions to patients. Patients often seek the help of traditional
medicine healers and street vendors before visiting public health facilities. This
may be due to inaccessibility of public health facilities, low standard of care and
high cost of services in most available public health facilities (Dahiru, 2009).
1.4 Drug Supply, Distribution and Regulation in Nigeria
The National Drug Policy (NDP) guides public drug supply in Nigeria. The
National Drug Policy, which was last revised in 2003, has a major goal of
ensuring that medicines which are effective, affordable, safe and of good quality
are available for use at all times. It also promotes rational drug use and local
production of essential medicines (Federal Ministry of Health, 2003).
Drug distribution in Nigeria is still not well organised. This disorganised nature
of drug distribution in Nigeria may in part be attributed to insufficient number of
pharmacists around 1960. Due to the lack of pharmacists at the time, some of32
the existing pharmacists engaged in multiple registrations of premises with the
agreement of the shop owners, thereby creating room for traders and other non-
professionals who lack the basic knowledge of drugs to engage in the sale of
medicines without supervision (Peterson and Obileye, 2002). With time these
traders obtained licenses to trade on patent and proprietary medicines under
the liberalisation policy of the government at the time (Toye, 2009). This
consequently led to the establishment of big drug markets in major Nigerian
cities (Lagos, Kano and Onitsha). Presently there are open drug markets in
other cities such as Aba, Enugu, Maiduguri, Gombe, Kaduna and Owerri
(Pharmaceutical Society of Nigeria, 2001 cited in Peterson and Obileye, 2002).
These markets are unregulated and unlicensed with the majority of the shops
failing to meet the standards set by the Pharmacists Council of Nigeria (PCN)
(Peterson and Obileye, 2002). They also create a ready market for counterfeit
medicines and poor quality medicines as a whole (Nigerian Food and Drug
Regulatory Advisor, 2010).
The sources of medicines used by patients include pharmacies of public and
private healthcare institutions, retail medicine outlets (retail pharmacies, patent
medicine shops, illegal street vendors and hawkers) (Federal Ministry of Health
and World Health Organisation, 2010). Although, patent medicine shops are
allowed by the law to stock over the counter (OTC) medicines, they often stock
all categories of medicines, diagnose, prescribe and administer injections and
are a major source of drugs and disease information for patients as they are
widely distributed across the nation (Federal Ministry of Health and World
Health Organisation, 2010). This means that over the counter, prescription and
controlled drugs can be obtained from anywhere including the open drug
markets, patent medicine stores, pharmacies and hospitals.
Patent medicine shops are greater in number than pharmacies and
pharmacists, which are in short supply. For instance, in comparison to the wide
availability of patent medicine shops, there were only about 2,685 registered33
pharmacies in Nigeria in 2006, which were unequally distributed in favour of the
urban areas (Federal Ministry of Health and World Health Organisation, 2010).
In 2001, there were about 9,308 pharmacy graduates in Nigeria; out of which
6,412 were registered. This makes pharmacist patient ratio to be about 1 to
10,743 based on the estimated population of Nigeria at the time. These figures
give an idea of the scarcity of pharmacists when compared to the large number
of people in Nigeria who need their services. This scarcity may also be one of
the reasons why some patients seek their medicines from other sources and
may be a contributory to the chaotic nature of medicine supply and distribution
in Nigeria.
The majority of the drug distribution outlets are located in the urban areas;
urban areas of Nigeria account for 70% of health care workers and facilities
(Campbell 1998 cited in Peterson and Obileye, 2002). Lagos alone accounts
for 30% of the total number of pharmacies in the country (see Appendix 1). For
the states where pharmacies are present, the percentage of pharmacies in
urban area of each state of the federation ranges from 50% in states such as
Kebbi and Abuja to 100% in other states such as Bayelsa, Ebonyi, Sokoto and
Yobe state (see Appendix 1). About 98% of pharmacies in Lagos state are
located in the urban areas (PCN, 2000 cited in Peterson and Obileye, 2002).
Several bodies have been established to help improve the quality of medicines
supply and distribution in Nigeria. For instance, the National Agency for Food
and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) was formed following the
resolution by the 1988 World Health Assembly (WHA), which requested
engagement of countries in the fight against medicines counterfeiting. It is the
responsibility of NAFDAC to control the quality of food, drugs, cosmetics,
medical devices, chemicals, detergents and packaged water which are either
imported or locally manufactured (Yusuff and Tayo, 2004). The Federal Task
Force on Fake and Adulterated Drugs established by decree 21 of 1988 as
amended, an arm of NAFDAC is empowered by Section 8 of Decree 25 of 199934
to close down the open drug markets and all unregistered premises (Orivri,
2009) (See Appendix 2). The Pharmacists Council of Nigeria (PCN) is in
charge of regulating professional practices including the issuance of licenses to
Pharmacists and Patent Medicine Vendors (PMVs) as well as drafting the
pharmacy education curriculum (Yusufu, 2008).
The lack of enforcement by the Federal Task force, conflict of responsibilities
between PCN and NAFDAC as well as limited access to essential medicines
have contributed in making recent efforts to permanently close the open drug
markets and improving the quality of medicines in Nigeria futile (Nigerian Food
and Drug Regulatory Advisor, 2010). In addition, the increased complexity of
the nature of Nigeria’s drug distribution network remains an obstacle in the fight
against medicines counterfeiting and ensuring the availability of good quality,
efficacious and safe medicines in general. Other issues such as lack of good
transportation networks, unavailability of funds, erratic power supply and
unreliable telecommunication networks constitute a significant challenge to drug
dispensing particularly in the rural areas (Peterson and Obileye, 2002).
The problem of poor quality medicines is particularly important in many
developing countries such as Nigeria which are faced with an increased burden
of both communicable and chronic diseases among other numerous public
health issues as described by Beran, (2006). The health workforces in these
countries are overburdened, in short supply and are faced with the problem of
poor quality medicines.
In addition to medicines being a major target to counterfeiters because of their
low bulk despite being of high value, chaotic drug distribution systems, leaky
supply chain systems, scarcity and/or erratic medicines supply, high cost of
medicines, vested interests both on the part of the regulatory officials and the35
counterfeiters, weak laws and lack of enforcement of existing laws, ignorance or
low literacy rates, pervasive poverty, poorly equipped laboratories, under-
funded regulatory authorities as well as poor handling and manufacturing
practices and high level of corruption in the health care system has been
identified as the common reasons for the increased prevalence of counterfeit
medicines in such countries as Nigeria (Erhun et al., 2001). The high cost of
medicines is worsened by high import tariffs on drugs in such countries as
Nigeria, Iran, India, Congo, Morocco and Zimbabwe among others that have
tariffs of 15% or more (Bate and Boateng, 2006 and Wertheimer and Norris,
2009). This constitutes a significant financial burden to the patients especially
where they are forced to pay for the medicines out of their pocket (Wertheimer
and Norris, 2009). Poor quality medicines can also result from such factors as
degradation of medicines when exposed to tropical weather conditions as well
as inadequate quality control on the part of the manufacturers. Furthermore,
the problem of lack of human and financial resources needed to tackle the
problem of poor quality medicines creates a conducive atmosphere for the
proliferation of trade in counterfeit and sub-standard medicines (Caudron et al.,
2008).
1.5 Definition of terms
Several factors such as the raw materials used, manufacturing environment,
formulation, manufacturing process, equipment, technical know-how for
production and packaging of the product, transportation and storage conditions
determine the quality of medicines. Quality specifications are usually set by the
manufacturers and are published in pharmacopeias (United States
Pharmacopiea; USP, 2010). Poor quality medicines refer to medicines (legally
registered, generics or counterfeits), which do not meet the official
specifications for strength, quality, purity, packaging or labelling (USP, 2010).
There remains a lack of agreement among stakeholders on a universal
definition for counterfeit and substandard medicines. This has significantly36
hindered initiatives that are aimed at curbing medicines counterfeiting (Caudron
et al., 2008).
In an attempt to differentiate counterfeit drugs from substandard medicines
which are both categories of poor quality medicines; the World Health
Organisation (WHO) defines a counterfeit drug as “a medicine, which is
deliberately and fraudulently mislabelled with respect to identity and/or
source” (Wondemagegnehu, 1999 cited in Newton et al., 2006a).
“Counterfeiting can apply to both branded and generic products and
counterfeit products may include products with the correct or wrong
ingredients, without or with insufficient active ingredients or with fake
packaging” (World Health Organisation 2010). It has also been found that
counterfeiters copy or imitate existing products. They can also manufacture
products that they have invented, and are not normally available (IMPACT,
2008). All counterfeits are, by nature, at high risk of being substandard
(IFPMA, 2010). According to WHO regional office for the Western Pacific
(WPRO) (2005-2010)
Drugs are classed as counterfeit if they fall into any of the following seven
categories:
1. Fake packaging and correct quantity of correct ingredient;
2. Fake packaging and wrong ingredient;
3. Fake packaging and no active ingredient;
4. Fake packaging and incorrect quantity of correct ingredient;
5. Genuine packaging and wrong ingredient (deliberate);
6. Genuine packaging and no ingredient (deliberate); or
7. Genuine packaging and incorrect quantity of ingredient (deliberate).
According to the WHO and the United States Pharmacopeia,37
Substandard medicines are regarded as “genuine drug products that do not
meet the quality specifications set for them” (Wondemagegnehu, 1999; WHO,
2005 and Smine, 2002). They are approved and legally manufactured, but do
not meet all quality criteria. They may pose a significant health risk, as they
are not of good quality, but should not be regarded as counterfeit.
For instance if there is:
Genuine packaging + incorrect quantity of ingredient (not deliberate).
Examples are choloroquine samples with genuine packaging from a
genuine manufacturer but with incorrect quantity of active ingredient as
shown in Maponga and Ondari, (2003). Another example is when a
product from a genuine manufacturer with the correct quantity of active
ingredient gets contaminated for example contaminated magnesium sulfate
leading to Serratia septicaemia and gentamycin-resistant Pseudomonas
aeruginosa in gentamycin eye drops causing severe infections (Newton et
al., 2010)
While a genuine medicine has:
Genuine packaging + correct quantity of ingredient
These definitions above by WHO for counterfeit (falsified or spurious) and
substandard medicines were adopted in this research project and form part of
medicines regarded as poor quality medicines in this entire report. These WHO
definitions clearly show that additional inspection of the packaging of the drugs
may be helpful in differentiating which medicines are counterfeit from those that
are substandard. However, this may be limited by the sophisticated nature of
medicines counterfeiting as the counterfeiters have successfully copied even
complex holograms. Further tests such as forensic examinations of trademarks
or product designs can be carried out to differentiate counterfeited medicines
from substandard medicines as well as to determine the source of the
counterfeited products (Newton et al., 2008). The use of techniques such as
HPLC and NIR have also proved helpful in detection of counterfeits. This38
distinction is vital since the reasons for their production and potential
countermeasures are different. For example, the strategies to combat
substandard medicines may be more straightforward. In this instance, focus
can be placed on the manufacturing and quality assurance processes in
production to resolve these issues, which is not the case with tackling
medicines counterfeiting where the need to tackle fraud may be obvious
(Newton et al., 2010).
Due to the varying nature as well as the complexity of medicines counterfeiting
in some countries, the definition of counterfeit medicines also varies from
country to country. For instance; The National Agency for Food and Drug
Administration and Control (NAFDAC) - Nigeria’s drug regulatory agency - has
identified counterfeit drugs to be those with;
“Same quantity of active ingredient as the genuine brands which are clones that
are unlikely to produce the desired therapeutic effects due to differences in their
formulation and bioavailability when compared to the genuine brands or
Medicines with insufficient or without active ingredient, expired medicines as
well as toxic or ineffective herbal preparations and medicines lacking the name
and address of the manufacturer” (Akunyili, 2004).
The Nigerian Counterfeit and Fake Drugs and Unwholesome Processed
                                                                      
1. “Any drug product which is not what it purports to be;
2. or any drug or drug product which is so coloured, coated, powdered or
polished that the damage is concealed or which is made to appear to be
better or of greater therapeutic value than it really is, which is not labelled
in the prescribed manner or which label or container or anything
accompanying the drug bears any statement, design, or device which
                                                                   
3. or any drug or drug product whose container is so made, formed or filled
as to be misleading;39
4. or any drug product whose label does not bear adequate directions for
use and such adequate warning against use in those pathological
conditions or by children where its use may be dangerous to health or
against unsafe dosage or methods or duration of use;
5. or any drug product which is not registered by the Agency in accordance
with the provisions of the Food, Drugs and Related Products Registration
Decree 1993, as amended."
The above definition shows that any medicine that is not registered by NAFDAC
is also classed as counterfeit. This means that what may be considered
counterfeit in Nigeria may not be considered as such in other countries. It also
potrays products that have been genuinely registered by drug regulatory bodies
of other countries and imported into Nigeria but sold without further registration
with NAFDAC as counterfeit. Other countries such as Pakistan, United States,
Brazil, Portugal, Australia, India, The Philippines and Japan have their own
definitions for a counterfeit medicine.
Apart from these country definitions of counterfeit medicines, which seem to be
rooted in a public health perspective, some other organisations define
counterfeiting from an Intellectual Property (IP) right infringement point of view.
For example, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property defines counterfeit trademark goods as
“meaning any goods, including packaging, bearing without authorisation a
trademark which is identical to the trademark validly registered in respect of
such goods, or which cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from such
a trademark, and which thereby infringes the rights of the owner of the
trademark in question under the law of the country of importation” (Forzley,
2005).40
WHO research into the use of the term “counterfeit” revealed that majority (34)
of the member states used the term “counterfeit” in their national legislation.
Other terms used include “falsified”, “illicit”, “illegal”, “unregistered”,
“unauthorized” and “adulterated”. Besides these variations in terms; the
meaning of counterfeit medicines in some of the national legislations includes
unauthorised medicines, substandard medicines and intellectual property
infringement. The implication of these is that what may be considered a
counterfeit in one country may not be viewed as such in another country
(Deisingh, 2005).
1.6 History of medicines counterfeiting
Medicines counterfeiting is not new. It can be dated back to the first century in
Greece when Dioscorides first classified drugs by their therapeutic use and
warned of the dangers of adulterated drugs as well as how they could be
detected (WHO, 1999a cited in Newton et al., 2006a). It has also been referred
to as the ‘second oldest profession’ (Lybecker, 2008). Other early incidents of
counterfeiting includes the adulteration of herbal medicines such as Valeriana
officinalis, adulteration of Ferula assa-foetida with red clay and the adulteration
of the Peruvian cinchona bark with other astringent barks and aloes in the 17
th
century (Newton et al., 2006a). In the mid 19
th-century, there was a widespread
adulteration of medicines especially quinine which led to the establishment of
the code of ethics for pharmacists and guides on the detection of counterfeits in
the United States of America (Newton et al., 2006a).
The first case of a documented death which was attributed to fake anti-malarial
was in 1999 when a 33 year old man from Cambodia died despite treatment
with mefloquine, further testing revealed the mefloquine as fake (Strobel et al.,
2010). Since then there have been anecdotal reports of tragedies resulting
from the use of poor quality medicines.41
In Nigeria, medicines counterfeiting was first observed in 1968 when there was
a deregulation of Crown agents as sole distributors of medicines (Akunyili,
2007). Owing to the global economic recession at the time and the consequent
devaluation of the Naira, which is Nigeria’s official currency, most drugs became
unaffordable to the majority of the population leading to the issuance of import
licenses for drugs (NAFDAC, 2002-2009). Politicians largely influenced the
implementation and issuance of import licenses. This led to its issuance to
unqualified persons who lacked adequate knowledge about drugs. This
situation coupled with an increase in demand for drugs, limited number of
pharmacists and continued irrational drug use led to increased importation of
fake drugs by non-professionals since they were cheaper than genuine drugs
(Peterson and Obileye, 2002). It then became obvious that the existing laws on
medicines distribution could not tackle the problem of drug quality in Nigeria and
the Counterfeit and Fake Drugs Decree No.17 of 1989 was promulgated. This
established the Federal Task force that is now an arm of NAFDAC. Decree No.
17 of 1989 was later replaced with Decree 25 of 1999 that included a stricter
penalty for forfeiture and a fine of N500,000 for offenders (Peterson and
Obileye, 2002).
Despite the importance of tackling medicines counterfeiting, it was not given
international recognition until about 30 years ago when it was first discussed at
an international health meeting; the WHO Conference of Experts on Rational
Drug Use (WHO, 2006c). Since then several efforts have been made by the
WHO to help tackle the problem of poor quality medicines. WHO held a
conference in Rome in 2006, which led to the formation of International Medical
Products Anti-counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT) as a collaborative effort
among a range of stakeholders to curb medicines counterfeiting. IMPACT
focused on major technical areas which were identified as needing action
nationally and internationally; legislative and regulatory infrastructure, regulatory
implementation, enforcement, technology development for detection of
counterfeits and technology transfer to developing countries as well as42
communication of risk and innovations/strategies aimed at curbing
counterfeiting (WHO, 2010a). What is now unique about medicines
counterfeiting when compared to what was reported prior to the 20
th Century is
the international nature and scope of the problem as well as the sophisticated
technology and strategies the counterfeiters currently use (Forzley, 2005).
1.7 The thesis structure
This research project sought to conduct a systematic review of the literature on
medicines quality in addition to validation of MAS; an anti-counterfeiting
intervention and exploring stakeholder perspectives on issues relating to quality
of medicines distributed in Nigeria. The main sections of the thesis are the
Introduction, Methodology, Results, Discussion and Recommendations for
future research and Conclusion. The results section was divided into two
chapters in order to give a clearer understanding of the results arising from the
different phases of this research. Figure 2 illustrates how the thesis is
structured.43
Figure 2: The thesis structure
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1.8 Conclusion
This chapter presents a background to the research by describing the context in
which the research was carried out, giving an overview of the health system of
Nigeria as well as drug supply, distribution and regulation in Nigeria.
Inefficiencies such as availability of poor quality medicines are also discussed.
In order to systematically examine the extent and impact of the use of poor
quality medicines in Nigeria as well as the strategies in place to tackle the
problem and to provide a focus for the research, a systematic review of the
literature was conducted. The details of the literature are formally presented in
Chapter 2.45
Chapter 2
Review of the literature
2.1 Introduction to chapter
A systematic review of the literature was necessary in order to find out what has
been done in the field of medicines quality and how the present research can
add to the existing body of knowledge. The review was continually updated
throughout the data collection, data analysis and synthesis phases of the study.
This chapter of the thesis starts by stating the objectives of the literature review.
It goes ahead to describe the procedure for the review. This is followed by a
discussion of the results obtained from the literature review based on the
literature review objectives. The limitations of the review and future areas of
research identified were also presented. At the end of review, the objectives
and rationale for conducting the research as well as the research approach
were presented.
The literature review aimed at identifying the extent of medicines counterfeiting
and poor quality medicines in Nigeria and other low-income countries such as
other sub-Saharan countries that may be facing similar developmental
challenges as Nigeria. This review did not explore in details the extent of
counterfeiting in developed regions such as Europe and the United States of
America. However, the worldwide impact and strategies in place to combat this
public health threat were reviewed.
2.2 Objectives of the systematic literature review
The objectives of the literature review were to identify;
i) The extent of poor quality medicine
ii) The impact of poor quality medicine46
iii) The strategies in place to curb the existence of poor quality medicine
iv) The barriers hindering the fight against poor quality medicines and
v) Existing evaluation of interventions against poor quality medicines.
Publications that described the extent and impact of poor quality (counterfeit
and substandard) medicines in Nigeria and other parts of the world as well as
strategies in place to combat medicines counterfeiting and the problem of poor
quality medicines as a whole were searched for in order to determine what has
been done in these areas.
2.3 Methods
2.3.1 Search strategy
In order to obtain the articles relevant to meeting the review objectives, an
electronic, English language search of PUBMED and EMBASE databases were
carried out. Entering the key words; substandard and drug and Nigeria yielded
7 relevant articles; Onwujekwe et al. (2009), Taylor et al. (2001), Verduin-
Mutiganzi and Verduin-Mutiganzi, (1998), Garuba et al. (2009) and Bate and
Hess et al. (2010), Osadebe and Akabogu (2003) and Shakoor et al. (1997)
which provided links to 15 other relevant studies.
A bibliographical search of Onwujekwe et al. (2009) retrieved Atemnkeng
(2007), Amin et al. (2005), Amin and Kokwaro (2007), Basco (2004), Bate et al.
(2008), Kaur et al. (2008), Newton et al. (2006a) and Wondemagegnehu (1999)
while bibliographical search of Shakoor et al. (1997) yielded Ifudu (1989) (the
first systematic study conducted to examine the quality of drugs on sale in
Nigerian street markets), OgohAlubo (1994), Okuonghae et al. (1992), Roy
(1994), Abdi et al. (1995), Sowunmi et al. (1994) and Hanif et al. (1995). WHO
(2011) was retrieved in Geneva when the researcher attended the WHO47
advanced technical briefing seminar on quality assurance and safety of
medicines at the WHO headquarters in Geneva. It was from this study that
Hebron et al. (2005) was obtained. Minzi et al. (2003) was obtained from the
citation in Hebron et al. (2005).
When the key words; counterfeit or substandard or poor quality and drug or
medicine and Nigeria were combined in PUBMED; 10,744 articles were
retrieved. However, no new relevant articles were retrieved. No new articles
were retrieved when the terms pharmaceuticals, pharmaceutical products or
medical products were used in PUBMED instead of drug or medicine. A repeat
of the search in EMBASE by entering the same keywords as in PUBMED
yielded all the articles obtained through PUBMED in addition to 2 other studies;
Nnamdi et al. (2009) and Eichie et al. (2009). One article Erhun et al. (2001)
was retrieved from Eichie et al. (2009). One of the studies; Shakoor et al.
(1997) was reported twice (See appendix 3) as the study was carried out for
Nigeria and for Thailand. Searches were unlimited for all the databases
searched. A bibliographical review was done for the studies retrieved from
EMBASE. Relevant articles were seen; however, most of them were already
retrieved from PUBMED. A search of an article Arya (1995) which was
retrieved from PUBMED, provided a link to a review; Kelesidis et al. (2007);
from which the citation; Okeke et al. (1995), Newton et al. (2001), Kayumba et
al. (2004), Nazerali and Hogerzeil (1998) and Kenyon et al. (1999) were
obtained. One of the articles (Odeniyi et al., 2003) was retrieved from the
citation of Deisingh, (2005).
The key words counterfeit and medicines were combined with names of 45
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa; Tipke et al. (2009) was retrieved when
combined with Ghana. A study, Idowu et al. (2006) cited in Amin and Kokwaro,
(2007) was excluded from the study, as there were no details on the analysis
performed on the chloroquine samples. In all 46 articles that were relevant in48
determining the extent of poor quality medicines in Nigeria and related countries
were obtained (these are summarised in Appendix 3).
Further searches were conducted by combining the key words such as extent or
scope and drug quality or substandard or counterfeit and
drug/drug*/medicine/medicine* and Nigeria. However, this did not help to
retrieve any more relevant articles. Key questions were also entered in the
Google search engine in order to retrieve relevant articles. In doing this, a lot of
news articles and other grey literature were obtained rather than peer reviewed
studies or articles. A few of the articles that were already seen in PUBMED
reoccurred when searches were conducted in the Google search engine.
A search of the term counterfeit medicines in the WHO regional library data
database for the Western Pacific retrieved WHO, (1999a) and WHO, (1999b),
when the same key words were entered into other regional databases such as
South East Regional Office (SEARO) and African Regional Office (AFRO); no
relevant article could be retrieved. A repeat of the search by entering the same
key words and searching all WHO sites yielded nineteen other relevant articles;
WHO, (2003) and WHO, (2010a), WHO, (2010b), WHO, (2010c), WHO,
(2010d), WHO, (2010e), WHO, (2010f), WHO, (2010g), WHO, (2006a), WHO,
(2006b), WHO, (2006c), WHO, (1998), WHO, (1995), WHO, (2008), WHO,
(1997), WHO, (2005), World Health Organisation (2003), World Health
Organisation (1999a) and World Health Organisation (1999b).
No study on the extent or impact of poor quality medicines could be retrieved
from NAFDAC official website when it was visited. However, other articles
related to poor quality medicines in Nigeria and current initiatives were
obtained. One of the articles (Akunyili, 2006a) obtained from a Google search
made reference to studies by NAFDAC at baseline in 2001 (Nnani et al., 2001)
to determine the extent of unregistered and unauthorised medicine use with49
repeat studies conducted in 2003 and 2004 as well as reference to another
study by NAFDAC in collaboration with WHO and DFID. However, the studies
referred to could not be retrieved directly from the databases searched, as the
full citation details were not provided. NAFDAC and DFID were both contacted
directly via e-mail in order to retrieve these studies or get more information
regarding them. However, the stated studies could not be retrieved from both
sources.
A further search of the following terms; anticounterfeiting and pharmaceuticals
on the International Bibliography of Social Sciences (IBSS) database retrieved
two relevant articles; Lybecker, (2007) and Lybecker, (2008) which focused on
extent, impact and strategies in combating medicines counterfeiting. The use of
the key words used in PUBMED in IBSS and the Web of Knowledge could not
retrieve any more relevant article.
Due to the key strategies instituted under the leadership of Akunyili, a search
was made via Google and Google scholar to retrieve any of her relevant
articles; this retrieved Akunyili (2003), Akunyili (2004), Akunyili (2005a), Akunyili
(2006a), Akunyili (2006b) and Akunyili (2007). When the phrase “quality of
metformin tablets in Nigeria” was put into the Google search engine, one article
Osadebe and Akabogu (2003) was retrieved. NAFDAC website was visited to
retrieve NAFDAC (2010a) and NAFDAC (2010b). The International
Pharmaceutical Students’ Federation (IPSF) site was visited and information on
the Anti-counterfeit Drug Campaign organised by IPSF was retrieved (IPSF,
2007). International Pharmaceutical Federation (FIP) website was visited and
this yielded FIP, (2010a), FIP (2010b) and FIP (2010c). FIP (2010b) provided
link to the European Directorate for Quality of Medicines and Health Care
(EDQM) website, from which EDQM, (2010) was obtained. The European
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) website was
visited; from which EFPIA (2010) was retrieved. The Food and Drug50
Administration (FDA) website was visited; from which FDA (2009) was retrieved
as it contained relevant information on strategies employed by the FDA.
Furthermore, the websites of different pharmaceutical companies were visited
(Pfizer, Glaxo, GSK, AstraZeneca, Johnson and Johnson, Eli Lilly, Abbott,
Merck, Aventis, Novartis, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Wyeth and Roche); most of the
information available was vague rather than empirical as they lacked adequate
methodology. Except for Bristol-Myers Squibb, some information were retrieved
on strategies the other firms have employed in curbing medicines counterfeiting
(see Appendix 3).
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-counterfeiting strategies, a search
on IBSS using the key words anti-counterfeiting and pharmaceuticals revealed
two relevant articles; Lybecker, 2007 and Currais et al. (2008) which developed
an economic model to evaluate some of the anti-counterfeiting strategies
geared towards curbing medicines counterfeiting. When the question; mobile
phones for detection of counterfeit or fake medicines was entered into
EMBASE; an article; Abdoulaye et al. (2006a) was retrieved. Combination of
keywords such as counterfeit, substandard, poor quality, medicines or drugs or
pharmaceuticals and barriers or strategies in PUBMED, EMBASE and IBSS
could not retrieve any more relevant articles.
Contact was made with some organisations to retrieve materials that were
identified during the search and thought would be helpful. For instance African
Matters Limited (AML) was contacted for the proceedings of the counterfeit
medicines workshop in the East African Countries (EAC) but this could not be
retrieved. Proof of concept result, one page overview of MAS, brochure and the
Biofem case study report on MAS were obtained from Sproxil.51
2.4 Objective 1: Extent of poor quality medicines in
Nigeria
2.4.1 Size of the problem of poor quality medicines in Nigeria
Out of all the quantitative field studies retrieved from the search of the literature,
Sixteen of them were conducted specifically to determine the proportion of
collected samples which did not meet pharmacopeial criteria in order to
ascertain the incidence of poor quality medicine in Nigeria; Taylor et al. (2001),
Shakoor et al. (1997), Bate at al. (2009a), Eichie et al. (2009), Nnamdi et al.
(2009), Onwujekwe et al. (2009), Odeniyi et al. (2003), Sowunmi et al. (1994),
Babalola et al. (2004), Okeke and Lamikanra, (1995), Odunfa et al. (2009),
Osadebe and Akabogu, (2003), Esimone at al. (2008), Ifudu, (1989), Ofonaike
et al. (2007) and WHO (2011). None of the studies identified clearly
distinguished between counterfeit and substandard medicines.
In trying to describe the extent of medicines counterfeiting as one category of
poor quality medicines, it is important to note that the majority of the evidence
available is anecdotal. This is probably due to either the limited number of peer
reviewed studies conducted to estimate the scale or concealment of the
problem by some legitimate manufacturers in order to avoid adversely affecting
their reputation and public trust in medicines (Shakoor et al., 1997). Much of
the information on the quality of medicines is published in the grey literature
such as in newspapers and Internet articles instead of in the scientific literature,
suggesting significant under reporting or a lack of properly designed studies.
Studies aimed at determining the extent of poor quality medicines where
available are often limited to a few drug classes and test for a narrow set of
problems such as antimalarials and antibiotics as can be seen from Appendix 3.
Thirty-one of the studies included anti-malarials, six of the studies involved anti-
bacteriaes while four involved anti-tuberculosis drugs. Only a few of the studies
involved a relatively wider range of therapeutic classes; Taylor et al. (2001)52
sampled anti-malarials, anti-bacteriaes, anti-tuberculosis, antifungal and
anthelminthic drugs. Bate at al. (2009a) and Bate et al. (2009b) sampled anti-
malarial, antibacterial, and anti-tuberculosis, Wondemagegnehu (1999)
sampled antimalarials, anti-bacteriaes, anti-tuberculosis drugs, and analgesics
in addition to other medicines such as diazepam, cimetidine, ranitidine,
multivitamin/ vitamin B, prednisolone and salbutamol. One study; Osadebe and
Akabogu (2004) assessed the quality control parameters and interchangeability
of different brands of metformin hydrochloride marketed in Nigeria. Ifudu (1989)
sampled purgatives, benzodiazepines, antipsychotics, multivitamin/vitamin B
and some haemopoetic medicines. Eichie et al. (2009) and Ofonaike (2007)
were the only two studies that involved solely analgesics.
The majority of studies conducted in developing countries in order to determine
the prevalence of medicines counterfeiting show that about half of the drugs
tested were substandard. In one study conducted as part of the Juniper
operation by INTERPOL anti-counterfeiting taskforce, it was found that about
half (195) samples out of a total of 391 samples of anti-malarial drugs collected
from different regions of South East Asia (Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao PDR,
Myanmar (Burma) and the Thai/Myanmar border contained no or small
quantities of artesunate. Some of the medicines contained banned
pharmaceuticals, such as metamizole, and Safrole, a carcinogen and raw
material for the manufacture of methylenedioxymethamfetamine (ecstasy)
(Newton et al., 2008). Fake Viagra tablets made by combining ingredients in a
cement mixer have been found in Egypt (NST online, 2007 cited in Millisa
McGinnis, 2010).
Studies conducted in selected African countries (Ghana, Kenya, Mali,
Mozambique, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Congo, Burundi,
Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, and Burkinafaso) seemed to have similar
findings. Previous studies in Kenya by Kibwage et al. (1992) and Roy, (1994)
revealed that about 46% and 31% respectively of different drug samples53
obtained from Kenya were substandard while more recent studies show that
about 40% of medicines sampled from Kenya failed quality tests Amin et al.
(2005).
Another study carried out to determine the prevalence of substandard drugs
include the study by Atemnkeng et al. (2006), which showed that about 37.5%
of antimalarials (artemisinin derivatives) randomly collected from pharmacies in
Peoples’ Republic of Congo and Kenya failed quality tests for active ingredients.
Other studies aimed at determining the prevalence of poor quality medicines
have also been conducted in other countries such as India (see Appendix 3).
These studies clearly show that poor quality medicines are prevalent in Africa;
with almost half of the samples collected in this region being shown to fail the
necessary tests. High failure rates were also obtained from samples from
Thailand, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Viet Nam and Cambodia. While samples from
India showed relatively lower failure rate compared to other parts of Asia.
Pharmaceutical Security Institute (PSI) found that about 7% of the medicines
marketed in the Philippines were counterfeits (Ham, 2003).
This finding is similar to the studies on the extent of poor quality medicines in
Nigeria, which ranged from about 32% to 48% in the majority of the studies.
The study by Bate et al. (2009a) showed a smaller proportion (18%) that failed
the standard tests. Even so; 18% is unacceptable, as the dangers that may
result from it cannot be under estimated. This reduction observed from Bate et
al. (2009a) may have been due to the methodology used to determine the
chemical constituent of the medicines or the small sample size (140 treatment
packs). A repeat study by Bate and Hess (2010) showed that overall failure
rates in Lagos had fallen from about 32% observed in 2007 to about 13% in
2010. However, this finding may have been due to the small sample sizes
involved (22 samples in 2007 and 94 samples in 2010) and therefore may not54
be conclusive without larger studies conducted to confirm such observations. A
more recent study; WHO, (2011) shows that Nigeria had the highest number
(63.9%) of failing antimalarial samples. Again the small sample size used in
this study may have limited its findings.
A study by Taylor et al. (2001) which showed that 48% of randomly sampled
drugs (antibiotics and antiparasitics) from Nigeria failed to comply with set
pharmacopeia standards seemed to be the first to employ random sampling and
tried to appropriately describe the methods used (Newton et al., 2006a). Other
studies on drug quality determination which have employed random sampling in
order to reduce bias include Amin and Snow (2005) and a study which was
conducted in Laos (unpublished work cited in Newton et al., 2008).
A review; Kelesidis et al. (2007) showed that counterfeit and substandard forms
of anti-malarials and antibiotics have been found in Nigeria (see table 2 below).
This does not necessarily mean that counterfeit forms of other drugs not
mentioned here do not exist in Nigeria, as there is a probability that they may
not have been sampled for testing.
Table 2: Counterfeit and substandard form of medicines that have been
found in Nigeria
Drug class Examples
Antimalarials artemisinin derivatives: dihydroartemisinin and
artemether-lumefantrine),
Others: Chloroquine, Sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine, Quinine
sulphate and Halofantrine
Antibiotics Penicillins: Ampicillin, Ampicillin-clavulanate, Ampicillin-
cloxacillin, Amoxicillin, Cloxacillin)
Macrolides: Erythromycin
Sulphonamides (Cotrimoxazole, Sulphamethizole),
Quinolones (Ciprofloxacin),
Aminoglycosides: Gentamycin and Neomycin
Others: Chloramphenicol, Tetracycline, Metronidazole
Adapted from Kelesidis et al. (2007)55
Medicines from all therapeutic classes can be counterfeited (Cockburn et al.,
2005). This is further illustrated by the recent drug seizures by INTERPOL in
Asia and Egypt, which found counterfeits in almost all drug classes (WHO,
2010b). However, the majority of counterfeited medicines in developing
countries such as Nigeria are life saving medicines such as antibiotics, anti-
malarials and anti-infectives (Bate et al., 2009a).
Furthermore, contrary to expectations, it may not always be the most expensive
drugs that are counterfeited; economies of scale may make counterfeiting even
the cheapest drug attractive. This is shown from the results of Ofonaike et al.
(2007) where relatively inexpensive medicines such as paracetamol and
chloroquine were found to be of poor quality and Tipke et al. (2009) where
chloroquine samples formed a significant proportion of samples that were of
poor quality. It may also have been that failures observed in these studies were
due to poor quality control on the part of genuine manufacturers.
Figure 3 shows the different therapeutic classes of counterfeit medicines that
have been reported according to WHO.56
Figure 3: Therapeutic classes of counterfeit medicines that have been
reported. Adapted from Harris et al. (2009).
From the results of the studies reviewed, it seems that the WHO’s estimate of
about 10% of the global Pharmaceutical commerce being counterfeit may be
reasonable. A survey by the WHO of the quality of anti-malarials in seven
African countries (Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Sudan, and
Zimbabwe) revealed that a significant proportion of the chloroquine and
sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine tablets sampled failed quality testing (content of
active ingredient and dissolution testing). About 20% to 67% of the chloroquine
tablets and 5-28% of the sulphadoxine/pyrimethamine failed test for active
ingredient (Maponga and Ondari, 2003).57
Between 1991 and 1993, 519 samples were collected from private, public and
non-governmental drug outlets and illegal markets in three African countries by
the WHO; 429 of the samples were tested in independent laboratories; out of
which 77 (18%) were discovered to be substandard (WHO 1995 cited in WHO,
1999b). Sixteen of the samples that failed quality tests did not contain any
active ingredient, and were therefore deemed counterfeit (WHO 1995 cited in
WHO, 1999b). About 20% of medicines sampled from Cameroon were found to
be substandard (Taylor and Craig, 2009)
The WHO started collecting data on medicines counterfeiting in 1982; most of
which were from developing countries (Forzely, 2005). Between 1984-1999,
the WHO received about 771 reports of medicines counterfeiting from different
countries; 78% of these were from developing countries. Figure 4 shows the
geographic origin of reports of counterfeited drugs received between 1984 and
1999 by WHO region. From January 1999 to October 2002, 46 confidential
reports were received from 20 different countries; 60% from developing
countries and 40% from developed countries (Akunyili, 2003). Almost a third of
reported counterfeited medicines did not contain active ingredients. About
20.2% had incorrect quantities of active ingredients, 21.4% included wrong
ingredients, 15.6% had the correct quantities of active ingredients but with fake
packaging, 1% was copy of the original and 8.5% contained high levels of
impurities and contaminants (Patel, 2006). Comparing the trend in reports
between 1984 and 1999 with that between 1999 and 2002 reveals that although
the problem of poor quality medicines is prevalent in developing countries, there
has also been an increase in counterfeiting in the developed countries
(Association of International Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 2007 cited in
Lybecker, 2008). It must be noted that the information contained in the WHO
database may not be completely accurate as it may contain some reports that
have not been validated (Ham, 2003).58
Figure 4: Geographic origin of reports of counterfeited drugs by WHO
region between 1982 and 1999 adapted from Ham, (2003)
PARO: Pan American Regional Office; AFRO: African Regional Office; WPRO: West Pacific Regional
Office; SEARO: South East Asian Regional Office; EURO: European Regional Office; EMRO: East
Mediterranean Regional Office; Dev: Developing; Ind: Industrialised.
Nigeria has been stated to be the second largest producer of counterfeit
medicines, accounting for about 23% of counterfeit medicines distributed
worldwide after India, which is thought to account for about 35%; and Pakistan,
13.3% (Datta, 2003 cited in Lybecker, 2004). Medicines counterfeiting is now
very similar to the worldwide narcotic trade in that in majority of the cases, the
raw materials are obtained from one country, formulated into tablets or capsules
in another country, packaged in a different country and then shipped through
several countries before arriving at its final destination (Lybecker, 2007). An
example is the report from The Partnership for Safe Medicines where Spanish
Police discovered that counterfeit medicines from Mexico, Brazil and Thailand59
were being exported to Spain and then sold in Italy, France and Portugal
(Taylor and Craig, 2009).
Profits from medicines counterfeiting may equate to and may even supersede
that of the narcotics trade, yet it is subject to lesser penalties in some countries
(Lybecker, 2004). For instance, one gram of cocaine may be valued at one
hundred US dollars ($100) while some counterfeited medicines may sell for up
to $3,000 per gram (Kontnik, 2003). Aside from the personal monetary gains
that may be obtained from medicines counterfeiting, there is some evidence
that funds raised from such crime may be used to sponsor terrorism or be linked
to some form of social disruption (Kontnik, 2003 and Millar, 2002, O’Mathuna
and McAuley, 2005, Clark, 2008, Harper, 2008 cited in Taylor and Craig, 2009).
The WHO, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and the Pharmaceutical Security Institute (PSI) estimates that about
30% of medicines in some parts of Latin America, South East Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa are fake; it can even be as high as 50% in some of these
countries while in many of the former Soviet republics it can be as high at 20%.
About 10% of drugs in emerging economies may be counterfeit while in wealthy
countries, it may account for less than 1% of the market value (WHO, 2010a).
About half of medicines illegally sold through the Internet may be counterfeit
(WHO, 2006a). These are usually a threat to people who look for cheaper,
stigmatized or unauthorised treatments (WHO, 2006b).
Although these estimates and findings may not accurately represent the
situation in all countries, they are indicative of an unsatisfactory and potentially
hazardous situation. Figures 5 and 6 seem to show an increased incidence of
medicines counterfeiting. However, this increase may have been due to60
improved data collection and reporting, greater law enforcement and increased
awareness (PSI, 2010). Also the increase seen in Figure 5 may have been
confounded by increase in reports of cases of illegal diversion and theft.
However, they show that national measures and co-operation between
pharmaceutical companies and governments have not been able to tackle the
growing problem of medicines counterfeiting. As a result of this failure, the
need for an international framework convention in response to the problem was
recognised. This led to the formation of International Medical Products Anti-
Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT) in 2006 (Forzley 2006).
Figure 5: Annual data collected by PSI on counterfeiting, illegal diversion
and theft incidents for eight consecutive years. Adapted from PSI, (2010)
and PSI, (2014)61
Figure 6: Counterfeit drug cases opened by the USFDA/year. Adapted
from Patel, (2006)
Figure 5 shows the number of pharmaceutical crime incidents (cases of
medicines counterfeiting, illegal diversion or pharmaceutical theft) from different
countries in 7 regions of the world (Asia, Europe, Latin America, North America,
Eurasia, Africa and Near East) documented by PSI. It shows a steady increase
from 2002 to 2010. More recent data from PSI indicate that there was an
increase in the documented pharmaceutical crime incidents in 2012 and more
significant increase in 2013 when compared to year 2012 (PSI, 2014). Figure 6
shows the number of counterfeit drug cases opened by the United States Food
and Drug Administration’s (USFDA) office of criminal investigation per fiscal
year. It shows a steady increase in medicines counterfeiting from 2001 to 2004.
More recent data from USFDA also show that the number of counterfeit drug
cases increased significantly again in 2009 (Bernstein, 2012).
2.4.2 Source of poor quality medicines
Three of the studies obtained from the literature review; Onwujekwe et al.
(2009), Tipke et al. (2001) and Lon et al. (2006) discussed possible sources of
poor quality medicines. These studies showed that drugs found in places such
as the streets and open markets may be of lower quality since they are often62
not well regulated. For instance patent medicine vendors accounted for 78% of
suspect medicines in Onwujekwe et al. (2009) and 90% of medicines found to
be substandard in Tipke et al. (2009) were obtained from illicit outlets (market,
street vendors and shops). Similarly, a large proportion (100 out of 122) of
samples that failed quality tests in Lon et al. (2006) were obtained from illegal or
unlicensed outlets.
The National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC)
reported in 2006 that the incidence of counterfeit medicines had been reduced
to about 16.7% from previous values of as much as 70% (Taylor and Craig,
2009). However, this figure is believed to have been made worse by the
increased incidence of about 40% at the open drug market located in Onitsha,
popularly known as head bridge market (Pharmaceutical Society of Nigeria
(PSN), 2007, Okoye, 2007 cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010). Other open drug
markets in Nigeria which may have contributed to the high prevalence of
substandard and counterfeit medicines include Ariaria market (alleged in 2002
to have about 75% of drugs in stock as fake), Sabon Gari market, Kano (survey
by NAFDAC showed about 90% of drugs in this market are unregistered) and
Idumota market, Lagos (PSN, 2007). This raises a question of whether Nigeria
should devote more efforts in curbing counterfeiting in areas perceived to have
ah i g h e rp r e v a l e n c e .
The trend of medicines counterfeiting seems to vary between different regions.
In Europe and the United States of America as well as other developed
countries, the target of the counterfeiters seems to be on the Internet due to
increased access to the Internet in these countries. It is estimated that about
44% to 90% of medicines sold over the internet are counterfeit (Jackson et al.,
2010). However, this is common for drugs purchased from Internet sites that
conceal their physical address (IMPACT, 2008). The majority of the most
commonly counterfeited medicines in these countries are lifestyle medications.
It has been estimated that 2.5 million men in Europe are exposed to illicit63
sildenafil; suggesting that the number of legal and illegal users of sildenafil may
be equal (Jackson et al., 2010). WHO, (2010b) made mention of a Dutch study
cited in the International Journal of Clinical Practice which showed that only 10
out of 370 seized Viagra® samples were genuine. Recently, it was discovered
that counterfeit life saving prescription medicines such as drugs for cancer and
cardiovascular diseases are also available over the Internet (WHO, 2010b).
2.5 Limitations of the studies on extent of poor quality
medicines
Most of the studies had an unclear or inadequate methodology, which may have
led to unreliable conclusions. The inability to distinguish between counterfeit,
substandard and degraded medicines in the articles included in this review has
made it difficult to ascertain the extent of either of the problems. The
differences in methodology, lack of uniformity in reporting of findings as well as
incompleteness or limited scope of methodologies employed in these studies
make comparisons between them difficult. This calls for a standardised method
of reporting of results from drug quality studies as proposed by Newton et al.
(2009). Small sample size and range of products sampled may have resulted in
lower or higher number of products failing quality tests in some of the studies.
Most of the studies did not include paediatric formulations contrary to the WHO
recommendations for field sampling (WHO, 1999a).
Most of the studies collected samples from specific regions and majority of them
employed convenient sampling, which may have contributed some bias to the
findings of the studies. Also, majority of the studies focused on therapeutic drug
classes which they anticipated where most likely to be of poor quality for
instance anti-malarials and anti-infectives.64
Furthermore, the majority of the studies merely involved collection of samples
and testing them without a further investigation of whether the manufacturers
stated on the products were actually genuine or existing and if they were
produced by genuine manufacturers; a step recommended by WHO as being
important in determining which of the products were counterfeit rather than
substandard (WHO, 1999b). None of the studies aimed at determining the
extent of poor quality medicines determined the proportion of counterfeit or
substandard medicines emanating from each outlet. This is important as it may
reveal whether the problem of counterfeiting is localised or peculiar to certain
outlets and help to better channel the effort in curbing the problem by ceiling up
the outlets involved and further investigating where such retailers obtain their
medicines.
These limitations highlight the need for more research which employing well
designed random sampling technique and possibly involving pollen analysis and
forensic analysis in order to determine the source of raw materials or location of
drug manufacture as well as the real extent of counterfeiting (Newton et al.,
2008).
2.6 Objective 2: Impact of poor quality medicines
There are no reliable data on the mortality and morbidity arising from the use of
poor quality pharmaceutical products in Nigeria and other developing countries.
The effects go unnoticed except when it causes easily observable tragedies
(Erhun et al., 2001). When data on extent and impact of counterfeiting are
available, they are often limited as only 5-15% of the 191 WHO member states
report cases of counterfeiting and generalisations made from such reports may
not be accurate (Newton et al., 2010).
2.6.1 Economic consequences for industries
Five articles; Morris and Stevens, (2006), Beach, (2001), Naik, (2004), Business
call to action, (2012) and Lybecker, (2007) retrieved from the literature review65
discussed the economic consequences of medicines counterfeiting to
pharmaceutical industries. Only 2 of these; Beach (2001) and Lybecker, (2007)
were journal articles. The other 3 were web articles.
Medicines counterfeiting undermines the ability of Research and Development
(R&D) based companies to invest in future innovation (Morris and Stevens,
2006). It also negatively affects the R&D companies by reducing their sales; for
example Beach (2001) showed that circulation of counterfeit copies of a product
of an international pharmaceutical company in China caused a drop in their
annual sales to $242,000. However, after the counterfeiting was controlled,
sales rose to $1.2 million. In Nigeria, sales volume for Panadol
® and Glaxo's
antimalarial halofantrine (Halfan
®) doubled in 2002 compared with 2001 when
medicines counterfeiting was considered to be more prevalent (Naik, 2004). It
is also believed that following the introduction of the Mobile Authentication
Service (MAS) on Glucophage® which is marketed by Biofem in Nigeria, Biofem
has been able to regain its market and therefore experienced increased sales
resulting from the possible reduction in the counterfeiting of Glucophage®
(Business call to action, 2012).
Genuine medicine suppliers are greatly affected by this menace as it has been
shown that consumers have a particular preference for these counterfeited
medicines because they are relatively cheaper leading to lower patronage of
genuine medicines (Rozendaal, 2001 cited in Lybecker, 2007). In addition,
counterfeiting also causes serious harm to the reputation of the genuine
pharmaceutical manufacturers and makes them liable to any harm that may
result from consumers taking such products. It also increases the expenditure
of the legitimate manufacturers, as they have to constantly develop new
strategies to thwart counterfeiting.66
2.6.2 Economic consequences to consumers
Three articles; Seiter, (2009), Willyard, (2010) and IMPACT, (2009) retrieved
from the literature review discussed the economic impact medicines
counterfeiting can have on consumers.
Seiter (2009) tried to quantitatively assess the cost of ineffective anti-malarials.
From previous estimates, he estimated that in a country of about 20 million
people, there might be 4 million anti-malarial treatments. Among these, there
may be an estimated 800,000 cases treated with poor quality anti-malarials
resulting in up to 4,000 childhood deaths. From his calculations an average
worker spends about half a day working to pay for these ineffective drugs. In
total, about 3.2 million working days is spent working to obtain money for these
illicit medicines. One can therefore imagine the indirect financial losses of fake
drugs that far exceed their face monetary value.
The calculations and estimates by Seiter, (2009) may be lower than the real
costs of these medicines as they do not take into consideration the possibility
that one patient can be treated on multiple occasions per year for malaria and
the chances of treating the individual with an ineffective medicine are the same
each time treatment is received (Willyard, 2010). There is therefore no doubt
that patients who buy these illicit drugs waste money which can be equated to
several days’ wages considering the low socio-economic status of patients in
such resource poor countries as Nigeria where about 34.1% of the population
live below the poverty line (Seiter, 2009 and UN Human Development Report,
2008 cited in IMPACT, (2009).
2.6.3 Economic consequences on national economies
Five articles from the literature review discussed the economic impact
medicines counterfeiting may have on national economies. These were Fenoff
and Wilson, (2009), Akunyili, (2005a), Lybecker (2007), Wertheimer and Norris,
(2009) and Seiter, (2009).67
Medicines counterfeiting can be detrimental to national economies. This is
because genuine manufacturers compete with illegal manufacturers who do not
pay any import duties and sales tax on the drugs they sell (Fenoff and Wilson,
2009). In addition to this, medicines counterfeiting reduces public trust in
indigenous manufacturing companies and health-care providers as a whole. In
developing countries, this may lead to importation of costlier branded medicines
that the patients consider to be more effective (Seiter, 2009).
Also, through such avenues as parallel importation, counterfeiting may affect
other markets such as the US market (Lybecker, 2007). It also hampers trade
relations between countries as it may result in trade restrictions. An example is
the ban of sale of ‘Made in Nigeria’ pharmaceutical products which were sold in
neighbouring countries before 2001; a time when Nigeria seemed to be well
known for medicines counterfeiting (Fenoff and Wilson, 2009). Between 2001
and 2005, 30 Indian and Chinese pharmaceutical companies and one Pakistani
company that were confirmed to be manufacturing counterfeit drugs were
banned from exporting drugs to Nigeria (Akunyili, 2005a). Counterfeiting
therefore repels foreign investment in the countries concerned, reduces profits
for developing countries by reducing incentives for further research in such
countries, and diverts resources for genuine treatment (Lybecker, 2007).
2.6.4 Health Risks of poor quality medicines
Roy (1994); Abdi et al. (1995); Arya (1995); Kron (1996) focused on treatment
failure as a consequence of poor quality medicines use while seven other
articles; Milan (1987); Pandya (1988); Masland and Marshall (1990); Silverman
et al. (1990), Okuonghae et al. (1992), OgohAlubo (1994) and Hanif et al.
(1995) showed that consumption of poor quality drugs could result in serious
damage to the patients health or even death. Majority of the information in this
area were from grey literature or web articles.68
2.6.4.1 Death as a consequence of poor quality medicines
It is a difficult task to trace illness and death to counterfeit or substandard
medicines. However, evidence show that poor quality medicines pose
significant threats to consumers as they cause adverse reactions, lack of
successful treatment and possibly death as can be shown from previous
incidents in some developing countries (Nsimba, 2008). In 1990, 100 children
in Nigeria were speculated to have died following the ingestion of a cough
mixture that was diluted with a poisonous solvent, diethylene glycol (DEG)
(Deisingh, 2005). Eighty-four more children were said to have died in Nigeria
between late 2008 and early 2009 due to the consumption of diethylene glycol-
contaminated teething medicine “My Pikin Baby Teething Mixture”, distributed
by Barewa Pharmaceuticals; a company licensed by NAFDAC (Polgreen, 2009,
Eboh, 2008, Harris, 2008, Mbachu, 2009 cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010). This
event is similar to the 109 cases of acute renal failure among children in Haiti,
which was associated with an epidemic of severe systemic effect from DEG
contaminated paracetamol syrup (O’Brien et al., 1998). In Bangladesh,
Paracetamol elixirs that were found to contain DEG were associated with an
outbreak of fatal renal failure between 1990 and 1992 (Hanif et al., 1995). In
2006, about 200 patients died in Panama due to the manufacture of medicines
with counterfeit glycerine (Seiter, 2009).
Another catastrophic example is the death of about 2,500 people resulting from
the consumption by about 60,000 people of vaccines donated by Nigeria to
Niger during a meningitis epidemic which were later found not to contain any
active ingredient (Fenoff and Wilson, 2009). Other incidents that have been
attributed to the use of poor quality medicines include the report from three
Nigerian hospitals of cases of adverse reactions from the use of infusions that
were contaminated with microorganisms. Also, 147 out of the 149 water for
injections analysed from these hospitals were found to be unsterile (Akunyili,
2006a). Three children in Nigeria were reported to have died as a result of fake
adrenaline (Akunyili, 2007). It is also estimated that about 80,000 children may
have been given fraudulent meningitis vaccines (Knox, 2003 cited in Lybecker,69
2004). Other countries that have experienced similar catastrophic incidents
include the United States of America, South Africa, Spain, Austria, India, Haiti,
Argentina and China.
In 1998, about 200 unwanted pregnancies were reported in Brazil due to the
use of counterfeit contraceptive tablets (Pecoul et al., 1999). In January, 2009,
China’s state run news agency; Xinhua revealed that a counterfeit diabetes
drug that contained about 6 times the required amount of active ingredient
(glibenclamide) was responsible for the death of 2 people in China and about 7
people were thought to be hospitalised in XinJiang as a result of this (Mooney,
2010, WHO, 2010a). It was estimated by a Chinese government controlled
newspaper; Shenzhen Evening News of January 25, 2002 that about 192,000
people died in China in 2001 as a result of fake drugs (Goodman, 2002 cited in
Lybecker, 2007). Although it has been argued that the figure quoted in the
Chinese newspaper does not refer only to fake drugs as the sole cause of
mortality rather it represents the number of deaths arising from drug-induced
diseases due to irrational drug use (Cockburn et al., 2007); it still shows that
there is a high risk associated with medicines.
The World Health Organisation estimates that about 20,000 malaria deaths per
year occur due to substandard medicines use and that these deaths could be
avoided if treatment was with only high quality medicines (Akehurst, 2005 cited
in Lybecker, 2007; International Council of Nurses, 2005). Although it is unclear
how WHO arrived at this number of avoidable deaths, it is obvious that using
medicines which are of good quality should help stop development of
complications and resistance thereby leading to better treatment outcomes.
Similarly, Dora Akunyili, former head of the Nigerian’s National Agency for Food
and Drug Administration and Control speculates that medicines counterfeiting
may be partly responsible for the doubling of malaria deaths over the last 20
years (Morris and Stevens, 2006). This is evidenced by the fact that 8 of the 1270
major antimalarial drugs in use have been reported to be counterfeited (Newton
et al., 2006a).
In early 2008, counterfeit medicines were thought to have caused the admission
of about 150 people into hospital in Singapore for severe hypoglycaemia. Out
of these, four died and a further seven suffered brain damage (WHO, 2010b).
Forty-five out of these 150 patients were reported to admit ingesting illegal
medicines for erectile dysfunction prior to developing hypoglycaemia. When the
samples were tested; they were found to be contaminated with glyburide with
some containing other dangerous chemicals (Kao et al., 2009). In 1999, at
least 30 people died in Cambodia as a result of counterfeit sulphadoxine-
pyrimethamine that was sold as artesunate (International Council of Nurses,
2005).
In 2005, about twelve children died after they were fed with counterfeit milk
products (Feldschreiber, 2009). The effects of counterfeit cases of Lipitor®,
Procrit®, Epogen®, Nutropin®, Neupogen®, Serostim®, Zyprexa®,
Gamimune®, Oxycontin®, Combivir® and Viagra® are not yet known (Kontnik,
2003).
2.6.4.2 Development of drug resistance
Counterfeiting can lead to drug resistance. The Netherlands Leprosy Relief and
Royal Tropical Institute states that about 305 samples of TB medicines tested in
Nigeria did not pass the tests and may have largely contributed to the
development of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) (Van der Grinten,
2000 cited in Peterson and Obileye, 2002). The WHO speculates that poor
quality medicines may have also contributed to development of resistance to
other diseases such as cholera and salmonella (Feldschreiber, 2009). The use
of counterfeit and substandard artesunate and widespread monotherapy with
artesunate has led to Plasmodium falciparum artesunate resistance on the71
Thailand-Cambodia border (Newton et al., 2010). More recently, large numbers
of fake Coartem® tablets have been found in Lagos, Nigeria and Launda,
Angola (Faucon et al., 2013). This recent finding of counterfeit forms of
artemisinin derivative in Africa is a serious cause for concern due to fear of
development of resistance to artenisinin in the highly malaria endemic Africa
(Newton et al., 2006a).
It therefore appears that until the distribution of poor quality medicines is
tackled, the efforts of new drug discovery and development will continually be
rendered futile. This also means that resistance at the population level renders
legitimate drugs less effective, even amongst patients who have not used fake
and/or poor quality medicines (Bate at al., 2009a) causing a switch to second or
third line medicines which are usually more expensive and more toxic (Centre
for Global Development, 2010).
2.6.4.3 Adverse drug reaction and treatment failure
There have been instances where the use of counterfeit medicines has been
linked to treatment failure. A typical example of therapeutic failure attributable
to poor quality medicines is the lack of response to miltefosine by Bangladeshi
patients suffering from visceral leishmaniasis. The capsules taken by the
patients were later discovered not to contain miltefosine (Senior, 2008 cited in
Newton et al., 2010).
It is an obvious fact that the impact of medicines counterfeiting especially in the
developing countries have been under reported because consumers may not
link their non response to treatment to counterfeit drugs rather they may
attribute it to other factors such as contamination of drinking water supply,
disease complication, malnutrition, failure to complete the course of treatment
or even a belief in curses or the supernatural (Lybecker, 2007). A study
sourced from PSN, (2001) cited in Wertheimer and Norris, (2009) and Peterson72
and Obileye, (2002) stated that fake and substandard drugs accounted for
12.8% of adverse drug reaction, 52.9% of drug resistance, 10% of therapeutic
failure, 48.2% of increased disease severity and 34.2% of the patients taking
such drugs may develop complications (see table 3)73
Table 3: Impact of Fake and Substandard Drugs in Nigeria
Adapted from PSN, (2001) cited in Peterson and Obileye, (2002)
The estimates quoted above are an indication that fake and substandard
medicines can lead to a variety of problems. However, the methods employed
by the PSN to arrive at these estimates are unclear so it is uncertain if vested
interest by PSN may have influenced these estimates.
From the above discussion on the impact of poor quality medicines, it is clear
that there is limited documented evidence on the actual impact of poor quality
medicines in terms of their economic and health consequences. Most of the
information presented is speculative, however it points to the fact that poor
quality medicines have serious detrimental economic and health consequences
for industries and individuals and at national levels.
Fake and Substandard drug impacts Percentage (%)
Fatality rates 12.8
Resistance to drug therapy 52.9
Therapeutic failure 10.0
Increased severity 48.2
Development of complications 34.2
Proportion of Physicians that had life threatening encounters with fake drugs 29.0
Proportion of Physicians that had life threatening encounters with fake
drugs, leading to death
9.1
Adverse drug reaction 23.6
Therapeutic response to adverse drug reaction when the source or brand
was changed
29.7
Antibiotic counterfeiting accounting for total numbers of death 21.074
2.7 Objective 3: Strategies and barriers in the fight
against poor quality medicines
2.7.1 Strategies against poor quality medicines
One of the objectives of the literature review conducted was to identify different
strategies that have been taken against medicines and any challenges or
barriers that may be hindering the fight against poor quality medicines. The
review revealed that there have been responses to medicines counterfeiting
from government bodies, drug regulatory authorities, professional organisations
and industries.
Different models/ frameworks have been developed identifying areas attention
needs to be focused to help curb medicines counterfeiting. This includes the
model by IMPACT, USFDA and the conceptual model by Bayer Schering
Pharma. Most of the responses/strategies against medicines counterfeiting by
government bodies, industries and other organisations are based on the
framework on the formation of IMPACT involving key areas that were identified
as needing action both nationally and internationally to tackle the problem of
poor quality medicines. These five key areas are; Legislative and regulatory
infrastructure, Regulatory implementation, Enforcement, Technology and
Communication (IMPACT, 2008). Similarly, the United States Food and Drug
Administration (USFDA) identified 6 critical measures to combat fake drugs
(Mehta, 2006) (See Appendix 4);
1. Securing the actual medicine and its packaging:
This includes all strategies that secure the medicines itself or its
packaging from being counterfeited for instance, the use of colour
shifting inks, holograms, finger prints and chemical markers.
2. Securing the movement of medicines through the distribution chain:75
This includes ways medicines are prevented from being counterfeited
when they are moving through the distribution chain. It includes all
strategies geared towards ensuring that the drugs are handled by the
right persons and not diverted or changed in any way.
3. Enhancing regulation and enforcement:
This involves strategies in place to ensure that medicines are well
regulated such as setting up of bodies that can regulate medicines and
monitor them when they are within the distribution chain to ensure that
they are manufactured according to the recommended procedures and
meet all the requirements set out.
4. Increasing penalties for medicines counterfeiting:
This involves putting in place penalties to ensure that those identified as
culprits are adequately punished in a way that will discourage them from
counterfeiting.
5. Increasing vigilance and awareness of medicines counterfeiting:
This involves the medicines users adopting techniques to ensure that
they are sourcing their medicines rightly. It involves adopting secure
business practices like ensuring that medicines are sourced from
legitimate outlets. It also involves educating health professionals and
consumers of the risk of medicines counterfeiting, how medicines
counterfeiting can be detected and what to do if they encounter
medicines that they think are of poor quality.
6. Increasing international collaboration:
This involves both national and international collaboration against
medicines counterfeiting. The international collaboration can be between
countries or at the regional level.76
2.7.1.1 Strategies against medicines counterfeiting by
industries
Lybecker, (2008) classified the avenues through which the pharmaceutical
industries have tackled counterfeiting into three pathways. First are the
technological changes of the products or their packaging with the aim of making
medicines counterfeiting more difficult and expensive. Secondly is ensuring
increased cooperation across the supply chain with the aim of increasing
difficulty of counterfeits entering the supply chain and indirectly increasing the
cost of counterfeit product distribution. Finally, firms can cooperate with
enforcement agencies in order to improve the chances of detection of
medicines counterfeiting and prosecution of the offenders.
As an example of technological changes on product and product packaging,
firms like Roche have used advanced technology to make their product difficult
to copy, for instance they have included an inscribed hole in their Valium
® pill
(Lybecker, 2008). GSK and Roche have also tried altering their packaging, for
instance is the inscription of Roche and GSK logo in their vials. In order to
avoid the counterfeiters re-using the vials from GSK, the company has also
applied the use of shrinkable self-adhesive labels made of Vinyl and other
colourful graphics (Goodman, 2002 and Kontnik, 1998 in Lybecker, 2008).
Pfizer capsule making division has acquired non-exclusive rights to Nano codes
containing encrypted information about their drug. This is punched to the
surface of their medicine without altering its chemical constituent (Mullard,
2010). Novartis has adopted a hidden digital marker technology that allows
customs officials to detect whether secondary packaging of a product is
authentic by placing it under an office scanner and sending the resulting image
to the security division of the company for verification (Taylor, 2010).77
GSK and Pfizer have also adopted the use of Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) in some of their products (Weithermer, 2009). GlaxoWellcome has
initiated a global anti-counterfeiting strategy for its products, which includes
monitored destruction of waste, field monitoring for counterfeits, and security
packaging (Kontnik, 2003). Abbott has a global product protection team
focusing on the use of track and trace technologies to secure its supply chain
(Abbott, 2010). Similarly, AstraZeneca conducts analysis of all suspect
counterfeits of their brand and addresses any medicines counterfeiting related
issues through its global issues management team (AstraZeneca, 2010).
Both Johnson and Johnson (J&J) and Abbot have employed supply restrictions
to make wholesalers buy their products directly from the company rather than
from other sources that are usually prone to counterfeiting (Lybecker, 2008). In
addition, in order to facilitate customer access to their approved wholesalers,
Abbot publicizes the names of the wholesalers who agreed to their terms and
conditions (Abbot Laboratories, 2004 in Lybecker, 2008). Following such efforts
by the industries, wholesalers have also expressed their commitment in
discontinuing buying and selling drugs among the secondary wholesalers which
is strongly viewed as an entry point for counterfeiters (Lybecker, 2008).
Sanofi-Aventis formed an anti-counterfeiting organisation in 2005 and a central
operational coordination team. It launched a team to be in charge of the
analysis of suspect products and development of a database for counterfeit
drugs (Sanofi-Aventis, 2010). It has also recently opened a central anti-
counterfeiting laboratory in 2008 in France to research on such techniques as
the use of chemical markers in the detection of counterfeit pharmaceuticals.
(Taylor and Davies, 2008).78
Some of the pharmaceutical companies such as Pfizer, GSK, Merck, Abbott,
AstraZeneca and Eli Lilly collaborate with enforcement agencies, regulatory
bodies, trade unions, PSI and Microsoft Corp. to reduce the incidence of
medicines counterfeiting. For instance Pfizer recently led an investigation in
China leading to dismantling of an operation involving about 11 countries, which
included Britain and Israel (Sommerville, 2005 cited in Lybecker, 2007). Due to
the tremendous increase of sales in counterfeited drugs over the Internet and
via mail order, it declared a joint effort with Microsoft Corp aimed at reducing
Internet sales of Viagra (Tesoriero, 2005a). As a collaborative effort, Johnson
and Johnson is employing security companies in countries such as China and
India to investigate counterfeit cases and provide necessary evidence which
may justify raids led by police officials (Goodman, 2002 cited in Lybecker,
2008). Between 2001 and 2003, it established 38 criminal cases against
individuals/ bodies involved in counterfeiting their products in China (Goodman,
2002 in Lybecker, 2008). Companies such as Pfizer, GSK, Roche, Eli lilly,
Astrazeneca and German Pharma Health Fund (GPHF) have also been
engaged in the public enlightenment campaigns and training of stakeholders in
the area of drug quality and detection of medicines counterfeiting.
The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union adopted the
Falsified Medicine Directive in 2011 and should be implemented fully in 2018.
Under this directive, all medicines will be required to have a unique serial
number applied during their manufacture and displayed on the medicine pack
through a 2D barcode. All prescription only medicines (POMs) except POMs
that are exempt based on their risk assessment will be included while all over
the counter medicines (OTCs) will be exempt unless they are identified to be at
high risk of counterfeiting. Before the medicines are supplied to the patient,
they will be scanned and the unique number verified against a database (Jones,
2014).79
2.7.1.2 Government efforts against poor quality medicines
The literature review revealed that government of different countries have in
several ways tried to curb medicines counterfeiting and poor quality medicines
as a whole. Majority of these efforts are geared towards increasing penalties or
enforcement (Lybecker, 2007). Information below show how government of
different countries have tried to tackle the problem of poor quality medicines.
Most of the information in this section has been published as 2 documents used
as advocacy tools by the World Health Professions Alliance (WHPA) and can
be retrieved from their website as Onwuka, (2010) and Onwuka, (2011).
2.7.1.2.1 Response from different African country
governments and their regulatory bodies
Nigeria: In Nigeria, several strategies were identified that have been put in
place to help curb the problem of poor quality medicines. Several technological
innovations have been adopted by NAFDAC to help curb the problem of
medicines counterfeiting. For instance, NAFDAC in collaboration with Sproxil
launched the Mobile Authentication Service (MAS) also called Mobile Product
Authentication (MPA). MAS was born out of a drive to empower consumers to
authenticate the quality of their medicines. This requires consumers to send a
unique code located on the scratch card on the package of their medicines to a
short code to authenticate their medicines (Health Care Packaging, 2010). More
recently other avenues of authentication such as using the Mobile Product
Authentication (MPA) app on android and on Sproxil's website was commenced
by Sproxil (Meliza, 2014).
Although it may be too early to ascertain if such services like MAS may not
indirectly lead to increase in the cost of medicines, a 100-day pilot project aimed
at determining the feasibility and cost implementation of the Mobile80
Authentication Service (MAS) using Glucophage® as a case study showed that
customers are utilising the service at no direct cost (Sproxil, 2010b). Following
the pilot study, Sproxil expanded its activities to include other antidiabetics,
antimalarials, antifungals and some antibiotics. The MAS has been adopted in
other countries such as Ghana, Kenya and India. In Nigeria, other companies
such as Pharmasecure and Mpedigree have implemented mobile authentication
service for medicines.
There are anecdotal reports suggesting that the counterfeiters are already co-
selling genuine medicines containing the unique identification code with the
counterfeit versions in a bid to deceive the customers (Chu, 2010). Also there
are questions of whether on expansion, all legitimate manufacturers of
medicines distributed in Nigeria can be included in the program or if smaller
firms producing locally-made versions or legitimate generics which may not be
able to afford it be excluded from the programme (Freschi, 2010). If the latter is
true, it may mean that these smaller firms manufacturing medicines affordable
to the Nigerian population may be driven out of business by the larger firms and
in turn lead to decreased access to some life saving medicines (Freschi, 2010).
It is important that serious consideration is given to medicines and firms who
would be engaged in this initiative, upon expansion and that the Federal
Government of Nigeria is prepared not to forsake the public health implications
of access to good quality affordable medicines at the expense of promoting the
authentication of genuine drugs from larger multinational companies.
Furthermore, NAFDAC in partnership with Verification Technology Ltd has
launched the use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology to
identify and verify products, documents and other important items (Ogbebo,
2010a). Verayo, Skye Tech and Global PCCA are set to start supplying secure
and easy to use RFID systems to Nigeria and other African countries at a
relatively low cost (Taylor, 2010). Recently, it introduced the use of thermo81
scientific TruScan® handheld RAMAN instrument for rapid identification of
fake and substandard drugs (NAFDAC, 2010a).
In order to mop up the fake drugs already in circulation, the Nigerian
government has in collaboration with registered manufacturers,
confiscated and destroyed expired and counterfeit medicines thereby
increasing the cost of obtaining such illicit medicines (Naik, 2004 in
Lybecker, 2007, Akunyili, 2007). NAFDAC has engaged in raids leading
to confiscation and destruction of a wide range of fake and substandard
products; destroying over US$35,753,014 worth of drugs found to be fake or
substandard between 2001 and 2004 (Akunyili, 2005b cited in Milissa
McGinnis, 2010). Between 2001 and 2006; drugs worth US$109 million were
destroyed (Edike and Obinwanne, 2006 cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010).
The Lagos State Taskforce on counterfeit, fake drugs and unwholesome
processed foods has also engaged in confiscation and destruction of fake
drugs, sealing of premises which are illegal and arresting of persons involved
in the act of medicines counterfeiting (The Tide News, 2008, This Day, 2008,
Nigerian Tribune, 2009, Akoni, 2009, Oladunjoye, 2010 cited in Milissa
McGinnis, 2010). The Yobe state government formed a committee on fake
drugs in 2002 to help tackle the problem (Daily trust, 2002).
The Nigerian government through NAFDAC has made efforts to develop
collaborative networks against medicines counterfeiting. For instance,
Nigeria plays an active role in IMPACT; with the Director General of
NAFDAC acting as one of the chairs. Nigeria is also collaborating with
medical equipment manufacturers such as Secure pharma, Sproxil and
Global PCCA as well as international organisations (Turkur, 2009).
NAFDAC has entered into partnership with the USFDA to provide training
to delegates and signed a memorandum of understanding between India
and China that should help harmonise strategies employed in curbing
medicines counterfeiting (Ogbebo, 2010a). Nigeria also shares strategies with82
other countries in the West African Drug Regulatory Authorities Network
(WADRAN). NAFDAC initiated WADRAN in 2008 as an avenue to share
strategies and experiences by member states in the fight against medicines
counterfeiting (Akunyili, 2007). It is made up of 12 countries in West Africa.
The Nigerian government is collaborating with the Indian and Chinese
governments in the fight against medicines counterfeiting; the Chinese
government has agreed to provide advanced information on drugs exported
to Nigeria (Turkur, 2009). Nigeria in collaboration with Indian authorities
adopted the concept of “whistle blower” initiative where a cash reward of
N200,000 is proposed to be given to anyone who discloses information
leading to interception of fake drugs while individual identities remain
confidential (This Day, 2010).
NAFDAC embarked on re-orientation and motivation of its staff for positive
outcome (Akunyili, 2007). Other initiatives includes the introduction of
public enlightenment campaign via jingles on the radio and television, alert
notices about fake drugs in the supply chain for instance is an alert issued
on fake Maloxine® tablets in circulation in 2009 (Ogundipe and Obinna,
2009). In addition, there are billboards and publications in national dailies
on medicines counterfeiting for example; the list of counterfeited medicines
as well as workshops/meetings/seminars on drug quality for stakeholders
(Akunyili, 2007). A quarterly bulletin that distinguishes between counterfeit
and genuine medicines as well as original and blacklisted companies is
usually published by NAFDAC (Federal Ministry of Health and World
Health Organisation, 2010). NAFDAC also engaged the local
governments at the grassroots by organising workshops letting them know
the need to join the agency in the fight as well as organising advocacy
campaigns against medicines counterfeiting (Ogbebo, 2010a). NAFDAC in
collaboration with Christables conducted a state-to-state drug market83
sensitization that flagged off on 15
th of July 2010 beginning with the Onitsha
head bridge market, Anambra state (Daily Sun, 2010). It also conducted
secondary school essay competition contests to help publicize the harmful
effects of counterfeit drugs, established consumer safety clubs in schools,
attempted to raise a NAFDAC army made up primary school children who
are taught on the advantage of good quality products (Naik, 2004 in
Lybecker, 2007; World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), 2008).
To facilitate the reporting of adverse drug reactions and other drug related
problems by health professionals, NAFDAC has printed Adverse Drug Reaction
(ADR) reporting forms with prepaid stamps (Akunyili, 2004).
NAFDAC has been engaged in updating of its laboratories and
inspection of laboratories abroad to ensure their compliance to Current
Good Manufacturing Practice (cGMP). Appointments of analysts in India,
China and Egypt who re-certify drugs for importation, mandatory pre-
shipment information before importation, mandatory NAFDAC clearance
permit prior to financial document processing in Nigeria for all drug importers,
discontinuation of importation of drugs marked "For export only" into Nigeria
by insisting on an authenticated certificate of free sale, regular monitoring of
Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) of local manufacturers and
enforcement of NAFDAC registration guidelines are also some of
NAFDAC‘s key strategies in eliminating medicines counterfeiting (Akunyili,
2007). It has designation Calabar and Apapa seaports, Murtala Muhammed
and Mallam Aminu Kano International Airports as the only ports of entry for
the importation of drugs and pharmaceutical raw materials to avoid
smuggling in illegal medicines.
Furthermore, NAFDAC has banned importation from some Indian
Pharmaceutical companies, sealed some drugs from being imported
(Chinyere, 2008 in Bate et al., 2010) and set up an office for its regulator in84
India (The Economic Times, 2009 in Bate et al., 2010). NAFDAC has also
conducted a survey and audit of all drugs on sale in Nigeria in order to build a
pharmaceutical database (Bate and Hess, 2010).
The Federal government of Nigeria submitted a draft resolution at the 63
rd
WHA seeking for WHO’s support in tackling its chaotic drug distribution
system and enhancing the regional fight against counterfeiting (Ogudipe,
2010). The current Director General of NAFDAC, Dr Paul Orhii is advocating
for passage of bill of life jail term and confiscation of assets upon conviction
and compensation of victims where injury has been caused as punishment for
counterfeiting. Similarly, the president of the Manufacturers Association of
Nigeria (MAN) has recently called for a new legislation to be implemented to
reduce the importation of counterfeit, adulterated and substandard medicines
in Nigeria (Securing Pharma, 2010).
Senegal: The government of Senegal increased its monetary budget
to tackle counterfeiting in 2006 (Milissa McGinnis, 2010). United
States Pharmacopeia Drug Quality and Information Program (USP
DQI) has set up medicine monitoring sentinel sites in Senegal and
provided technical assistance to the National de Lutte contre le
Paludisme (PNLP) in setting up a pharmacovigilance program in order
to aid reporting of adverse effects of Artemisinin Combination
Therapies (Hadiri, 2009). It has also provided training to members of
the pharmacovigilance team on drug quality testing in order to
conduct a study on the Quality of Antimalarials in Sub-Saharan Africa
(QAMSA study) (Hadiri, 2009). In addition, it supports the Drug
Regulatory Authority of Senegal in the registration of medicines (USP
DQI, 2009). A technical committee was created in 2009 to enforce
drug regulation in Senegal as well as raise the public awareness of
the impact of medicines counterfeiting (Milissa McGinnis, 2010). A85
campaign aimed at combating counterfeit medicines on the illicit
market was conducted in July 2009 and September 2010 to raise
the awareness of poor quality medicines sold by unlicensed
vendors (USP/ASAID, 2010).
South Africa: Purchasing registered medicines from licensed suppliers,
use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and audits by
manufacturers, distributors and health care providers were the key
strategies identified that were used to protect medicines quality in South
Africa (Patel et al., 2009a).
Ghana: In 2008, the M-Pedigree developed a mobile drug anti-counterfeiting
service in Ghana whereby consumers are required to text an 8-digit numerical
code to a number for free authentication. Similar systems have been rolled
out in other African countries such as Nigeria, Kenya and Rwanda as
previously described (Mullard, 2010). Anti-illicit Trade Coalition at Kpone
Landfill has been involved in the destruction of counterfeit products for
instance counterfeit toothpaste (My Joy online, 2009 cited Milissa McGinnis,
2010). Also, sentinel sites for medicines monitoring were established as
part of a drug quality program with the support of the US government in
Bolatanga, Kumasi, Ho, Accra and Tarkwa to help identify counterfeit
medicines (Kwei, 2006-2009; Bate, 2010). Through this program, fake
Coartem
® was detected in the Ghana market (U.S Pharmacopeia press
release, 2009 cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010). Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya and
Tanzania have introduced a system of drug distribution whereby drug shops
are franchised to improve access to cheap but high quality medicines as well
as high quality dispensing services. It has also helped to ensure uniform
standards among drug sellers in these countries (Centre for Global
Development, 2010). Diocesan pharmacies of the National Catholic Health86
and Pharmaceutical Services in Ghana have also established minilabs for the
detection of counterfeit medicines.
Liberia: The Liberian Medicine Regulatory Authority in collaboration with
USP DQI, the pharmacy board of Liberia, Ministry of Health, US Agency for
International Development (USAID)/Liberia mission and Malaria Control
Program is working on how to further strengthen the quality control
laboratories of the ministry of health and finalised the drug legislation that
established the Liberian Regulatory Authority (Smine et al., 2009).
Mali: An e wt e c h n o l o g yi n v o l v i n gt h eu s eo fc a p i l l a r ye l e c t r o p h o r e s i st od e t e c t
substandard medicines was rolled out in Mali in late 2009. This technology has
been used in Switzerland, USA and Japan (IRIN, 2010a). Pharmacists in
Mali have led a campaign against unlicensed medicines named “Street
drugs kill” (IRIN, 2002). With the help of USP/USAID, training workshops on
good laboratory practices have been conducted for staff members of the
Official Medicine Control Laboratories (OMCLs) in Mali and Benin.
Since 2008, USP/USAID through its Promoting the Quality of Medicine
Programme has provided technical assistance to the OMCLs of Mali and
Benin (Milissa McGinnis, 2010)
Lesotho: An Intellectual Property program; Operational Assistance, Services
and Infrastructure Support (OASIS) was conducted by the Police in
collaboration with International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL)
resulting in seizures of counterfeit medicines during the “operation fiela”
(Ilston, 2009).87
Sierra Leone: The National Drug Safety Monitoring Programme was
commissioned by the Pharmacy Board to ensure drug safety in Sierra Leone
(Koroma, 2006 cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010). The Pharmacy Board of
Sierra Leone has been conducting raids, which leads to destruction of
counterfeit medicines (Massaquoi, 2007 cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010). Its
ministry of health has also increased monetary budget of the Pharmacy Board
so that more inspectors can be hired (Horner and Hallam, 2009). The
Pharmacy Board has deployed officials at Queen Elizabeth Quay and Lungi
airport to aid inspection of medicines at its borders (Horner and Hallam,
2009)
Uganda: The German Pharma Health Fund (GPHF) has developed a
minilab for field-testing of medicines in developing countries (Wertheimer
and Norris, 2009). Five minilabs have been purchased to test medicines at
the point of entry to Uganda (Kariuke, 2008 cited in Taylor and Craig, 2009).
The Uganda National Drug Authority in collaboration with INTERPOL
conducted raids that led to the discovery of counterfeit medicines (Ultimate
media, 2009 cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010). The National Drug Authority
of Uganda conducts tests on samples of medicines in Uganda in order to
determine the extent of poor quality medicines (Nafula, 2008 cited in Milissa
McGinnis, 2010). It also issues alerts on counterfeit medicines in circulation
in Uganda (Nyakairu and Nakabugo, 2005; Bogere and Nafula, 2007 cited in
Milissa McGinnis, 2010).
Kenya: Established a Pharmacy and Poisons Board that helps to identify
and destroy counterfeit medicines as well as ensuring that pharmacies are
licensed (Maina, 2008 cited in Taylor and Craig, 2009). The Pharmacy and
Poisons Board has launched a project in seven provinces geared towards
closing down illegal drug distribution outlets (Maina, 2008 cited in Milissa88
McGinnis, 2010). The East African Community (EAC) secretariat developed
a draft policy and a bill on medicines counterfeiting. The anti-counterfeit bill
was passed in Kenya and Uganda (Michael, 2010) and Kenya has enacted a
law on counterfeiting (Equinet, 2010).
Tanzania: Its government seized large amounts of counterfeit medicines in
Tanzania and have warned patients of the existence of fake Metakelfin®
and Cotexin® tablets in its market (Rugonzibwa, 2008b cited in Milissa
McGinnis, 2010). The Confederation of Tanzanian Industries (CTI) has
called for an amendment in the Merchandize Act of 1963 that it deems out
dated and ineffective in combating medicines counterfeiting (Milissa
McGinnis, 2010). A key resolution by the Tanzania Food and Drug Authority
(TFDA) in 2009 was to introduce the writing of trade names and batch
numbers on all medicines purchased by or sold from wholesale pharmacy
outlets (TFDA, 2009). TFDA carries out inspection of Pharmacies to help
detect unapproved and low quality medicines (Shekighenda, 2009 cited in
Milissa McGinnis, 2010). Tanzania Food and Drug Authority put a
program in place for the accreditation of drug dispensing outlets and
overseas the quality of services and products sold in these outlets (Centre for
Global Development, 2010). Tanzania deployed the use of more than 20
GPHF minilabs across the country (Bate, 2009).
Angola: The Government of Angola banned the sale of medicines as well
as surgery and hospital tools in municipal markets as they were discovered not
to be sold under proper hygienic conditions (Agencia Angola Press, 2009 cited
in Milissa McGinnis, 2010).89
Egypt: Warehouse raids were conducted through which a large number
of counterfeit medicines were confiscated from the supply chain (CNN
Money, 2009 cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010).
Ethiopia: In 2003, the Ethiopian health officials warned the public against
purchasing counterfeit anti-retrovirals in the market that the Ethiopian‘s
Drug Administration and Control Authority confirmed did not meet necessary
quality specifications (Kaiser network, 2003). As part of capacity building of
Ethiopian‘s Product Quality Assessment Directorate (PQAD), the
USP/USAID through its Promoting the Quality of Medicines (PMQ)
programme have trained laboratory analysts on methods used for testing
medicines quality and have collaborated with the directorate in developing
Standard Operating Procedures for gas chromatography (USP, USAID,
2010).
Zambia: The Zambia Bureau of Standards withdraws counterfeit medicines
when discovered (Africa News, 2009 cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010). The
Zambian government issued an alert on counterfeit HIV/AIDS drug named
Tetrasil
® which was later discovered to be a pesticide (Medical News Today,
2007).
Cameroon: Its Food and Drugs Authority exposed 30 websites in May
2010 that are thought to be engaged in the sale of counterfeit medicines
and disseminating false drug information (Kopp, 2010).
Sudan: The regional government of southern Sudan is utilising the mega
phone to publicise the dangers of medicines counterfeiting in its main90
markets. Village health committees have also been formed and hold
consultations with relevant stakeholders such as the businessmen in order
to help combat medicines counterfeiting in some of the counties (Sudan
Tribune, 2010).
Zimbabwe: Police has been arresting persons involved in the dispensing of
unregistered and expired medicines. The Medicines Control Authority of
Zimbabwe (MCAZ) issues public alerts on counterfeit medicines in
circulation (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2007 cited in
Milissa McGinnis, 2010). It recently warned the public that counterfeit
antiretroviral are being imported and sold in its markets and salons (Milissa
McGinnis, 2010).
Police in countries such as Senegal, Mauritania and Mauritius have also
been engaged in raids resulting in seizures of counterfeit medicines some of
which were thought to originate from China, Nigeria, Hong Kong and Syria
(Milissa McGinnis, 2010).
Leem (a body representing French pharmaceutical companies held a
meeting in January, 2010 involving government health officials from sub-
Saharan Africa in order to reinforce public and private efforts against
medicines counterfeiting (IRIN, 2010b).
2.7.1.3 Response from professional organisations
This section presents the efforts of different professional organisations against
existence of poor quality medicines. Most of the information here has been
published as part of 2 documents used as advocacy tools by the World Health
Professions Alliance (WHPA) and can be retrieved from their website as
Onwuka, (2010) and Onwuka, (2011).91
International Pharmaceutical Federation (FIP): FIP adopted
the FIP/IFPMA statement; “Ensuring the quality and safety of medicinal
products to protect the patient” at the 1998 FIP congress. FIP policy statement
on counterfeit medicines was adopted in Barcelona with a replacement of it
adopted in 2003 at the FIP congress in Sidney (FIP, 2003). FIP has also
been involved in creating specific and practical tools for pharmacists
for fighting counterfeiting; examples include the tools for visual inspection
and Guide for Pharmacists. Several articles have been published by FIP as a
means of raising awareness of the risks of counterfeiting among pharmacists
and pharmacy leaders as well as educating them. Sections at FIP congress
meetings in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010 were dedicated to discussions on
medicines quality, which included medicines counterfeiting in order to
sensitize pharmacists on the dangers of medicines counterfeiting (FIP,
2010).
In collaboration with the World Health Professions Alliance (WHPA), FIP
leads the IMPACT working group on communication. The WHPA tool kit “Be
aware, take action” for health professionals and public health advocates was
developed in 2008 to aid detection, reporting and prevention of medicines
counterfeiting (Kopp, 2010). The first "Be aware, take action" workshop on
medicines counterfeiting took place in October 2010 in San Jose, Costa Rica
while a second workshop was held in Nigeria in November 2010 (Kopp,
2010). The WHPA (consisting of the International Council of Nurses,
International Pharmaceutical Federation, World Confederation for Physical
Therapy, World Dental Federation and the World Medical Association) has
issued a joint statement on medicines counterfeiting.
FIP has also been collaborating with the Council of Europe ad hoc
committee since 2004 in the fight against medicines counterfeiting. In
2008, this became the Committee of Experts on Minimizing Public Health92
Risks Posed by Counterfeiting Medical Products and related crimes (CD-P-
PH/CMED).
Other organisations such as the International Conference of French Speaking
Orders (CIOPF) have produced recommendations on the issue of medicines
counterfeiting (Chauve, 2008).
International Pharmaceutical Students Federation (IPSF) :
The IPSF organised its first Anti-counterfeit Drug Campaign (ACDC) in 2007
with the aim of increasing the awareness of the risks posed by medicines
counterfeiting among students in health professions as well as educating
them on the threats of medicines counterfeiting (IPSF, 2007). Discussions
with one of the executives of IPSF indicate that the organisation has a draft
document on medicines counterfeiting that is yet to be published (Chittoory,
2010).
International Council of Nurses (ICN): In 2005, the focus of the
International Nurses‘ Day (IND) was medicines counterfeiting. Its major
objectives were raising the awareness of the problem, providing nurses with
the tools for the detection and reporting of medicines counterfeiting as well
as encouraging nurses and health professionals to lobby increased
government and regulatory authorities' attention on medicines counterfeiting
(International Council of Nurses, 2005). It has also issued a position
statement on tackling medicines counterfeiting (International Council of
Nurses, 2005). The ICN collaborates with IFPMA in fighting fake medicines.
It has also published tool kits on the extent of medicines counterfeiting
and strategies aimed at curbing it.93
Pharmaceutical Society of Nigeria (PSN): The state branches of
PSN organise seminars and public enlightenment campaign on drug quality
during its pharmacy week (Erhun et al., 2001). PSN organises meetings that
provide an avenue for sharing information on drug quality in order to guide
importers (Orivri, 2009). The Kano state chapter of PSN sealed 5 drug
company depots after concerns were raised that the companies were
engaged in the manufacture of substandard medicines (Muhammad, 2009
cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010). It has also organised workshops and
seminars on medicines counterfeiting and drug quality in Nigeria (Ogbebo,
2010a). The Association of Community Pharmacists of Nigeria (ACPN), which
is part of the PSN, has been engaged in the destruction of fake and expired
drugs (Ogbebo, 2010b).
National Medical Association of Nigeria: It organises a monthly
continuing education programme where doctors are taught on drugs/drug
quality. It also collaborates with NAFDAC from which it obtains the list of
banned pharmaceuticals that it disseminates to its members (Orivri, 2009).
Medical experts in Uganda: These experts collaborate with the
police to conduct raids in order to confiscate poor quality medicines (The
New Vision, 2008 cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010).
Appendix 4 illustrates the strategies and interventions by government and/
regulatory and professional bodies and industries in Nigeria (which has been
discussed in details within this report) as well as in other countries.94
2.7.2 Evaluation of strategies against poor quality medicines
Due to the nature of counterfeiting, it is almost impossible to evaluate the
effectiveness of different anti-counterfeiting strategies; also most of the
strategies against counterfeiting are pursued with other goals in mind, for
instance in Spain the proposal for the use of Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) in their medicines supply chain is to combat reimbursement fraud rather
than counterfeiting (Taylor and Davies, 2008). This emphasises the need for
cost benefit analysis of anti-counterfeiting strategies to take into consideration
these additional benefits (Taylor and Davies, 2008).
An economic model was developed by Currais et al. (2008) to determine the
impact of differential in perceived quality and cost of genuine and fake drugs on
the prevalence of medicines counterfeiting. The model revealed that the
efficacy of policies and strategies adopted in the fight against this illicit crime is
highly dependent on the level of impact on both differential perceptions of
quality as well as cost differential. In most cases such strategies are influenced
by the conflict of interests between different stakeholders (Currais et al., 2008).
A similar model by Lybecker, (2007) showed that some strategies such as those
that are geared towards increasing penalties for offenders and those that
increase cost of counterfeiting such as development of anti-counterfeit
technologies or those that help to secure the supply chain have greater effect
on tackling counterfeiting when compared to campaigns that raise consumer
awareness of the dangers of counterfeit medicines such as the use of high
school essay competitions to publicize the dangers of counterfeiting as it is
done in Nigeria (Lybecker, 2007).
Except for campaigns that help consumers to distinguish between fake and
genuine pharmaceuticals which may be beneficial, strategies or campaigns that
raise awareness of consumers of dangers of counterfeiting may result in fall in
the sale of medicines as well as increase in counterfeiting which consequently95
leads to lack of access to good quality medicines (Lybecker, 2007). However,
the conclusions from the model by Lybecker, (2007) does not mean that such
initiatives as raising awareness of the dangers of medicines counterfeiting are
completely unhelpful. An evaluation of a public awareness campaign on the
dangers of medicines counterfeiting in Cotonou, Benin showed that it was
effective in increasing awareness. About 90% understood the dangers of illicit
medicines leading to a reduction in their demand for such drugs (Abdoulaye et
al., 2006). However, the findings of this evaluation study may not be conclusive,
as other factors may have contributed in the change in the consumer behaviour
observed.
2.7.3 Barriers to curbing poor quality medicines
This section discusses barriers that have hindered the fight against poor quality
medicines. Eight key issues were identified as major factors that have hindered
efforts in this area. These are conflict of interest among stakeholders,
globalisation and advancement in technology, product promotion, technological
limitation of testing kits, inadequate legislation against medicines counterfeiting,
inaccurate information on the true extent of medicines counterfeiting, slow
litigation processes in many countries linked to corruption and disagreement on
the definition of counterfeit medicines. Each of these barriers is discussed in
details below.
2.7.3.1 Conflict of interest among stakeholders
One of the barriers in the fight against medicines counterfeiting is the conflict of
interest that may exist between different bodies involved in curbing medicines
counterfeiting. For instance while government agencies may be motivated by
the public health burden associated with poor quality drug use, the industries
may be motivated by profit and issues of intellectual property theft rather than
the potential harm caused by such medicines to patients.96
2.7.3.2 Globalisation and advancement in technology
Globalisation, increase in world trade, advances in desktop publishing as well
as advancement in production technologies are just some of the factors that
have helped the proliferation of medicines counterfeiting (Lybecker, 2007 and
Schofield, 2001). The invention of newer and easier production technologies
has made it easy for counterfeiters to replicate even complex safety features
such as holograms. The existence of free trade zones have created ready
markets for counterfeit medicines and indirectly increased the complexity of
medicines counterfeiting and the difficulty in detecting counterfeits. This is
because counterfeiters can operate in several countries. For instance they can
source the materials in one country, produce the medicines in another country
and then transport them to different countries for sale.
2.7.3.3 Product promotion
The increased importance which may be attached to medicines that are highly
promoted for instance through advertisement by the pharmaceutical industries
may cause an increase in their demand and consequently make such products
an ideal target for counterfeiters. A typical example is Viagra® which is
frequently targeted for counterfeiting due to increased demand for it. However,
other factors may be responsible such as the tendency for consumers to
purchase drugs for sexual dysfunction from unscrupulous channels rather than
the legal distribution chain (Lybecker, 2007). Difficulties may be experienced in
making firms not to advertise their products in order to avoid counterfeiters from
targeting it because it may be difficult to prove the extent to which increased
demand for their product as a result of their advertisements have contributed to
their products being counterfeited.
2.7.3.4 Technological limitation of testing kits
The fact that technologies involving the use of simple testing kits to detect fake
medicines may be limited as they may only be able to identify some few97
ingredients was noted by Lybecker (2008) as a major barrier against reducing
the extent of poor quality medicines. An example of such technology, which
has been flawed by its limitations, is the simple and affordable field technique,
the Minilab currently used for rapid screening of drug quality in resource poor
countries such as Nigeria. The Minilab kits were found to detect only grossly
substandard or counterfeited medicines after a pilot study was conducted by the
Tanzanian Food and Drugs Authority (Kaur et al., 2010). Hence, the
recommendation that Minilab be used in conjunction with medicine quality
control laboratories (MQCL) (Risha et al., 2008 cited in Kaur et al., 2010).
Furthermore, the use of other techniques for detection of drug quality such as
the use of HPLC have been found to be expensive and requiring a considerable
amount of expertise. Although liquid chromatography- mass spectrometry (LC-
MS) reveals an enormous amount of chemical information, it is relatively tedious
and involves a time-consuming sample preparation. In order to overcome this
challenge, the use of open-air ionisation techniques, direct analysis in real time
(DART) and desorption electrospray ionisation (DESI) that are less time
consuming have been developed (Kaur et al., 2010). Some field tests for
combination drugs such as antimalarials that rely on colour tests may be
unreliable; for instance one of the tests for artemisinin is dependent on its
yellow colour but at least 2 antimalarials available are yellow and may give a
false result according to Harparkash Kaur (Willyard, 2010). Also, the presence
of small quantities of artesunate in samples may give false positive result to the
Rapid Red dye test (Newton et al., 2006b). Bioavailability studies via dissolution
tests are also expensive to carry out due to their sophisticated nature.
Due to the destructive nature of methods based on colorimetry, refractometry
and chromatography, non-destructive spectroscopic methods such as Raman
and Near Infrared Spectroscopy (NIR) are now increasingly accepted and used
to test for quality of medicines and in the detection of counterfeits (Kaur et al.,98
2010). The use of handheld Raman spectrometers such as the TruScans
purchased by NAFDAC is extremely useful, however it is not left without
disadvantages as they are subject to interference from inactive components of
the pill (Mullard, 2010). Also, Raman spectroscopy may not be able to
accurately detect content uniformity of the product tested since only the surface
of the sample is usually detected unlike infrared spectroscopy that penetrates
through the sample surface (Kaur et al., 2010). Both techniques (Raman and
Infrared spectroscopy) require fingerprinting to match the spectra of the tested
sample with those on the database. However Raman spectroscopy just like
NIR requires less training unlike the use of other techniques such as the Thin
Layer Chromatography (TLC). This may make it compare favourably with TLC
even in terms of cost, as the cost of staff training is not incurred (Bate et al.,
2009c). Raman spectroscopy provides both quantitative and qualitative
information, not invasive and is less susceptible to external interference and
climate change unlike NIR and TLC (Bate et al., 2009c).
Track and trace technologies such as RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) are
less reliable with relatively high error rates and costly especially when it is used
on individual products rather than on batches and when it is compared with the
use of 2D-Encryption which has been found to be less expensive (Hemalatha,
2008). The use of simple digital camera and free downloadable software is
currently under investigation for use in determination of content of active
ingredient (Fernandez et al., 2008).
2.7.3.5 Inadequate legislation against medicines counterfeiting
The legislation in most countries has been shown to be inadequate in a survey
performed in 50 most populous nations (Anisfeld, 2007). The survey revealed
that only 16 of the 50 countries have legislation with particular reference to
medicines counterfeiting; most of which are outdated. Drug counterfeiting is
regarded as an Intellectual (IP) issue in most countries rather than seen from a99
public health point of view and the punishment for drug counterfeiting is not
always different from counterfeiting of other goods such as handbags and may
even be less severe in some cases (Anisfeld, 2007). Inadequate international
collaboration, inadequate number of inspectors and low renumeration for
inspectors which are linked to increased bribery and corruption rate and
insufficient funding for laboratories are barriers to enforcement of the existing
legislation in most of the countries (Anisfeld, 2007).
2.7.3.6 Inaccurate information on the true extent of medicines
counterfeiting
Publicising of deceitful information regarding the extent of counterfeiting is a
serious limitation to its fight, for instance, the Indian government published an
article in a local newspaper which stated that just about 0.04% of drugs
sampled in a study were counterfeit (Bate, 2010). A figure which differs
significantly from findings of other investigators; for instance; the WHO reported
in 2002 that the Indian manufacturers estimated that 20% of drugs in the
markets of major cities in India were illegal or substandard (Bate, 2010).
Similarly, the Pakistan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association stated that
the production rate of counterfeit medicines in Pakistan is 0.4%. Again, there is
need to doubt this figure, bearing in mind that Pakistan is ranked among the top
exporters of counterfeit medicines (Babar, 2005).
2.7.3.7 Slow litigation process linked to corruption
Another barrier to fighting counterfeiting is the nature of legal systems in most
countries such as the slow litigation processes which encourages the criminals
to carry on with counterfeiting since many of the cases may never really be
concluded (Bate et al., 2010). In addition to this, is corruption, which is inherent
in many countries that have a major problem with counterfeiting with many
cases of counterfeiting, linked to top government officials. Bate et al. (2010)100
cites instances of such in countries like India, China, Argentina, Sri Lanka,
Uganda and Bolivia.
2.7.3.8 Disagreement on the definition of counterfeit medicines
Definitional confusions in this area as previously noted also contribute a serious
barrier to the fight against counterfeiting for instance, while NAFDAC considers
medicines not registered by it as counterfeit, the International Federation of
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA) warns that medicines
authorised for marketing by one regulatory authority but not by another should
not be deemed counterfeit in the territory of the latter (IFPMA, 2010).
There are currently agitations from groups such as Health Action International
and Equinet amongst others that the definition adopted for counterfeit
medicines especially as included in the Uganda bill and Kenyan law may be too
broad to include generic medicines and so may impede access to generic
medicines which are usually more affordable to majority of the people in
developing countries (Equinet, 2010). There are also concerns that the WHO
actions via IMPACT is geared towards intellectual property protection thereby
compromising its pubic health role as raised at the 63
rd World Health Assembly
(WHA) and contained in the draft resolution proposed by the delegations of
India and Thailand (WHO, 2010e). Sequel to the concerns and other
discussions from the 63rd WHA, the WHO decided to create a working group to
evaluate the concerns and proposals raised by the member states as well as
advocating that the Director General of WHO held consultations with member
states and regional economic integration organisations on specific issues
(WHO, 2010f). The working group presented its preliminary report at the 64
th
WHA. After which it was given more time to deliberate and present its final
report. The final report of the working group that proposed a member state
mechanism in tackling the problem of Substandard/spurious/falsely-
labelled/falsified/counterfeit (SSFFC) medical products was presented and101
adopted at the 65
th World Health Assembly (WHO Regional office for South
East Asia, 2012). The conflicts and controversies in the definition of counterfeit
medicines and the role of WHO in tackling medicines counterfeiting have
therefore been a major impediment to any progress made so far towards
curbing medicines counterfeiting.
2.7.4 Limitations of the review and future areas of research
This review has several limitations, which include the inclusion of only studies
published in English language. Although PUBMED, EMBASE and IBSS
databases were searched, the majority of the information and articles included
in the review were obtained from the grey literature such as newspaper pages
and links to internet web pages from Google, Norton and Google scholar search
engines.
There is paucity of information in the field of medicines counterfeiting and poor
quality medicine as a whole. Although, the literature review showed that some
studies have been carried out to determine the causes of medicines
counterfeiting and the extent of poor quality medicines in Nigeria. It would be
worthwhile to conduct qualitative research aimed at evaluating the awareness
and perceptions of stakeholders; medicine sellers, consumers and the like on
the problem of poor quality medicines in Nigeria (Newton et al., 2010) and to
explore challenges such as non-governmental inefficiencies leading to irrational
drug use for example sale of drugs by illegitimate outlets, dispensing of
prescription medicines by unauthorised dealers and control of pharmacies by
non-pharmacists to determine their magnitude and solutions to them. Any
discrepancies between the stakeholder perceptions of the quality of medicines
in Nigeria and the reality of the situation need to be identified (Garuba et al.,
2009). Other areas identified from the literature that may need to be explored
further include determining what government authorities are doing to stay
current on trends and methods used by counterfeiters and exploring how102
reported cases on medicines counterfeiting are handled by regulatory and
professional bodies in Nigeria. Information arising from these will help inform
areas that need to be improved upon to further reduce the problem of poor
quality medicines in Nigeria.
From the literature review, very few studies made attempts to determine or
assess improvements that have been made in curbing medicines counterfeiting
in Nigeria; Garuba et al., (2009) which accessed the perceived level of
transparency and potential vulnerability to corruption in the areas of drug
registration, procurement and inspection and distribution. Bate and Hess
(2010) and Bate and Mathur (2011) tried to assess if there were improvements
in drug quality in Lagos and Accra between 2007-2010 and if there were
improvements in drug quality following the introduction of the TruScans for
counterfeit drug detection by comparing the quality of medicines before and
after the introduction of the TruScans. Considering the relatively short interval
between 2007 and 2010 to expect any significant changes, it would be more
useful to conduct a larger sample study which would make comparisons with
situation of drug quality at the beginning of 2001; a time where relatively few
strategies were in place to combat medicines counterfeiting (Bate, 2010) and to
determine the factors responsible for any improvements which were not shown
in the Bate and Hess (2010) study.
Another important observation from the review is that despite the very many
interventions in place to curb medicines counterfeiting in Nigeria, no study could
be identified that validated any of these interventions. Therefore evidence on
how best to address medicines counterfeiting is currently lacking. Also, the
perceptions of stakeholders on such interventions and on issues relating to
accessibility of good quality medicines are often neglected where in fact better
outcomes could be achieved if the users’ perceptions are incorporated in
formulation of such interventions aimed at improving access to good quality103
medicines. This is because the stakeholders are in a better position to discuss
issues relating to medicines quality from their experience. Their opinions can
then be integrated into interventions against medicines counterfeiting and poor
quality medicines as a whole for better outcome.
In addition to these, many of the available studies aimed at determining the
extent of poor quality medicines in Nigeria often employed convenient sampling
of few drug classes mainly anti-infectives. There is very limited information on
other drug classes that have been reported to be counterfeited and are of great
significance such as medicines for chronic diseases like the anti-diabetics.
Conditions such as Type 2 diabetes (like all forms of vascular disease) already
are of growing prevalence in countries such as Nigeria. Hence, this is an
appropriate area of study in relation to anticipated future trends in chronic
disease management in Africa. Although there is a paucity of data on the exact
prevalence of diabetes in Nigeria, there is evidence to show that it is increasing
when compared to previous estimates. Current estimates of the prevalence
rate of Type 2 diabetes in Nigeria show a prevalence rate of 6.8% in some
areas of the country (Nyenwe et al., 2003). It is envisaged that by the year
2030, diabetes will rank the 7
th leading cause of death (WHO, 2008b). It is
therefore important to conduct a random sampling and testing of drugs used for
the treatment of chronic diseases such as diabetes in order to assess their
quality and determine ways to ensure better access to good quality medicines
giving the impending disaster which may result from the increased prevalence
of such chronic diseases and from consuming counterfeit medicines used for
the management of such diseases. It is based on this observation of gaps in
literature and the need to generate information on the current situation of the
quality of medicines for chronic diseases in Nigeria as well as to make
recommendations aimed at optimising the current strategies in place to curb
medicines counterfeiting that this two-phase study was predicated.104
The current research in addition to the systematic literature review conducted,
assessed the perceptions of stakeholders on issues relating to the accessibility
of good quality medicines in Nigeria and on the initiatives in place in Nigeria to
curb medicines counterfeiting using the recently introduced Mobile
Authentication Service (MAS) as an example. It also validated the MAS through
determination of the quality of medicines to which the service has been
introduced and comparing the results with the response to their SMS
authentication. It also made comparisons between the quality of the innovator
brand; Glucophage® and their generic counterparts in terms of the content of
their active ingredient; metformin. Among other medicines which are MAS
enabled in Nigeria, metformin was chosen because it is in the essential
medicines list and the first medicine to which the service was introduced.
Metformin also seems to be the most utilised anti-diabetic medicine in Nigeria
from previous studies (Adibe et al., 2009). It was also important to focus on
metformin given that the high cost of the innovator brand Glucophage® may
make them attractive for counterfeiting. The price of the cheapest generic in
the outlets visited during the preliminary fiedwork ranged from a hundred naira
to a hundred and fifty naira (N100-N150) per card of about 10 tablets while the
price of Glucophage® ranged from two hundred and fifty naira to four hundred
naira (N250-N400) per card of 12 tablets. This means that the price of
Glucophage® could be as high as four times the price of the cheapest generic
metformin. The high cost of Glucophage may make it prone to counterfeting
because when medicine prices are high and unaffordable, patients will more
likely look for cheaper sources and may in the process purchase cheaper
counterfeit mediicnes. It was therefore important to compare the quality of
tagged Glucophage® and the cheapest generic metformin versions to
determine if there were significant differences in quality between them and to
make recommedations towards the promotion of the use of good quality and
affordable medicines rather than expensive brands which are prone to
counterfeiting.105
2.8 Aims and Objectives
2.8.1 Aims
The two-phase study aimed at validating the Mobile Authentication Service
(MAS) and exploring stakeholder experiences and perceptions of the current
situation of medicines counterfeiting and quality of medicines distributed in
Nigeria.
2.8.2 Objectives
In order to explore all the variables necessary to meeting the aims of this
research, the systematic review of the literature (already presented) was
conducted followed by a preliminary fieldwork. A 2-phase study comprising
collection and analysis of metformin samples (Phase 1 or quantitative phase)
and conducting and analysis of semi-structured interviews (phase 2 or
qualitative phase) was then carried out.
2.8.2.1 Objectives of the quantitative phase of the study (phase 1)
1. To perform a test validation of the Mobile Authentication Service (MAS)
by comparing the responses obtained from the mobile anti-counterfeit
service with the actual quality of medicines received by the consumers
via packaging and experimental/chemical analyses (Do these
authentication tags imply good quality?)
2. To determine if there are differences in quality between the
Glucophage® (metformin) with the authentication tags and the cheapest
generic metformin versions without the tags (by comparing the results
obtained from the packaging and chemical analyses of the tagged
Glucophage® with that of generic metformin versions without the
authentication tags)
2.8.2.2 Objectives of the qualitative part of the study (phase 2)
1. To examine stakeholder perceptions of the current situation of medicines
counterfeiting and quality of medicines distributed in Nigeria (in order to
show the extent to which medicines counterfeiting is a problem in relation106
to other inefficiencies which may be hindering accessibility to cheap good
quality medicines)
2. To identify the successes and challenges (potential problems) which may
arise in MAS implementation and determine how these problems can be
mitigated in order to ensure optimum utilization and future expansion of
the service
3. Explore the consequences of the use of MAS
4. To determine the perceptions of stakeholders on how best MAS can be
improved in order to ensure optimum utilization and future expansion of
the service
5. Make adequate feedback/recommendation based on the findings of this
research towards the successful implementation of the Mobile
Authentication Service in Nigeria and reduction of poor quality medicines.
This will ultimately promote access to good quality medicines and
translate to improved health outcomes.
Additional issues in the context of the research question that emerged during
the data collection were also considered.
2.8.3 The Mobile Authentication Service and how it works
MAS enabled medicines have a scratch card on their packaging, which hides a
unique one-time 12-digit pin or code. Patients are required to scratch the card
and send the codes free of charge via SMS through a mobile phone to a short
code 38353 and should receive a reply stating the medicine is genuine, fake or
stolen. If the medicine is genuine, the first line of the message will say “OK,
Original”. The response also usually contains some health tips and reminders
that are targeted at specific patient groups for which the medicine authenticated107
is used to treat. It also contains a phone number to call if any problems are
encountered. Below is a typical message for a medicine, which was
authenticated:
“Ok, original Glucophage® 500mg. NRN: 04-6233. If you are diabetic, avoid
shoes with cracked sole. Problem? Call 08039012929. Nafdac and Biofem
care. Sproxil SMS”.
More recently, Sproxil started offering a web app that allow patients to
authenticate their medicines by sending the unique code via the web app.
Customers can also call their call centre to verify the quality of a product.
Figure 7 shows the picture of how MAS is used to authenticate medicines via
SMS.
Figure 7: Picture of how the Mobile Authentication Service works
(Okeugo, 2014)108
2.8.4 Rationale and significance of the study
The current research assessed the perceptions of stakeholders on issues
relating to the accessibility of good quality medicines in Nigeria and on the
initiatives in place in Nigeria to curb medicines counterfeiting using the recently
introduced Mobile Authentication Service (MAS) as an example. MAS was
validated by comparing the results of the Short Message Authentication (SMS)
with the quality of medicines to which the service has been introduced;
metformin. The MAS was chosen as the focus of this study as it is the only end-
user focused intervention introduced by NAFDAC. That is, it aims to confer the
power of medicine authentication to the general public by allowing consumers to
validate their medicines at or after purchase. Other anti-counterfeiting strategies
tend to empower professionals and other agents.
Since the inception of MAS, very few studies have been carried out to evaluate
it. These include the pilot study by Sproxil (the company that initiated the
service in Nigeria), which determined the feasibility and cost implementation of
MAS using data from pharmaceutical companies that have signed up for the
service. Another study conducted by Oyetunde and Ilozumba (2013) assessed
public response to MAS by comparing data from pharmaceutical companies on
their monthly sales with monthly SMS responses received. Oyetunde and
Ilozumba (2013) also assessed the effectiveness of MAS strictly from the
perspective of company representatives. In 2011, a group of MIT students
critically analysed MAS. However their assessment was based mainly on
information from Sproxil's pilot study. All these studies have often left out the
users. MAS is a social enterprise geared towards the users so would greatly
benefit from research which would involve the perceptions of the users (the
consumers and medicine sellers) and it is based on this that this research is
predicated.109
This research is the first to show from the perspective of stakeholders including
the service users the impact of MAS on the prevention of medicines
counterfeiting, and for the first time presented a holistic independent evaluation
of its utility. Therefore, findings from this study may serve as a baseline for
future evaluations of such strategies employed by NAFDAC in order to
determine if there are deteriorations or improvements and help to determine
areas of intervention. This is also in accordance to the WHO consensus on the
evaluation of global e-health and m-health initiatives.
In addition to validating the MAS, this study provides an insight into the overall
quality of generic metformin supply in Nigeria. As previously stated, other
studies of counterfeiting and related issues in poorer developing countries have
frequently focused on the integrity of conveniently sampled products such as
antibiotics and anti-malarials. This study is therefore the first of its kind to
employ random sampling and a relatively large sample size to show the quality
of medicines used in the management of such a chronic disease as diabetes.
Finally, this research work also revealed the part that professionals such as
pharmacists could play in promoting availability of good quality medicines and
made recommendations relevant to further reduction of poor quality medicine
supply in Nigeria. These recommendations should be useful to regulatory
authorities in developing countries that may be facing similar drug quality
problems as Nigeria and other countries such as Ghana and Kenya that are
adopting the use of MAS.
2.8.5 Research approach
This research was conducted with the approval of the School of Pharmacy,
University of London ethics committee and the Lagos University Teaching
Hospital ethics committee. A systematic review of the literature in the area of110
medicines' quality (already presented) and a preliminary fieldwork was
conducted. These were followed by random sampling of metformin samples
from different outets in Lagos, Nigeria, SMS authentication of tagged
Glucophage® samples, packaging and chemical/experimental analyses of
collected drug samples in the quantitative phase, also referred to as phase 1 of
this research. Semi-structured interviews were the primary data collection
method used in the second phase.
2.9 Conclusion
Medicines counterfeiting has previously been ignored due to perceived low
profitability of markets in the developing countries, the unique nature of ethical
drugs market and fear of loss of reputation. However, with advancement in
technology and globalisation in recent times, it is now beginning to attract
increased attention (Lybecker, 2008). The current disagreements on the
definitions of counterfeit medicine and increasing reports of cases of medicines
counterfeiting in developed countries have also contributed in making it a topic
of interest among different local and international organisations.
The literature review presented in this chapter shows that some efforts have
been made in Nigeria especially through NAFDAC in the past 14 years to
combat the existence of poor quality medicines and internationally through
various government bodies, regulatory authorities, professional organisations
and the WHO. However, the extent to which the strategies have been effective
in curbing counterfeiting still remains largely unknown and therefore calls for
further better designed studies to determine the extent of the problem of poor
quality medicines as well as evaluate the strategies in curbing this problem.
The next chapter; chapter 3 presents the details of the preliminary field work
which was conducted prior to commencing the data collection.111
Chapter 3
Preliminary fieldwork
3.1 Introduction to the chapter
There was a need to meet with stakeholders in the field to obtain more insight
into the area of medicines quality before commencing the study. The major
aims of the preliminary fieldwork were to inform the research design and
establish the feasibility of carrying out the research work in Nigeria. The
preliminary fieldwork involved two visits to Nigeria and meeting researchers with
similar interests.
The main purposes of the preliminary visits to Nigeria were to meet
stakeholders in medicines supply in Nigeria for example NAFDAC officials and
other individuals holding key positions within the Nigerian pharmaceutical sector
and visit a convenient sample of community pharmacies and Patent Medicine
Vendors (PMVs) in some major cities in Nigeria (Makurdi, Abuja, Port Harcourt,
Lagos and Awka) in order to have an idea of what obtains in practice. Most of
the stakeholders met were introduced to the researcher through her previous
contacts while some were identified during the review of the literature. Others
were opportunistically interviewed mostly at meetings attended by the
researcher while in Nigeria. This strategy was appropriate because this was not
intended to be a study but to obtain a preliminary knowledge, which will inform
the design of the proposed study.
Summary notes were made during and immediately after each discussion to
record and ensure later reflection of issues raised. In order to ensure
confidentiality, names of all the individuals contacted and outlets visited were
coded so that they cannot be identified.112
3.2 Outcomes of preliminary meetings held with
Nigerian stakeholders
During the preliminary visits to Nigeria, key stakeholders were met. This
included two officials of the Nigerian drug regulatory agency; NAFDAC, four
managers of pharmaceutical industries and one leader in academia. The
meetings with NAFDAC officials revealed that NAFDAC has done a lot of
quantitative field-testing of medicines and some social pharmacy research in
this area. This led to an official application to NAFDAC to retrieve some of
these research works. None of the articles requested could be obtained. One
of the NAFDAC officials informed the principal researcher that NAFDAC uses
the BP specification for assay of metformin. This led to the use of BP
specification for percentage concentration being used as an indicator for pass/
fail of HPLC analysis in this research.
Several initiatives against medicines counterfeiting instituted by NAFDAC such
as the use of TruScan®, RFID and MAS were discussed. These discussions
further highlighted the need for research to be conducted on the adoption of
MAS and further comparison with future research in order to determine changes
in the extent/ trend of counterfeiting MAS enabled medicines. Other uses of
MAS such as its application in tracking and tracing medicines while they are
within the distribution chain and its adoption in other countries were
subsequently discussed.
All the stakeholders expressed positive view about MAS and its advantage of
targeting the end users and at no cost to the users. The stakeholders were of
the opinion that the MAS system is highly secured and were optimistic that it
would be difficult to counterfeit MAS enabled medicines since MAS works in the
same manner with mobile phone scratch card production, which till date has not
been counterfeited. However, concerns were raised about the possible113
increase in the price of medicines as a result of the MAS service and the
consequences that may have on users. Concerns were also raised about the
type of medicines that should be MAS enabled; that is whether MAS should be
for all or restricted to some categories of medicines such as the expensive
branded medicines. These concerns raised were subsequently explored during
the semi-structured interviews. Another concern raised was the disagreement
on the definition of counterfeit medicines and need to clarify this in the research.
This research focused on poor quality medicines as a whole rather than just
medicines counterfeiting which form part of medicines that are of poor quality.
The opinions from these stakeholders helped further inform the design of this
research.
3.3 Observations from outlets visited
Fifteen outlets (9 community pharmacies and 6 patent medicine shops) were
visited to find out the perception of community pharmacists and patent medicine
vendors as regards medicines counterfeiting in Nigeria. Some of the issues
explored were the awareness of community pharmacists and patent medicine
vendors of the Mobile Authentication Service, their perceptions of initiatives in
place in Nigeria to combat medicines counterfeiting and the different brands of
metformin that they stock. Although the outlets were conveniently sampled,
useful information were obtained on the perception of community pharmacists
and patent medicine vendors of the situation of medicines counterfeiting in
Nigeria and the initiatives against medicines counterfeiting. Other useful
information obtained was the availability of different kinds of metformin in the
Nigerian market. Below are some of the important issues discussed and how it
informed the research.
3.3.1 How poor quality medicines can be tackled in Nigeria
One of the pharmacists stated the need for training of medicine sellers on
detection of counterfeit medicines but added that such training should be done114
in partnership with government agencies because Non-Governmental
Organisations may face considerable barriers if they carry out such tasks
independently. The need for frequent and recent updates from NAFDAC was
emphasised. One of the interventions currently been proposed, the zonal drug
distribution network was applauded as a good idea that can help remove the
drug business from the hands of quacks even though it was acknowledged that
this may take some time to accomplish.
3.3.2 Awareness about MAS
All the community pharmacists and patent medicine vendors met during the
preliminary visit were aware of MAS and seemed optimistic about the service.
However, there seemed to be disagreement as whether their patients were
aware of and using it or not. Many of them were of the view that there is low
awareness level about MAS except for the very few enlightened consumers
who know about the service.
Out of the 9 pharmacies visited, only in one outlet did the pharmacist
interviewed state that he encourages his patients to use the service and give
them leaflets about the service. It was also observed that although the
community pharmacists were aware of the service, some of their shopkeepers
who sell medicines in their absence were not aware of MAS.
3.3.3 Glucophage® stocked in the outlets
All the 9 pharmacies visited stocked Glucophage® (3 out of these stocked
untagged Glucophage®) while two out of six patent medicine shops visited
stocked Glucophage® (1 out of these stocked untagged Glucophage®).
There seemed to be disagreement on the reason for stocking both tagged and
untagged Glucophage®. In one outlet, the pharmacist stated that the untagged
Glucophage® is an old stock while a shop keeper in the second pharmacy
stated that the untagged one is locally produced while the tagged one is
imported from UK. The exact reasons for stocking the untagged Glucophage®
could not be ascertained from the third pharmacy that stocked it because the
pharmacist was not around when the researcher visited the pharmacy. The115
patent medicine vendor that stocked untagged Glucophage® stated that the
tagged ones were only used during the trial period. No manufacturing date was
seen on 3 of the untagged Glucophage® packets, raising questions about the
authenticity of the untagged Glucophage®. As a result of this observation, the
research was designed to include collection of both tagged and untagged
Glucophage®. However untagged Glucophage® was later excluded because it
was discovered that at the time of the sample collection, all the Glucophage®
samples in Nigeria had been coded by Sproxil so no untagged Glucophage®
could be obtained.
Sale volume of Glucophage® seemed to vary between the outlets. One
pharmacist said that Glucophage® is rarely sold in his outlet and that he does
not often recommend its use unless the patient specifically requests it. This is
because of the frequent failures he has encountered with such high cost brand
pharmaceuticals due to high level of faking. Some other reasons given for low
sale volume in some of the outlets was the location of the outlets and the fact
that Glucophage® is a prescription medicine that should be obtained from the
hospitals and refilled in the pharmacies. This means that even though in
Nigeria, most pharmacies prescribe medicines, the major source of most
prescriptions medicines is the hospital. This observation led to the hospital
been a target for easy recruitment of consumers of Glucophage® in this study.
The price of the cheapest generic in the outlets visited ranged from a hundred
naira to a hundred and fifty naira (N100-N150) per card of about 10 tablets
while the price of Glucophage® ranged from two hundred and fifty naira to four
hundred naira (N250-N400) per card of 12 tablets.
3.3.4 Source of medicines sold at the outlets
Most of the community pharmacies and patent medicine vendors visited stated
that they obtain their medicines from company representatives and wholesalers.
However, the open market remain a major source of their medicines due to the116
frequent "out of stock" syndrome in most of the wholesale outlets except in
situations where the outlet is located very far away from the open drug market.
3.3.5 Recommendation on how MAS can work better
One pharmacist recommended the codes to be affixed on the medicine
packs/cartons in order to encourage the pharmacists to use the service while
making their own purchases. This is because if they open the individual
medicine packs and authenticate, patients will doubt the genuinity of the opened
packs. Also, because the authentication can only be done once, patients
purchasing such open packs may no longer be able to authenticate them.
3.4 Outcomes of meetings held with researchers of
similar interest
Several researchers in the field of medicines counterfeiting and medicines
quality whom the researcher identified during the literature review phase were
contacted and met to discuss issues relating to drug quality and the proposed
research. Following meetings with these researchers, inputs were received
which further informed different stages of the research. The discussions that
follow contain information on how these inputs informed the different stages of
the research.
3.4.1 Literature review
Meetings with 2 of the researchers (TM and HK) led to obtaining more
information on medicines counterfeiting through further reading the articles they
recommended, some of which were not retrieved during the literature review.
Some of the articles retrieved at this stage were Kuar et al. (2010), Anisfeld,
(2007), Assi et al. (2009), Willyard (2010), Dolgin (2010), Ghosn (2010),
Killugudi (2010), Mooney (2010), Mullard (2010), Plancon (2010) and Torres
(2010). Information from these articles were then included in the literature
review.117
Insight on how to better structure the literature review into different
subheadings; extent of poor quality medicines, impact of poor quality medicines
and strategies in place to curb medicines counterfeiting in different parts of the
world was received from TM, this led to modification of the literature review into
these different subheadings as shown in Appendix 4.
3.4.2 Data collection
3.4.2.1 Sample size for Phase 1
Insight was received from 2 researchers OS and PNN on the number of
samples that can be obtained for analysis and testing in the first phase of the
research.
The need to establish a hypothesis for the research to aid proper sample size
calculation was discussed. Insight into the use of formulas in online databases
and Newton et al. (2009) to calculate the sample size of metformin needed was
provided. In order to determine the adequate sample size, the hypothesis was
derived from the objectives of the quantitative phase of the research which were
to validate MAS and determine if there were differences in quality between
tagged Glucophage® samples and their generic counterparts which were not
tagged. Based on this, the null hypothesis was that the quality (pass/fail quality
tests) of tagged Glucophage® was not significantly different from generic
metformin. The power and sample size (PS) software was used to calculate the
number of samples that will be adequate to meet the study objectives, details of
this are presented in chapter 4.
3.4.2.2 Sampling strategy- phase 1
Random sampling and its advantages over other sampling methods such as
convenient and systematic sampling were discussed in detail with PNN. It was
based on this discussion that the sampling method for the first phase of the118
study was changed from systematic sampling to random sampling because it
was thought that this would provide more reliable data with limited bias than
other sampling methods. Insight was also received on the use of the Microsoft
Excel Rand Between functions to obtain random numbers from the sampling
frame. Random sampling in cases where there was no pre-existing sampling
frame such as sampling from the drug market traders was also discussed. This
provided insight on how metformin from the drug market traders were sampled.
An independent statistician verified the sampling methods and techniques as
well as the procedure taken to determine the sample size.
The need to confirm if other sources of medicine in Nigeria such as basket
sellers/ drug hawkers were also a source of metformin and if metformin should
be collected from hospitals were also discussed. This led to iteratively checking
the basket sellers to determine if they were also a major source of metformin
before commencing sample collection. This was done by asking them and then
checking among their baskets. The need to obtain information on the
components of the Medicine Quality Assessment Reporting Guideline
(MEDQUARG) for field surveys of medicine quality as proposed in Newton et
al., (2009) was discussed. This guided the kind of information obtained during
the metformin sampling stage. It was decided that metformin from the hospitals
would not be sampled because of the associated risks involved in sampling
from the public sector (government regulated outlets) from previous research as
discussed with PNN.
Limitations of the British Pharmacopoeia, which does not state a standard
number, required for all screening and what to do if the sample units available
are not enough to ensure accurate results was discussed. Judgement as to the
number of tablets per sample to collect from each tablet was made based on
input from 2 researchers, HK and HG who have carried out a lot of research
involving analysis of medicine samples using HPLC. Practical guidance on how
to conduct the chemical analyses of the samples was received from HG. The119
total number of tablets analysed per sample were four tablets and they were
analysed in duplicate using the HPLC equipment. This is because the research
did not aim at ascertaining the content uniformity of the tablets in which case
more of the tablets per sample would need to be analysed. Also given the
number of metformin samples that needed to be analysed and the limited time
to complete the PhD, it was practical and adequate to analyse only 4 tablets per
sample. The average percentage concentration of the analysed tablets were
obtained and used as an indication of failure/pass for HPLC quality test.
The importance of blinding to avoid introducing any bias to the study was
discussed. This led to different people being involved in different aspects of the
research; for instance the principal researcher was involved in collecting the
samples and coding them while the samples were recoded by one of the
sample collectors in order to blind the principal researcher to the results of the
packaging and chemical analyses.
3.4.2.3 Transporting the medicines to the UK
Discussions with PNN informed the precautions taken to ensure that the
metformin samples collected from Nigeria arrived in the United Kingdom safely.
For instance the need to obtain a letter from a top person at The School of
Pharmacy with authorising stamps or from the Medicines and Healthcare
Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) stating that the medicines were for
analysis, not for resale or human or veterinary consumption and were not
hazardous was raised and this led to obtaining a letter from School of
Pharmacy, University of London to the UK customs been included in the pack of
medicines when they were been transported to the UK.
Other important ideas shared which was implemented while trying to transport
the medicines to the UK were; keeping half of the medicines in Nigeria as a120
contingency plan in case the medicines were seized on transit and repackaging
the samples to be retained in Nigeria with all the packaging information on the
medicines written on the new pack. Others include exercising caution when
removing the tablets from their original container to ensure that they were not
contaminated if in the future they were to be analysed by some sensitive
techniques such as mass spectrometry to detect why any of the medicine was
counterfeit, sending the samples through reputable courier companies such as
DHL or FedEx to avoid embarrassment by custom officials as well as including
one of the yellow Gemini temperature loggers which was set to measure the
temperature every 30 minutes from the time the medicines were collected
through shipping and completion of analysis of the samples to ensure they were
stored within the stipulated temperature range, sealing the containers for
transporting the medicines with the name of the researcher written across the
seal so as to be able to notice any opening and transporting the samples in
polystyrene cool boxes to help maintain the temperature within specified limit.
3.4.2.4 Semi-structured interview
Useful input was received from some of the researchers that informed how the
interview questions were structured and some of the questions asked during the
semi-structured interviews. For instance when interviewing pharmacists, it was
suggested that it may be better to begin with questions on their experiences of
medicines counterfeiting before proceeding to ask them about policies in order
to avoid any bias as previous research in this area have shown that they are
more likely to talk negatively about the policies if they are asked first about
them.
Some of the interview topics suggested by the researchers were included in the
interview guide. These include which medicines that are easily counterfeited
from participant’s experience, participants’ experience of medicines
counterfeiting, how big the problem of poor quality medicine is in Nigeria,
medicine sellers’ perceptions of the medicines they offer to patients in terms of
ethical considerations they make while selling medicines to patients, use of121
cheap medicines based on the laws on generic substitution in Nigeria, the risk:
benefit ratio of their use for instance depending on the class of medicine,
socioeconomic class of the patient, reasons for selling particular brands of
medicines and the training they need to authenticate counterfeit medicines, the
kind of medicines commonly used (local production versus imported medicines)
and how detected cases of medicines counterfeiting are handled.
3.4.3 Methods
3.4.3.1 Conceptual framework
As part of efforts by the researcher to further develop the qualitative phase,
there was a need to understand the value of theoretical frameworks in
qualitative research in order to determine the theoretical framework that would
underpin the research. Conceptual frameworks were discussed with one of the
researchers; AH. The Cornford et al. (1994) socio-technical framework and
other theories in organisational behaviour such as the theory by Paul Sabatier;
Advocacy Coalition Framework, Institutional theory, the Actor network theory
and Rational Choice Theory were discussed. Following this discussion and
further reading, the Cornford et al. (1994) socio-technical framework was
adopted for this research. Further reading on theoretical frameworks expanded
the researcher’s knowledge on its use and provided insight into other theories
used in prediction of adoption of new technologies especially in the field of
Information technology. Some of these included the Technology Acceptance
Model (TAM), the Innovation Diffusion Theory, the theory of perceived risk and
the Switching barrier theory. Even though, this research did not aim at using
these theories to predict MAS adoption. Constructs of the Technology
Acceptance Model and Innovation diffusion theory gave the researcher an idea
of the variables to be explored within the Socio-technical framework proposed
by Cornford et al. (1994).122
Table 4: The conceptual framework
System functions Human perspectives (the stakeholders) Organisational context
Structure Technical detail (in this case, the
mobile phone) for instance availability
of mobile phone networks
Work conditions and implied requirements for instance skills required by the
stakeholders who use the service, do they have to be more patient in order
to receive the text message responses? Is the system cost effective when
compared to other anti-counterfeiting strategies? These encompass
stakeholder attitude and opinions of MAS, that is what they think about
MAS; its perceived risks and benefits, Perceived Ease of Use (PEOU) and
Compatibility
Sustainability-mobile phone services, skills required
for instance ability to use mobile phones, Impact of the
geographical habitation of the users and questions on
compatibility
Process Information processing (correct and
valid). This can be determined from
the results of the quantitative aspect
of this study (phase 1). The results
from the packaging, NIR and HPLC
analysis will be compared with the
results from the SMS authentication
Human participation in tasks; social interaction. This includes questions
such as how MAS has changed their mode of operation in terms of; for
instance their concern about their medicines, the brand of metformin that
they purchase. How has the users’ experience of health care altered on
using the service? How has MAS affected their work? Will they prefer to
buy medicines at a costlier price just because they are of good quality or
would they go for cheap ones irrespective of their quality? If the cost of
medicines increases due to MAS, will they still buy Glucophage®? Do they
trust the response they receive from MAS?
Altered delivery and practice. Is there an ability to
implement MAS as a support for change? Can MAS
support other health strategies aimed at improving
patient outcomes; if so what are the future
expectations. What suggestions can participants offer
for implementing or maintaining the system? Does it
take their time? Has it changed their health or
purchasing behaviour? Do they report medicines
counterfeiting cases? Has the sale of Glucophage®
with the tags increased since the introduction of these
tags or do medicine sellers now have to procure more
Glucophage® to meet demand?
Outcome Relevant/useful, applicable, reliable Quality of service and outcomes such as users’ satisfaction with MAS,
complacency to use, Changes in healthcare delivered/ quality of care; effect
of MAS on other health outcomes such as therapeutic failure. Do medicine
sellers think that their clients on Glucophage® respond better to it since they
started to use the ones with tags? Do consumers feel that they are better off
with Glucophage® with the tags than without the tags? Is this service
useful?
Adapted from Cornford et al. (1994)123
3.4.3.2 Analytical techniques
In order to inform the method of sample analysis that would be employed,
discussions were held with 5 different pharmaceutical analysis experts (MZ, OS,
AN, KJR and PNN) on the possible tests to carry out in order to meet the
objectives of the quantitative phase of the research. During the course of these
meetings, different methods of medicine analysis such as the use of NIR, IR
and Raman spectroscopy, HPLC, dissolution and disintegration tests were
discussed.
Following a review of the advantages and disadvantages of these methods
discussed, analysis of the sample via NIR, packaging analysis and HPLC was
chosen as the ideal method to analyse the samples for this research. This is
because packaging analysis and NIR were noted as methods that can help
rapidly detect counterfeit medicines while HPLC can yield quantitative
information about the content of the medicines.
Although, complex counterfeits with no differences in packaging and content of
active ingredient have been found, research shows that in most cases they can
be identified through thorough checking of the packaging and other simpler
techniques such as NIR in addition to methods that can give an indication of the
content of their active ingredients. This study did not aim at determining
bioequivalence of samples but rather sought to validate the information from
MAS in order to find out if there were any counterfeits and to give an indication
of the quality of the samples studied in terms of their active ingredient.
Need for package screening to be conducted was discussed in addition to NIR
and HPLC, as it has shown to be a very important indicator of counterfeit
medicine although many researchers in this field often neglect it. This should
involve checking for differences in colours of the scanned copies of the124
medicine packets using a colour meter, checking for differences in font and font
size using a font checker or by using the eye, the use of two different languages
on a packet, spelling mistakes, wrong language construction for instance the
wrong use of apostrophes and commas as these are also quick indicators of
counterfeits. All these except checking for differences in colour were done as
part of the analysis. Differences in colour of the medicine packets could not be
done using the colour meter because some of the medicines were not sold in
their original packaging. Also most of the packets had markings with inks,
which may have affected the colour meter reading.
The need for the original samples for comparisons to be collected from the
manufacturers or their agents/ representatives was emphasised. Following
input from PNN on the definition of counterfeit and substandard/degraded, the
following was adopted as a guide to avoid definitional confusion;
1. Genuine packaging + Failed chemistry = Substandard/ degraded
2. Failed packaging + with or without failed chemistry = Counterfeit.
From the above, package screening is a very important test to conduct to help
differentiate between counterfeit and substandard/degraded medicines. This
is also in line with the recommendation by WHO on detection of counterfeit
medicines as can be deduced from the definition of counterfeit medicines by
WHO regional office for the Western Pacific presented in chapter 1 of this
thesis.
Currently, it is difficult to differentiate between substandard and degraded
medicines. However, PNN mentioned that there is an on-going research
aimed at establishing degradation products for different medicines, which will
help to differentiate between substandard and degraded medicines in the
future using mass spectroscopy. It is based on this discussion and further125
reading that the researcher incorporated packaging analysis as part of the
tests to be carried out on the metformin samples.
3.5 Conclusion
The preliminary fieldwork was conducted to get input from experienced
researchers in the field of drug quality since the information obtained from the
literature seemed very limited and to inform the design of the study. Also visits
were made to Nigeria to meet key stakeholders and visit drug outlets in order to
have an idea of what was obtainable in practice so that the research could be
better designed to be of greater value. Useful inputs were obtained on all
stages of the research; data collection, data analysis and synthesis phases.
The information obtained from the literature review and the preliminary fieldwork
helped to define the direction of the PhD research. The following chapter
discusses in detail the methodology employed for the 2 phases of this study.126
Chapter 4
Methodology
4.1 Introduction to the chapter
In order to take a holistic approach in exploring all the variables necessary to
meeting the aims of this research, a literature review on medicines' quality in
Nigeria was conducted followed by a preliminary fieldwork, details of which are
already presented in chapters 2 and 3. A 2-phase study was then conducted.
The first phase involved a quantitative random sampling of metformin tablets in
order to determine the extent of poor quality medicines in Nigeria and to
validate the MAS while the second phase involved a qualitative social research
approach using semi-structured interviews to obtain the views and perceptions
of stakeholders on relevant issues needed to meet the objectives of this phase
of the research. This chapter discusses in detail the theoretical framework
underpinning the research, how the study was designed, the data collection and
analysis methods used and justification for their use. It also describes the
ethical issues that were considered in the course of this research.
4.2 Theoretical framework
4.2.1 Conceptual framework for MAS evaluation
Variables relating to MAS explored in this research work were adapted from the
socio-technical framework approach proposed by Cornford et al. (1994) which is
an advancement of Donabedian, (1978) structure, process, and outcome
approach. As shown in table 4, this framework comprises the system’s
structure (in this case, it is the mobile phone, the process that it supports (in this
case, it is the detection of poor quality medicines) and the outcome of its use (in
this case, the consequences of MAS use). To ensure conformity to this
framework, stakeholders with similar roles as proposed in the framework were
included in the research (consumers, health professionals/providers; the127
pharmacist and other medicine sellers and the administrator, in this case
regulatory body staff members/policy makers in pharmacy). By using this
framework, it is hoped that a wider range of issues beyond the technical
performance of the service would be captured. The framework acted as a
repository for findings for the research and was used to develop categories from
the research questions. It also allowed collected data to be structured and
analysed within a multi-dimensional scheme, thereby allowing a rich and more
insightful view of the experience of the use of MAS.
This multi-dimensional concept that is proposed in the Cornford et al. (1994)
framework has been endorsed by such theories as the Actor network theory
that was proposed in the mid-1980s from the work of Bruno Latour, Michel
Callon and John Law to aid exploration of socio-technical processes (Crawford,
2004). It has also been employed in several qualitative researches some of
which include the evaluation of an Estripod information system (Cornford et al.,
1994) and more recently in the evaluation of an electronic prescribing and
administration system (Barber et al., 2007).
This framework provides a systematic way to consider the infrastructure
surrounding technological achievements/innovations through consideration of
both human and non-human factors and assigning the same level of importance
to each of these factors in the theoretical framework. It shows that there is a
need to consider all surrounding factors (including technical and non technical
elements) when evaluating any service or intervention. The actors in this
research include among others; the users of the service (community
pharmacists, patent medicine vendors, traders and consumers), mobile phone
manufacturers (the technology in question), the network providers, regulatory
body staff and policy makers in pharmacy. The descriptors under the different
categories in the conceptual framework were mainly from ideas obtained from
the literature review conducted, the preliminary field work, the theories in the
literature which were thought by the researcher to be applicable to the study128
and the researchers own ideas about how people may respond to issues
discussed. The conceptual framework was flexible; with deletions and additions
made following data collection.
Other theories in the field of technology acceptance such as the Technology
Acceptance Model (TAM), the Innovation Diffusion Theory (IDT) and the theory
of perceived risk were considered in the course of this research as possible
theories that may help explain the findings relating to MAS, which is also a
technological innovation. While these theories gave the researcher some ideas
on questions that can be asked during the interviews in order to obtain more
useful information from the participants, they did not directly apply to the
analysis and interpretation of the research findings, as they are mainly theories,
which help predict the adoption of new innovations/technologies.
4.3 Research design
In order to achieve all the objectives of this study, the research was conducted
in two phases. The first was quantitative and the second qualitative. The aim of
the quantitative phase (phase 1) was to validate the MAS via a random
sampling of Glucophage® packs bearing the relevant authentication tags.
(Glucophage® was the first medicine distributed with MAS tags/identifiers). A
comparator quantitative study involving the purchase of generic (branded and
non-branded) metformin tablets was conducted. All the samples were
purchased from community pharmacies and open market traders in Lagos,
Nigeria.
A quantitative approach involving random selection of metformin and analysis
was chosen to meet the objectives of the first phase of this research because it
gives equal chances of sampling from all the outlets in the sampling frame used
in this research. It also makes the results arising from this phase representative
and generalisable to the population under study. In addition, the large sample
size used, as it is typical with quantitative research will help to identify129
statistically significant differences between groups (tagged Glucophage® and
generic metformin).
The second phase of this research employed a qualitative social research
approach, using semi-structured interview schedules and questionnaires (to
collect the demographic details of the participants). The three groups of
stakeholders included were consumers/members of the public; medicine sellers
(community pharmacists, patent medicine vendors and open drug market
traders); and health policy makers in pharmacy. This phase aimed at
determining the perceptions and experiences of stakeholders and their attitudes
towards the use of the Mobile Authentication Service and other drug quality
related issues. Possible problems such as the acceptability of MAS to the
public and to professional stakeholders, and logistical or allied concerns were
systematically explored.
A qualitative social research approach involving the use of semi-structured
interviews was employed in the second phase. This was chosen because the
researcher thought that it would help generate rich descriptions and
explanations from the participants on issues, as it is typical with qualitative
research. Also, the researcher thought that the nature of the topic discussed
(quality of medicines and counterfeiting) might make more detailed views to be
obtained from individual interviews than from focus group interviews. Focus
group interviews was considered but was not chosen because the researcher
envisaged that it may make the participants not to say their honest views due to
fear of being reported to regulatory authorities by other focus group members.
In addition, the researcher believed that a higher response rate would be
obtained through semi-structured interviews than through focus group
interviews. This was because other issues such as lack of access to the focus
group meeting venue may have hindered participants from attending the focus
group meetings given the Nigerian context where there is an inefficient
transportation system.130
4.4 Ethical Approval
Ethical approval was obtained from the UCL School of Pharmacy and the Lagos
University Teaching Hospital (LUTH) ethics committees (copies of the ethical
approval documents can be seen in appendix 5).
4.5 Data collection process -Phase 1
The process of data collection for this phase required sampling medicines to
validate the Mobile Authentication Service and to determine if there are
differences in quality between the MAS enabled samples (tagged
Glucophage®) and their generic counterparts. As previously noted, among all
the interventions MAS was chosen for validation because it is the only end-user
focused intervention introduced by NAFDAC. That is, it aims to confer the
power of medicine authentication to the general public by allowing consumers to
validate their medicines at or after purchase. Other anti-counterfeiting strategies
tend to empower professionals and other agents. The MAS helps users to
determine if the medicine they wish to purchase is authentic or not. Medicines
which are MAS enabled have a unique number under a silver panel which can
be scratched by the user and sent via text message to a short code. Response
is received as to whether the medicine is “OK, Original or fake”.
Since the introduction of MAS in Nigeria many medicines have become MAS
enabled. Among all the medicines that are MAS enabled, metformin was
chosen because it is in the essential medicines list and the first medicine to
which the service was introduced. Metformin also seems to be the most utilised
anti-diabetic medicine in Nigeria from previous studies (Adibe et al., 2009).
Although few studies have been conducted to determine the quality of some
brands of metformin distributed in Nigeria, they mainly focused on determining if
the brands of metformin tested were bioequivalent. This study is the first to131
determine the quality of metformin samples randomly sampled from different
outlets in order to validate an anti-counterfeiting service.
4.6 Sampling strategy
4.6.1 Study setting
The metformin samples were obtained from Lagos state. Lagos was chosen as
the site for the collection of the samples because it is one of the first states
where the Mobile Authentication Service was commenced. Lagos is the largest
city in Nigeria by population (about 17 million people). It is also the most
ethnically diverse; constituting the low, middle and high-income earners as well
as rural, peri-urban and urban dwellers, which is very typical of Nigeria. One of
the major open drug markets in Nigeria; the Idumota market is located in Lagos.
Also, Lagos has the largest number of medicine outlets in Nigeria (about 30% of
pharmacy outlets) and the highest number of pharmacists (2236 out of 6713
registered pharmacists in Nigeria) (Peterson and Obileye, 2002). In addition, the
preliminary fieldwork showed that all the brands of metformin available in the
different cities visited where also available in Lagos.
4.6.2 Study sample and sample size
This phase involved random sampling of Glucophage® 500mg tablets to which
this service was first introduced and which have the authentication tags and
generic metformin 500mg tablets. The samples were randomly obtained from
community pharmacies in Lagos state and outlets in the open drug market at
the Idumota market in Lagos, Nigeria.
Sample size calculations were performed as shown below;
To test the null hypothesis that the quality (pass/fail quality tests) of tagged
Glucophage® (experimental or comparator group) was not significantly different
from generic metformin (control group). Prior data from the literature on quality
of medicines in Nigeria indicated a worst-case scenario failure rate of 48%.132
This worst-case failure rate is according to a report by Taylor et al. (2001). We
tested whether the frequency of poor quality in the tagged Glucophage® was <
24%, Power 90% and alpha 5%. We assume that if this frequency (48%) was
reduced to <24% (that is by 50%) that would be significant in terms of public
health impact although no poor quality is acceptable. We also sought to
compare differences in quality between the two groups (generic metformin and
tagged Glucophage®).
Imputing the following variables; Power= 90%, Type 1 probability error (alpha) =
5%, Prevalence for the control group (P0) = 48% and Prevalence for the
experimental group (P1) = 24% into the Power and Sample size (PS) software
yielded a sample size of 82 samples per group (that is 82 samples of tagged
Glucophage® and 82 samples of generic metformin (locally branded and non-
branded) metformin tablets which in total is 164 samples) to use an uncorrected
chi-squared statistic to evaluate this null hypothesis and detect any statistically
significant differences between these groups.
Before commencing the sample collection, it was imperative to know if the
mobile medicine sellers were also a major source of metformin in Nigeria. To
determine this, 20 mobile medicine sellers (medicine sellers with no outlets) in
Lagos were iteratively sampled to see if they stocked metformin. None of them
stocked metformin so they were excluded from the major sources of metformin
to the Nigerian public. It was therefore decided that the major sources of
metformin to the Nigerian public should be the community pharmacies, the
patent medicine shops (PMS) or vendors and the open drug market traders.
Based on this, 164 samples (82 samples of cheapest generic and 82 samples
of tagged Glucophage®) were initially set out to be collected from the
community pharmacies, patent medicine shops and the open drug market
traders in the proportion of their total numbers in Lagos (590:639:203)
respectively. Based on this 34 community pharmacies, 37 patent medicine
vendors and 12 outlets in the drug market were to be visited to collect the133
samples as shown in figure 8 below assuming that all the outlets stocked both
the cheapest generic version of metformin and the tagged Glucophage®.
164Samples
82 outlets
34CP 37PMS 12 drug market outlets
CP: Community pharmacies; PMS: Patent Medicine Shops;
Two samples (One Glucophage® and One generic) will be sampled/outlet but at different times
Figure 8: Sample size or initial proportion of samples to obtain from
different outlets
Two people were recruited and trained as sample collectors to help with the
sampling phase of the data collection. These two people were recruited
because they were thought to know Lagos very well so as to avoid difficulties in
moving from one location to another when obtaining the samples. Also one of
the sample collectors was a native Yoruba speaker, which was thought, would
help to locate outlets where the samples would be purchased easily.134
4.6.3 Pilot study
A pilot study was conducted to ensure that the sample collectors understood the
training they were given on how to collect the samples and to ensure that the
entire sample collection process went smoothly.
As a pilot study, 4 pharmacies were selected from the list of community
pharmacies as at December 2010 obtained from the Pharmacists Council of
Nigeria (PCN) from which samples would be purchased. For each of these 4
pharmacies, the researcher accompanied one of the sample collectors to
purchase the sample. During this time the researcher acted as a close relative
of the sample collector who has only accompanied him to purchase the
medicines. Following this pilot study, it was clear that the sample collector who
would be involved with purchasing the samples understood what to do. An
agreement was therefore reached between the researcher and the sample
collectors not to tell anyone the reasons why the samples were being collected
to ensure the safety of the researcher and the sample collectors as well as to
avoid any bias that may be introduced by the medicine sellers presenting only
the medicines they felt were of good quality for sale.
4.6.4 Sampling procedure
In order to have a sampling frame, the list of Community pharmacy retail outlets
as at December 2010 was obtained from the Pharmacists’ Council of Nigeria
(PCN). The 2011 lists were not used, as it was incomplete at the time.
Attempts were made to collect the list of open drug market traders from PCN.
However this was not possible, as they are not recognised by the Council
despite being a major source of medicines consumed by the Nigerian public.
Attempts were also made to collect the list from some of the traders through
some medical representatives that supplied medicines to the drug market. This
was also not possible as the traders approached were afraid of releasing their
details to anyone due to the recent closure of the market by NAFDAC. In order
to randomly sample from the traders in the drug market, the list was made by
visiting the market and making a list of all the outlets selling medicines in each135
of the streets in the drug market. In total, a list of 203 outlets in the drug market
was obtained and for each outlet, a description of their location in the street was
noted so as to help locate them easily when collecting the samples from the
market. This was independently confirmed by one of the data collectors on a
second visit.
Random numbers that represented the outlets from which medicines would be
sampled were generated using the Rand function in the Microsoft Excel
programme. Spare random numbers were generated to cover for repeated
random numbers, outlets that may be closed at the time of visiting and outlets
which for any reason may have been unable to furnish requested samples.
Appendix 14 shows the audit trail of outlets visited containing the random
numbers corresponding to the outlets visited.
In order to ensure the safety of the researcher and other sample collectors, the
name, address and contact details of the locations being sampled per day was
given to a close and responsible relative of the principal researcher in Nigeria at
the beginning of each day before commencing the sample collection.
4.6.5 Collection of samples
For each of the outlets, the researcher went with one of the sample collectors to
collect the medicine for easy location of the outlets. The sample collector
collected the tagged Glucophage® while the researcher collected the cheapest
generic metformin. These samples were collected at two different times to
avoid any suspicion by the medicine sellers that their medicines were being
sampled for testing. The researcher and the sample collector posed as ordinary
shoppers while collecting the samples. Outlets not furnishing the samples were
noted and the reasons for this were obtained in order to determine if such
outlets differed systematically from those where samples were obtained. Extra136
care was taken to avoid the medicine sellers knowing that their medicines were
being sampled for quality testing. For instance, the sample collectors avoided
asking the medicine sellers any questions aside requesting to purchase the
medicines except if the medicine sellers offered to talk to them about any issues
relating to medicines. The sample collectors avoided any form of note taking
until they were outside the vicinity of the outlet or the drug market.
Outlets corresponding to the first 34 distinct random numbers for community
pharmacies, the first 37 distinct random numbers for patent medicine shops and
the first 12 distinct drug market trading outlets were to be visited. Out of the 37
patent medicine outlets randomly selected, 18 in 11 different locations were
visited to purchase the samples. Out of these 18 outlets; only two tagged
Glucophage® samples and one generic sample could be obtained. Among the
reasons given for not furnishing samples by the patent medicine vendors
included lack of knowledge by the store keepers as to whether metformin was
stocked or not. This was because the owners of some of the patent medicine
shops were absent for some of the outlets visited. Also some store keepers
lacked knowledge of different brands of metformin available in the market and
some said they stock only what people ask for except in cases of special
requests for such medicines. Some of the patent medicine outlets visited
stocked only particular groups of medicines such as cough syrups as patent
medicine vendors are only licenced to sell over the counter (OTC) medicines,
so did not stock metformin, which is a prescription medicine. Some were closed
at the time the data collectors went to purchase the samples and some outlets
were no longer patent medicine shops or had moved from the location.
Following these observations, the patent medicine outlets were excluded as a
major source of metformin. The community pharmacies and the traders were
therefore included as major sources of metformin and the proportion of samples
obtained relative to their total numbers (590 and 203) respectively. Based on
this, 61 community pharmacies and 21 outlets at the Idumota drug market were
randomly selected to be visited to collect 122 samples (61 tagged Glucophage®137
and 61 cheap generic versions) and 42 samples (21 tagged Glucophage® and
21 cheap generic versions) respectively as shown in figure 9.
164Samples
82 outlets
61CP 21 drug market outlets
CP: Community pharmacies
Two samples (One Glucophage® and One generic) were sampled per outlet but at different
times from each outlet
Figure 9: Sample size and proportion of samples collected from the
different outlets types
All samples were collected in their original container. The minimum number of
units (tablets) per sample collected was 20 (if greater quantity was not
available). This was to ensure that sufficient numbers of tablets were collected
for analyses. Therefore, in this context, a sample is, at minimum 20 units from
the same batch number and tablet pack and collected from the same
location/outlet. Apart from the innovator brand; Glucophage® with the tags, all
other commercially available metformin products were regarded as generic
metformin. Sample collection commenced on the 19
th of October 2011 and was
completed on the 17
th of December 2011.138
4.6.6. Selection of samples
In shops where there were two different generic metformin products of the same
price, the cheapest was randomly selected by following the following procedure;
the researcher asked the shopkeeper to display the available brands on the
counter, pretending that she will choose which to select. She then selected a
container based on the number of available generic metformin products in
accordance to a list of random numbers generated prior to visiting the outlets.
4.6.6.1 Samples collected
Although the sample collectors aimed at stopping when a total of 82 samples of
tagged Glucophage® and 82 samples of the cheapest generic brands were
purchased, a total of 92 tagged Glucophage® and 87 cheapest Generic
metformin samples were purchased. This is because both tagged
Glucophage® and cheapest generic versions were requested in all shops
visited including the shops covering for outlets in which one of the samples had
been collected. This was done to avoid any bias being introduced in sampling
differently from the outlets. In total, samples were obtained from 90 instead of
the 61 initially proposed community pharmacies and 60 instead of 21 initially
proposed medicine outlets in the open drug market.
4.6.7 Sample processing
All the samples were initially coded following their collection by the researcher.
A sample collection form adapted from WHO, (1999) and USP/DQI (2004) was
filled out and attached to each of the medicines collected. Information filled
included the sample code, the International Non-proprietary Name (INN) and
strength, brand name, the manufacturers name and address, the price, the
batch or lot number, the manufacturing and expiry date, the NAFDAC number,139
the package size (number of units), quantity purchased as well as the date and
place of collection (See appendix 15). Following this, the text messages for the
authentication were sent from Nigeria with 5 different mobile phone lines and on
different days in order to authenticate the collected samples. This was done to
avoid any suspicion that may arise from the verification centre.
Once all the samples were verified through text message they were recoded
against the researcher’s initial coding by one of the sample collectors so as to
blind the principal researcher. The second sample collector then crosschecked
this in order to avoid any bias that may be introduced since the principal
researcher will be involved with the chemical analyses of the samples. The
tablets in each pack (sample) were divided into two portions with each
containing a minimum of 20 tablets except for samples where lower quantities
were obtained; in which case it was divided into two portions in accordance to
the amount obtained. One portion was transported to the United Kingdom by
courier on 10
th February 2012 for testing with a letter to UK Customs from UCL
School of Pharmacy indicating that the samples are not for re-sale, not for
human or veterinary consumption and are not hazardous (see appendix 6).
They were sent to the UCL School of Pharmacy pharmaceutics laboratory for
analysis. The 2
nd portion was retained in Nigeria and was repackaged with all
the packaging information on the original pack and its code written on the new
packs. This was a contingency plan put in place to avoid losing the entire
samples collected in case the first portions were seized or lost while being
transported to the United Kingdom.
All samples were within their stated shelf life as at the time of collection. All
samples were stored and kept according to the manufacturers’ recommended
storage conditions (room temperature for metformin) until analysis and
authenticity investigation was completed (see appendix 7 for the temperature
log of samples during transport and storage). They were retained in their
original packaging and safeguarded against any conditions that may cause it to140
deteriorate or degrade such as air, light, and moisture. For example each
sample was sealed in an airtight plastic with their initial codes stuck on them.
Additional efforts were made to prevent the tablets from any physical damage
while they were being transported from their site of collection (Nigeria) to where
they would be tested (London, United Kingdom). For instance the samples
were transported in a polystyrene cool box with a temperature logger inserted
into it so as to monitor temperatures the samples were exposed to during their
transit to the United Kingdom. The temperature logger was set to measure the
temperature every thirty minutes and the data generated were downloaded unto
a computer (see appendix 7). Temperature monitoring continued until analyses
were complete. In addition, the box in which the samples were transported was
sealed with the researcher’s name written across the seal so as to help easily
identify any opening of the boxes.
Following arrival of the medicines in the UK, relevant tests (packaging, NIR and
HPLC) analyses commenced. Medicines collected were analysed before their
stated expiry dates in order to prevent the results of the analysis from being
confounded by failures resulting from degradation. Analyses of the samples
were completed on the 22
nd August 2012.
Although, complex counterfeits with no differences in packaging and content of
active ingredient have been found, research shows that in most cases
counterfeits can be identified through thorough checking of the packaging and
other simpler techniques such as NIR conducted in addition to methods that can
give an indication of the content of their active ingredients. This study did not
aim at determining bioequivalence of samples but rather sought to validate the
information from MAS in order to find out if there were any counterfeits and to
give an indication of the quality of the samples studied in terms of their active
ingredient. Given the time available to complete this PhD, the choice of the141
analytical methods (packaging, NIR and HPLC) used in this study to meet the
research objectives is justifiable.
4.6.8 Packaging analysis
Packaging analysis involved visually checking the packaging for obvious
differences in the colour of the packaging, differences in font and font size and
checking for spelling mistakes and wrong language construction. The WHO
visual inspection tool kit was employed in conducting the packaging analysis
(See appendix 8). The analysis was performed in comparision to genuine
products from the manufacturers. Any differences in appearance meant that
the sample failed the packaging analysis.
4.6.9 Short Message Service (SMS) authentication of the
samples
Following collection of all the samples, the tagged Glucophage® samples were
initially coded and then authenticated. Random numbers corresponding to the
number of sachets in each pack of Glucophage® were generated. The sachet
corresponding to the first random number generated when the pack was
opened from the right side was collected for authentication. Authentication was
done via SMS by scratching off the panel on the back of the card of medicine
and sending the unique PIN number to a five digit short code, 38353 to check if
the medicine was genuine (“OK, Original”) or fake. The Glucophage® samples
were authenticated via the four network providers enrolled in the scheme (GLO,
MTN, Etisalat and Airtel) on five different days using 5 different mobile phones.
This was done to ensure that there was no suspicion that medicines were being
authenticated as part of a research project.
4.7 Near Infrared Spectroscopy (NIRS) analysis
NIR involves exciting molecules in a compound in order to generate a unique
fingerprint (Kaur et al., 2010). It uses the Near Infrared region of the
electromagnetic spectrum, which is approximately between 800-2500nm. The142
fingerprint obtained from NIR shows if the compounds in a sample are not in
correct proportion, which indicates that it may be counterfeit. This method is
non-destructive in that the samples remain intact after analysis and less time
consuming. It is often utilised in the measurement of homogeneity and particle
size of tablet components. In addition to this, NIR can yield both qualitative and
quantitative information about medicines (Deisingh, 2005). This means that it
can detect medicines that are counterfeit and also determine the concentration
of active ingredients of the samples. However, its major disadvantages are that
it is affected by humidity, position of the sample relative to the probe and the
type of tablet surface (Deisingh, 2005).
4.7.1 Procedure for NIR analysis
The Foss NIRSystems 6500 spectrometer was used. A tablet sample was
placed in the machine and the NIR spectrum was obtained. The surface of the
tablet sample was scraped and the same process repeated in order to find out if
the film coating on the tablets had any effect on the NIR spectrum. The two
spectra (with and without the film coating) obtained were the same, so it was
concluded that the presence of the film coating on the metformin tablets had no
effect on the NIR analysis. The tablets were therefore tested without scrapping
off the surface.
In order to ensure that the resulting spectrum was representative of the sample
being tested and that the results were accurate, ten intact tablets from each of
the authentic samples of metformin products from the manufacturers were
measured once on each side. The mean Standard Normal Variate (SNV)
second derivative (D2) spectrum was then taken from the 20 spectra per
sample in the portable Unscrambler software version 9.7. This was done to
help remove the effect of particle size and scatter that may be caused by the
different orientations and sides of the tablets in the NIR spectrometer. The
randomly selected samples from the outlets were measured in the same way as143
the authentic samples to get the mean SNV-D2 spectrum for each metformin
sample collected. The spectra of the authentic samples from the manufacturers
and those from the corresponding samples from the outlets were then
compared using correlation in wavelength space (CWS) method. The
correlation coefficient (r) of the samples analysed were obtained using the
Microsoft Excel 2013 software. This method of spectra comparison was used
because it has been shown in previous studies to be easy and fast (Moffat et
al., 2010). It enabled comparison to be made between the correlation
coefficient (r) of the SNV-D2 mean spectra of the samples from the outlets and
that of the authentic sample. The closer the r is to 1, the greater the similarity
between the tested sample and the authentic sample.
Previous research in this area has shown that the spectra of counterfeit
medicines always fall below a correlation coefficient of 0.95 (Moffat et al., 2010).
Therefore, for the present research, a threshold of r< 0.95 was used to identify if
the samples from the outlets (the test samples) were counterfeit. Test samples
were said to be authentic if their correlation coefficient (r) was > 0.95.
4.8 Analysis by High Performance Liquid
Chromatography (HPLC)
HPLC is used to separate, identify and quantify compounds present in a
sample. While the retention times are used to identify the compounds, the area
under the curve helps to quantify the compounds (Clark, 2007). In order to
determine the quantities of active ingredient present, pure samples are often
used as reference (Kaur et al., 2010). Its major advantages are its accuracy,
specificity and precision while some of its disadvantages include that it is
expensive to conduct, requires some degree of expertise and destructive as the
samples analysed cannot be re-used.144
4.8.1 Materials
The High Performance Liquid Chromatographic system was made up of Agilent
HPLC model (1200 series) with a quaternary pump, sample thermostat, column
thermostat, thermostatic auto sampler and variable wavelength programmable
detector. Analysis was carried out with a C18 column (Discovery® HS F5 HPLC
Column). The Metter Telledo electronic balance (AX 105) was used for
weighing. Analytically pure metformin, acetonitrile, methanol, trifluorocacetic
acid used were purchased from Sigma-Aldrich. The acetonitrile, methanol,
trifluorocacetic acid and water (TKA water purification system) used were of
HPLC grade.
4.8.2 Chromatographic parameters
For the HPLC analysis, a flow rate of 1.0 mL/minute and detection wavelength
of 210nm was used. The sample injection volume was 10µL and the column
was maintained at a temperature of 40
oC. The run time for each injection was 7
minutes.
4.8.3 Method development and sample preparation
Metformin hydrochloride is an oral anti-diabetic medicine that belongs to the
biguanide class. Its chemical name is 1,1-dimethylbiguanide hydrochloride. C18
column (Discovery® HS F5 HPLC Column) was used for the analysis of the
metformin samples at the chromatographic parameters stated above. The
buffer used was 0.1% trifluoroacetic acid (PH: 2-3) while the mobile phase was
acetonitrile. After the chromatographic conditions were set and the instrument
was stabilised to obtain a steady baseline, the calibration curve was obtained
using the pure metformin. 0.01218g of pure metformin was weighed and put
into a 100ml volumetric flask. 10mls of methanol was added, shaken and
sonicated to dissolve the metformin. This was then diluted with 0.1%
trifluoroacetic acid (1ml trifluoroacetic acid in 1000mls of water) to get a stock145
solution of concentration of 120µg/ml. 9ml, 8ml, 7ml, 6ml, 5ml, 4ml, 3ml were
respectively obtained from the stock solution and put in 10mls volumetric flasks.
These were then made up to 10ml respectively using 0.1%trifluoroacetic acid.
The solutions were then analysed in HPLC instrument and the chromatograms
were recorded. The readings (the area under the curve for the different
concentrations) obtained were used to plot the calibration curve. The mean
retention time for metformin was 4.5 minutes.
After obtaining the calibration curve, analysis of the individual tablet samples
commenced. The tablet samples equivalent to 500mg metformin were
prepared by crushing and dissolving in 0.1% trifluoroacetic acid using the
ultrasonic cleaner, shaken and made up to 100ml using 0.1% TFA (5000µg/ml
solution). The solution was well shaken and allowed to settle for about 10
minutes to eliminate any bubbles generated by shaking the conical flask. It was
then diluted further by withdrawing 2ml and making it up to 100ml (100µg/ml). A
2ml syringe was used to withdraw the solution and each sample solution was
filtered with the 0.45µm sterile Millex filter. The filtered solution was then put into
the HPLC vials and screwed with the cap. Each sample was prepared in
duplicate. After the chromatographic conditions were set and the instrument
was stabilised to obtain a steady baseline, the prepared sample solutions were
then loaded in the instrument according to the sequence template. The sample
solutions were run/injected in duplicates and the chromatograms recorded.
4.8.4 Method validation
The method developed for the HPLC analysis was validated for linearity and
range, precision, and system suitability according to the International
Conference on Harmonisation (ICH) guidelines.
4.8.4.1 Linearity and Range
The linearity and range of the method was determined by recording the
response of a standard metformin preparation at 8 different concentrations146
prepared in the range of 40 to 120% (although the range for linearity is between
80-120%) of nominal concentration injected three times each. The linear
regression analysis of the data was done by method of least squares to obtain
the correlation coefficient as reported in table 5.147
Table 5: Linearity of metformin
Area of Metformin Concentration Average Predicted Residual
inj 1 inj 2 inj 3 ( g/ml) Area Response
0 26.20
1961.20 2002.80 1982.00 36.54 1982.000 1988.38 -6.38
2645.60 2621.50 2633.55 48.72 2633.550 2642.43 -8.88
3312.90 3298.80 3305.85 60.90 3305.850 3296.49 9.36
3965.50 3952.90 3959.20 73.08 3959.200 3950.55 8.65
4600.40 4574.30 4587.35 85.26 4587.350 4604.60 -17.25
5283.80 5295.50 5289.65 97.44 5289.650 5258.66 30.99
5917.30 5920.70 5919.00 109.62 5919.000 5912.72 6.28
6544.30 6543.70 6544.00 121.80 6544.000 6566.78 -22.77
Slope 53.699
Mean
conc. 79.17
Intercept 26.204
Correlation Coefficient 0.9999
Residual Sum Of Squares 2098.228
Theoretical 100% conc. 100.000
Intercept/(slope x nominal
conc.) 0.488  Ratio
95% CI of intercept 106.573 to -54.165
Results:148
Slope 53.70
Intercept 26.20
Correlation Coefficient 0.9999
Correlation coefficient is more than 0.995
The residual plots does not have a systematic trend
The results from the linearity of metformin meet the acceptance criteria as
specified (correlation coefficient greater than 0.995 and no systematic trend in
the residuals) and confirms that the method is linear over the concentration
range of 40 to 120 mcg/ml of metformin.
4.8.4.2 Precision
The precision of the method was determined by measuring the system
repeatability and the intermediate precision.
4.8.4.2.1 System precision
Six injections of a solution containing 100µg/ml of metformin were injected and
the coefficient of variation calculated. Below are the results.
Table 6: Percentage Relative Standard Deviation (%RSD) for system
precision
Sample injections Area
GLUCO for Preci inj 1 5390.2
GLUCO for Preci inj 2 5389.6
GLUCO for Preci inj 3 5412.7
GLUCO for Preci inj 4 5391.4
GLUCO for Preci inj 5 5407.0
GLUCO for Preci inj 6 5422.3
Mean 5402.2
SD 13.83
%RSD 0.26
The %(RSD) of the areas of the standard metformin is less than 0.85, thus the
system precision is acceptable.149
4.8.4.2.2 Method precision
At least 6 tablets were analysed to check the method precision. The product
samples were the same as were used for establishing system precision with the
assays being performed on a different day. The time interval between the two
occasions was < 7 days. Table 7 below shows the relative %RSD for the
method precision.
Table 7: Percentage Relative Standard Deviation (%RSD) for method
precision
Test Samples at 100% API level Area
Amount of Metformin
found (mg)
% of Metformin
(%)
inj 1 5304.60 491.50 98.30
OGL NOV 3 SAMP 1 inj 2 5350.50 495.80 99.15
inj 1 5326.40 493.50 98.70
OGL NOV 3 SAMP 2 inj 2 5350.30 495.70 99.15
inj 1 5362.40 496.90 99.37
OGL NOV 3 SAMP 3 inj 2 5413.60 501.60 100.33
inj 1 5376.30 498.20 99.63
OGL NOV 3 SAMP 4 inj 2 5399.70 500.30 100.07
inj 1 5367.40 497.30 99.47
OGL NOV 3 SAMP 5 inj 2 5365.40 497.10 99.43
inj 1 5320.30 492.90 98.59
OGL NOV 3 SAMP 6 inj 2 5324.70 493.40 98.67
Mean 99.24
overall %RSD 0.61
The % RSD is 0.61. This is less than 2, thus the method precision is
acceptable
4.8.4.3 System suitability and supplement tests
4.8.4.3.1 Stability of standard solution
Stability of metformin standard solution was checked by injecting duplicate
injections of standard solution of metformin over 96 Hours for solutions kept at
room temperature (20-25°C), as well as solutions kept in a fridge at around 4°C.
The stability data are shown in tables 8 and 9 and figures 10 and 11.150
Table 8: Percentage concentration of pure metformin (Standard) at room
temperature at different time intervals (0-96 hours
Time (Hours) % Amount of metformin
0 100.10
24 99.68
48 97.96
72 98.46
96 99.06
Figure 10: Graph of percentage concentration of pure metformin over 96
hours at room temperature151
Table 9: Percentage concentration of pure metformin (Standard) in the
fridge at different time intervals (0-96 hours)
Time (Hours) % Amount of metformin
0 100.36
24 100.06
48 99.87
72 99.73
96 99.04
Figure 11: Graph of percentage concentration of pure metformin over 96
hours in the fridge
For stability the percentage of standard in the solution should not be less than
98%. The above results confirm that the standard solution of metformin is
stable for 96 hours at room temperature and in the refrigerator.152
4.8.4.3.2 System suitability
System suitability tests were performed in order to verify that the resolution and
reproducibility of the system were adequate for the analysis to be performed.
These tests are based on the concept that the equipment, electronics, analytical
operations, and samples constitute an integral system that can be evaluated as
aw h o l e .
Table 10: System Suitability for Metformin Standard
System suitability parameters System suitability values
Rt 4.4
Capacity factor (k') 2.0
USP Tailing 1.7
Symmetry 0.49
Rt= Retention time, k'= Capacity factor
The capacity factor (K')= (Rt-T0)/T0
=(4.360-1.45)/1.45
=2 . 0
K' should not be less than 2. The USP tailing should not be more than 2, so the
system is suitable for the analysis performed.153
4.9 Data analysis for phase 1
The concentration of metformin, % RSD values, correlation coefficient, and
linear regression analysis by method of least squares were calculated using
Microsoft Excel 2013. Descriptive statistics in the Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) software version 22.0 were used to analyse the results
of the quantitative tests of the drug samples. Every component of the Medicine
Quality Assessment Reporting Guideline (MEDQUARG) for field surveys of
medicine quality as proposed by Newton et al. (2009) was reported on.
4.9.1 Descriptive statistics
Nominal variables (metformin products/brands, adherence to packaging, HPLC
and NIR requirement, outlet type and the SMS authentication result) were
described with numbers and percentages.
4.9.2 Inferential statistics
Dichotomous variables were compared using the Chi-square ( 
2-test) to test
differences in frequencies. The results of the cross tabulation analysis were
also stated. P-values of < 0.05 were considered to be significant. Association
between metformin products and quality (pass/fail of packaging, NIR and HPLC
analysis) were determined with the Chi-square test in order to assess whether
there were differences in these variables between tagged metformin;
Glucophage® and their untagged generic counterparts as this involved
comparing the proportions in categories of two nominal variables. The Chi-
square ( 
2) was used if no cell had an expected count of less than 5 for a 2 by 2
table while the Fisher’s exact test was used instead if any of the cells had an
expected count of less than 5.154
4.9.3 Data collection process-phase 2
The data collection for the second phase was not commenced until the data
collection for the first phase was completed. This was to help exclude outlets
from which samples were obtained from the qualitative phase to avoid any bias
from the medicine sellers that the researchers had sampled their medicines for
quality testing.
4.9.3.1 Study setting
Data collection for the second phase was conducted in Lagos. As previously
mentioned, Lagos is the most ethnically diverse state in Nigeria; constituting the
low, middle and high-income earners as well as rural, peri-urban and urban
dwellers, which is very typical of Nigeria. It is also home of one of the major
drug markets in Nigeria; the Idumota market. It was thought that this would
make it easier to locate traders that will be willing to participate in the study.
Also, the researcher needed to include both users of the MAS service and non-
users to meet the objectives of the research, sampling participants from Lagos
which is the largest city in which the service was first rolled out was considered
ideal as it was thought that that will aid easy recruitment of MAS users. Lagos
is home to many agencies in Nigeria including NAFDAC; hence this made
recruitment of policy makers easier.
4.9.3.2 Development of interview topic guide
The semi-structured interview topic guide was developed for each category of
stakeholders (consumers, medicine sellers and policy makers in pharmacy) to
meet the aims and objectives of this research (copies of the interview guide for
the stakeholders are presented in appendix 9). Topics explored were mainly
from the literature review conducted prior to commencing the study. The
interview included mainly open-ended questions and some closed ended
questions. The open ended questions were used to allow the participants to
describe their views and experiences in their own words as recommended by
Smith, (2010) for example consumers were asked to describe what they thought
were the potential or actual benefits of the Mobile Authentication Service.155
Closed ended questions were used to get factual data (for instance, have you
used the Mobile Authentication Service?) and to get a summary of a
participant’s view on an issue discussed (for instance, “Overall how satisfied are
you with the Mobile Authentication Service?”). Probing questions and prompts
were used to get more detailed information on the views and experiences of the
participants. Leading questions were avoided to prevent any bias that may have
arisen from participants giving anticipated responses or responses, which they
think were the interviewers’ opinion.
Questions in the interview guide were aimed at helping to get detailed views
and experiences of participants on the current situation of poor quality
medicines in Nigeria and also the recently introduced Mobile Authentication
Service. For instance, some of the topics explored for the consumers and
medicines sellers included their perceptions of the quality of medicines
distributed in Nigeria, experiences with poor quality medicines, their perception
of branded and generic medicines, initiatives against poor quality medicines and
challenges to fighting poor quality medicines, their awareness of MAS and
factors that may hinder or promote its use, their perceived benefits of MAS and
how MAS can be improved. The interview questions for the policy makers
included their perception of the quality of medicines distributed in Nigeria,
initiatives against poor quality medicines and challenges to fighting poor quality
medicines in Nigeria, their perceived benefits of MAS, factors that may affect
the use of MAS and how MAS can best be improved.
Interview sessions were held with 3 students in London to develop and check
the interviewing technique. Following the pilot interviews, the interview
schedule was modified by re-organising the order of the questions to ensure an
easy flow and that questions that fell into more than one topic were not
repeated. The recordings using the cassette recorder were unclear so it was
decided that instead of using one digital recorder and one cassette recorder,
two digital recorders would be used in the main study. The interview schedule156
was further modified during the course of the main interview sessions to
incorporate new emerging issues that were considered necessary to be
explored in greater detail. The participants were free to talk as long as they
wished and in no particular order.
4.9.3.3 Sampling strategy
4.9.3.3.1 Study sample
In order to meet the study objectives, it was necessary to include stakeholders
in the field of medicines quality/ regulation. This includes the consumers (that is
the Nigerian public) because they are the medicine users and they also form
part of the users of MAS. Medicine sellers (Community pharmacists, patent
medicine vendors and drug market traders) are also major stakeholders
included in this research because they form users of the MAS. Even though
they may not be direct users of the medicines, they are involved in purchasing
and selling of medicines. The third group of stakeholders included in this study
were the policy makers in pharmacy. This is because they are involved in
implementation of policies and interventions aimed at tackling poor quality
medicines such as MAS.
4.9.3.3.2 Inclusion and exclusion criteria
4.9.3.3.2.1 The inclusion criteria (consumers)
1) Persons who can communicate in English
2) Persons who are aware and/ have used the MAS service
3) Persons who consented verbally because they cannot write or those who
provided a written consent
4.9.3.3.2.2 Exclusion criteria (consumers)
1. Persons who cannot communicate in English157
2. Persons who are unaware and/ have not used MAS
3. Persons who have not given their consent to participate in the study
4.9.3.3.2.3 Inclusion criteria (community pharmacists, patent
medicine vendors and traders)
1. Those who are involved in selling medicines to the Nigerian public
2. Have given a written or verbal consent to participate in the study
(because they wish to be anonymous)
4.9.3.3.2.4 Exclusion criteria (community pharmacists, patent
medicine vendors and traders)
1. Those who are not involved in selling medicines to the Nigerian public
2. Those who have not given any consent to participate in the study
4.9.3.3.2.5 Inclusion criteria for regulatory body staff/ relevant
policy makers in pharmacy
1. Persons who were deemed by the researcher as knowledgeable in the
medicine policy making process in Nigeria either because they have
been introduced to the researcher as been involved with policy making or
individuals who have been delegated to talk on the views of the
regulatory body and are willing to participate in the study
2. They must have held or currently hold a post with the drug regulatory
authority in Nigeria, a medical professional organisation or regulatory
authority or the Ministry of Health to be considered knowledgeable
3. Those who have given a written consent to participate in the study158
4.9.3.3.2.6 Exclusion criteria for regulatory body staff/ relevant
policy makers in pharmacy
1. Persons who were neither introduced to the researcher as being
knowledgeable in the medicine policy making process in Nigeria nor
were delegated to talk on the views of the regulatory body
2. Persons who have not held or are not currently holding a post with the
drug regulatory authority in Nigeria, a medical professional organisation
or regulatory authority or the Ministry of Health to be considered
knowledgeable in policy making in Nigeria
3. Persons who did not consent to participate in the study or those who are
unwilling to participate in the study
Persons who can communicate in English were chosen as English is the most
widely used and official language in Nigeria. The researcher envisaged that
people of diverse ethnic groups and different native languages are most likely to
be included in the study and therefore decided to include only those who can
communicate in English. There are presently more than 250 ethnic groups in
Nigeria and with one ethnic group speaking more than one language; the total
number of languages in Nigeria is about 527 (Ethnologue, 2011). The total
number of dialects numbers even higher.
4.9.3.4 Recruitment procedure for the phase 2
Purposive sampling was used to sample the stakeholders (consumers,
medicine sellers and regulatory body staff/policy makers) included in the study.
This means that the researcher sampled with a purpose of targeting those who
met the inclusion criteria of this research. Purposive sampling is a non-random
method of sampling where a group of people or setting with a particular
characteristic is deliberately sampled (Bowling, 1997). This method of sampling159
has been shown to be useful when there is need to reach the targeted sample
quickly (Trochim, 2006).
4.9.3.4.1 Recruitment of the consumers
The consumers were recruited from the diabetic/endocrinology clinics of the
federal teaching hospital in Lagos (Lagos University Teaching Hospital, Idi
Araba, Lagos). This was chosen as the best method to recruit consumers who
have used MAS following the findings from the preliminary fieldwork conducted
which showed that most diabetic patients obtain their prescriptions from the
hospital while subsequent refills may be obtained from the private oulets such
as the community pharmacies.
4.9.3.4.2 Recruitment of the medicine sellers
The community pharmacists and the patent medicines vendors interviewed
were selected from different places in Lagos. Traders in the drug market
interviewed were key informants that were introduced to the researcher by a
pharmacist that was well known to the drug market traders.
4.9.3.4.3 Recruitment of the policy makers
Five policy makers previously known to the researcher were contacted by
telephone and/ e-mails because they have a present role or have held a key
position at the Pharmacists’ Council of Nigeria, Pharmaceutical Society of
Nigeria or NAFDAC and met the other inclusion criteria. Appointment for
interview was scheduled on the dates and times that were suitable for them. All
the interviews took place in their respective offices.160
For each category of stakeholders, there was no further recruitment once
similar themes began to emerge or when there were no new emerging themes
(point of saturation).
4.9.3.5 Data collection instruments
All the participants were approached by the researcher who told them about the
research and sought their consent to participate. Leaflets containing a detailed
description of the research as well as consent forms were given to all the
participants except the traders (See appendices 10, 11 and 12). There was
opportunity for them to ask any questions they may have concerning the
research and clear any concerns they may have. Their permission to tape
record the interviews was sought. Following this, semi-structured interviews
were conducted for participants who met the inclusion criteria, were willing to
participate and gave their consent (written or verbal for those who cannot read
or write or those who preferred not to write) to participate in the study using the
appropriate interview guide.
As previously noted, the consumers were sampled from the Lagos University
Teaching Hospital (LUTH). The hospital was visited on the diabetic clinic days
(Tuesdays and Thursdays) in order to easily reach the target population, which
were consumers that have used MAS. Consumers/patients were approached
and given the information leaflet and verbal explanation of what the research
was about and what the interviews involved as well as consent forms. If
consent was granted (either written or oral in the case the patient preferred not
to write or cannot read or write) they were asked for their preferred convenient
place and time to be interviewed. All the patients approached preferred to be
interviewed while they were still in the hospital waiting to see their doctor at the
consultation section of the diabetic clinic or while they were waiting to collect
their medicines from the pharmacy unit. Even though the interviews were
conducted in the quietest area in order to minimise interruptions during the161
interview, they were told they could excuse themselves at anytime to see their
doctor or nurse or pharmacist.
All the traders preferred to be interviewed immediately they were approached.
Written information leaflets and consent forms were not given to the traders due
to the nature of the market and to avoid any suspicion. Therefore only verbal
explanation of the research objectives was given to them and any clarifications
they needed were provided. Traders who verbally consented to participate in
the study were interviewed. This method of obtaining consent was justifiable in
this circumstance as the researcher envisaged that there were no risks to the
participants and no potential invasion of their privacy. Their rights of voluntary
participation and withdrawal at any time during the interview were respected.
The pharmacists and patent medicine vendors were approached and given the
information leaflets and consent forms. Semi-structured interviews were
conducted for those who met the inclusion criteria and gave their consent to
participate. Apart from one pharmacist who preferred to be interviewed at her
home, all the other community pharmacists and patent medicine vendors
preferred to be interviewed at their outlets immediately they were approached or
on subsequent appointment with the researcher. They were therefore told they
could excuse themselves at anytime to attend to their clients. One pharmacist
approached declined to take part due to time constraint and one other
pharmacist could not take part as no convenient time could be arranged. All the
pharmacists and patent medicine vendors who took part in the study gave their
written consent.
The policy makers were contacted by telephone or e-mail and appointment for
the semi-structured interview was booked with each of them on the day and
times they considered was most convenient. No response was received from
one out the five policy makers contacted. The interviews with the 4 policy162
makers took place at their respective offices on the day agreed. They were
also given the information leaflets and consent forms and the interviews were
conducted if written consent was provided. Their rights of voluntary participation
and withdrawal at any time during the interview were respected.
All participants were given a demographic data sheet after the interview (See
appendix 13). Variables explored from the demographic data sheet were their
age, gender, educational background, place of residence and work status (for
consumers), position (for policy maker), location of outlet (for community
pharmacies and patent pedicine vendors) and years of practie or work in the
field of pharmacy/medicines regulation. Although it was anticipated that each
interview would take about 20 to 30 minutes, participants were given the
opportunity to talk for a longer time if they wished so that greater details could
be obtained. Two digital recorders were used to record the interviews to avoid
any disappointment of one of the recorders not working, to ensure that nothing
was missed out and to ensure validity.
A reflective diary was kept by the researcher and all observatory notes and
interview summary were written immediately after the interviews. This included
details about the time and place of the interview, the participant, duration of the
interview, and details about the content and emerging themes. The summary
notes were attached to the transcripts in order to facilitate the data analysis
stage. Figure 12 shows the different stages of the data collection in the 2
phases of this study.163
Phase 1
Collection of samples of metformin and
analysis
SMS authentication of tagged tagged Glucophage®
samples, Packaging and chemical (NIR and HPLC)
analysis of all metformin samples and data analysis
using Microsoft Excel 2013 and SPSS statistical
software version 22.0
Phase 2
Recruitment of participants, collection of
demographic information and conducting semi-
structured interviews with stakeholders
Reporting of demographics using descriptive statistics
and analysis of semi-structured interviews using
framework analysis approach to manage data in
Nvivo®
Figure 12: Data collection stages
4.9.4 Data analysis for phase 2
The semi-structured interviews were transcribed verbatim and any confusing
information was confirmed with the participants. Various techniques were
employed to make appropriate sense of the data collected. Deductive (theory
driven) approach to data analysis was combined with inductive (finding driven)
approach while analysing the data. The deductive approach formed a major
part of the analysis as data collected were coded into various themes, which the
researcher had identified as important to interpretation based on the variables
identified from the literature, which formed part of the conceptual framework of
the research. However, the researcher employed some element of induction by
being open to new and relevant findings that were not in the framework.
Comments and thoughts on incidents and linkages between variables were kept
as the analysis progressed in order to build an in-depth understanding of all the
issues explored. By employing a deductive approach to analysing the data
obtained, it was easier to explain patterns of relationships better since data
were grouped by clearly defined variables obtained from the pre-conceived
conceptual framework.164
The methodology employed in analysing the data obtained from the qualitative
aspect of this research was the framework analysis (a form of deductive data
analysis approach). In framework analysis, data are gathered, sifted, charted
and sorted in line with key issues and themes (Srivastata and Thomson, 2009).
Framework analysis is used when the aim of the research is to generate
recommendations within a specific period on a given issue with specific a priori
issues that may inform the research question and with a predetermined sample
population as is the case with the present study (Srivastata and Thomson,
2009).
Framework analysis allows for generation of rich data from interviews to be
complemented with observational notes. The process involves 5 distinct
stages; familiarisation (this is done by listening to the tapes arising from the
interviews, reading the entire transcripts severally, reading the observatory
notes taken during the interview and summary notes written shortly after the
interview so as to get the researcher acquainted with the details to make a
holistic sense of the interview before fragmenting them into parts). It is during
the familiarisation stage that themes start to emerge (Rabiee, 2004). This stage
is followed by identification of a thematic framework (this is done by writing
memos, for example short phrases and ideas by the margin of the text).
The third stage is indexing. This involves sifting data, highlighting and sorting
quotes and making comparisons within and between cases. This stage leads to
charting where the quotes are lifted from the original text and are re-arranged
under the developed thematic contents. The final stage is mapping and
interpretation of the data.165
In a bid to make the analytical process more reliable or dependable, an audit
trail of how the data were collected and analysed was maintained. In addition,
all the procedures involved in the data analysis were counterchecked by
another researcher, for instance the first two interviews were recoded by
another researcher so as to establish inter-rater reliability.
Framework analysis has the advantages of being dynamic (in that it allows for
change such as additions and amendments throughout the analytical process).
It is systematic and comprehensive (in that it allows a full review of all the
materials used in the data collection phase) and transparent (in that it allows
easy access to the original textual data making it easier for others other than
the primary researcher to view and judge the analytical process and
interpretation. Framework analysis also allows within case and between case
analysis thereby making it easy for comparisons and associations to be made
(Srivastata and Thomson, 2009). It is also flexible as it allows the researchers
to either collect all the data before analysing them or to analyse the data while
data collection is still on-going (Rabiee, 2004). For the present research, data
analysis commenced while the data collection was still on-going so as to
explore evolving issues from the analysis.
In order to facilitate the data analysis process, the transcripts from the semi-
structured interviews were analysed using the Nvivio 10® Software programme
which is a Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS).
This has the capacity to facilitate the efficient organisation and analysis of this
type of data and has a friendly outlook interface, allowing the use of colours to
differentiate between themes. This qualitative data analysis software package
also supports the framework methodological approach employed in this study.
This software enabled the data obtained from the interviews to be organised
into nodes, making case based and thematic analysis easier.166
4.9.5 Ethical considerations
It is the researcher’s responsibility to ensure that informed consent is obtained
from the participants, that the participants are protected from harm and that
their privacy is ensured (Bloomberg and Volpe, 2008). Other ethical issues in
quantitative research such as the objectivity and generalisability of the study
and in qualitative research such as the issues of trustworthiness (reliability and
validity of the research, reflexivity and transferability) were critically considered.
Although there were no significant ethical threats to the participants anticipated
by the researcher, steps were taking to ensure that all the necessary ethical
issues were appropriately considered. Details of how they were considered are
shown below.
4.9.5.1 Informed consent and confidentiality
Participants were given the information leaflet that contained details of the aims
of the research, the methods to be used, the possible outcomes and their role if
they choose to take part. Verbal explanation of the study was also given to
participants and they were given the chance to ask questions. Participants
were included in the research if they agreed to take part either through written
or in some cases through a verbal consent, for instance if the participant cannot
read or write or if they preferred not to write. Data collected were kept securely
in a password-protected computer throughout the research, with access granted
only to the researcher. The filled consent forms were kept secured in a locked
cabinet. In order to ensure confidentiality and anonymity, codes were assigned
to all participants included in the preliminary fieldwork and during the qualitative
phase of the research. All outlets visited during the preliminary fieldwork and
the quantitative phases of the study were coded. These codes were also used
during the analysis of the data and cannot be linked to the participants or the
outlets in anyway. The researcher removed all identifying information such as
names of the participants noted on digital recordings immediately after they167
were transcribed. The names of the participants or their identifiers have not and
will not be used in any publication or reports from this study.
In accordance to the Data Protection Act of 1998, data collected were used
strictly for the purpose of this research and was not transferable to other parties.
As previously noted, data collected were kept securely throughout the research,
with access granted only to the researcher and other members of the research
team. This will be kept securely up to 5 years after the research is completed
and would then be appropriately destroyed afterwards.
4.9.5.2 Beneficence
Participants were informed that their contributions would help to achieve the
aims and objectives of the research and contribute to existing literature and
research on medicines’ quality as well as aid formulation of adequate
interventions aimed at curbing the problem of poor quality medicines in Nigeria.
4.9.5.3 Non-malfeasance
To the best of the researcher’s ability, appropriate measures were taken to
protect the interests of all participants in this research. For example, interviews
were halted if participants became uncomfortable to continue with the interview
or if they needed to attend to other more crucial issues such as seeing their
doctor (for consumers) and attending to clients (for medicine sellers). Also,
participation in the study was voluntary, so participants were given the
opportunity to withdraw from the study at any time if they wished to do so.168
4.9.5.4 Issues of trustworthiness
4.9.5.4.1 Validity and reliability
Efforts were made to ensure the validity and reliability of the study. Validity
refers to the extent to which the research measures what it aims to measure
while reliability refers to the consistency with which it measures it over time
(Bloomberg and Volpe, 2008).
In order to ensure the reliability of the study, unclear responses were verified
from the participants before moving on to the next question. Inconsistencies
observed were also followed up and clarified from the participants. Also,
another researcher counter checked the initial codes generated from the
interview transcripts. In addition, two digital recorders were used to record the
interviews to avoid any disappointment of one of the recorders not working, to
ensure that nothing was missed out and to ensure validity. An audit trail of the
evolution of the researcher’s thinking as well as rationale for the decisions and
choices made during the research process was documented in order to ensure
‘transparency of method’ as advocated by Bloomberg and Volpe (2008).
In order to ensure the validity, the inter-relationship between the aims and
objectives of the research, the conceptual framework, and methods used for
collecting and analysing the data were critically examined. Also appropriate
interviewing techniques were employed during the semi-structured interview
sessions, for instance the use of leading questions were as much as possible
avoided in order to be sure that data obtained reflected the views and
experiences of the participants and not that of the researcher. Also, in order to
avoid influencing the views of the participants, the researcher avoided
interrupting participants when they were answering questions. The use of
neutral comments such as ‘I see’ and ‘hmmm’ instead of evaluative comments
like ‘good’ were employed whenever the participants sought to confirm their169
own views and at such points, they were reminded that there were no right or
wrong answers to the questions they were asked, instead their honest opinions
on the topics discussed was what was needed.
Furthermore, the findings of the research were compared with existing literature
and some of the participants were asked to comment on the extent to which the
findings reflected their views and experiences as recommended by Smith
(2010).
4.9.5.5 Reflexivity
Reflexivity includes a process of demonstrating how the research can be traced
back to its origins (Bloomberg and Volpe, 2008). The researcher acknowledges
that there may be some bias in the methodology, analyses and interpretation of
the findings of this research because she is a pharmacist from Nigeria where
the study was conducted. This means that prior knowledge of medicines
distribution and regulation in Nigeria may have influenced the claims made
concerning the data obtained from this study. To minimise this kind of bias, the
researcher engaged in on-going critical reflection by journaling and discussing
with colleagues. The researcher also remained open and believed that it is
possible for others to have a different perception of issues.
An audit trail of the evolution of the researcher’s thinking as well as rationale for
the decisions and choices made during the research process was documented
and presented in detail in section 7.5 of this thesis. In addition, all the
procedures involved in the data collection analysis were counterchecked. For
instance, as previously noted the first two interviews were recoded by another
researcher. Also the list of outlets in the drug market made by the researcher
was counterchecked by one of the sample collectors.170
The audit trail and memos kept throughout the research as well as the field
notes and transcripts offer an opportunity to assess the findings of the research.
4.9.5.6 Transferability and generalisability
Both concepts of transferability and generalisability were considered in this
research because it consisted of both quantitative and qualitative research
methods. Transferability is a term used in qualitative research to refer to the
“applicability of findings to other situations under similar, but not identical,
conditions” (Patton, 1990 cited in Bloomberg and Volpe, 2008). Through the in-
depth and detailed descriptions obtained from the participants who took part in
the semi-structured interviews, the researcher believes that the findings of the
qualitative phase of this research may be of relevance in some broader
contexts. This means that the findings arising from this research may not be
applicable to only Lagos where the research was conducted but may be
applicable to other similar areas. Also the recommendations arising from this
research may also be beneficial in other contexts such as other African
countries facing similar drug quality problems as Nigeria and countries that are
adopting the use of MAS.
Generalisablity in quantitative research refers to the extent to which conclusions
from a study on a sample population can be extended to the population at large
(Writing@CSU, 1993-2012). The large sample size of medicines analysed in
this study, the study site (Lagos) which has the largest number of medicine
outlets in Nigeria with urban, peri-urban and rural areas as well as the random
sampling method used in this study are necessary attributes which may make
the results and conclusions from the quantitative phase generalisable. Although
metformin was anaysed in this study, the findings arising from it such as the low
failure rate may be similar to other medicines for the management of other
chronic diseases such as the antihypertensives, which have not been
predominantly counterfeited in the past. This situation may be different for other171
medicines that have been commonly counterfeited such as antibiotics and
antimalarials. Therefore it may be necessary for a repeat study of this kind
involving large sample size of a medicine such as the antibiotics to be
conducted to know if similar findings to this research will be obtained and how
the findings of this research may be applicable to other categories of medicines.
Although it was thought that conducting this research in Lagos should represent
the Nigeria situation and make the findings generalizable to other parts of
Nigeria because of the perculiar attributes of Lagos previously mentioned, the
findings may not have been entirely the same if this study was conducted in the
Northern parts of Nigeria given the socio-economic and cultural differences
between the North and South of Nigeria (where this study was counducted).
However, this can only be confirmed through a repeat study in other settings
such as the Northern Nigeria.
4.9.6 Methodological limitations
4.9.6.1 Collection of drug samples
One of the challenges faced while compiling the list of outlets in the drug market
is the lack of names and adequate numbering system for the outlets. In
addition to this, the streets could not be easily located through the Global
Positioning System (GPS). Some of the shops were closed at the time the
market was visited to compile the number of the outlets and as such were
excluded, as the reason for their closure could not be easily ascertained. This
is because the data collectors thought that any further enquiries about shop
closures might raise some suspicion that they were sampling medicines for
some official purposes. In addition to these, the criteria for inclusion of the
outlets in the list was if medicines were being stocked and sold in the shops
which made it difficult to differentiate the retail outlets where medicines should
be sampled from the wholesale outlets which only sell medicines in large
quantity. This caused some delay during the sample collection as more outlets
had to be visited to be able to obtain the number of samples needed for the
study.172
Furthermore, the disorganised nature of the drug market may have affected the
random sampling technique as some furnished samples even after they said
they did not have the medicines asked for. Out of the quest to sell, they often
obtained the medicines from elsewhere to sell to the data collectors. Although
such samples were purchased, as that is what is obtainable in practice, they
may have obtained it from a previously sampled outlet or outlets not in the
sampling frame.
In addition, some of the shopkeepers at the drug market and the community
pharmacists may not have supplied the cheapest available brand as the data
collectors observed that some of them were sceptical of furnishing their
cheapest available brand especially when it was requested against their advice.
This may be because they are not confident of the quality of the cheapest
brands as explained by some of the shop keepers, in which case they may have
supplied what they felt was of good quality and at a reasonable price and not
necessarily their cheapest available brand.
The rainy season and the early closure of the market on some of the days
disrupted the sample collection from the drug market. The Salah public holiday
also disrupted sample collection from the community pharmacies as most of
them were closed during the holiday period. The sample collection was also
delayed by the on-going local government elections at the time, which meant
that some areas could not be visited on some days due to safety concerns by
the researcher and the other sample collectors.
4.9.6.2 Analyses of drug samples
Differences in colour between packets could not be ascertained as part of the
packaging analysis that was conducted because some of the medicines were173
sold without the original packaging even though the sample collectors
requested that the medicines should be in its original packaging. The use of
handheld portable counterfeit detection device 3 (CD-3) which uses an
alternate light source with multiple wavelengths in the visible (350-700nm) and
non-visible (>700nm) electromagnetic spectrum (Ranieri et al, 2014) may have
provided more accurate information on any differences between the samples
and the genuine products.
The chemical analyses of the samples were by Near Infrared (NIR)
spectroscopy and High Performance Liquid Chromatography (HPLC). Both NIR
and HPLC techniques yield useful information. However, they are also limited
in various ways. For instance, the sample preparation stage of the HPLC
analysis is time consuming. Also, the technique is expensive and requires
some degree of expertise. This method of analysis is also destructive which
means that the tablets used were destroyed in the process of the analysis, so
would not be available for subsequent analysis. Analysis of the samples via
NIR is also subject to some limitations. NIR is susceptible to external
interference and climate change, which means that the results obtained through
this method may be confounded by some of these factors.
4.9.6.3 Sampling and recruitment of participants
Consumers were recruited from the hospital. This may not be representative of
the views of the other consumers. This is because patients who visit the
hospital may be more concerned about their health as previous studies have
shown. This may mean that only consumers who are more cautious of the kind
and source of medicines they take have been recruited and may have held a
different opinion when compared to other patients who obtain their medicines
from elsewhere such as the community pharmacies, patent medicine shops and
the drug market. Furthermore, it may have been better to distribute
questionnaires as a first step towards recruiting the consumers to participate in174
the qualitative phase so that those who have used the service can easily be
identified and to triangulate the data obtained. Also some particular group of
people may have been excluded from the interviews since it was conducted in
English. This means that the views of those who cannot speak and understand
English may have been excluded.
4.9.6.4 Information leaflet and consent forms
Some consumers and patent medicine vendors did not want to read the
information leaflet or complete the consent forms either because they were not
literate enough to read and write or because they considered it too formal. Most
of them preferred that the research be explained to them and if they wished to
participate gave a verbal consent. The traders in the drug market were not
given any paperwork (information leaflet and consent forms) because the
researcher was informed by an informant that presentation of any paper work to
this group would make them reluctant to participate in the study as they were
more likely to view the process as an official activity linked to the government
from their previous experience. An informal forum was therefore created by the
researcher whereby each trader was told what the research is about and what
participating in the study would involve. They were also informed of how the
information from the research would be used or disseminated and how their
confidentiality would be maintained. Any questions they had concerning the
research was answered by the researcher. Their rights not to participate or to
withdraw at any point were respected. Although this technique used for the
traders was considered the most appropriate way to obtain information from
them, it may have affected the findings from this research as they may have
responded differently if they were given the information leaflets and consent
forms.175
4.9.6.5 During the interviews
Some of the interview sessions with the patients were often interrupted by the
doctors/nurses/pharmacists because most of them preferred to be interviewed
while they were waiting to see their doctor or while awaiting collection of their
medicines from the hospital pharmacy. This also happened with the medicine
sellers who in most cases preferred that interviews be conducted at their place
of work and were often interrupted if they needed to attend to patients and by
noise as most of the outlets were located close to the roads. These
interruptions may have disrupted the flow of the interviews in these stakeholder
categories.
Due to the sensitive nature of the topic addressed, most of the participants
exercised some caution in giving information especially participants in the policy
making group. This also seemed common with majority of the medicine sellers
(community pharmacists, patent medicine vendors and traders) and few of the
consumers. For instance, one consumer refused to be tape recorded stating
that he has held a key position with the Lagos state government, most of the
traders did not want to talk in details on issues raised and were not ready to
mention names or give instances when and where necessary. The policy
makers were cautious by avoiding giving instances or going in depth on issues
raised or questions asked rather they spoke more generally. Also, the use of
tape recorders as previously mentioned may also have limited the amount of
information given by the participants as it was observed that important
information were often given once the tape recorders were switched off. As a
result of this, the interviewer took notes of major points raised by the
participants when the recorders were switched off.
Furthermore there may have been increased willingness to give information to
the researcher by some of the participants because of her being a fellow
Nigerian as expressed by some of the participants, this may have also176
contributed some bias to the study. For instance the researcher may have
introduced some preconceived ideas from her experience of being Nigerian into
the study especially during the interviews in a bid to impress the participants in
return.
4.9.7 Conclusion
This chapter provided a detailed description of the conceptual framework from
which variables relating to MAS explored in the study were derived. It also
discussed the research methodology used and the justification for methods
chosen to collect the drug samples for the first phase, recruit the participants
that were included in the second phase and methods used to analyse the data
obtained. It showed how the different ethical issues in quantitative and
qualitative research were critically considered throughout the research process
and possible methodological limitations of this study. The results of the first and
second phases of this research are presented in the next 2 chapters, Chapter 5
and Chapter 6.177
Chapter 5
Presentation of results- Phase 1
5.1 Introduction to chapter
This chapter of my thesis presents and discusses the results of the first phase
of this study. It starts by discussing the samples collected, then the results of
the verification of tagged drug samples via text messaging. The results
obtained from the packaging and chemical (HPLC and NIR) analyses
conducted are also presented in this section.
5.2 MAS valiation and quality of medicines collected
A test validation of the Mobile Authentication Service (MAS) was conducted by
comparing the responses obtained from the MAS with the actual quality of
medicines received by the consumers via packaging and chemical analyses.
Following this, differences in quality between the tagged Glucophage® samples
and the cheapest generic versions without the tags were determined. The
samples of tagged Glucophage® and other cheaper generic versions were
obtained from different outlets in Lagos, Nigeria as previously noted.
5.2.1 Plan for sample collection
5.2.1.1 Sample size and collection of samples for analysis
Following the sample size calculation performed to determine the number of
samples that would be adequate, details of which are presented in chapter 4 of
this thesis, the sample collectors aimed at stopping when a total of 82 samples
of tagged Glucophage® and 82 samples of the cheapest generic brands were178
purchased. However, a total of 92 tagged Glucophage® and 87 cheapest
Generic versions were purchased. This was because both tagged
Glucophage® and cheapest generic versions were requested in all shops
visited including the shops covering for outlets in which one of the samples had
been collected. This was done to avoid any bias that may have been
introduced by sampling differently from the outlets.
5.2.2 Samples collected
None of the outlets visited stocked untagged Glucophage® contrary to
observations in the preliminary fieldwork. This may be because all the
Glucophage® without the tags which were in stock during the preliminary field
work when the service was newly introduced had been used up. This may be a
confirmation of some of the reasons given by medicine sellers for stocking
untagged Glucophage® during the preliminary fieldwork; that the untagged
Glucophage® was from the old stock obtained before MAS was commenced.
Tagged Glucophage® in addition to 21 other cheaper metformin products
(branded and unbranded generics) from different manufacturers were obtained
as shown in the table 11.179
Table 11: Metformin products collected
S/no Codes of
metformin
products
collected
Names of
metformin
products
collected
Name of manufacturer stated on
the packaging
Name of distributor in Nigeria
1Z G l u c o p h a g e ®M e r c k S a n t e s a s , F r a n c e B i o f e m p h a r m a c e u t i c a l s
2A D i a b e t m i n ® H o v i d B h d , M a l a y s i a P h a r m a t e x N i g . L t d
3B D i a b e x ® M e d o p h a r m , I n d i a S o l i d i u m P h a r m a c e u t i c a l s L i m i t e d
4C G l u m i n ® R a j a t P h a r m C h e m L t d . , I n d i aS e a g r e e n P h a r m a c e u t i c a l s L t d .
5D I o n o p h a g e ® M B L P h a r m a , P a k i s t a n I n n o b e s t P h a r m a c e u t i c a l C o m p a n y
(Nig) Ltd.
6E G l u c o p a c ® Z h e j i a n g D N D P h a r m a c e u t i c a l s C o
Ltd., China
Pacmai International Ltd.
7F D i a m e t ® M a y a n d B a k e r N i g e r i a P l c . ,
Nigeria
May and Baker Nigeria Plc., Nigeria
8G V P L ® M e t f o r m i n J i a n g s u R u i n i a n Q i a n j i n
Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.
Vixa Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.
9H A s k a p h a g e ® E n d o l a b s L i m i t e d , I n d i a T e n d e r w e l l l i m i t e d
10 I Formet® Strides Arcolab Ltd., India Strides vital (Nig) Ltd.
11 J Sanformin® Micro Labs Limited, India Sanpharm Nigeria Limited
12 K Lifeback®
metformin
Rhydburg Pharmaceuticals Ltd.,
India
Lifeback pharmacy and stores limited
13 L Trippleace®
metformin
Healthy life Pharma PVT Ltd.,
India
Trippleace pharmaceuticals Ltd.
14 M Betaphage® Shine Pharmaceuticals Limited,
India
Eurosource Pharm and Chem Inds.
(WA) Ltd.
15 N Metformin by
Bristol
Laboratories
Bristol Laboratories Ltd., United
Kingdom
-
16 O Juformin® Juhel Nigeria Ltd., Nigeria Juhel Nigeria Ltd.
17 P Diamin® Henan Topfond Pharmaceuticals
Co. Ltd., China
Korlyns Pharmaceuticals
18 Q Gluformin® Nigerian German Chemicals Plc,
Nigeria
Nigerian German Chemicals
19 R Miformin® Mano Greater Pharma Ltd.,
Thailand
Didachons Pharm. Ltd.
20 S Glucophage® by
Merck (Private)
Merck (private) limited, Pakistan -
21 T BG Lophage® Stallion Laboratories PVT. Ltd.,
India
BG Pharmacy and stores Limited
22 U Climax®
metformin
Mancare Pharmaceuticals PVT.
Ltd., India
Royal Pharmacy180
In total, 22 different metformin products were collected from the community
pharmacies and the drug market as shown in table 11. This included the
innovator brand; Glucophage® and 21 generic metformin products. Only one of
the generic versions (N) is unbranded while the rest are branded. Three of the
metformin products collected (F, O and Q) are locally produced while the 19
others are imported. Ten of the generic sample brands were claimed to be
manufactured in India, three in Nigeria, three in China, two in Pakistan, one in
France, one in Thailand, one in the United Kingdom and one in Malaysia. Four
of the cheapest generic brands (S, T, N and U) did not have a NAFDAC
number.
5.2.3 Collection of original samples from manufacturers
Original samples from the pharmaceutical companies/ manufacturers stated on
the pack of the medicines were collected in order to compare their quality
against the other samples obtained using packaging analysis and Near
Infrared spectroscopy. This was done to help detect any differences that may
show samples that may be counterfeit. All the manufacturers stated on the
packet of the medicines were initially contacted via the telephone numbers and
e-mail addresses provided but no response was received. Manufacturer’s
samples were later obtained for 20 of the samples. With the exception of N
which was obtained from the UK and Q which was obtained from a wholesaler
recommended by its manufacturer; Nigerian German Chemicals (NGC)
because they had no samples in stock as at the time of visit as production of Q
was on hold at the time, the rest were obtained mainly through the medical
representatives of the company or their distributor in Nigeria. This is because
efforts to obtain them directly from the companies in their countries of
manufacture proved abortive.181
Manufacturers’ sample of S and U could not be obtained, as neither their
medical representatives nor their distributors in Nigeria could be identified. The
manufacturers stated on their packaging were repeatedly contacted for a
sample through e-mail but no response was received.
5.2.4 Quantity of each metformin product collected
Over half of the samples collected 92 (51.4%) where tagged Glucophage®
while the rest 87 (48.6%) were generic (branded and unbranded) metformin as
shown in the figure 13 below. Table 12 shows the individual quantities of the
different metformin products collected. For the purpose of this thesis all the
metformin products with the exclusion of the tagged Glucophage® samples are
regarded as generic metformin. This is because comparisons of the quality of
metformin samples collected were between the tagged Glucophage® samples
and the generic versions.
Figure 13: Quantity of tagged Glucophage® and generic metformin
samples collected182
Table 12: Total number of each metformin product collected
Group Metformin
products
collected
Number collected Percentage (%)
Tagged
Glucophage®
Z9 2 5 1 . 4
Generic versions A 35 19.6
B7 3 . 9
C1 0 . 6
D2 1 . 1
E6 3 . 4
F7 3 . 9
G2 1 . 1
H1 0 . 6
I1 0 . 6
J1 0 . 6
K2 1 . 1
L1 0 . 6
M1 0 . 6
N1 0 . 6
O1 0 . 6
P1 0 . 6
Q1 0 5 . 6
R2 1 . 1
S3 1 . 7
T1 0 . 6
U1 0 . 6
5.2.5 Outlets/Sources of samples collected
The community pharmacies and the drug market were included as major
sources of metformin and the proportion of samples obtained from them was
relative to their total number in Lagos; 590 and 203 respectively. 61 community
pharmacies and 21 outlets at the Idumota drug market were randomly selected
to be visited to collect 122 samples (61 tagged Glucophage® and 61 cheap
generic versions) and 42 samples (21 tagged Glucophage® and 21 cheap
generic versions) respectively based on the sample size calculation performed
details of which are presented in chapter 4.183
In total, 90 community pharmacies (the first 61 distinct community pharmacies
and the following distinct 29 community pharmacies corresponding to the extra
random numbers) were visited. Five pharmacies were repeats of previously
generated random numbers. 59 outlets furnished both tagged Glucophage®
and cheapest available generic metformin, 5 outlets furnished only the cheapest
available generic metformin, 12 outlets furnished only Glucophage®, 2 outlets
did not have any metformin product, 3 outlets were no longer pharmacies at the
time of visit, 2 outlets were still pharmacies but had changed their name, one
outlet was closed at the time of visit and 3 outlets could not be located. For
some of the pharmacies not furnishing the requested samples, the exact reason
could not be ascertained probably because for most of the outlets visited, the
pharmacists were not around to explain why the sample was unavailable and
the shopkeepers seemed not to know why the medicines were not available.
Sometimes the shopkeepers were completely unaware of the existence of any
other metformin product aside Glucophage®. Some of the reasons given for
not furnishing the sample included either that the medicines had finished or that
they stocked medicines based on demand. Some pharmacists stated they only
stock Glucophage® as that is the only metformin with a “guaranteed” quality.
In the drug market, the first 60 distinct medicine outlets from the list of randomly
generated numbers were visited (samples were obtained from only 29 out of the
60 outlets visisted; 16 supplied both Glucophage® and the cheapest available
generic metformin, 6 supplied only Glucophage® and 7 supplied only the
cheapest available generic). 31 outlets did not supply any sample. The reason
given for inability to supply samples included being solely wholesale outlets, not
selling diabetic medicines but instead dealing on specific medicine categories,
stocking only specific company products or that metformin was finished at the
time of visit. For outlets stocking only one version (Glucophage® or cheapest
generic metformin), the most common reasons given were that they stocked
medicines based on demand or based on the medicines they trust their quality.184
In total 135 (71 tagged Glucophage® samples and 64 untagged generic
versions) samples of metformin from the community pharmacies and 44 (21
tagged Glucophage® samples and 23 untagged generic versions) samples from
the drug market were obtained as shown in table 13 below. As previously
noted, the number of samples collected were more than the 122 samples and
42 samples aimed at been collected from the sample size calculation. This is
because both tagged Glucophage® and generic versions were requested from
all outlets visited including the outlets corresponding to the extra random
numbers.
Table 13: Quantity of samples collected from the outlets
Outlet type Quantity
collected
Percentage
collected
Community pharmacy 135 75.4%
Drug market 44 24.6%
5.2.6 Objective 1: To perform a test validation of the
Mobile Authentication Service (MAS)
A test validation of the Mobile Authentication Service was done by comparing
the responses obtained from the mobile anti-counterfeit service with the actual
quality of medicines received by the consumers via packaging and
experimental/chemical analyses. This was done in order to compare the results
of responses obtained about the quality of the samples with the actual quality of
the samples determined via packaging and experimental/chemical analyses.
The tagged Glucophage® samples were initially coded and authenticated via
SMS/text message. Following this, the authenticated samples were recoded
and analysed via packaging analysis, NIR and HPLC. The results of the text
message authentication and the packaging and chemical analyses were then
compared. The results of the SMS/text message authentication, packaging and
chemical analyses (NIR and HPLC) are presented below;185
5.2.6.1 Short Messaging Service (SMS) sample authentication
The tagged Glucophage® samples were authenticated via the four network
providers that were enrolled in the scheme (GLO, MTN, ETISALAT and
AIRTEL) on five different days. All the 92 samples of tagged Glucophage were
authenticated (23 samples with GLO network, 23 samples with MTN network,
23 samples with Etisalat network and 23 samples with Airtel network). Aside 2
samples (TGlBPM and TGlEMAU), almost an immediate response were
received for all the other samples. The average time of response for each
network was 58.58 seconds for GLO, 12.07 seconds for MTN, 6.41 seconds for
ETISALAT and 50.7 seconds for AIRTEL. Responses received from the text
message authentication showed that all the 92 samples were "OK, ORIGINAL".
This means that all the 92 samples of tagged Glucophage® passed the text
message authentication as the response meant they were genuine samples.
Table 14 and Appendix 16 show the result of the responses received from the
text message authentication for the tagged Glucophage® samples.
Table 14: Short Message Service (SMS) authentication of tagged
Glucophage samples
Tagged Glucophage® samples
(N=92)
No. (percentage)
that were confirmed
as genuine
No. (percentage) that
were confirmed as fake
92 (100%) 0 (0%)
Following the SMS authentication of the tagged Glucophage® samples, they
were recoded before other (packaging, NIR, HPLC) analyses were conducted to
avoid introduction of bias to the results from the researcher who was involved
with the SMS authentication.186
5.2.6.2 Packaging analysis
Packaging analysis performed involved checking all the medicine packets of the
samples for any differences in font or font size when compared to the original
versions from the manufacturers, checking for spelling mistakes and wrong
language construction in addition to other parameters in the visual inspection
tool in Appendic 8. Samples passed the packaging analysis test if there were no
differences in these parameters when compared to the original samples from
the manufacturers. The results of the packaging analysis conducted for tagged
Glucophage® samples can be seen in table 15 below and appendix 17. All
(100%) the samples of 92 samples of tagged Glucophage® passed the
packaging analysis.
Table 15: packaging analysis of tagged Glucophage® samples
Tagged Glucophage® samples
(N=92)
No (percentage) that
passed packaging
analysis
No (percentage) that
failed packaging analysis
92 (100%) 0 (0%)
5.2.6.3 Near infrared (NIR) analysis of the tagged Glucophage®
samples
The spectrum of the authentic Glucophage® from the manufacturer was
obtained by individually placing 10 tablets of it and measuring once on both
sides in the NIR spectrometer. The mean Standard Normal Variate (SNV)
second derivative (D2) spectrum was then taken from the 20 spectra. Each of
the Glucophage samples from the outlets were analysed in the same manner as
the authentic sample. The mean Standard Normal Variate (SNV) 2
nd derivative
spectra of the Glucophage® samples obtained from the outlets were individually
compared with that of the manufacturer's sample for any differences that may
suggest that the samples may not be original or genuine using the correlation in
wavelength space (CWS) method to obtain their correlation coefficient (r). The
sample tested was regarded as failing the NIR analysis/ counterfeit if the
correlation coefficient was less than 0.95 while samples with correlation187
coefficient of >0.95 were regarded as passing the test/authentic. All the
Glucophage® samples analysed passed the NIR analysis because they had a
correlation coefficient of > 0.95 (see appendix 18) and the SNV-D2 NIR mean
spectra of all the Glucophage® samples from the outlets and the authentic
sample from the manufacturer showed that they are practically super-imposable
when individually compared. Therefore, none of the tagged Glucophage®
samples analysed was identified as counterfeit using NIR (see table 16). Figure
14 shows the comparison of the SNV-D2 NIR mean spectra of the authentic/
manufacturer's sample of Glucophage® (OGL GLUCO) and a sample from the
outlet (GL27) as an example.
Figure 14: SNV-D2 NIR mean spectra of authentic Glucophage® (red) and
Glucophage from outlet (blue, r=0.9996 compared to the authentic
Glucophage®)188
Table 16: NIR analysis of tagged Glucophage® samples
Tagged Glucophage® samples
(N=92)
No (percentage) that
passed NIR analysis
No (percentage) that
failed NIR analysis
92 (100%) 0 (0%)
The results of the NIR analysis presented in table 16 above are in agreement
with the responses obtained from the text message authentication of the
samples which identified all the collected tagged Glucophage® samples as
"Original" and the packaging analysis which showed that all the samples were
the same with the original sample from the manufacturers.
5.2.6.4 HPLC analysis of tagged Glucophage® samples
The concentration of metformin for each Glucophage® sample was obtained
using the calibration curve method (See appendix 19). The mean concentration
of metformin for each sample was calculated in the Microsoft Excel 2013
software. Samples with metformin concentration within the specified British
Pharmacopoeia standard of 95-105% were regarded as meeting the standard
or passed the HPLC analysis. While samples with metformin concentration
outside this range were regarded as not meeting specified standard or failed the
HPLC analysis. The specification for percentage concentration of metfmorin is
the same for the British Pharmacopoeia, International Pharmacopeia and the
European Pharmacopoeia. However, throughout this thesis compliance to the
British Pharmacopoeia was used to judge if medicines passed or failed HPLC
analysis as that is the standard for metformin used by NAFDAC according to
the information obtained from one of the NAFDAC officials during the
preliminary fieldwork.
Appendix 19 and table 17 show the results obtained from the HPLC analysis of
the Glucophage® samples. They show that all the 92 samples of tagged189
Glucophage® passed the HPLC analysis since the concentration of metformin
in all the samples were within the stated range 95-105%.
Table 17: HPLC analysis of tagged Glucophage® samples
Tagged Glucophage® samples
(N=92)
No (percentage) that
passed HPLC
analysis
(%Concentration of
metformin within 95-
105%)
No (percentage) that
failed HPLC analysis
(%Concentration of
metformin outside 95-
105%)
92 (100%) 0 (0%)
The results from the Short Message Service (MAS) authentication of the tagged
Glucophage® samples show that all the 92 samples are "authentic" or
"original". This means they should be of good quality. This result agrees with
that of the packaging and chemical analyses (NIR and HPLC) analyses, which
showed that none of the tagged Glucophage was counterfeit and that the
percentage concentration of metformin in them were within the specified limits.
This is because all the samples passed the packaging analysis, NIR and HPLC
analysis.
From results presented above, it seems that the Glucophage® samples are
original (from genuine manufacturers) as stated in the MAS SMS response and
of acceptable quality in terms of their active ingredient with percentage
metformin concentration in all the tagged Glucophage® samples falling between
95-105% recommended by the British Pharmacopoeia.
5.2.7 Objective 2: To determine if there are differences in
quality between tagged Glucophage® samples and the generic
metformin samples without tags
In order to determine if there were differences between the tagged
Glucophage® samples and the generic versions, the generic metformin
samples were recoded and then analysed using packaging analysis, NIR and190
HPLC. The quality of the generic metformin samples were then compared with
that of the tagged Glucophage® samples presented above.
5.2.7.1 Packaging analysis of the generic metformin samples
Packaging analysis performed involved checking all the medicine packets of the
87 generic samples of metformin for any differences in font or font size when
compared to the original versions from the manufacturers, checking for spelling
mistakes and wrong language construction in addition to the parameters in the
visial inspection tool in Appendix 8. Samples passed the packaging analysis
test if there were no differences in these parameters when compared to the
original samples from the manufacturers. The results of the packaging analysis
conducted for the generic metformin samples are presented in appendix 20 and
table 18 below. All but 4 of the samples of generic metformin samples passed
the packaging analysis test. The four (Ge38, Ge60, Ge67 and Ge83) samples
were not analysed because there were no manufacturers' samples to which
comparisons could be made.
Table 18: packaging analysis of generic metformin samples
Generic metformin
samples (N=87)
No (percentage) that passed
packaging analysis
No (percentage)
that failed
packaging
analysis
No
(percentage)
that could
not be
analysed
83 (95.4%) 0 (0%) 4 (4.6%)191
From the results of the packaging analysis, no differences could be established
between the tagged Glucophage® and generic metformin because all the
samples analysed (both tagged Glucophage® and generic metformin) passed
the packaging analysis.
5.2.7.2 NIR analysis of the generic samples
The spectra of the authentic/manufacturer’s sample of each generic metformin
product (A- U) were obtained by individually placing 10 tablets each of authentic
generic metformin products (A-U) obtained from the manufacturers and
measuring once on both sides in the NIR spectrometer with the probe. Each of
the generic metformin samples from the outlets were analysed in the same
manner as the authentic samples. The mean Standard Normal Variate (SNV)
2
nd derivative spectra of the samples obtained from the outlets were then
compared with that of their corresponding manufacturer's sample for any
differences that may suggest that the samples may not be original or genuine
using the correlation in wavelength space (CWS) method to obtain their
correlation coefficient (r). The sample tested was regarded as failing the NIR
analysis/ counterfeit if the correlation coefficient was less than 0.95 while
samples with correlation coefficient of >0.95 were regarded as passing the
test/authentic.
The SNV-D2 NIR mean spectra of all the generic metformin samples from the
outlets analysed and the corresponding authentic sample from the manufacturer
were all practically superimposable when they were individually compared.
Therefore, none of the tagged generic metformin samples analysed was
identified as counterfeit using NIR. Figure 15 shows the comparison of the
SNV-D2 NIR mean spectra of the authentic/manufacturer's sample of a generic
brand of metformin, Gluformin® (OGE GLUFOR) and a sample of Gluformin®
from the outlet (GE40) as an example.192
As Illustrated in appendices 21 and 22 and Table 19, 83 out of the 87 generic
samples passed the NIR analysis because they had a correlation coefficient of
>0.95. Four of the generic samples (Ge38, Ge60, Ge67 and Ge83) could not be
analysed because their manufacturers' sample could not be obtained. Table 20
compares the result of the NIR analysis of tagged Glucophage® samples with
the generic metformin and it shows that all the samples of both tagged
Glucophage® samples and generic metformin samples that were analysed
passed the NIR test.
Table 19: NIR analysis of generic metformin samples
Generic metformin
samples (N=87)
No (percentage) that passed
NIR analysis
No (percentage)
that failed
NIR analysis
No
(percentage)
that could
not be
analysed
83 (95.4%) 0 (0%) 4 (4.6%)
Table 20: Comparison of the results of NIR analysis of tagged
Glucophage® with generic metformin samples
Metformin No.
(Percentage)
that passed
NIR analysis
No. (Percentage)
analysed that did
not pass NIR
analysis
No. (Percentage)
that was not
analysed via NIR
Tagged
Glucophage® 92 (100%) 0( 0 % ) 0( 0 % )
Generic
metformin
83 (95.4%) 0( 0 % ) 4(4.6%)193
Figure 15: SNV-D2 NIR mean spectra of authentic metformin product;
Gluformin® (blue) and Gluformin® from outlet (red, r= 0.9998 compared to
the authentic Gluformin®)
From the results of the NIR analysis, no differences in quality could be
established between the tagged Glucophage® and generic metformin samples
because all the samples analysed (both tagged Glucophage® and generic
metformin) passed the NIR analysis.
5.2.7.3 HPLC analysis of the generic metformin samples
The concentration of metformin for each sample was obtained using the
calibration curve method (See appendix 19). The mean concentration of
metformin for each sample was calculated in the Microsoft Excel 2013 software.
The quality of the samples was evaluated in terms of the percentage of active
ingredient (metformin) present. Samples with percentage of metformin between
95-105% as specified by the British Pharmacopoeia (BP) passed the test while
samples with percentage of metformin outside this range failed the test. 87194
samples of generic metformin were analysed; results of HPLC analysis of
tagged Glucophage® samples are already presented above in section 5.2.6.4.
Following the HPLC analysis of the generic metformin samples, the quality of
tagged Glucophage® samples were compared to the quality of the generic
metformin samples and any differences were noted. Table 21 shows the results
of the HPLC analysis of generic metformin samples and appendix 23 shows the
concentration of metformin obtained from the HPLC analysis conducted for
each sample of generic metformin.
Table 21: HPLC analysis of generic metformin samples
a) Overall result of HPLC analysis of Generic metformin samples
Generic metformin samples (N=87)
No (percentage) that
passed HPLC
analysis
(%Concentration of
metformin within 95-
105%)
No (percentage) that
failed HPLC analysis
(%Concentration of
metformin outside 95-
105%)
80 (91.95%) 7 (8.05%)
b) Percentage concentration of metformin in the genetic metformin
samples that failed HPLC analysis
Sample code Percentage (%) concentration
of metformin
Ge1 94.06
Ge7 93.80
Ge10 93.03
Ge31 94.02
Ge32 92.85
Ge60 86.68
Ge69 83.11
5.2.7.4 Compliance of samples to HPLC standard for metformin
Seven (3.9%) out of the 179 samples did not meet standard for concentration of
metformin recommended by the British Pharmacopoeia. That means they had195
percentage metformin concentration outside the range of 95-105%. The seven
samples that failed were all from the generic sample group. This means that 7
(8.05%) of the 87 generic metformin samples failed quality test for concentration
of active ingredient. The seven samples that failed were; three samples of F
(Ge1, Ge31 and Ge69), one sample of D (Ge7), O (Ge10), Q (Ge32) and U
(Ge60) respectively. Only one (Ge60) of the samples that failed was not
registered by NAFADC while 4 out of the 7 samples that failed were locally
produced. As previously noted, all the tagged Glucophage® samples were
within the specified range (95%-105%) of active ingredient as shown in table 22
below.
Table 22: Compliance of tagged Glucophage® and generic metformin to
standard specification for percentage of metformin
Metformin Number
(Percentage
that met HPLC
standard)
Number
(Percentage that
did not meet
standard per
group)
Number
(Percentage that did
not meet standard
overall)
Tagged
Glucophage® 92 (100%) 0( 0 % )
7 (3.9%)
Generic metformin 80 (91.95%) 7 (8.05%)
In order to determine if there was any significant difference between the two-
level categorical variables: metformin product (tagged Glucophage® and
generic metformin) and adherence/non adherence to the BP standard for
metformin (pass or fail of HPLC analysis), the Chi-square analysis was
conducted in SPSS statistical software version 22.0. Following the analysis
conducted in SPSS, some (>20%) of the cells had an expected count of less
than (<) 5, therefore the Fisher’s exact test was used instead of the Chi-square
analysis to test whether there was any significant difference in quality between
them (tagged Glucophage® and generic metformin), this resulted in a P value of
0.006 as shown in Table 23. A P-value of less than 0.05 shows that there is a
significant difference between the quality of the tagged Glucophage® in terms
of the concentration of active ingredient when compared to their generic196
counterparts for the samples included in this research. Although there seems to
be a significant difference in quality between the tagged Glucophage® samples
and generic metformin, it is important to note that this result/finding may have
been limited by the small sample size in each generic product/ brand collected.
It is also important to note that as shown in Table 21b, the percentage
concentration of metformin in the lowest failing sample is 83.11% and more
than half (4) of the samples that failed had a percentage concentration of
metformin of >92%. Considering that metformin is an oral anti-diabetic with a
wide therapeutic window and that it may not be possible to develop resistance
from the use of subtherapeutic doses, it may be concluded that although the 7
generic medicines that falied the HPLC analysis did not meet the BP
specification for concentration of active ingredient, this failure may not be
clinically significant and may be considered acceptable because of the reduced
associated risk from their use. This kind of flexibility can be considered
acceptable according to UN Millennium Project, (2005).197
Table 23: Result of the Chi-Square analysis conducted to determine
difference in quality between Tagged Glucophage® and generic metformin
samples
Chi-Square Tests
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 7.704
a 1 .006
Continuity Correction
b 5.711 1 .017
Likelihood Ratio 10.402 1 .001
Fisher's Exact Test .006 .006
Linear-by-Linear
Association
7.661 1 .006
N of Valid Cases 179
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
3.40.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
5.2.7.5 Major findings- phase 1
From the results presented above, the key findings for the first phase of the
study are therefore as follows;
1) The results of the MAS authentication agree with the packaging and chemical
analyses conducted. The Glucophage® samples seem to be original as stated
in response to the SMS authentication and of good quality in terms of their
packaging and content of active ingredient from the results of the packaging
analysis, NIR and HPLC conducted.198
2) No differences in quality in terms of the percentage concentration of active
ingredient; metformin between the tagged Glucophage® samples and generic
metformin was detected via packaging and NIR analysis. However, there
seems to be a significant difference between the tagged Glucophage® samples
and their cheaper generic counterpart with a p value of 0.006. The tagged
Glucophage® samples seem to be of better quality than their generic
counterparts.
5.3 Conclusion
This chapter of my thesis presented the results of the SMS/text message
authentication, packaging, HPLC and NIR analysis of metformin samples
randomly selected from different outlets (community pharmacies and open drug
market) across Lagos, Nigeria. All the tagged Glucophage® samples were
certified as original via SMS and seemed to be of acceptable quality in terms
their percentage of active ingredient; metformin with values falling between
95%-105% as recommended by the British Pharmacopoeia. No counterfeit
samples were detected from the packaging and NIR analysis conducted.
However there seems to be a significant difference in quality between the
tagged Glucophage samples and their cheaper generic versions (P-value=
0.006) as 7 (8.05%) of the generic versions failed to meet standard for
percentage concentration of active ingredient
Having presented the result of the SMS authentication and analyses of
collected samples, the next chapter will focus on presenting the results arising
from the exploration of the perceptions and experiences of stakeholders of MAS
and issues relating to the quality of medicines distributed in Nigeria.199
Chapter 6
Presentation of results-Phase 2
6.1 Introduction to chapter
This chapter presents the key findings obtained from 37 semi-structured
interviews conducted in the second phase of this study. It starts by discussing
the profile of the qualitative data including the demographic profile of the
participants. Stakeholder perceptions of the current situation of medicines
counterfeiting and quality of medicines distributed in Nigeria were presented.
Finally, findings arising from exploring stakeholder perceptions of the successes
and challenges that may arise in the implementation of MAS, the impact of MAS
and how MAS may be improved are presented.
6.2 Profile of the qualitative data
Eleven pharmacists, five patent medicine vendors, twenty patients, five policy
makers and seven traders were approached to participate in the research. Out
of these, 3 pharmacists, 6 patients, 1 policy maker and 1 trader could not
participate mainly due to time constraints. In total, 37 interviews were
conducted; 8 community pharmacists, 5 patent medicine vendors, 6 traders, 4
policy makers and 14 consumers were interviewed. Only 3 out of the 14
consumers interviewed had used the MAS. Out of these, comprehensive
interviews were conducted for 2 of the consumers while the 3
rd (patient 14)
could not be interviewed comprehensively because the interview session was
interrupted by his doctor who requested to see him and the researcher could
not locate him afterwards to complete the interview. The duration of the
interviews ranged from about 10 minutes to 1 hour. The mean time duration for
the interview was 35 minutes. One participant in the consumer category
preferred not to be tape-recorded as he said he previously held a key
government position with the Lagos state government. Therefore notes were
taken instead. The interview topic guide for the different stakeholder categories200
were used to interview the participants. The questions asked were based on
the interview topic guide and where new issues were raised, they were explored
in subsequent interviews in order to triangulate and confirm findings.
6.3 Demographic profile of participants
One of the policy makers interviewed was a senior official of the National
Agency for Food and Drug (NAFDAC), 2 were past senior officials of the
Pharmaceutical Society of Nigeria (PSN) while one was a senior official of PSN.
All the community pharmacies and policy makers were aware of MAS while all
but one of the patent medicine vendors were aware of MAS. The patent
medicine vendor who was unaware of the MAS stated that it is because she has
been sick and has been away from Nigeria for a long time. Only 3 out of the 15
consumers interviewed had used MAS.
Table 24: Demographics of participants (N=37)
Table 25: Number of years of practice for the medicine sellers
Community pharmacists (N=8) Patent Medicine Vendors (N=5) Traders (N=6)
<2Y e a r s :1 3 %
2 to 5 Years: 25%
5+ to 10 Years: 25%
>10 Years: 37%
< 2 Years: Nil
2 to 5 Years: 20%
5+ to 10 Years: 60%
>10 Years: 20%
< 2 Years: Nil
2 to 5 Years: 17%
5+ to 10 Years: 33%
>10 Years: 50%
Gender
Male: 65%
Female: 35%
Education (maximum
achieved)
University: 62%
Secondary school: 35%
Primary school: 3%
Uneducated: Nil
Stakeholder group
Community pharmacists: 22%
Patent medicine vendors: 13%
Traders: 16%
Consumers: 38%
Policy makers: 11%
Age (Years)
20-39: 32%
40-60: 46%
>60: 22%
Employment
Retired: 16%
Working: 81%
Unemployed: 3%201
The 37 interviews were transcribed verbatim. Out of these, 24 participants
discussed issues relating to MAS while all the participants discussed issues
relating to the current situation of medicines counterfeiting in Nigeria. The
statements were carefully examined and analysed using the framework analysis
approach in Nvivo 10® software.
To help organise the information arising from the interviews; 2 coding frames
were developed (see tables 26 and 27). The first coding frame consisted of all
the themes relating to the perceptions of stakeholders of the current situation of
medicines counterfeiting and quality of medicines distributed in Nigeria while the
second coding frame consisted of all the themes relating to the perceptions,
experiences and attitudes of the stakeholders towards the MAS (See
appendices 24-29). The coding frames were first deductively generated from
the interview topic guide, which was based on the conceptual framework
underpinning the research. Additions were made inductively as the researcher
read the interviews.
The coding frames remained flexible throughout the analysis as new themes
were added. Previous interviews were re-read to identify any comments
relating to the newly added themes. Matrices were created and themes arising
from the participants were placed accordingly in the matrices they belonged. In
order to ensure rigour, another experienced researcher reviewed the coding
matrix and the interview transcripts. A research journal of changes made to the
coding matrix was kept. The initial codes were further grouped as categories
with subthemes. The categories/themes and subthemes formed the coding
index that was used to organise the entire qualitative data. The coding index
remained flexible and was refined as new insights developed. The researcher
remained true to the participants’ descriptions by constantly referring to the
original transcript to check meanings across the interviews using the text search202
and word frequency search query functions in Nvivo®. Also, at every stage of
the analysis, the researcher tried to reflect on what the participants were really
trying to describe and the participants' words were used as much as possible to
ensure that their views were accurately reflected. Quotations were taken from
the interview transcripts to show the perspectives of multiple participants.
The objectives of this phase were to;
1) Examine stakeholder perceptions of the current situation of medicines
counterfeiting and quality of medicines distributed in Nigeria
2) Identify the successes and challenges (potential problems) which may arise
in the implementation of MAS and determine how these problems can be
mitigated in order to ensure optimum utilization and future expansion of the
service
3) Explore the consequences of MAS use (what are their actions after using
MAS? does this increase their confidence on the medicines they buy? do they
report cases of medicines counterfeiting through the use of MAS?); this will
inform areas that consumers may be educated in order to achieve better
outcomes
4) To determine the perceptions of stakeholders on how best MAS can be
improved in order to ensure optimum utilization and future expansion of the
service
Table 26 shows the categories that were developed to meet the objectives of
this phase and the subthemes identified203
Table 26: Categories and final themes developed based on research
objective 1 of phase 2
Current situation of medicines counterfeiting and quality of medicines in
Nigeria
Objective 1: To examine stakeholder perceptions of the current situation of
medicines counterfeiting and quality of medicines distributed in Nigeria
Categories Subthemes
Size of the problem of poor quality medicine
in Nigeria
Trend in the size of poor quality medicine in
Nigeria
Encounter with poor quality medicines
Medicines most likely to be faked
Factors that encourage or discourage
existence of poor quality medicines in
Nigeria
Reasons for the existence of poor quality
medicines
Reasons for perceived reduction in the
incidence of poor quality medicines in Nigeria
Awareness as an initiative against existence
of poor quality medicine in Nigeria
How medicine sellers can help reduce
existence of poor quality medicines
Generic and branded medicines Choice between generic and branded
medicines
Perceived quality of locally made medicines
Perception of drug quality in relation to the
cost of medicines
Educating consumers about generic
medicines204
Table 27: Categories and final themes developed based on research
objective 2-4
Barriers/facilitators to MAS use
Objective 2-To identify the successes and
challenges (potential problems) which may
arise in the implementation of MAS
Barriers
Cost issues
MAS awareness
Time issues and MAS
Educating consumers about MAS
Trust in source of medicine
Confidentiality
Dispensing practices in rural areas and
hospitals
Poor phone network service
Facilitators
Compatibility of MAS
Ease of use
Time taken to respond to text message
authentication
Impact of MAS
Objective 3- Explore the consequences of MAS
on the health and purchasing behaviour of the
users (what are the actions after using MAS?,
does this increase peoples’ confidence in the
medicines they buy? do they report cases of
medicines counterfeiting through the use of
MAS?); this will inform areas that consumers
may be educated in order to achieve better
outcomes
Change in purchasing behaviour of
consumers
Other usefulness of MAS
Detection of medicines counterfeiting,
increased confidence in medicines
purchased, increased knowledge about state
of health through the tips from the response
sent to consumers, increased trust in
medicine sellers
How to improve MAS
Objective 4-To determine the perceptions of
stakeholders on how best MAS can be
improved in order to ensure optimum utilization
and future expansion of the service
How to improve MAS
Authentication by the medicine sellers for
instance pharmacists
Choice of medicines that will be MAS enabled
Network service improvement
Assistance by government and its agencies
Improved awareness creation205
6.4 The major findings of Phase 2
Below is a presentation of the findings based on the objectives of the second
phase of this research with details that support and explain these findings using
quotations from the semi-structured interviews. This was done to better
understand the reality of the research participants and their experiences. These
quotations help to show perspectives of multiple participants. Attempts were
made not to over quote participants; rather quotations were taken from different
stakeholder groups where possible to illustrate findings.
This section starts by presenting the findings relating to the perceptions and
experiences of stakeholders of the situation of poor quality medicines in Nigeria.
The findings relating to the perceived size of the problem of poor quality
medicines in Nigeria and the reasons for the existence of poor quality medicines
were first presented. It then goes ahead to present reasons for the perceived
reduction in the incidence of poor quality medicines. Findings from other issues
which arose during the semi-structured interviews such as stakeholder
perception of generic medicines compared to the innovator brands and locally
manufactured medicines as well as the role of medicine sellers in tackling poor
quality medicines in Nigeria are also presented.
This is followed by the presentation of findings relating to the successes and
challenges that may arise in the implementation of MAS in the form of perceived
barriers and facilitators to its use by stakeholders. Furthermore, findings
relating to the perceived impact of MAS and how MAS could be improved were
presented.206
6.5 Stakeholder perceptions of the current situation of
medicines counterfeiting and quality of medicines
distributed in Nigeria
6.5.1 Size of the problem of poor quality medicines in Nigeria
6.5.1.1 Trend in the size of the problem of poor quality
medicines in Nigeria
As part of the interviews, participants were asked what they perceived was the
current situation of the existence of poor quality medicines in Nigeria. This
section describes the subthemes relating to the perceived size of the problem of
poor quality medicines in Nigeria.
All the participants in the entire stakeholder groups interviewed were of the view
that existence of poor quality medicine is a problem in Nigeria. However there
was disagreement among the participants as to whether the problem is
increasing or decreasing. All the consumers, traders and policy makers were of
the view that the problem is decreasing while few of the participants from the
community pharmacists and patent medicine vendor groups thought that the
problem is on the increase as illustrated below. This perceived increased level
of poor quality medicines by these participants might be linked with their
observation of increase in activities such as illegal hawking of medicines; an
activity that they think promote the existence of poor quality medicines as
illustrated below;
"It is increasing. It is increasing. Have you entered public transport? They will
be selling medicines. They will be saying this medicine cures syphilis, it cures
heart disease, it cures gonorrhoea. They will be talking rubbish"
Patent medicine vendor 3, female, line 208-210207
Majority of the participants thought that the problem is decreasing mainly due to
interventions in place by regulatory agencies such as NAFDAC and the
Pharmacists' Council of Nigeria as illustrated below. This view was shared
across all the stakeholder groups interviewed.
"It has reduced drastically. There is no doubt about that. It has reduced. Both
NAFDAC, the Pharmacists’ Council and so on and so forth have done a lot in
that direction and there are so many things they have done to reduce the
incidence, even some of these people who even hawk, who sell drugs on the
road side, the incidence have gone down"
Community pharmacist 7, male, line 87-91
"Sometime ago it was a problem but as far as NAFDAC came into the drug
industry it is now reduced, so it's not as rampant as it used to be let us say as at
5o r7y e a r sa g o "
Patent medicine vendor 1, female, line 23-25
"It is decreasing because since the establishment of NAFDAC at least there has
been quality control to check on fake drugs, arrest fake drug traffickers and
manufacturers and there have been stern measures taken by the government
that has checked fake drugs"
Patient 1, male, line 48-50
Although, all the participants interviewed stated that poor quality medicine is a
problem in Nigeria, only few of the participants seemed to have encountered
medicines of poor quality. Only few of the participants in the medicine seller and
consumer groups stated that they have encountered medicines they thought
were of poor quality. Therapeutic failure, death and adverse drug reaction were208
the major consequences of such encounters noted by the participants as shown
below.
"A case was that of somebody who took Flagyl® 400mg and there was no
response, the diarrhoea was still there so the people complained that it is not
working, so on a second visit, Flagyl® from another place but from the same
company; that is the same make from another source was administered and the
person got well so there is nothing to query again other than the quality of the
original medicine that was administered to the patient initially"
Community pharmacist 6, male, line 148-152
"It (my sugar level) was just not coming down. It gave me heartache and
headache as I was thinking that I was dying. So I had anxiety that I was dying"
Patient 1, male, line 200-202
These two instances above illustrate a case of therapeutic failure as a
consequence of poor quality medicines.
"They were putting the drip for the mother not knowing that the drip was fake
one that they were putting on the mother so before you know it, the mother died
and later the doctor now confirmed that the drip was not the original one. So it
is a problem"
Patent medicine vendor 2, male, line 48-50
The case directly above illustrates death as a consequence of the use of poor
quality medicines. Another instance illustrated below indicate development of
adverse drug reaction after the use of a medicine, which was thought to be of
poor quality.
"For instance where I’m living now, there was a day this girl was coughing. Her
mother went to chemist to buy her drugs and later they found that the drugs did209
not have NAFDAC number and the drug reacted so badly to that girl. The thing
became worse and something started to come out of her body which she was
not seeing before she started taking that medicine"
Patient 2, female, line 55-63
In all the encounters stated by the participants above, it seems that cases of
poor quality medicines are discovered when they have caused harm rather than
before the harm is done. This may be because of the complex nature of
medicines counterfeiting where they are produced in such a way that they look
almost exactly like the original so cannot be overtly noticed at the time of
purchase. It may also be that the medicines in these cases were substandard
rather than outright counterfeits.
The reason why some of the participants may not have had encounter with
medicines of poor quality may be due to precautions taken by some of them
such as sourcing their medicines from reputable outlets or maintaining a
particular source for their medicines so as to aid easy rectification of any issues
that may arise as described below. These precautionary steps taken were
stated by the community pharmacists, patent medicine vendors and the
consumers.
"I have not come in contact with any because I make sure that I get my own
drugs from the manufacturers. Most of the drugs are gotten from the
manufacturers or registered distributors because we tend to get all these
adulterated or counterfeit products through marketers let me just put it that way"
Community pharmacist 1, female, line 55-57
"I don’t just walk up to any place and say I want to buy medicine, both for
personal use or for corporate use. My boss is very particular about it because if
anything happens I would phone that place, honestly I will phone that place and
say I got this drug from you people, what happened? So we can start right there
to trace whatever it is that has happened"210
Community pharmacist 3, male, 539-542
"You see I don’t normally buy drugs just anywhere because there are too many
fake drugs in the market so what I normally do is either buy my drugs here or go
to a licensed pharmacist that I know like “Tabade”; they do not sell fake drugs,
they have not been accused of selling fake drugs as far as I know so there are
pharmacists that sell quality drugs and we know them and once you know them,
you buy your drugs from them"
Patient 1, male, line 23-27
Other precautionary steps noted by the consumers which may have protected
them from encountering medicines of poor quality include relying on their doctor
to tell them where to purchase their medicine and/ getting a confirmation about
medicines purchased from their doctors as described below;
"My doctor tells me the place to buy from. He says buy from so and so
company. I go there and I see the exact one he prescribed for me. I will be
convinced. And another thing, if I buy it I will get it, go back to him so that he
can certify it ok"
Patient 4, male, line 97-99
Furthermore, other precautionary steps taken by some of the participants such
as visually inspecting the packaging may also have contributed to their not
having encountered medicines of poor quality as shown below;
"From the pack, I'm very particular about those very small details they say
watch out for; expiry date, validity of your medicines. All these things they say I
check unless where they don't write it"
Patient 9, male, line 33-34211
"Yea, I look at of course like I said packaging, that’s the first thing, the physical
appearance because people who fake medicines are not so interested in quality
so sometimes the physical appearance can tell you"
Community pharmacist 3, male, line 548-550
As can be seen from the illustrations above, there seems to be some level of
caution exercised by the consumers and medicine sellers to guard against
purchasing medicines of poor quality. Most of the consumers and medicine
sellers rely on visual examination of the packaging and obtaining their
medicines from reputable sources. Some of the consumers also go further to
verify the authenticity of their medicines from their doctors.
None of the medicine sellers commented on the actions they took after an
encounter with medicine they perceived to be of poor quality. However, among
the consumers who have encountered poor quality medicine, the immediate
reaction was to discard or stop the medicine in question and/ return it to where
they purchased it rather than reporting the incident as noted by some of the
participants below;
“So what I did was to dump the drugs given to me that time, then I went to a
pharmacy shop in Ebutte metta and I told them that I wanted good drugs not
fake and they gave me and I started taking them, within few days it (my sugar
level) came down"
Patient 1, male, line 202-204
"I will not just take the drug. I will just discard and go to doctor to tell me what to
get and where to get it. That is what I have been doing whenever I notice
anything"
Patient 4, male, line 68-69212
"I haven’t reported that to anybody now because if I experience that I will stop
using the drug, that is it"
Patient 5, male, line 32-33
One of the reasons for this low reporting rate observed in this study may include
fear of the reporter being harassed by enforcement officials or lack of trust in
how such cases will be handled based on participants' experience for instance
whether the culprits will be adequately punished as noted by some of the
participants below;
"You see it has been happening in other areas before. You know at times may
be you notice a robbery case in some areas, then you phone police. They will
tell you that they are coming. They may not come. You see what they are
doing there can be extended to other areas. That is why people will not even
bother to report. If you give the information they won't work on that information,
you understand? That is why I said it would be a wasteful effort. That is it"
Patient 5, male, line 215-219
Interestingly this view was also shared by one of the policy makers as a reason
why people may not report incidents of medicines of poor quality as described
below.
"But are they (the laws) applied? As small as those laws are, they are not even
applied. Somebody comes with fake container of antibiotics, when you report to
the agency they cover it up"
Policy maker 2, male, line 213-215213
6.5.1.2 Reasons for existence of poor quality medicines
High cost of medicines, poverty, corruption, high cost of product registration,
low level of local drug manufacturing, ignorance and lack of awareness on how
to detect medicines counterfeiting or sourcing medicines, demand surpassing
supply, lack of stringent laws, inadequate law enforcement, difficulty tracing
counterfeiters, inadequate knowledge of pharmacy graduates, poor availability
of/ shortage pharmacists, greed, existence of open drug markets, lack of
commitment by the industries, porous borders, poor government financing, lack
of co-operation among stakeholders and global warming were the major factors
identified that may be responsible for the existence of poor quality medicines in
Nigeria as described by some of the participants below. Table 28 shows the
reasons given for the existence of poor quality medicines in Nigeria. The table
shows that that corruption (with the largest number of respondents) within the
medicines regulation and distribution in Nigeria ranks highest as a cause of the
continued existence of poor quality medicines. This is followed by ignorance
and lack of awareness, poverty and greed.214
Table 28: Reasons for existence of poor quality medicines in Nigeria
Reason Number of
Respondents
(N=37)
High cost of medicines 4
Poverty 6
Corruption 12
High cost of product registeration 1
Low level of local drug manufacturing 3
Advancement in technology 1
Ignorance and lack of awareness 8
Demand surpassing supply 3
Lack of stringent laws and inadequate enforcement of existing laws 5
Difficulty tracing counterfeiters 2
Inadequate knowledge of pharmacy graduates 2
Shortage of pharmacists 2
Greed 6
Existence of open drug markets 4
Lack of commitment by the pharmaceutical industries 2
Porous borders 4
Global warming 2
Poor government financing 3
Lack of co-operation among stakeholders 2
6.5.1.2.1 High cost of medicines
High cost of medicines have been a major barrier to access to good quality
medicines in Nigeria as about 70% of the population live below poverty line
(CIA, 2011) and therefore may not afford expensive medicines. Some (11%) of
the participants of the participants stated that high cost of medicines will make
such medicines attractive to counterfeiters who may want to counterfeit the
medicine to sell at a more affordable rate as described below.
"Most of the prescription drugs are expensive and why people fake is that they
feel they can go to China, fake it, bring it down and sell it at a very cheap price
and give it to the people so that is just that"215
Trader 6, male, line 73-75
Another point raised by some of the participants described below is the belief
that medicines priced highly may be of better quality. As such they always
prefer the expensive brands to the cheaper generics. Due to the high demand
for such expensive brands, counterfeiters may want to counterfeit them to sell at
cheaper rates so that people will be lured to buy them just because it bears the
popular brand name;
“The costly ones may be more preferable to me that those cheaper ones. If it is
a cheap one, it may not be good. It may not work”
Patient 12, male, line 79-80
6.5.1.2.2 Poverty
Another reason echoed by majority of the participants is poverty. Some of the
participants in all the stakeholder groups were of the view that not having
enough money for instance not been adequately remunerated may lure even
the professionals like pharmacists to go into the business of counterfeiting as
described below;
"That is what I am saying, Poverty! The economy is not friendly to even the
professionals. Is it friendly to me and I am here? How can you ask that kind of
question now? It is not easy my sister"
Community pharmacist 3, male, line 155-157
Also, not having enough money by consumers was seen as a major reason why
such consumers demand cheap medicines which makes them prone to
purchasing counterfeit medicines as described below. This view was expressed
by the medicine sellers rather than the consumers.216
"Nobody wants to spend money to buy medicine. If somebody comes now and
complain of fever, loss of appetite and you say take a better drug like Dart®,
Farinex® or lonart DS®, he will say mummy how much and you say seven
hundred and fifty naira, he will say no, you don't have the one of hundred naira?
Or mix the one of twenty naira for me. Me, it is twenty naira I have. So which
twenty naira medicine will cure malaria? If it is people who are not well trained
they give them anything to take"
Patent medicine vendor 3, female, line 88-93
6.5.1.2.3 Corruption
Participants in all the stakeholder groups stated that corruption inherent in
Nigeria is a major cause of the existence of poor quality medicines as
counterfeiters may bribe regulatory officials or custom officials at the ports so
that their medicines can be released as described below.
"It is bribery and corruption. You understand? If they want to bring in fake
drugs, drugs that are substandard; if they bribe them at the ports, they will
release their drugs. You understand what I am saying?"
Community pharmacist 2, Female, line 126-127
"Some of them, that is the security agents still go into partnership with these
people to bring in these fake drugs. Afterall they should pass through the
customs and they do and some people they drove past cleared them. Drugs
don’t have wings. So disgruntled elements in the society have been working
against government efforts"
Patent 1, male, line 108-111217
6.5.1.2.4 High cost of product registration
When medicines are imported into Nigeria or locally manufactured, it is required
that the medicines are registered with NAFDAC before they are distributed and
sold. Therefore companies are required to send samples to NAFDAC and pay
some registration fees as part of the registration process. Majority of the
community pharmacists interviewed felt that the fees are exorbitant and
discouraging to the professionals who may not have the money for the
registration. This situation creates room for non-professionals with inadequate
knowledge of medicines for instance businessmen who have enough money to
go into production and importation of medicines. This also creates a scenario
where manufacturers and importers are lured into distributing their medicines
prior to registering them in a bid to raise funds to register them.
"One of the ways it is also discouraging is the cost of product registration. If you
have to import a drug you have to pay a huge amount to register it which you
and I even as professionals cannot afford but the people who are into business
that have enough capital you just see them saying let me give you the capital
and before you know it, they will gain access into selling of medicines and they
will just think it is all about business but medicine is not like any other product"
Community pharmacist 3, male, line 188-192
"And even when they bring them in. The charges NAFDAC is asking for, most
of them don’t have it, so they tell them let us go and sell a bit and then come
and register but by then the product has entered the distribution chain even if
they retrieve it after, whatever harm it would do is already done"
Community pharmacist 5, female, line 161-170218
6.5.1.2.5 Low level of local drug manufacturing
Some participants in all the stakeholder groups stated that the poor state of
local infrastructure discourages local drug manufacturing. It also increases the
cost of local manufacturing which may indirectly lead to reduction in the quality
of locally manufactured medicines as the manufacturers may be tempted to
reduce the quality of their medicines in order to cover for the cost of
manufacturing as stated below;
"We don’t have a lot of manufacturing plants here because of bad roads, no
electricity, because like now if I am manufacturing something, I have to be
putting on generator day and night because NEPA is not reliable. Also getting
the finished products from the ports to where they are going to be used because
of the bad roads takes a longer time"
Community pharmacist 5, female, line 148-151
"For instance the manufacturers if they want to manufacture anything in Nigeria,
the light will not be there, the roads might not be there. So for you to
manufacture assuming you are manufacturing it here, it will cost you almost ten
times what it will cost may be in China or any of these developed countries so
definitely they will try to bring down the quality?"
Trader 6, male, line 113-116
6.5.1.2.6 Advancement in technology
Some medicine sellers felt that advancement in technology has helped to make
counterfeiting easier as described below. This is because counterfeiters can
easily package their medicines with the technologies available in any way that it
will be difficult to detect them.219
"People now can copy conveniently making use of machines that are available
now and you know, packaging and printing all of them are more convenient and
easier done now than before. So if you think of faking it is very easy because
you can always clone what you want based on the level of technology now"
Community pharmacist 6, male, line 78-81
6.5.1.2.7 Ignorance and lack of awareness
Almost all the participants in all the stakeholder groups interviewed stated that
ignorance on the part of the medicine sellers and consumers may contribute to
the continued existence of poor quality medicines. If medicine sellers are not
aware of how to differentiate between good and poor quality products, they may
unknowingly sell fake medicines to the consumers as described below.
"People don't know the difference between good and bad if it is drug. Ignorance
and lack of updates on the part of medicine sellers who sell medicines make
them stock and sell fake because they cannot differentiate the original from the
fakes especially in the eastern part of the country such as Onitsha drug market,
Enugu and Ariara market in Aba"
Community pharmacist 6, male, line 258-261
Similarly, the low literacy rate of the Nigerian populace may make some
consumers to source their medicines mainly from the quacks that they think sell
medicines at cheaper rates.
"People are naive so whatever they advertise for them in the buses, they
convince them then you see them buying it, they tell you that it can work
wonders, within a day or two you will get the results of the drugs and since
people are very gullible they cash in on it and buy it"
Patient 13, male, line 87-89220
6.5.1.2.8 Demand surpassing supply
Another reason for the existence of poor quality medicine stated by some of the
policy makers and medicine sellers is increased demand for medicines with
limited supply as described by some of the participants below. This may occur
when products are banned but consumers still continue to demand them or in
cases where the companies amidst increased demand for such medicines
create an artificial scarcity in order to increase the price of such drugs. This
creates opportunity for counterfeiting of those medicines in order meet the
existing demand as described by the participants below;
"You know United States bans products occasionally. They have banned
several and when they ban such products, the reputable manufacturers or
importers in Nigeria will stop, they will stop and when they stop they create
scarcity here. That is when people go and bring them illegally on demand
because people are still asking for them. You explain to them that this product
has been banned because they have found that it has some bad effects on the
body but they say no I want it"
Policy maker 3, male, line 142-147
"Yes, at times they create something like artificial scarcity that is artificial out of
stock. May be because they want to increase the price. They artificially
withdraw or stop selling. You see the people demanding it and it is no longer
available and because the demand is there, those ones who have that sense of
going to China and other countries. They fly to China, bring it down. I mean
faking it. That has been the issue"
Trader 6, male, line 29-33221
6.5.1.2.9 Lack of stringent laws and inadequate enforcement of
existing laws
Majority of the stakeholders in the policy makers' group felt that the laws against
counterfeiting is not deterrent enough to discourage counterfeiting, rather some
of the laws may be an incentive for the counterfeiters. This means that people
may decide to go into medicines counterfeiting because they know they have
little to lose if they are discovered as stated below. None of the other members
of the other stakeholder groups interviewed commented on this.
"Somebody who has made millions and millions or who has been making
millions and is caught once and you ask the person to pay 500,000 naira fine. It
is even an incentive for him to carry on. Nobody will want to be killed but many
people will like to pay 500,000 naira which is nothing out of their profit"
Policy maker 3, male, line 333-336
"You know the laws are not stringent enough. They are not deterrent enough;
anybody can do anything, he knows he will just pay his way and continue"
Policy maker 4, male, line 46-47
Aside lack of stringent laws that will deter people from going into medicine
counterfeiting, concerns were also expressed by some of the policy makers on
the lack of enforcement of the existing laws as described below;
"We have some beautiful laws against faking and adulteration of drugs. We
have the NAFDAC decree 25 of 1999 which is now an act of Parliament that
talks about if you give a drug of questionable quality what should happen to
you, how your things will be confiscated, how you will be jailed. You also have
the Pharmacists' Council law amended now that talks about if you handle fake
drugs what should happen. We also have the NDLEA law that talks about if you
are found with a fake drug or narcotic drug what will happen to you. But are
they applied? As serious as those laws are, they are not even applied”.222
Policy maker 2, male, line 207-213
6.5.1.3 Difficulty tracing counterfeiters
Another issue perceived as contributory to the existence of poor quality
medicines and as a hindrance to curbing the problem of counterfeiting is
difficulty locating or tracing counterfeiters as pointed out by some of the
medicine sellers. This is because most of them do not have a physical address
as described by some of the participants below. In most cases where
medicines counterfeiting have been uncovered, it is usually discovered that they
were produced in people's houses or where other products are manufactured.
"Some of them they are still in the field of producing fake but they are hidden
somehow, they don’t have address so because of that they can hardly trace
them"
Patent medicine vendor 1, female, line 43-44
"The hindrances may be that most of these people they have no shops. They
just have packing shop where they keep them so it is not all the time they will
detect them. They are not in the open places like this"
Patent medicine vendor 5, male, line 68-70
6.5.1.3.1 Inadequate knowledge of pharmacy graduates
Concerns were raised about the quality of pharmacists been graduated from the
schools of pharmacy in the country. Some of the participants; mainly the
patients and drug market traders felt that recent pharmacy graduates are not
prepared enough to handle cases in the real world as described by some of the
participants below.
"There are too many schools of pharmacy in this country where half baked
pharmacists are turned out. National University Commission should not
accredit universities that do not have good teachers, good laboratories, good223
research laboratories and researchers and there must be constant check of
those institutions"
Patent 1, male, line 126-130
"You say you are a pharmacy student and the situation in Nigeria is that there
are so many pharmacists today that do not even know much about the drugs
themselves and yet they are in pharmacy school. Many of them will graduate
and they bring them to pharmacy stores and they will not even know the drugs"
Trader 6, male, line 94-97
6.5.1.3.2 Shortage of pharmacists
Another issue raised by some of the participants (the patients and traders) is
the lack of pharmacists to cater for the drug needs of the Nigerian population.
Pharmacists are still limited in number and are often more in the urban areas
than the rural areas. This leads to people seeking other ways of meeting their
drug needs and in the process may be exposed to the dangers of medicines
counterfeiting as described below;
"So that is another thing. These chemist operators are now plenty but what we
call pharmacies, pharmacy shops is where we go and get drugs and before you
can get a well certified pharmacy around, you have to transport yourself a
distance so you just go anywhere you see around to get the drugs”
Patient 4, male, line 122-124
"When University of Nigeria is the only University in the whole south-east that is
producing pharmacists, the question is how far can such a kind of thing go? So
you can see that the shortage of the pharmacists is so much that it will require
the proper organisation, proper planning for them to fight away fakes"
Trader 6, male, line 188-192224
Another reason given by some of the patent medicine vendors is that
pharmacists engage in “register and go” where they give their certificates for
registration but are not always present in the outlets to oversee what goes on as
described below. No pharmacist commented on this.
“In fact what they do in Nigeria is that they give their certificates and register the
shops. When you come you think it is a registered pharmacist that is there but
it is not. Most people go there for treatment but they really don’t know the
combination to give. That is the problem. They think anybody there is a
pharmacist, a doctor or a nurse”
Patent medicine vendor 3, female, line 136-140
6.5.1.3.3 Greed
Greediness is also a major cause of poor quality medicines noted by
participants in all the stakeholders groups as exemplified by the comments
below. This is because greed can make manufacturers to reduce the quality of
medicines in order to make more money.
“Some are greedy of money. Some will have that money to produce a genuine
drug but because they want to make more money, they go to China they go
there tell them to do Paracetamol or Gresolvin. They say the one that is normal
250mg, they say do it 125mg and they will write it 250mg. That is greediness in
order to make money.
Trader 4, male, line 46-49
6.5.1.3.4 Existence of open drug markets
Most of the stakeholders in the policy makers' and community pharmacists'
groups stated that the conditions in the open drug market, which presently is a
major source of medicines is not adequate for storage of medicines. Storage
and marketing of medicines in these open drug market may therefore lead to
degradation of such medicines as described below;225
" The market system essentially does not provide the right condition for storage
of medicines anywhere they are because they are shanties. They are not made
for medicines’ storage"
Policy maker, male, line 82-83
Some of the community pharmacists expressed concern that the existence of
the open drug market is a major contributor to the existence of poor quality
medicines and suggested that they should be closed down or at best be
restructured and controlled by pharmacists as shown by some of the comments
below;
“There is nothing anybody can do to stop faking. So clean up the system; close
the markets and then set up monitoring and control systems. That is all”
Community pharmacist 6, male, line 373-374
“Why must we have drug markets and if at all we should have something of
such, it supposed to be controlled by pharmacists”
Community pharmacist 8, male, line 68-69
None of the patent medicine vendors and the traders discussed any issues
relating to the closure or restructuring of the open drug market.
6.5.1.3.5 Lack of commitment by the pharmaceutical industries
Another point raised is the lack of commitment by the pharmaceutical
companies in terms of monitoring their medicines when it is in the distribution
chain to ensure that it passes through the right channels. With the exception of
the patent medicine vendors, the majority of the stakeholders (community
pharmacists, policy makers and the traders) interviewed expressed the view
that the pharmaceutical industries are mainly motivated by the profit they will
make rather than ensuring the health of the public through ensuring their226
medicines are not exposed to counterfeiting as described below. This means
that majority of the companies may prefer to sell their medicines to whoever can
afford to pay them the huge amount of money they need irrespective of whether
they are knowledgeable enough to handle medicines, resulting in most of
medicines been channelled through the open drug market where business men
with enough capital can buy them.
"Even the industry must show concern to what happens to their product when it
is out of the factory. In Nigeria, it is not their business. Once it leaves the
factory, somebody comes and pays 10 million to them, it can go to Idumota. It
can go to under the sun. It is not their business but it should be their business"
Policy maker 2, male, line 219-223
"The companies can't depend on pharmacies that are 30 sq. meter apart in
Victoria Island. What quantity of drug can you sell for them? A distributor can
afford to spend twenty million naira, thirty million naira buying up one drug and
controlling market price. They are those controlling market price"
Trader 1, female, line 227-230
6.5.1.3.6 Porous borders
Porous borders were viewed by participants in the policymaking group as one of
the main reasons for the existence of poor quality medicines as described
below. A problem noted is lack of adherence of importers of medicines to
designated ports through which medicines can be brought into the country.
" There are certain ports that were designated for certain drugs in this country. I
think Kano and Lagos and one other one but today what of Warri? People can
bring in anything through anywhere. All you need to do is to bribe the custom.
The ship goes there and offloads everything in the night. Is head of state there?
Is Akunyili there? Is NAFDAC DG there?"227
Policy maker 2, male, line 243-247
In addition to this, the volume of the goods that pass through the ports coupled
with inadequate staffing of the regulatory agencies, which are tasked with
verifying the authenticity of all medicines coming into Nigeria, may make co-
ordination of quality verification difficult. This creates a situation where
medicines of poor quality can pass through without being noticed as stated
below.
" The manifest will tell you it contains this, how can you be opening every
carton? Where do you mobilise staff to do that. So they can come under
different framed labels and packages and it happens. It is not easy to get them"
Policy maker 3, male, line 172-174
6.5.1.3.7 Global warming
Global warming was noted by one of the policy makers as a cause of medicine
deterioration, resulting in substandard medicines as described below. This is
because global warming will make medicines to be stored at temperatures
usually higher than their recommended storage temperature.
"Then with the substandard products the biggest natural thing is global
warming. Most of these medicines were produced to be stable at room
temperature of 25 degrees, now the room temperature has risen to 30-35
degrees around here, so you find there are many products that get deteriorated
easily because of increase in temperature"
Policy maker 4, male, line 51-54
6.5.1.3.8 Poor government financing
Most of the participants across all the stakeholder groups attributed the
continued existence of poor quality medicines to lack of adequate capacity by
NAFDAC to handle the enormous task of monitoring the quality of medicines as228
described below. This lack of capacity is in terms of poor staffing and lack of
funds to carry out its tasks.
"You know government funding is dwindling instead of increasing because costs
are rising and we don’t have much in grants to meet these costs and you know
for regulation to do anything you have to pay 100%. Yes, but if there is more
money there are some things we can do. A big challenge is financing"
Policy maker 4, male, line 261-269
"Yes, I know that NAFDAC have been doing their best. The only thing is that
they don’t have enough manpower. They don’t have enough hands that to go
round and check. They don’t have enough hands and money to do those
things"
Trader 6, male, line 200-202
6.5.1.3.9 Lack of co-operation among stakeholders
Almost all the traders in the open drug market that were interviewed expressed
concern about the lack of co-operation by other stakeholders especially the
pharmacists as described below. They (the traders) felt that this lack of co-
operation has resulted in only little success being made in curbing the problem
of poor quality medicines. They felt that there is need for the community
pharmacists to co-operate with them (the traders) as they are also major
stakeholders in medicines distribution. By doing so, better ways of curbing
medicines counterfeiting can be explored.
"They (pharmacists) are not cooperative; the people are not cooperative but
whether you like or not Idumota has come to stay. If they don’t like Idumota
they should go to hell. We have extended our hands of friendship to them many
times but they are treating us like bunch of moneybags that don’t know229
anything. I think these pharmacists should think very well. They have to
swallow their pride, let us discuss and see how these things can be tackled"
Trader 3, male, line 227-231
"But instead of that they (the Pharmacists’ Council) will like us to get out from
the place (the drug market) just because we are not pharmacists and because
of that they are not just winning the battle. We don’t have enough pharmacists
and people must continue to buy drugs so in a situation like that, what do you
do?"
Trader 6, male, line 163-168
This view is contrary to the views of most of the community pharmacists who
stated that the existence of the open drug market was a major impediment to
tackling poor quality medicines and as such advocated that such markets
should be closed down.
6.5.1.4 Reasons for the perceived reduction in the prevalence of
poor quality medicines in Nigeria
Some of the reasons noted for the perceived reduction of the incidence of poor
quality medicines in Nigeria by the majority of the participants are adoption of
technological solutions, increased involvement of pharmacists in medicines
distribution, establishment of NAFDAC, routine inspection of the outlets by
NAFDAC, effective stakeholder collaboration and awareness creation by
NAFDAC. Table 29 below shows that awareness creation was a major reason
stated by majority of the participants for the perceived reduction in the
prevalence of poor quality medicines. Awareness creation stated by the
participants included mainly awareness by NAFDAC. Few of the participants
also applauded awareness creation by the Pharmaceutical Society of Nigeria
and the pharmaceutical industries. Establishment of NAFDAC and its active
role in monitioring and inspection of medicines and/ outlets and the industries230
were also largely recognised by the participants as a major reason for the
possible reduction in the prevalence of poor quality medicines.
Table 29: Reasons for the perceived reduction in the prevalence of poor
quality medicines in Nigeria
6.5.1.4.1 Adoption of technological solutions
One of the reasons for the perceived reduction in the incidence of poor quality
medicines in Nigeria is adoption of technological solutions such as MAS as
described below. This is because such technological solutions may make it
difficult for counterfeiters to copy medicines. Participants in all the stakeholder
groups expressed this view.
"Now it is this scratch card. So these are things that you know made it a little
more difficult for those who go to copy. I know that they may come with
something later but at least for now, this scratch card something has put so
many of them at bay"
Community pharmacist 7, male, line 136-138
Reason Number of
respondents
Adoption of technological solutions 6
Increased involvement of pharmacists 4
Establishment of NAFDAC 29
Inspections by the drug regulatory agencies 29
Effective stakeholder collaboration 4
Awareness creation 35231
6.5.1.4.2 Increased involvement of pharmacists
Some (4) of the participants in the medicine seller group stated that the
perceived reduction in the incidence of poor quality medicines may be due to
increased involvement of pharmacists both at the individual and at
organisational levels when compared to previous years when counterfeiting was
very high. They felt that many pharmacists now go into retailing and distribution
of medicines unlike before when mainly non-pharmacists controlled the drug
business in Nigeria. At the organisational level, majority of the participants also
noted the increased involvement of pharmacy associations such as the
Pharmaceutical Society of Nigeria and the Association of Community
Pharmacists of Nigeria (ACPN) in activities geared towards reduction of the
incidence of poor quality medicines. Interestingly, the open drug market traders
shared this view as well. This shows the important role pharmacists can play in
tackling the problem of poor quality medicines.
"It is decreasing because before we didn’t really have pharmacists opening
premises or having premises. It was just all these Igbo boys that trade. They
train their boys to know medicines even those that don’t know about the drugs
but now we have pharmacists, more pharmacists opening their own premises
and it is being registered so they won’t want to spoil their name. So they have
to get good quality drugs so I think that one is trying to push out fake drugs"
Community pharmacist 2, female, line 91-96
"If you look at years back we didn’t have so many retail shops. Really the non-
pharmacists were those controlling drug business but now that you have more
of the pharmacists. Right now in Lagos you can boast of 3, 4 pharmacists that
are distributors."
Trader 1, female, line 446-449
"And then the Association of Community Pharmacists of Nigeria (ACPN) is now
more active. They do monthly meetings. Pharmacists are beginning to meet
regularly. It is like pharmacists woke up and said that this profession will not be
taken up by people that will be abusing it, so they are now more involved"232
Trader 1, female, line 210-213
6.5.1.4.3 Establishment of NAFDAC
Most of the participants in all the stakeholder groups stated that the
establishment of NAFDAC might have contributed positively towards the
reduction of the incidence of poor quality medicines in Nigeria as described
below. This is because establishing a regulatory body like NAFDAC helps to
ensure monitoring of drug quality. It also gives the body opportunity to raise
funds to help tackle the problem of poor quality medicines as stated by some of
the participants below;
"Well, first of all is the establishment of NAFDAC in itself because before there
was no NAFDAC at all so the establishment of NAFDAC itself removes
bureaucracy, creates autonomy and makes it more open to better financing
because they can now raise some funds for themselves and they can use it to
build the capacity "
Policy maker 4, male, line 68-71
6.5.1.4.4 Inspections by the drug regulatory agencies
Another reason why the incidence of poor quality medicines in Nigeria may
have reduced according to some of the medicine sellers and policy makers is
the routine inspection of outlets and pharmaceutical companies by NAFDAC as
part of post-market surveillance. This is described below by some of the
participants.
"Then I think another thing is this regular routine check that they (NAFDAC)
does yearly or quarterly. They visit shops unannounced and close them up
when they see things that they feel are not proper"
Trader 1, female, line 186-189233
6.5.1.4.5 Effective stakeholder collaboration
Collaboration among stakeholders in medicines distribution in Nigeria may have
contributed in reducing the problem of poor quality medicines in Nigeria. This
includes inter-agency collaboration for instance NAFDAC collaborating with
Pharmacists' Council of Nigeria, the trade unions, customs, National Drug Law
Enforcement Agency and the police.
The policy makers stated that collaboration of NAFDAC with bodies such as the
Pharmacists’ Council of Nigeria, customs, police and the Consumer Protection
Council through the federal taskforce may have helped curb the problem of poor
quality medicines better as illustrated below. Such collaboration should help
pool expertise against poor quality medicines.
"One thing that we (NAFDAC) have done is to try to build an effective
collaboration and we have really worked with all the other agencies that are
related in this, we brought customs, we brought police. We brought the
Pharmacists Council of Nigeria, we brought the Consumer Protection Council,
we brought all others together into the Federal task force"
Policy maker 4, male, line 79-92
Similarly, the market traders also felt that the formation of a taskforce, which
collaborates with the police and NAFDAC within the market, has helped reduce
the problem. This is because through the taskforce, anyone involved in the
manufacture and sale of poor quality medicines within the drug market can be
reported as stated below;
"Inside our market, we have a task force that connects with police and
NAFDAC. If they catch you with fake drug and may be you are powerful, it is
their work now to hand you over to the police. Police together with the
association will then transfer you to NAFDAC or they will even give you a day
on which they will call NAFDAC. NAFDAC will come with police and pick you
up"
Trader 4, male, line 83, 86-90234
6.5.1.4.6 Awareness creation
Almost all the participants stated that creation of awareness by NAFDAC and
other agencies might have contributed positively in reducing the incidence of
poor quality medicines in Nigeria. The majority of the participants applauded
enlightenment campaigns that help them differentiate between good quality
medicines and medicines of poor quality as described below.
"Before I don't know which one is fake and which one is original but since the
enlightenment by NAFDAC has come I know the counterfeit. That is the impact
of the enlightenment campaign"
Patient 9, male, line 56-58
“Every year they enlighten us. They have something like conference. We had it
again I think 3 weeks ago. At times it will be NAFDAC, at times it will be
National Drug Law Enforcement Agency. So because of that a lot of people
now started to know what fake drug is and the implications of fake drug. All
these things make me say that it is coming down"
Trader 4, male, line 69-75
"Awareness is created by NAFDAC. For instance, may be if there is a fake they
will televise it, they will publicise that this one is fake drug, don't use it, and don’t
buy it because it's fake. They will show you what will make you to know that
those drugs are fake. The criteria may be on the pack, the fake is like this, the
original is like this. At least it is an awareness to know that so and so has fake
now. So when you are going to buy it, you will be at an alert"
Patient 11, female, line 124-129
6.5.1.5 Perception of generic and innovator/branded medicines
Eighty percent of the pharmacists interviewed perceived the generic medicines
as being inferior or of lower quality when compared to the innovator brands. As
such this may have contributed in making some of them have a preference for
innovator branded medicines when making recommendations to patients unless
in situations where the patient specifically requested for a generic or cheaper235
version when he cannot afford the more expensive innovator. This is described
below by some of the participants;
"If the innovator branded ones are may be 90% efficacious the generics may be
in the range of 80%. So if a disease is severe, you don’t encourage the use of
generics rather you go for the branded one. You can use generics for all these
other minor issues”
Community pharmacist 3, male, 319-321
"A number of them (the generics) fall short of the label potency and standard
qualities that the particular product should have. You see a lot of impurities that
measures sometimes up to 20-40% and that is why the innovator branded ones
are more expensive than the other ones (the generics), which don't spend
anything on details. They just cut the product; go straight to active ingredient
not minding the other products that should stabilise the product and market as
well. So it is cheaper but the branded ones in many cases work better"
Community pharmacist 6, male, line 104-111
This view expressed by the community pharmacists was very similar to the
perception of some of the consumers who stated explicitly that they will prefer to
buy well known brands as shown from the comment below;
“I think about the company, the brand name of the medicine. If it is a well
known brand, I can go for it”
Patient 11, female, 87-88
Consumers tended to trust advice they received from their doctors more than
that of other health care providers such as the pharmacists. They seemed to be
influenced more by their doctor rather than their pharmacist or medicine seller
when choosing between generic and innovator branded medicines. Most
consumers/patients in this study stated that they will only accept that their
pharmacist should change their medicines to generic versions at the point of236
sale if it was recommended by their doctor as shown below;
“I will not buy it at that time. I will go back to my doctor and say this is what I
saw. I stick to their guideline because I think they know best”
Patient 4, male, line 17-18
“For me, personally anyone the doctor prescribes for me, if I can afford it, I go
for that particular one. I don’t like changing prescription”
Patient 12, male, line 77-78
“I cannot agree for a pharmacist to change it. I have to see my doctor”
Patient 7, male, not tape-recorded
6.5.1.6 Perceived quality of locally manufactured medicines
An overwhelming majority (85%) of the participants seemed to see locally
manufactured medicines as good quality and comparable to imported medicines
in terms of their potency and in some cases may even be better. This view was
shared across all the stakeholder groups as described below;
"Alabukun, though a local drug, is highly potent. It is the best analgesic after a
hectic day especially for those of us that work in the sun. You might just use
one sachet like this and you will be ok. I’m just telling you. You know I just told
you that London panadol is very efficient so I’m now saying on the converse
that there are some local drugs here that are equally good"
Patient 10, male, line 125-129
"If you look through my stock very well, 90% of what I stock are the ones
produced locally. Yes, they are good. I mean definitely they will be good now"
Community pharmacist 8, male, line 389-390237
However, many of the participants stated that despite their perceiving locally
made medicines as being of good quality, their poor packing and aesthetics is a
challenge and may contribute in make them prone to counterfeiting as noted
below.
"It works just that they can easily fake it even though it works"
"There is nothing special about the packaging. You don’t have to go an extra
mile to do the drug. I don’t know about the ingredients or the constituents but
you can do it anyhow, print it out, and pack it. So there is no special packing"
Community pharmacist 2, female, line 377, 378-380
"Honestly they (locally manufactured medicines) are good but I think that their
challenge has been that of poor packaging. Their poor packaging has been a
challenge. They’ve not been able to take care of the drug. At times you have
them capping stuff but in terms of potency, our local manufacturers are not
doing bad"
Community pharmacist 3, male, 268-271
One of the reasons why some of the participants thought that locally
manufactured medicines may be better in quality when compared to imported
medicines was because they believe that most of the medicines of poor quality
may be more common among imported medicines which may not be properly
monitored during manufacture due to the distance barrier (that is the distance
between Nigeria and their place of manufacture). This may make NAFDAC not
to send representatives to where they are manufactured to monitor how they
are produced unlike the local drug manufacturers whose activities are closely
monitored by NAFDAC as described below;
"It (locally manufactured medicines) is good because they know that if they
don’t produce standard quality then their company will be closed immediately.
Everybody knows where it is, both NAFDAC and Police”238
Trader 4, male, line 191, 193-195
Another reason could be due to the fact that the local manufacturers can easily
be contacted if any quality issues are discovered as stated by some of the
participants below;
"The quality of the ones produced in Nigeria is still the best. Why I said it is the
best is that if anything happens we go to them and they are closer to us.
Trader 2, male, line 161-162
Another reason could be that the imported medicines are more likely to
deteriorate due to the impact of high temperatures and shipping conditions
when compared to medicines that are locally manufactured as described by
some of the participants illustrated below;
"It (imported medicines) can stay 2 to 3 months due to the distance from say
China or India where most of them come from and you don’t know how it is
packaged along the way and you don’t know if it is under pressure. So it is
expected that the quality will be dropping unlike the one made in Nigeria here"
Trader 3, male, 240-243
6.5.1.7 What medicine sellers should do to reduce the existence
of poor quality medicines
Getting medicines from reliable sources such as from the manufacturers, proper
education and training and formation of task force against poor quality
medicines were identified as key ways medicine sellers can tackle poor quality
medicines as described by some of the participants.239
6.5.1.7.1 Getting medicines from a reliable source
Most of the participants from the medicine seller group felt that poor quality
medicines can be reduced if those that sell medicines get their medicines from
reputable channels such as getting the medicines directly from the
pharmaceutical companies or through their medical representatives as
described below. This will help to ensure that any counterfeit medicines
encountered are easily traced.
"Like I said, I don’t just buy from anybody. Why not get it directly from the
company that is importing or manufacturing the drug. By so doing, at least you
can be sure if the medicine is a genuine product"
Community pharmacist 1, female, line 265-267
"They (medicine sellers) should be getting their drugs from the company directly
or from their medical representatives. That will help. By the time 2 or 3 people
have complained about a particular drug, you trace the invoice or get the
medical representative and complain"
Community pharmacist 2, female, line 164-166
6.5.1.7.2 Education/training
All the stakeholders expressed the need for medicine sellers to be educated on
drug quality so that they can be able to distinguish between good and poor
quality medicine. Those involved in selling medicines such as the patent
medicine vendors and the traders should have some basic knowledge about
drugs. This knowledge can be obtained through undergoing training and also
getting some practice experience from hospitals as described below.
"So those people (medicine sellers) should go for training or if such people that
they cannot handle come they should refer them to the general hospital or to a
professional who knows how to handle such"240
Patent medicine vendor 3, female, line 148-150
"So if they (medicine sellers that are not professionals) can to a certain extent
go to have some knowledge. May be not to come and study medicine in the
university if they think it will take a longer time for them, but at least they should
try to practice. Sometimes they should go to hospital to practice for a number of
years and then they would know medicines better"
Patient 4, male, line 126-134
6.6 The successes and challenges that may arise in the
implementation of the Mobile Authentication Service
(MAS)
This section of my thesis presents the results looking at the successes and
challenges that may arise during the implementation of MAS. In order to
identify the successes and challenges which may arise in the implementation of
MAS, it is important to understand factors which the participants perceived may
be a barrier to the use of MAS and what factors they thought may encourage
them to use MAS.
6.6.1 Barriers/facilitators to MAS use
As part of the interviews, participants were asked factors that they perceive may
be a barrier or potential barrier in the implementation and expansion of MAS
and what they thought may encourage them to use MAS. Several themes
relating to the barriers/facilitators to the use of the Mobile Authentication Service
emerged. This section describes the subthemes relating to the barriers and
facilitators to the use of MAS as described by the participants.241
6.6.1.1 Perceived barriers to MAS use
Constructs which arose from the interview and were perceived as possible
barrier to the use of MAS include issues relating to cost, low level of awareness
about MAS, time related issues, lack of consumer education by medicine
sellers, trust in source of medicine, complacency to MAS use, confidentiality of
product use data/information arising from MAS, dispensing practices in the rural
areas and in the hospital and poor phone netwrok. These are presented below.
6.6.1.1.1 Cost issues
Cost was one of the issues explored, as increase in cost of medicines may
present a barrier to MAS use. Cost is one of the constructs of the theory of
perceived risk; a model which can be used in the prediction of new
technologies. Issues relating to cost explored encompassed participants'
perception of the impact of the perceived cost of the service. The scenarios
below illustrate participants' perception of the impact of the cost irrespective of
whether they were right or wrong.
There was disagreement among the participants as to the impact increase in
cost of medicines as a result of MAS may have on the use of the service. Some
of the community pharmacists were of the view that if there is significant
increase in cost of medicines as a result of MAS introduction, consumers may
no more purchase such medicines as described below;
"It is basically the cost that I can think of right now. Because if it is too much on
the high side, people may even frown at it that why? How much are we earning
that I will be spending so much on medicines. You know the way Nigerians
think now"
Community pharmacist 1, female, line 360-363242
One participant described the impact cost may have on the use of MAS and
was of the view that MAS seems to be for the "middle and high class" as
described below. This portrays the fact that most of the MAS enabled
medicines are high cost brands from multinationals rather than cheaper
versions such as generics or locally manufactured medicines that may be more
affordable to majority of Nigerians especially those on low income.
"If the cost of medicines increase as a result of this MAS, they won't even buy
that drug again. It will just be the rich that are using it. Even the drugs we are
talking about, it is the people of high class or let us say average and high class
that are using it. No low class patient will come and use Ampiclox®"
Community pharmacist 2, female, line 237-239
The views expressed by these participants on the impact cost may have on the
use of MAS show that any increase in cost of medicines as a result of the
implementation of MAS may not only hinder consumers from using the service
but may also affect their decision to use or not to use the service. This is in line
with the impact of perceived risk of an innovation on the behavioural intention to
use the innovation. In this case, cost may be perceived as a risk by the users
and therefore, as a possible barrier to their use of the service. It is also
important that careful attention should be paid to the medicines enrolled in the
service so that all categories of persons (both the low and high income earners)
can benefit from the service. This means that systems should be put in place to
encourage and ensure that generic medicines which are mostly patronised by
the relatively low-income earners (or "low class patient" as mentioned by
community pharmacist 2 above) in the society are enrolled in the service.
Contrary to the views already described above, some community pharmacists
were of the view that despite increase in cost, people will still buy the MAS-
enabled medicines as described below;243
"If you are receiving a service then you should be ready to pay. Nothing is free
more or less. So if it is a service that is rendered to improve quality of a drug
and avoiding unnecessary faking, why not? People would not mind to pay so I
will still encourage people to buy it"
Community pharmacist 3, male, line 396-399
"Of course they will buy. What matters is if it is original not just the money. You
should be sure of what you are taking. Do you understand? When you are sure
of what you are selling, if it is original they will buy"
Community pharmacist 4, female, line 125-127
"It is a bit more expensive, but many people feel they are safe with it. They
don’t mind the extra cost, so I don’t think it (cost) is a hindrance to them. They
will rather have that than buy substandard"
Community pharmacist 5, female, line 128-129
The community pharmacists above who expressed the view that despite any
increase in cost of medicines as a result of MAS that consumers will still buy the
MAS enabled medicines seemed to think of the increase in cost in comparison
to any possible harmful effect the consumers may be exposed to as a result of
purchasing medicines that are of poor quality. In which case they felt that
consumers would still prefer to get medicines at a higher cost provided they are
safe to use.
All the patients who were interviewed about MAS felt that they will still buy MAS
enabled medicines despite any increase in cost due to MAS. One of the
participants stated that he will still buy them as there are no other options for
him as described below;
"You have no choice. Like some of the medicines we are now taking, we have
been told unless you have miracle healing that you will continue drinking it for244
as long as you live. If your life is dependent on a drug; you don't have a choice
no matter the price, you have no choice. I was looking for option. I prefer to
diet than to drink medicine but then I found out there is nothing you can do, you
must drink your medicine"
Patient 9, male, line 111-115
This view expressed by most patients may have been due to the fact that most
of the patients interviewed were those who came to the hospital and as such
they may constitute a group of patients who are more careful about their health,
financially more buoyant and ready to spend more on their health than an
average Nigerian just as one of them noted below;
"As for me, I don't really care, even if they increase the price, so far as it is good
for my health and the doctor tells me to buy, I will buy it. May be because I
have the money. Anyway, I don't know of others but I will still buy it"
Patient 14, male, line 44-46
It may also have been affected by the fact that participants were recruited from
Lagos, so may be more enlightened when compared to those in the rural areas
of Nigeria or other regions like the northen Nigeria who may hold a different
opinion.
Irrespective of participants' perception of the impact cost may have on the use
of the service, satisfactory views were expressed by some of the medicine
sellers on how they felt about the service being free as shown below;
"it is free, such information you won't be charged; that's the good thing about it.
They won't remove a kobo from your handset. That is for you to really know how
convenient they have really made it for the end users of those products. It is
text free. Infact, I think it's ok"
Community pharmacist 3, male, line 456-458245
"They (the patients) are all excited especially as they are not removing money
because it is free, so there is no need for them to complain"
Patent Medicine 2, male, line 439-440
From the statements above, you can deduce that these participants seemed to
be satisfied with the service since it is provided free of charge to the users. This
may help promote the use of the service. Sproxil (the innovator of this service
provides it free to the consumers while the pharmaceutical companies bear the
cost of the text message). Participants expressed divided views at to whether
the introduction of MAS has caused increase in the cost of MAS enabled
medicines even though MAS users are not charged for using the service.
Those who perceived that there is an increase in cost as a result of MAS
seemed to perceive it as an indirect cost added to the cost of the medicines
rather than a direct cost to the consumers for specifically using the service.
6.6.1.1.2 MAS awareness
17 out of the 38 participants (6 community pharmacists, 2 patent medicine
vendors, 3 policy makers and 6 traders) perceived the awareness level to be
low and a possible barrier to the use of MAS as described in some of the
scenarios below;
"They (the consumers) are not really aware of it. So most of them will ask you if
it is recharge card. Yes someone has asked me if it is real recharge card, so I
think that may be they should just enlighten people about it especially those that
have it on their product. They should let them know what it is".
Community pharmacist 4, female, line 186-188
"Yes, it is there but they have not actually done a lot of awareness creaton.
They have not let the people know what it is all about. About 80-90% of
Nigerians do not even know that it exists”246
Trader 6, male, line 37-38
On the contrary, only few (three) participants felt that people are aware of the
service for the medicines that have the scratch card as stated below. The other
participants did not comment on the awareness of MAS.
"Yes a lot of people are aware of it, for those drugs that have it"
Community pharmacist 5, female, line 92
"Many people are aware of it now because everybody that uses Ampiclox®,
everybody that buys Ampiclox® know that it is there"
Patent medicine vendor, male, line 479-480
"They always see it now. It is on the pack they are buying so naturally they will
know that that particular product has scratch card so whenever they come to
buy they always ask for that one".
Trader 3, male, line 124-125
From the views of these participants above, it seems that a major setback to the
introduction of MAS is the low level of awareness of the public on the existence
and use of MAS. Therefore, the pharmaceutical companies, medicine sellers
and NAFDAC should adopt more efficient systems of awareness creation so as
to the make the public aware of the service and the need to verify the
authenticity of the medicines they purchase.
6.6.1.1.3 Time issues and MAS
Time was another construct that was explored as a possible barrier to MAS use.
This is because if participants feel that they need to commit some of their time
to be able to use the service, this may make them not to use the service.247
Time constraints were perceived by some of the participants as a barrier to the
use of MAS. Most of the medicine sellers stated that people might not have the
time to use MAS as described below;
"People don’t have time to do that, you understand what I am saying? Many
people just rush in and say I want to buy Ampiclox® and they rush out"
Community pharmacist 2, female, line 208-209
"There are people who don’t even have the time, many people are not even
having the time. That is the issue. They say look at just scratching, scratching"
Community pharmacist 7, male, line 419-421
"You see people may want to text but they may not have all that time. They
should be encouraging people to use it and to know about it because some of
our people don't have that time that when they buy medicine they begin to
scratch"
Trader 5, male, 169-171
Similarly, one of the policy makers expressed concerns that the medicine
sellers may not have the time to wait for the consumers to confirm the
authenticity of their medicines due to large number of people they may have
waiting to be attended to as described below;
"Even the Mobile Authentication Service has problems that we have identified.
A patient has about 5 medicines in his prescription list and you’ve told the
person to go to the pharmacy, buy the drugs and stand in one corner and begin
to send text messages through to someone else. Then the person selling
medicine will wait for him. Will he pay before he begins to scratch or the seller
will wait for him to text or call? Will he certify his medicine is genuine before he
pays? He has 3 items on that prescription and he has four other people waiting
for him. So those are challenges I shared with the group that came here and I
think the pharmacists should be able to authenticate the medicines themselves"248
Also time wasted due to delay in getting responses to the text message
authentication may discourage people from using the service. Few of the
medicine sellers stated that they have experienced delays in getting responses
when they tried authenticating their medicines as described below. This delay
may be linked to poor phone network rather than inefficiency of the MAS
provider; Sproxil. However, this experience may discourage them from using
the service even if they have the time to authenticate their medicines.
"I have tried but actually the response from those manufacturers have not
always been immediate. I scratch, try to call but the response have not always
been immediate".
Trader 6, male, line 16-17
"It's ok but you know at times even network problem. I have an experience
with it, I think I texted up to 3 or 4 times before I heard from them so that is the
challenge.
Trader 3, male, line 71-72
None of the consumers interviewed stated that time was a constraint to their
use of the service.
6.6.1.1.4 Education of consumers by medicine sellers
Whether medicine sellers educate consumers about MAS was a variable that
was explored during the interview as this may have an impact on consumer use
of the service. If consumers are educated about MAS, that may increase their
awareness of the service and may make them to use the service. Most
medicine sellers acknowledged that they do not tell their clients about the
service as described below;
"People are not aware. The community pharmacy where I worked, the hand
bills they gave us we threw it away, they don’t like putting papers on their desk.
We didn’t show anybody”.249
Community pharmacist 2, female, line 255-256
"No, I won't lie I don’t really tell anyone about MAS. Like what we are doing
now I think we will start telling them now"
Community pharmacist 4, female, line 380-381
Some of the medicine sellers felt that it is not their responsibility to create
awareness about MAS. Rather the company should be responsible for creating
awareness about MAS as illustrated below;
"I don't have any business explaining that. I think it is the company's business
to explain to people that they have scratch card on their products except if
someone buys it and sees it and asks me. I will say yes it has scratch card"
Trader 3, male, line 136-138
6.6.1.1.5 Trust in source of medicines
Trust was a theme that arose throughout the interview. Contrary to popularly
held beliefs that people may likely use MAS because of lack of trust they have
for medicines obtained from outlets including the pharmacies in Nigeria, it was
perceived as a barrier to MAS use by most of the medicine sellers and
consumers that were interviewed. This is because they may see confirming the
authenticity of the medicines through the MAS as unnecessary if they trust that
they cannot get poor quality medicines from where they obtain their medicines
from as described below. Almost all the pharmacists expressed this view.
"Usually because most of them trust what I sell to them, they tell me there is no
problem, they know there won't be a problem with it. May be they may just try
it but most of them just don’t bother"
Community pharmacist 5, female, line 267-268250
"Well nobody has ever come to my premises and used it because they trust that
I will give them good medicines. I think that we should not bridge that trust that
patients have with their pharmacists. They are like saying that don’t trust this
man any longer because there is a technology you have to scan in front of him
and ensure that something he sells is genuine”
Community pharmacist 2, female, line 210-214
This view was also shared among the consumers as described by one of the
them below;
“I don’t check anything. I don’t worry about quality of drugs. I know quite well
that the university hospital pharmacy will not give me fake drugs because they
know they will be compounding my problems”
Patient 1, male, line 32-34
6.6.1.1.6 Complacency to MAS use
In addition to trust in where people obtain their medicines being a barrier to the
use of MAS, some participants felt that trust in the tag itself rather that the use
of MAS may make consumers not to go on to verify the authenticity of their
medicines. This is a significant factor that may considerably affect continued
use of MAS. This is because Sproxil may in the long run limit its success
despite reducing the incidence of counterfeit medicines because consumers
may at some point become complacent to the use of MAS. This will mean that
most consumers may make their judgements on the authenticity of their
medicines based on previous feedbacks they have received from Sproxil as
they will think there is no need to send the authentication message every time.
About 2 participants in the patient category interviewed were not aware they
needed to check the authenticity of their medicines at each purchase. They felt
that if they have ever checked it, then that was enough as noted below;251
"I check with them to know if it is original, I have checked it once and that is ok.
I don't send it every time I purchase Glucophage®. I did it the first time and I
am ok or am I supposed to keep scratching and sending every time?"
Patient 3, female, line 41-43
"I use Glucophage® and I see those things on it, anyone that is good they can
write such a thing, you know it is real. I remove it and just laugh. I can’t be
wasting my credit when the tag is already on it"
Patient 7, male, interview not tape-recorded
From the statement above, it seems that these patients may judge the
authenticity of subsequent Glucophage® they buy based on the response they
received the first time they authenticated Glucophage® or merely by seeing the
tag on the medicines. One community pharmacist interviewed seemed to echo
the same view as described below;
"More than 50% or 60% don’t even bother to open it. You get what I’m saying.
Once they look and see it (the tag), they are ok"
Community pharmacist 7, male, line 424-425
This perceived attitude of consumers seeing medicines with the scratch cards
as authentic without texting to confirm may be a serious setback to MAS use
because counterfeiters may attach fake codes to medicines that are not original
and consumers will buy them simply because they think it bears the mark of
quality.252
6.6.1.1.7 Confidentiality of product use information arising from
MAS
One of the policy makers was of the view that an issue that may arise as a
challenge in the implementation of MAS is how the information obtained about
different medicines from different companies can be kept confidential. He
described the lapses that may be obtained if the information is either domiciled
with the drug regulatory authority (NAFDAC) or the service providers (Sproxil)
as described below;
"The only challenge could be on confidentiality of information and because you
have to limit the information you give. Who keeps the database is the question?
If it is NAFDAC for example who keeps the database, then fine but if it is the
person who provides the service that keeps the database that means he is
availed of the database of the various companies. How do you control that
information? This is from a regulatory perspective; that could be the only
problem and it is a surmountable problem. The database, all the servers can be
domiciled within NAFDAC but how well can NAFDAC keep that because the
person who provided the domain is someone who wants to make money and he
will not want to play with it. Do you understand? He will prefer to keep his
servers and secure it so that nobody copies anything of his and things like that.
But he is keeping somebody’s information. This is something that we are now
still trying to resolve"
Policy maker 4, male, line 165-175
It is important that this issue of confidentiality is given due consideration as it
can lead to information about different companies being improperly handled. It
is important that laws relating to data protection are strictly followed by those
that are in charge of such information.253
6.6.1.1.8 Dispensing practices in rural areas and hospitals
Even though the service was perceived as being easy to use because it is
compatible to the use of mobile phones, the majority of community pharmacists
felt that the dispensing practice in rural areas where incomplete medicine doses
can be purchased in loose forms rather than in their original packaging as
stated below may hinder its use. This practice may not support the use of MAS
because the consumers may not be able to access the authentication tags that
are usually on the original packaging as described below;
"It will be good assuming all the people are given their medicine in original
packets because if is in a rural area where they dispose the capsules one by
one not as should be taken, then it will not work. This is because if someone
buys one or two capsules he may not remember to ask for the pin to send”
Community pharmacist 6, male, line 211-213
Similarly, some pharmacists interviewed pointed out that the dispensing
practices in some hospitals may not support the use of MAS as described
below. This is because most of the hospitals unlike the pharmacies do not give
out medicines in their original container. Their usual practice is to remove the
medicines from their original packaging that contain the code for MAS
authentication and repackage them in hospital dispensing envelopes without the
name of the drug before giving them to patients. In this case, it means that
authentication is left only in the hands of the medicine sellers rather than the
final consumer as intended by the MAS service providers.
"You know another thing is that if they are getting from the pharmacies it is ok,
but if they are getting from the hospitals, most hospitals will not give you the
sachets. They will rather remove it and put in nylons so you will not know what
they are giving you. So how do they verify?254
Community pharmacist 5, female, line 314-317
6.6.1.1.9 Poor phone network
Sproxil works in collaboration with GSM network providers such as MTN, Glo,
Airtel and Etisalat. It is through these networks that MAS users can text and
receive responses to the text message authentication. Few of the traders and
consumers perceived that the poor availability of poor phone network by these
providers might hinder the use of MAS as it can lead to unnecessary delays
during the authentication process.
"The only disadvantage is may be delay but it's not their fault. If there is
network failure you cannot be able to get the response immediately. That is the
only disadvantage I can think of”
Patient 11, female, line 47-49
"Well as for now it is functioning well but it is not everybody that has phone and
there may be no phone network, so in rural areas they should extend, extend
telephone system because the thing works with phone. If they don’t have
phone system or network then it is invalid so they must do that in rural areas”
Trader 4, male, line 157-160
6.6.1.2 Facilitators to MAS use
Compatibility of MAS with the use of mobile phone, Ease of use and the quick
response to authentication SMS were perceived by the participants as major
facilitators to MAS use and the views of the participants are presented below.
6.6.1.2.1 Compatibility of MAS
One of the constructs of the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM), which play a
significant role in the adoption of an innovation, is compatibility of the innovation
with the norms of the society in which it is being introduced. This is because the
more compatible an idea is to the values and norms of a society, the more255
easily adoptable it becomes. Some of the participants in all the stakeholder
groups were of the view that MAS is used in a similar way to the use of mobile
phone text messaging, an attribute which they perceive may facilitate the
adoption and use of MAS as described below;
"It helps as in quick action, just take your phone type it immediately. Everybody
have phone now so take your phone, type the number and send it immediately
from where you bought the medicine, you will know whether what you bought is
fake or original"
Patent medicine vendor 2, male, line 415-417
"Yes, well the process is simple and a lot of users of mobile phone can do text
message"
Policy maker 3, male, line 297-298
From the perceptions of participants on the use of the service, one can deduce
that MAS is compatible in terms of the platform it uses which is "the mobile
phone"; a device that is already being used by many for other purposes such as
text messaging which can be done by the majority of the people. Hence, no new
skills may be required to use the MAS service. These participants seemed to
feel that this compatible attribute of MAS makes it easy to use. There is
evidence to show that majority of Nigerians have mobile phones for instance the
Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC), (2014) reported that Nigeria has
a high teledensity of about 92.24% as at April, 2014 and Okoro et al. (2010)
found that more than half (66%) of patients with diabetes who attended a
diabetic clinic in Nigeria where the study was conducted had active mobile
phone lines. As at the beginning of the year 2013, the number of mobile phone
subscribers in Nigeria was about 110 million with a market penetration of about
70% (Buddlecomm, 2014).
This seems to show that innovations such as MAS employing the mobile phone
network may be relatively easier to use since majority of the people already256
have and/ use a mobile phone device. Practices and conditions in some areas
such as in rural settings and hospital may indirectly discourage its use in such
settings as mentioned by some of the participants above. In order to ensure the
widespread use of the service, there should be policies in place to ensure that
as much as it is possible that medicines are dispensed in their original
packaging. Phone networks should also be extended to the rural areas.
6.6.1.2.2 Ease of use
Ease of use is one of the major constructs of the technology acceptance model.
It was part of the variables in the conceptual framework, which was explored in
this research. Perceived Ease of Use (PEOU) is the degree to which a person
believes that a particular system or technology could be used without effort. It
has a direct positive effect on perceived usefulness and on behavioural
intention to use (Karaiskos et al., 2007). In other words, if people perceive an
innovation to be easy to use, then they are more likely to see such innovations
to be useful and will tend to use the service when compared to if they perceived
it to be difficult to use. Most of the participants in the entire stakeholder groups
interviewed stated that the service is easy to use in terms of the ease of
understanding the instructions about using the service and the sending of the
text messages as described below;
"I think the hand bill is very very clear. If you read it you will understand, there
is nothing so special about the service"
Community pharmacist 2, female, line 254
"It is very easy, the moment you scratch, you key it in and then send and you
will get almost an instant answer within a minute."
Patient 9, male, line 83-84
"Very easy because the number is there"
Patient 11, female, line 44257
However, one participant stated that she might have perceived it as easy to use
because she is enlightened and has time as described below;
"It is not that it is easy to use but it is easy to use for those of us who are
enlightened”
Community pharmacist 7, male, line 418-419
This means that while most of the participants in this study may have perceived
MAS as easy to use. It is possible that this reflects the views of people who
may be more literate rather than that of the entire MAS users in Nigeria.
6.6.1.2.3 Time it takes to respond to text message
authentication
One of the major themes that arose during the interviews was the time it takes
for the users to get response to their SMS authentication. Most of the
participants in all the stakeholder groups stated that responses are received
almost immediately as described below. This may therefore be a facilitator to
MAS use as it may encourage consumers to use MAS because they know that
they will not experience any delay.
"It just takes like 5 minutes. Just working down the road, before you get to
where you are going and within 5 minutes you get your reply so I don’t think
time is a problem"
Community pharmacist 5, female, line 271-272
" You will get almost an instant answer within a minute, the answer will come
back ".
Patient 9, male, line 84258
6.7 Impact of MAS
This section explored consequences of MAS use in terms of participants’
perceived usefulness of the service by looking at the impact or outcome of MAS
from the participants' perspectives. Perceived usefulness has been shown as
one of the factors that may affect the actual use of an innovation or service
based on previous research on adoption of new technologies or services. This
means that if users perceive an innovation to be useful, then they are more
likely to use it.
Some of the variables relating to the impact of MAS on the purchasing
behaviour and health of the consumers expolored are discussed below. By
exploring the variables relating to impact of MAS, the perceived usefulness of
MAS was revealed.
6.7.1 Change in purchasing behaviour of consumers
In order to determine if the introduction of MAS has affected the purchasing
behaviour of consumers, participants in the medicine sellers category were
asked whether they have noticed any change in the demand of MAS enabled
medicines since the introduction of MAS while participants in the consumer
category were asked if the introduction of MAS has made them buy particular
MAS enabled medicines. Although none of the consumers interviewed
commented on this, some of the medicine sellers believed that the introduction
of MAS may have increased demand for MAS- enabled medicines as described
below;
"They will tell you they want Beecham with the tag. If we don’t have it, they
won’t buy it"
Community pharmacist 5, male, line 111259
"Yes, some people do come and say what of the other one with the card (tag).
If you give them medicines that don't have that tag. They will say that these
people have not started putting the pin like the other ones?"
Patent medicine vendor 2, male, line 427-429
Now some people when they come in and they don’t see that paper, that small
leaflet attached, that scratch something, they won't buy"
Trader1, female, line 518-519
One of the policy makers interviewed stated that increase in demand of MAS
enabled medicines as a result of MAS introduction can be anticipated mainly
because any medicine that is MAS enabled will be promoted as described
below;
"Well it is only new, they can anticipate that it will increase demand but what
that means is that it is possible because if it has that one, you know it will be
promoted more by NAFDAC. Because the company has lunched it, we would
talk about it. It is promotion. You know since we are promoting it, it means that
one is unique. People will be looking for that unique one and because of that it
will improve on the returns of the company"
Policy maker 4, male, line 191-195
This raises a question of whether the introduction of MAS may lead to
unnecessary promotion of specific brands over another, thereby presenting the
cheaper alternatives which may not be MAS enabled but of good quality as poor
quality in the sight of the consumers. This can be detrimental as it may mean
that patients will pay higher to get the MAS enabled medicines that may be
costlier.260
6.7.2 Detection of counterfeit medicines
One of the usefulness of MAS highlighted by participants in all the stakeholder
group was that it helps in the detection of counterfeit medicines as described by
some participants below.
"It is a good thing because you can easily know that what you are using is the
real thing. At least it shows you that what you are using is good"
Community pharmacist 5, female, line 102-103
"This one is directly to the patient. Immediately the patient buys it (medicine),
they can easily check and get informed. It is a very good way of identifying
good drugs and fake drugs. It is good"
Community pharmacist 8, male, line 163-165
On the contrary, one of the policy makers was of the view that the service in
itself does not tell if the product is of good quality as described below;
"It (the MAS) does not say the product is genuine. It cannot! That method of
authentication cannot say. It says that look I have recognised this package as
the one that somebody has placed a chip on. It doesn’t say anything about the
quality of the drugs that are in that pack because we demonstrated something.
We said; you have your scratch here identifying your product. What if I boil this
product or heat this product to a stage where nothing remains as quality in the
medicine, the scratch will still remain and people will continue to recognise that
product as good. So we cannot stretch that authentication too far"
Policy maker 1, male, line 200-206
The policy maker above was of the view that MAS only confirms if the product is
from the genuine manufacturer but does not necessary mean that the product in
question is of good quality. The first line of the response given to customers if
the product is from the genuine manufacturer is "OK". However in actual terms
the product may have degraded and may no longer be suitable for261
consumption. This means that relying on MAS alone to determine the quality of
medicines may not be full proof, rather further investigations must be conducted
in order to determine the actual quality of these medicines being confirmed
through MAS as being "OK". Failure of which may mean that consumers are
misguided into taking medicines that may be unsuitable even if they are coming
from the genuine manufacturers. MAS in essence may not directly ensure that
consumers take good quality medicines at all times.
Similar to the views expressed about MAS helping to detect counterfeit
medicines, most of the participants in all the stakeholder groups were of the
view that MAS may help to reduce faking of medical products as the
introduction of MAS may make people patronise MAS-enabled medicines,
thereby reducing demand for medicines that are not MAS- enabled which may
be fake as shown below;
" People look out for that particular thing in that product, once they don’t have it
they will not buy it and when they don’t buy it, those counterfeiters cannot sell"
Community pharmacist 5, female, line 107-108
The introduction of MAS may have also helped reduce faking of medicines
because it may instil fear into the counterfeiters as they may think that they can
easily be traced from where they were purchased as illustrated below;
"To an extent now, it (MAS) has been able to scare or more or less discourage
fakers. At least for Ampiclox®, you hardly see any such faking whereas 2 years
ago everybody knows that there were plenty fakes of it but now we are not
hearing that because now those scratch tags are on everyone of them. So if
they try to fake those cards they can easily be caught”
Community pharmacist 3, male, line 413-417
All the participants who expressed this view felt that MAS can reduce262
counterfeiting by discouraging the counterfeiters from manufacturing since they
will not bear the tags and people will therefore not patronise them.
6.7.3 Provision of intelligence information about counterfeiting
One of the policy makers also stated that MAS might also provide intelligence
for the regulatory bodies, which will also aid detection of medicines
counterfeiting as described below;
"It gives you additional information about the product and for you the client you
will be able to know from the GSM tracking even where that particular product is
located. If there are too many questions coming from one location you will
know from the signals where they are coming from. You can now have a
suspicion and do extra check in that location because of too many questions
that are coming for there. That is the good work with the Mobile Authentication
Service, the MAS"
Policy maker 4, male, line 136-142
Although participants in the policy making group were asked how detected
counterfeit medicines are handled, they responded generally and made no
specific reference to any detection of counterfeit medicines through the use of
MAS.
6.7.4 Increased confidence in medicines purchased
Some participants in all the stakeholder groups were of the opinion that the
introduction of MAS may have helped to improve patients' confidence in their
drugs. The medicine sellers as described below particularly noted this;
" So that gives the patient that confidence to use that drug because they know it
is original but when you do not have something like that they keep thinking
otherwise, is it real? Is it fake?"
Community pharmacist 4, female, line 116-117263
"The thing is that it gives the users more confidence in using the drugs. They
are now more comfortable in using the drugs than before because before they
will be using it and thinking that maybe it is fake and say let me just be using it
but now they know it is the original so they are now more comfortable in using
it".
Patent medicine vendor 2, male, line 420-423
Similarly, most of the consumers interviewed stated that MAS has helped them
have more confidence in the medicines they take as described by some of them
below;
"It is very good. It makes one to feel safe like the medicine you are taking is ok.”
Patient 11, female, line 8
"It will make you have a relaxed mind when you take your medicines not
doubting if you have taken the bad one, the fake one or something like that"
Patient 9, male, line 76-77
6.7.5 Increased knowledge about state of health
The response given by MAS includes a list of health tips, which depends on the
disease for which the medicine is being used to treat. One consumer made
reference to this stating that those tips help her to analyse her health status as
described below;
"It will make the person to be conscious of his or her health because all those
things and tips they give will at least make you to analyse whether you are
sound, whether you fit in or not"
Patient 11, female, line 40-41264
6.8 How to improve MAS
This section discusses the different ways participants perceived that MAS could
be improved. It includes all the suggestions given by participants on actions that
could be taken to help improve MAS. Participants were asked how they thought
MAS could be improved. One of the major points raised by majority of the
participants in all the stakeholder groups was the need to improve the
awareness of MAS using more efficient means.
6.8.1 Improved awareness creation
Participants mentioned the need to raise awareness and the best ways they
perceived awareness about MAS could be more efficient. One of the ways that
was thought by some of the community pharmacists as a more efficient way of
creating awareness about MAS is by using different languages to advertise
MAS as described below;
"Well like I said, they just need awareness. They need to carry the people
along. May be they should go on air. May be teaching people how to use it,
say it in their dialect. It is not only learned people that use medicine. Do it in
different dialects, different languages, where people will really understand the
value. It’s not just by them coming to me. Do you understand?"
Community pharmacist 1, female, line 293-297
Some of the medicine sellers were of the view that different means of
awareness creation aimed at reaching the masses should be used. Apart from
the use of other conventional means of advertising such as through the
television, radio and newspapers, one of the points raised was finding a way to
reach people through gatherings such as talking or advertising to them during
free community health programmes or in religious gatherings such as in the
churches or mosques as described below;265
"They can organise like community programme, may be free health. That is
another gathering that people can actually use to get people together and talk to
them about their services”
“They could go to churches, go to mosque. Apart from saying it on air, they can
go to where there is like a gathering"
Community pharmacist 1, female, line 377-378, 393-394
"Take the message to churches that is where you will see a lot of people
everywhere, may be convention grounds just as what is happening now in the
season. Go to camp there you will see a lot of people"
Community pharmacist 6, male line 231-233
"It (awareness) is low so they should create awareness, teaching people may
be in church and in mosque, telling people about it"
Trader 5, male, line 174-174
6.8.2 Assistance by government and their agencies
Apart from more effective ways of raising awareness about MAS, some
participants were of the view that government has a role to play in the
introduction and expansion of MAS. One of the ways some participants thought
that government can aid the use of MAS is by off setting the cost of putting the
tags on the medicines or the cost of the SMS sent by the consumers which is
currently being paid for by the manufacturers as described below. These views
were expressed by the medicine sellers and the policy makers. None of the
consumers shared this view.
"If only Government can come to their aid, if government can come to the aid of
the manufacturers as the cost of putting all those authentication tags is high"
Community pharmacist 1, female, line 370-372266
“Government should give some incentives because they are paying 20 kobo for
every customer that will make a call. Government should take that bill. I mean
behind the scene. That will be a big support to the industry”
Policy maker 2, male, line 148-150
Some medicine sellers and policy makers mentioned the need for government
to step in to help create awareness of MAS as described below;
"Even government too, let us not create so much burden on these companies.
Government let them come in. At the federal level, at the local government
level, at the state level, let the government take the initiative to make sure that
people are aware of it.
Community pharmacist 3, male, line 420-435
“To put up an advert on the news is how much? Half a million for one minute,
half a million that is what they charge. For 2 minutes, 1 million. That is what
they charge. Who wants to spend that kind of money on a product? So those
things should be taken in totality if we want to help those companies, I think
government has the wherewithal. Either you give them a discount, maximum
discount. You say please give them 40% or 50% discount”
Policy maker 2, male, line 186-190
6.8.3 Follow-up evaluation of MAS
One of the policy markers pointed out that there should be follow-up evaluation
of MAS by NAFDAC to ensure that MAS remains beneficial to the users as
described below;
“The other one is to ensure that there is what we call operation research. That
means some research that will follow up the deployment of the MAS to ensure267
you now follow up the deployment of the MAS and see if people are even
scratching and using it. Are they benefiting from what is introduced and things
like that. Go back to the companies, have their market share improved? Are
people still counterfeiting their products? You need to know all these. These
are things which are not in place at the moment in many of these deployments"
Policy maker 4, male, line 209-215
6.8.4 PIN improvement
Some of the community pharmacists stated the need to reduce the number of
digits of the pin number to make it bolder in order to enable customers to easily
identify the numbers they are sending as described below;
"If they can reduce the numbers because I think the numbers are up to 12. If
they can reduce it to be a little bold so that by the time you scratch it you can
still see even if you injure some of the numbers, you can make it out. But if it's
too tiny, every small thing you clean it off, every small mistake you clean it off.
It is making it a little bit difficult for people to really know that it is the real thing"
Community pharmacist 7, male, line 275-278
The pins are printed and provided by Sproxil but are imported into the country.
The counterfeiters can intercept these pins or they can get it from the people
who attach these pins to the products. Therefore, it should be ensured that
there is a high level of security surrounding the scratch cards that hold the pin
numbers so as to prevent them from being accessed by the counterfeiters. In
this regard, some traders stated that it may be better for the pin numbers to be
imprinted directly on the tablet strips or made tamper proof in order to avoid
people removing them and placing on other strips as described below;
"If they can place it directly on the strip, but the way it is presently someone can
be able to remove it and put it on another strip. If it is not imprinted on the strips268
and they are not putting any stamp on it to say if it is tampered or not tampered,
it is just a sticker”
Trader 1, female, line 536-538
"Though it is moving fine but the only thing is they are just placing it on it; if they
break the system before they realise it those people would have gone far. They
are just placing it there but if they can print it along with the strips it will be
better"
Trader 2, male, line 203-205
6.8.5 Network service improvement
One participant stated the need for phone network system to be improved in the
rural areas to ensure the use of MAS as described below;
"In rural areas they should extend, extend telephone system because the thing
works with phone. If they don’t have phone system, it is invalid. So they must
do that in those rural areas"
Trader 4, male, line 158-160
6.8.6 Authentication by the pharmacists
One of the policy makers was of the view that it may be better for authentication
to be done by the pharmacists as described below;
"I think the pharmacy should be able to authenticate the medicine itself. The
regulatory agencies should work with the pharmacists to authenticate"
Policy maker 1, male, line 188-189269
6.8.7 Choice of medicines that will be MAS enabled
Even though there was disagreement among the participants as to which
medicines should be MAS enabled, the majority of them advocated that MAS
should not be for all drugs.
With the exception of the consumers, majority of the participants in all the other
stakeholder groups were of the view that MAS should be targeted on medicines
that are most likely to be counterfeited rather than all medicines such as
expensive and fast moving medicines as described below.
“It is not every drug that people will like to copy or counterfeit. They are looking
for those drugs that are in high demand, those that are moving fast and then a
little bit expensive. That’s exactly the type of something they should focus on”
Community pharmacist 7, male, line 156-158
"For economic reasons, it cannot be for everything. You know why the
companies are doing it is to protect their products. If a product is not at risk of
being faked then there is no need"
Policy maker 3, male, line 435-438
"Well if they can introduce it to prescription medicines before they can start
putting it on other OTCs, it will be better because prescription medicines are the
most important. Most of the prescriptions are expensive and why people fake is
that they feel they can go China, fake it, bring it down and sell it at a very cheap
price and give it to the people. So that is just that"
Trader 6, male, line 70-74
One of the policy makers advocated that MAS should be focused on medicines
that are commonly used, for instance medicines for endemic diseases like
malaria as he described below;270
“Well, my own is as I said, let us focus on anti-malarials because 60% of those
that will visit the hospital or any health facility will have malaria, so let us focus
on that because if we can remove that we would have saved millions of people
from dying because that means you are sure of what you are giving the
children, the neonates”
Policy maker 2, male, line 140-143
Contrary to the views above, some of community pharmacists were of the view
that it may be better for all products to be MAS-enabled in order to help boost
patients’ confidence in the medicines they take as described below;
"I think it will be better for every tablet. Let’s be sure of what we are taking.
Let’s be sure that what we are taking is authentic and not fake"
Community pharmacist 1, female, line 369-370
"Of course now I think it should be placed on every medicine because no drug
is small when it comes to diseases. Yes now, ordinary Vasoprin® that is 75mg
Aspirin has its function. How much is it sold? About 20 or 30 naira so if you put
it on them they will feel it is ok so that is it"
Community pharmacist 8, male, line 198-200
6.9 Conclusion
This chapter presented the findings from the second phase of this research,
which involved semi-structured interviews. The findings were organised
according to the research objectives. Extensive samples of quotations from
participants were included as it is typical with qualitative research. This was
done to build confidence of the readers that the views presented accurately
represent the reality of the persons and issues studied.271
The primary finding of this phase was that is that all the pharmacists and
majority of the consumers interviewed perceived innovator branded medicines
as better in quality when compared to their generic counterparts. This was
deduced from some of the comments they made which implied that generic
medicines usually contain less active ingredient or that the innovator brands
work better than generics. Also, most of the participants perceived the quality
of locally manufactured medicines as comparable to imported medicines or
better in some cases in terms of quality.
Majority of the participants perceived that existence of poor quality medicine is
still a problem in Nigeria even though they may not have come across
medicines they thought are of poor quality. An overwhelming majority (about
90%) of the participants felt that the problem is decreasing mainly because of
interventions such as the introduction of technological solutions like MAS,
increased involvement of pharmacists in medicines distribution, establishment
of NAFDAC, routine inspection of the outlets by NAFDAC, effective stakeholder
collaboration and awareness creation by NAFDAC. Many of them went ahead
to discuss reasons why Nigeria is still faced with the problem and how they
thought medicine sellers could help curb the problem. Some of the factors that
were identified as being responsible for the existence of poor quality medicines
were high cost of medicines, poverty, corruption, high cost of product
registration, low level of local drug manufacturing, ignorance and lack of
awareness on how to detect medicines counterfeiting or sourcing medicines,
demand surpassing supply, lack of stringent laws, inadequate law enforcement,
difficulty tracing counterfeiters, inadequate knowledge of pharmacy graduates,
poor availability of pharmacists, greed, existence of open drug markets, lack of
commitment by the industries, porous borders, poor government financing, lack
of co-operation among stakeholders and global warming.
Furthermore, majority of the participants perceived increase in cost of
medicines as a result of MAS, dispensing practices in rural areas and in the272
hospitals, poor phone network, lack of time by consumers and medicine sellers,
lack of consumer education about MAS, low awareness level about MAS,
complacency arising from the use of MAS, trust in source of medicines and the
issue of confidentiality of information about use of medicines obtained from
MAS service as possible barriers to adoption and use of MAS. On the other
hand compatibility of MAS use with other activities such mobile phone usage,
ease of use of MAS, and the time taken to respond to the text message
authentication were the key factors that were identified that can encourage the
use of MAS. Increase in demand of MAS enabled medicines, easier detection
of medicines counterfeiting, increased confidence in medicines purchased,
increased knowledge about state of health through the tips from the response
sent to consumers and increased trust in medicine sellers were the major
consequences of using MAS identified from this phase.
Finally, ways identified by the participants through which MAS can be improved
includes awareness creation through more effective means, financial assistance
by the government and their agencies, conducting follow-up studies to evaluate
MAS, improvement in pin for instance reduction in pin number and in printing
the pin directly on the tablet strips, improvement in phone network especially in
rural areas, allowing pharmacies to authenticate medicines instead of
consumers and focusing on medicines that can be easily counterfeited or
commonly used.
The next chapter of this thesis will focus on the discussion of some of the key
findings of this research and their implications.273
Chapter 7
General discussion and implications
7.1 Introduction to chapter
The previous two chapters (chapters 5 and 6) presented the results of the first
and second phases of this research. Chapter 6 focused on presenting the
findings that arose from the qualitative interviews conducted. This was done by
organising data from the interviews with different stakeholder groups into
categories to produce a readable narrative. The purpose of this present chapter
is to provide interpretive insights into the findings of the 2 phases of this
research. It presents a general discussion of the findings and how they relate to
existing literature and research in the field of medicine quality as well as the
implication of these findings to practice and policy. It starts by showing the
extent to which the objectives of the research were met. Following this, the
findings are discussed in relation to existing literature in order to see how they
support or refute existing knowledge in the area of medicines' quality. The
limitations of the research are then presented followed by the researcher’s
personal reflections about the research. Finally, the practice and policy
implications of the findings for different stakeholder groups are discussed.
7.2 Extent to which research objectives were met
This research is the first to validate the use of an anti-counterfeiting technology
and explore the perception of a wide range of stakeholders on the use of MAS
and the current situation of medicines counterfeiting and quality of medicines
distributed in Nigeria.
This research provided data that may serve as a basis for actions, which may
help to improve the MAS and quality or medicines distributed in Nigeria.
Information contained in this research work can also help for comparisons to be
made with future evaluation of MAS. This is the first study that tried to274
quantitatively compare the quality of randomly sampled innovator brand of
metformin with its generic counterpart; data arising from this is necessary to
making recommendation on generic prescribing and the use of medicines in
Nigeria.
The key objectives of the research were;
1) To perform a test validation of the Mobile Authentication Service (MAS) by
comparing the responses obtained from the service through the SMS
authentication conducted with the actual quality of medicines received by the
consumers via packaging analysis and experimental/chemical analyses
2) To determine if there are differences in quality between the Glucophage®
with the tags and the cheapest generic versions without the tags
3) To examine stakeholder perceptions of the current situation of medicines
counterfeiting and quality of medicines distributed in Nigeria
4) To identify the successes and challenges (potential problems) which may
arise in MAS implementation
5) Explore the consequences of MAS (on the health and purchasing behaviour
of the users)
6) To determine the perceptions of stakeholders on how best MAS can be
improved in order to ensure optimum utilization and future expansion of the
service
7) Make adequate feedback/recommendation based on the findings of this
research towards the successful implementation of the Mobile Authentication
Service in Nigeria and reduction of poor quality medicines. This should
ultimately promote access to good quality medicines and translate to improved
health outcomes.
These objectives were largely met by the results of the findings presented in
chapters 5 and 6. The key findings of this research were that;275
1) The results of the MAS authentication agree with the packaging and chemical
analyses conducted. The Glucophage® samples seem to be original as stated
in response to the SMS authentication and of good quality in terms of their
packaging and content of active ingredient from the results of the packaging
analysis, NIR and HPLC conducted.
2) No differences in quality between the tagged Glucophage® samples and
generic metformin could be established via packaging and NIR analysis.
However, there seems to be significant differences between the tagged
Glucophage® samples and their cheaper generic counterpart (branded and
unbranded) with a p value of 0.006. Therefore, the tagged Glucophage®
samples seem to be of better quality than some of their generic counterparts.
3) All the participants agreed that the issue of poor quality medicine is a
problem in Nigeria. However, only few of the participants seemed to have had
an experience with medicines, which they thought, were of poor quality or
counterfeit. Among the few participants that have encountered poor quality
medicines, the common response was to stop the medicine and/ or return the
medicine to where it was purchased instead of reporting it. The factors that
were identified as being responsible for the existence of poor quality medicines
were high cost of medicines, poverty, corruption, high cost of product
registration, low level of local drug manufacturing, ignorance and lack of
awareness on how to detect medicines counterfeiting or proper sourcing of
medicines, demand surpassing supply, lack of stringent laws, inadequate law
enforcement, difficulty tracing counterfeiters, inadequate knowledge of
pharmacy graduates, shortage of pharmacists, greed, existence of open drug
markets, lack of commitment by the industries, porous borders, poor
government financing, lack of co-operation among stakeholders, poor NAFDAC
financing and global warming.
An overwhelming majority (90%) felt that the problem is decreasing. Some of
the reasons given for this decrease were adoption of technological solutions,
increased involvement of pharmacists, establishment of NAFDAC, Routine276
inspection of the outlets by NAFDAC, effective stakeholder collaboration and
awareness creation by NAFDAC. Most of the participants perceived the quality
of locally manufactured medicines as comparable to imported medicines or
better in some cases in terms of quality. Almost all the pharmacists interviewed
perceived innovator branded medicines as better in quality when compared to
their generic counterparts. Obtaining medicines from reliable sources, proper
education and training and formation of task force against poor quality
medicines were the key ways identified through which those involved in selling
medicine can help tackle the existence of poor quality medicines
4) Possible increase in cost of medicines as a result of MAS, dispensing
practices in rural areas and in the hospitals, low level of mobile phone
ownership and poor phone network especially in rural areas, lack of time by
consumers and medicine sellers, lack of consumer education about MAS, low
awareness level, complacency arising from the use of MAS, trust in source of
medicines and the issue of confidentiality of information about use of medicines
obtained from MAS service use were identified as possible barriers to adoption
and use of MAS. Compatibility of MAS use with other activities such mobile
phone usage, ease of use of MAS, and the limited response time were the key
factors that were identified that can encourage the use of MAS.
5) Increased demand of MAS enabled medicines, easier detection of medicines
counterfeiting, increased confidence in medicines purchased, increased
knowledge about state of health through the tips from the response sent to
consumers, increased trust in medicine sellers were the impact or
consequences of MAS use identified from the semi-structured interviews
conducted.
6) Awareness creation through more effective means, financial assistance by
the government and their agencies, follow-up evaluation of MAS, improvement
in pin for instance reduction in pin number and in printing the pin directly on the277
tablet strips, improvement in phone network, allowing pharmacists to
authenticate medicines instead of consumers and focusing on medicines that
can be easily counterfeited or medicines that are commonly used were the key
ways identified by the participants through which MAS can be improved.
7.3 Comparison with literature
7.3.1 Validation of MAS
One of the components of the Cornford et al. (1994) framework is exploring the
system performance at the information processing level. This means checking
whether the information given through the service in this case is correct and
valid. The result of the first phase of this study showed that the result of the
SMS authentication agree with the packaging and chemical analyses
conducted. This suggests that the responses received from MAS regarding the
authenticity of the medicines may be accurate since none of the samples were
identified as counterfeit from the packaging analysis and the NIR analysis
conducted. Also none of the samples of tagged Glucophage® were identified to
be of low quality in terms of the content of active ingredient from the results of
the HPLC analysis. The low overall failure rate of samples reported in this
study seems to confirm the perceptions of the majority of the participants who
agreed that the problem is decreasing as well as recent assertions by NAFDAC
that there has been significant reduction in the prevalence of fake medicines in
Nigeria by over 80% from what it used to be in 2001 (NAFDAC, 2006). Even
though it may not be accurate to compare the findings of this research to
previous studies which employed different methodologies and involved
sampling and analysis of medicines other than metformin, the small overall
percentage of samples that failed quality testing here may also be indicative of
an improved situation of quality of medicines in Nigeria when compared to
previous studies such as Taylor et al. (2001) and Bate et al. (2008) which found
that nearly half of the medicines they analysed failed quality testing. This
observation is similar to the findings of Bate and Hess, (2010) which showed278
that the total overall failure rate of samples from Lagos that they studied had
fallen from about 32% in 2007 to 13% in 2010. It is also similar to some
recently conducted large scale studies such as the study by some group of
scientists at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine where just
about 3% of the antimalarial medicines sampled from 2 out of 5 African
countries studied and Cambodia were found to be falsified (Kaur, 2013).
The extent to which the finding of the percentage of medicines of poor quality in
this study and that of large scale studies mentioned above portray the true
situation of poor quality medicines is still questionable owing to limitations
inherent in these studies and the fact that large amount of counterfeit medicines
are still being intercepted by for instance custom officials such as in Angola
where about 1.4 million counterfeit antimalaria (Coartem®) sourced from China
were discovered to be counterfeit (Faucon et al., 2013). Larger scale studies
involving large samples of variety of medicines may help to confirm or disprove
these findings, as this study was not powered to detect the extent of poor
quality medicines in Nigeria.
That no counterfeits were identified from this study may be indicative that
medicines counterfeiting, even though a problem in sub-Saharan African
countries like Nigeria with limited regulation and enforcement, a more crucial
problem may be the existence of substandard medicines; that is medicines from
genuine manufacturers which fail to meet pharmacopeial standards set for
them. The findings of this study which showed that there were no counterfeits
among the medicines sampled also contradicts previous studies conducted in
this area included in the literature review which potray a high extent of
medicines counterfeiting. This contradictory finding calls to question the
methodology used in arriving at estimates of the extent of medicines
counterfeiting by some organisations such as the WHO and PSI among others.
It may be that some of the quoted estimates of the extent of medicines
counterfeiting are biased depending on whether the researchers want to find or
not to find counterfeits rather than its true extent based on adequate279
methodology. While medicines counterfeiting will continually be a problem as
long as medicines are used, it is important to ensure that its true extent in
relation to other inefficiencies that may be hindering access to good quality
affordable mediicnes is correctly determined so that that strategies can be
appropriately targeted to improve quality of medicines and access to medicines
in general.
7.3.2 Quality of generic metformin and innovator brand
(Glucophage®)
Another important finding is that there were no differences in quality between
the tagged Glucophage® samples and their generic counterparts from the
packaging and NIR analysis conducted; however there seemed to be significant
differences between their quality in terms of the percentage of active ingredient
from the HPLC analysis conducted. The packaging analysis and NIR analysis
conducted were to help identify if there were any counterfeit medicines. This
indicated that none of the samples (tagged Glucophage® or the generic
metformin samples) analysed were counterfeit, however a few of the generics
may be of lower quality, having lower concentration of metformin contrary to the
BP recommended concentration range for metformin (95-105%). This can be
linked to how participants perceived generic medicines in the second phase of
this research where the majority of the pharmacists seemed to see generic
medicines as being of lower quality.
This perception by a majority of the participants about generics being of lower
quality is similar to the findings of other studies conducted in Nigeria and other
related countries in Africa. Some of these include; Velasquez et al. (1998),
Kaplan et al. (2012), Auta et al. (2014), Patel et al. (2012) and Patel et al.
(2009b) which noted the professional and public perception that generic
medicines which are cheaper alternatives to innovator brands are of lower280
quality than the branded medicines sold by large firms and may have
contributed in hindering the use of generic medicines in Nigeria. This situation
in Nigeria is very dissimilar to what is obtainable in the developed countries
such as the UK, USA, Germany and Denmark where generic prescribing and
substitution has been relatively successful. It therefore seems that for generic
prescribing and substitution to be successful in Nigeria, there is need for
stakeholders to have a change in perception of what generics are and also
some level of persuasion led by the government may be needed aside ensuring
that the price of generics are affordable. This can also be applicable to other
countries that may be in a similar situation as Nigeria such as other countries in
sub-Saharan Africa where there is limited acceptance of generic prescribing
and substitution.
The finding in this study which show that most community pharmacists see
generic medicines as inferior and as such were likely to promote the use of
innovator brand Glucophage® based on perceived differences in quality seems
to contradict previous surveys conducted to determine the perception of
Nigerian pharmacists on generic prescribing and substitution which found that
most of the pharmacists would support generic substitution (Auta et al., 2014).
While generic substitution should be viewed as a crucial pharmaceutical care
intervention to improve access to good quality, affordable essential medicines, if
legislation on generic prescribing and substitution is to be put in place in
Nigeria, it is important to ensure that pharmacists' perception of quality of
generics do not hinder its practice and that pharmacists have adequate
knowledge on what generic medicines are so they can give adequate
information to the patients. This is so that it does not lead to confusion and
non-adherence as previous research has reported (Oyetunde et al., 2014). This
is also in accordance with the recommendation by the WHO working group on
access to essential medicines which states that accessibility of medicines
encompasses "products that are effective and of consistently good quality, that281
have no financial obstacle to a patient receiving it and that have available the
knowledge and guidance needed to use them properly" (UN Millenium Project,
2005). This means that for a medicine to be accessible it must be of good
quality.
Generic medicines usually become available after the patent expiry of original
or innovator brands. They can be unbranded (marketed under the International
Non-proprietary Name), semi-branded (marketed under the International Non-
proprietary Name with the manufacturer's name) or branded (copies of
medicines with their own brand names) (Oyetunde et. al, 2014). They are
required to show that they are of the same quality as the innovator brands as
part of their registration requirement, so should be interchangeable with the
innovator brands. Therefore, the finding from the first phase of this research
which showed that there were significant differences between Glucophage®
and their generic counterparts is worrying and points to the fact that there is
need for proper regulation of generic medicines in Nigeria to ensure that they
are of good quality, bioequivalent and interchangeable with their innovator
counterparts through enforcing good manufacturing practices by genuine
manufacturing companies. It may also be indicative of some deeper inefficiency
in medicines regulation in Nigeria due partly to the limited resources available to
NAFDAC. This may be associated with the inability of NAFDAC to meet up with
the volume of post market drug quality monitoring required of it which may lead
to manufacturers not adhering to good manufacturing practices after their
products have been approved. If this is the case, then it may be necessary to
identify ways by which better quality control and post market surveillance can
be ensured by NAFDAC and how assistance can be sought from the Nigerian
government and international agencies in areas that it may be less competent
as noted in UN Millenium Project, (2005).
The significant difference in quality between the innovator brand and the
generic counterparts contradicts the finding by Patel et al. (2012) where no282
differences in quality were found between innovator brands and generics
(branded and unbranded). This difference in the findings between these 2
studies may be because they were conducted in different countries (Nigeria and
South Africa) with different extent of drug quality problem, different medicines
were sampled and analysed in the 2 studies (while metformin was analysed in
this study, Patel et al. (2012) analysed paracetamol tablets, amoxicillin capsules
and hydrochlorothiazide tablets). Other methodological differences such as
sample size may have contributed to differences in the findings. Thirty six out
of thirty eight randomised controlled trials included in a study which compared
generic and branded drugs for the management of heart and artery diseases
(Beta blockers, diuretics, statins and warfarin) also showed no significant
differences between generic and innovator branded medicines (Bera and
Mukherjee, 2012).
7.3.3 Size of the problem of poor quality medicine in Nigeria
The majority of the participants agreed that the issue of poor quality medicines
is a problem in Nigeria just as other studies such as Odili et al. (2006), Erhun et
al. (2001), Rithenburg (2002), Bate et al. (2009a) and Seiter (2005) found.
Similar to Law and Youmans (2011), this study revealed that very few medicine
sellers (pharmacists, patent medicine vendors and open drug market traders)
have encountered a medicine, which they thought, was of poor quality.
However among the few participants in this study that have had an encounter
with poor quality medicines the most common reaction was to stop the medicine
and/ or return it to where it was purchased. While it is worth researching further
to understand the reasons for the low reporting of incidents of poor quality
medicine the most common reasons may include fear of the reporter being
harassed by enforcement officials or lack of trust in how such cases will be
handled based on participants' experience in other areas for instance whether
the culprits will be adequately punished or not.
This low reporting rate was also found in Bate et al. (2009a) and also noted by
Newton et al. (2010) as one of the reasons why determining the true impact of283
medicine counterfeiting has to date proved difficult. It is therefore very
important that those who use MAS such as the consumers and medicine sellers
are informed of the need to report any cases of counterfeit medicines they may
encounter as this can serve as a means of tracking the counterfeiters and help
reduce medicines counterfeiting.
The lack of experience with poor quality medicines observed in this study may
be due to precautions taken by the participants in ensuring they purchased
medicines of good quality or it may be due to difficulty in linking any
experiences they have had to poor quality medicines especially when there are
possibilities of other causes for in stance if consumers do not respond to
treatment, they may not link it directly to poor quality medicines but to other
reasons such as inappropriate diagnosis or prescribing.
The finding that the majority of the participants felt that locally manufactured
medicines were of good quality is similar to the finding in Auta et al. (2014)
where over half of the respondents felt that locally manufactured medicines in
Nigeria is of high quality. This perception may contribute in making consumers
to patronise locally manufactured medicines and may in return encourage local
drug manufacturing. However it is contrary to Bate et al. (2009) where about
75% of those who indicated that they knew manufacturers of fake medicines
stated that they were within the country and blamed the existence of poor
quality medicines in Nigeria on local drug manufacturers. This finding is also
contrary to popularly held view that people in Nigeria tend to trust the quality of
imported products more than those that are locally produced. It may be
because people tend to view the quality of medicines differently from those of
other goods for some reasons. Some of these reasons may include their lack of
trust in how imported medicines are regulated and the conditions such
medicines have been subjected to before arriving in Nigeria.284
The reasons identified as the causes of poor quality medicines in Nigeria is
similar to that found in Akinyandenu (2013) and Erhun et al. (2001). The
involvement of non-professionals in medicine distribution due to lack of
commitment by the pharmaceutical industries is similar to the concerns raised
by participants in Garuba et al. (2009). Community pharmacists in the Garuba
et al. (2009) study expressed concern that the control of the retail pharmacy by
rich business persons who use their wealth and influence to cut corners and sell
poor quality medicines while hiring pharmacists for the purpose of obtaining
licensure was a major cause for the continued existence of poor quality
medicine in Nigeria. Similar to the findings of this research, participants in
Garuba et al. (2009) noted that bribery and corruption is a common practice in
Nigeria and a major cause of rampant counterfeiting due to difficult living
conditions.
The majority of the participants stated that the problem of poor quality medicine
in Nigeria is decreasing mainly due to public awareness by NAFDAC. This view
about the positive impact of public awareness is an improvement over findings
of Erhun et al. (2001), a study conducted at a time when NAFDAC was
commencing its reforms. Erhun et al. (2001) found that public awareness on
drug matters as at 2001 was below average contrary to this study, which seems
to show a high level of awareness of medicines counterfeiting. It is important to
note here that awareness created by NAFDAC applauded by most of the
participants is awareness about how they can identify counterfeit medicines or
differentiate medicines that are of poor quality from good quality medicines for
instance showing them differences in packaging or appearance of the
medicines and/ publicising list of banned or blacklisted medicines. This is in line
with the conclusions from the economic model proposed by Lybecker, (2007)
which stated that awareness creation aimed at teaching consumers how to
distinguish between fake and genuine pharmaceuticals may be more beneficial
than strategies or campaigns that raise awareness of consumers of dangers of
counterfeiting. This is because the later may result in fall in the sale of285
medicines and may consequently lead to lack of access to good quality
medicines.
Furthermore, although this study did not aim at establishing whether there were
differences in quality of medicines from the community pharmacies when
compared to informal sources such as the patent medicine vendors and the
open drug market, The low failure rate from the medicine outlets sampled
(community pharmacies and open drug market) and that no counterfeits were
obtained from the open drug market indicate a situation contrary to the general
perception of most community pharmacists that the drug markets are a major
source poor quality medicines especially counterfeit medicines, as they are
often not well regulated. This is also contrary to the findings of previous studies
such as Onwujekwe et al. (2009), Tipke et al. (2009), Lon et al. (2006) and PSN
(2007) where a large proportion of samples sourced from places such as streets
and open drug market were discovered to be of poor quality. However, this
indication from this research is not conclusive of the nature of quality of
medicines obtained from open drug markets unless large scale studies
employing random sampling and powered to determine differences in quality of
drugs from the open drug market compared to community pharmacies are
conducted.
7.3.4 Barriers and facilitators to MAS use
One of the factors that may hinder the use of MAS observed from this research
is consumer trust in source of their medicines as most of the consumers
interviewed perceived there was no need to authenticate their medicines as
they trust the source of their medicines. The majority of the consumers that
expressed this view seemed to obtain their medicines from the pharmacies and
trusted that those pharmacies will not sell counterfeit medicines to them.286
This positive view about the quality of medicines sold in registered
pharmaceutical outlets may be partly due to the awareness created by
NAFDAC as stated by some of the participants. However, this is contrary to
popularly held belief that most consumers in Nigeria would like to authenticate
their medicines, as they do not trust that medicines they purchase from private
outlets such as the pharmacies and patent medicine shops may be authentic.
Some other previous research has obtained similar results. An example is the
study by Syhakhang et al. (2004), which found that most of the consumers in
Lao PDR interviewed did not worry about the quality of their medicines because
they trust that the health professionals (for instance the doctors and
pharmacists) will not sell poor quality medicines to them. Trust is a fundamental
principle in modern institutions composed of expert systems. This is because it
is not possible for members of such institutions to be an expert in every field so
they tend to trust that every expert knows his/her field and delivers products and
services that are of good quality (Giddens, 1990 in Syhakhang et al. 2004).
However, it can be an added advantage if consumers remain alert even when
they believe that they cannot get poor quality medicines from their health care
providers because consumer alertness can also help reduce medicines
counterfeiting.
Authentication complacency that may develop as a result of the users seeing
the tags as a mark of quality may lead to such consumers relying on previous
response they received to authenticate any medicine they purchase or their
seeing any medicine that has the authentication tag as being of good quality
even without authenticating them. This can limit the success of MAS as
counterfeiters can put tags on medicines that are of poor quality and consumers
will patronise them thinking they are original. This means that if the issue of
complacency on the part of MAS users is not tackled, it can mean than MAS
may indirectly promote counterfeiting in the long run rather than curbing the
problem. Awareness creation about MAS should therefore include educating
consumers of the need to authenticate their medicines at every purchase and287
that the tags on their own do not indicate if the medicines are of good quality
until such medicines are authenticated. The low level of awareness about MAS
observed in this study is very similar to the findings of Oyetunde and Ilozumba
(2013). However this may be because the MAS is relatively a new service.
This study found that most of the participants felt that MAS is easy to use
mainly because of how easy they perceived the instructions on how to use MAS
is and how easy they perceived the steps in authenticating their medicines.
Given the cultural diversity inherent in Nigeria, a country with about 527
languages (Ethnologue, 2011), this view may be applicable to only people who
are enlightened and can understand English language. This is because the
instructions on how to use MAS and the text message response are both in
English. The perceived ease of use (PEOU) of MAS may be a facilitator to its
use as PEOU is a major variable in the Technology Acceptance Model, which
can positively affect behavioural intention to use a service and consequently
lead to use of the service.
7.3.5 Impact/consequences of MAS use
Comparing the findings of this research with the proof of concept result
published by Sproxil, it seems that MAS may be beneficial in some ways and
can be said to be a good idea based on its benefits. From the proof of concept
results published by Sproxil following their pilot study of MAS in 2010,
conclusions were made that MAS is a good initiative based on the advantages it
confers on the users. For instance similar to the findings of this research, they
noted that MAS could help users identify counterfeits and therefore may serve
as a way of providing intelligence information for the regulatory agencies who
can trace the source of the identified counterfeit medicines. However, it is
worrying that this research showed a low reporting rate of incidents of
counterfeiting experienced by consumers. This is because consumers may not
report cases of counterfeiting they identify from the use of MAS if they do not
see the need to do so; meaning that the main objective of MAS which is to
reduce the incidence of medicines counterfeiting may not be fully achieved.288
The proof of concept result also showed that the introduction of MAS helped
Biofem, the distributor of Glucophage® in Nigeria regain its market share
(Sproxil, 2010a). This is similar to the perceptions of participants in this study
where the majority discussed the influence MAS may have on the purchasing
behaviour of consumers by increasing consumer demand for MAS enabled
medicines.
Another important consequence of MAS noted by the participants is that MAS
increases the confidence consumers have on the medicines they take. This
can indirectly promote adherence. This is because if consumers feel that they
are taking the right medicines, they will be encouraged to take them as
required. This increased adherence can therefore translate to better treatment
outcome.
7.4 Limitations of the research
This study determined quality of medicines via packaging analysis and chemical
analyses (NIR and HPLC) only. Other quality tests such as dissolution tests
were not conducted. More useful result on the quality and bioequivalence of the
samples would have been obtained if dissolution studies were carried out in
addition to other tablet quality parameters such as uniformity of content,
hardness, friability and disintegration tests. Also, inability to conduct further
chemometric analysis such as the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to help
accurately identify the counterfeits may also have limited the findings of the NIR
analysis. Four of the generic samples could not be analysed using packaging
and NIR analysis as no original samples from their manufacturers could be
obtained. It is therefore difficult to determine the extent to which not analysing
these samples may have affected the conclusions of this study. However,
unless they are complex counterfeits, the HPLC analysis, which showed their
percentage concentration of metformin, gave an indication that they may likely
be genuine samples.
The samples analysed in this study were all obtained from the private sector289
(community pharmacies and the open drug market). The findings on the quality
of medicines based on this research may therefore be limited as the public
sector for example hospitals were excluded. Also, the exclusion of some group
of stakeholders such as Sproxil, drug manufacturers, police, customs,
importers, wholesalers, doctors and other health professionals from the
interviews may have limited the findings of this study. This means that caution
must be exercised in extrapolating any findings from this research to the entire
Nigerian population, as it is possible that the stakeholders that were not
sampled may have held a different perception. However given the time and
resources available to complete the PhD and in order to ensure that the study is
independent and free of bias, the number of stakeholder groups included in this
study seemed feasible. It was also reasonable to sample from only the private
rather than the public sector, in order to avoid any problems or risks that may be
associated with releasing results of the quality of medicines within the public
sector. Also, as samples were collected from Lagos alone, there may be some
limitations in extrapolating the findings of this research to other regions of
Nigeria given the social-cultural and economic differences that exist between
the North and Southern Nigeria (where the samples were collected from)
The original samples to which comparisms were made via packaging and NIR
analyses were obtained from the company representatives/distributors rather
than directly from the manufacturers. This may limit the findings of these
analyses, as it is possible that the original samples collected are not from the
genuine manufacturers. Also the small number of each generic metformin
product collected may have limited the findings of this research.
Fear that medicines were being sampled for quality testing may have caused
some of the medicine sellers to present medicines they thought were of good
quality for sale to the sample collectors. This was exhibited by one of the
participants who insisted that the sample collector authenticated the medicine
he purchased before leaving the shop. In line with this, some participants may
not have given responses during the semi-structured interviews that reflect their290
true experiences due to the sensitive nature of the topic discussed and the
perceived associated risk they may be exposed to by revealing information if
they thought that the researcher was linked to NAFDAC. This may be the
reason why one of the participants refused to be tape-recorded. Also, some of
the participants revealed more information as soon as the tape recorders were
switched off and majority of the participants spoke generally about issues raised
rather than narrating their individual experiences.
Although attempts were made to conduct the interviews in a quiet place with
limited interruptions, most of the participants especially in the consumer and
medicine seller group preferred to be interviewed on the spot when they were
doing their normal duties for instance while they were in the shop for the
medicine sellers and while waiting to see the doctor or to collect their medicines
for the consumers. Interviewing participants at these times led to constant
interruptions during some of the interviews. These constant interrupts may
have limited the flow of the discussions during the semi-structured interviews.
Furthermore, only 3 consumers/patients who have used MAS were interviewed.
Although qualitative studies do not aim at ensuring representation of the entire
populations but to generate rich descriptions, it would have been better if more
people who have used the service were interviewed. This may be an indication
that the sampling strategy employed in this study may be inadequate.
Therefore, it may have been better to first conduct a survey using questionnaire
to help identify those who have used MAS and to help triangulate the findings.
The identified users of MAS willing to participate in the semi-structured interview
can then be recruited and interviewed. This way, richer descriptions can be
obtained from those who have first hand experience with MAS. Also, if focus
group interviews were conducted after the semi-structured interviews, it would
have helped to confirm the findings from the semi-structured interviews.291
7.5 Personal reflections about the research
Reflexivity is a critical concept especially in qualitative research. This is
because it is a major effort aimed at addressing the preconceptions researchers
unintentionally introduce in their qualitative design in order to ensure the
accuracy of qualitative research outcomes (Roller 2012). Having a personal
reflection about the research enables the researcher to consider ways his or her
relationship with the interviewees or participants have been affected by
presumptions arising from those preconceptions (Roller, 2012). This may
include reflecting on assumptions the researcher may have made about the
participants and their response to the interview questions and how these
assumptions influenced the interview process. It also includes how the values,
beliefs, life experience and socio-economic status of the researcher may have
influenced the analytical process (Roller, 2014). The impact of the research
location on the researcher’s relationship with the interviewees and the data
collection were also be reflected upon.
The researcher believes that her personal characteristics such as her
nationality, tribe and professional background may have influenced some of the
decisions made during the research process and the outcomes arising from this
research. Therefore, she engaged in an on-going critical reflection by keeping a
reflexive journal where she noted details of how she or her decisions may have
influenced the interview process and data analysis in order to minimise
interviewer bias. This journal helped inform the researcher of the possible
preconceptions that may have affected the credibility of the outcomes of this
research. This section of the thesis presents the personal reflections by the
researcher.
Due to the nature of the topic being discussed, the researcher assumed that
there might be some difficulty in getting the honest opinion of participants
especially the medicine sellers and consumers on issues raised during the292
semi-structured interviews. This is because, the nature of the topic being
explored; quality of medicines in Nigeria has been an issue of concern
especially for NAFDAC and has resulted in the closing down of so many outlets
suspected of engaging in production of medicines of poor quality just prior to the
commencement of this research. The researcher therefore, envisaged that this
might make the participants unwilling to disclose any sensitive information,
thereby limiting the credibility of the research. This may be worsened if the
researcher sought to obtain information from the participants in groups such as
through focus group interviews rather than on an individual basis as the
participants may think that other members of the group may report them to
NAFDAC even if the researcher does not report them. In order to overcome
this difficulty, the researcher obtained data through semi-structured interviews
rather than through focus groups. The researcher also prepared to take notes
rather then tape recording in case the participants declined being recorded. In
addition, the researcher introduced herself to all the participants as a PhD
student and a pharmacist but stated explicitly that the interviews were only for
research purposes aimed at improving the quality of medicines distributed in
Nigeria and as such should not implicate anyone. Even though these steps
were taken and a semi-structured interview method was used, some of the
experiences of the researcher during the data collection stage showed that
some of the participants may still not have disclosed their honest opinions about
issues raised due to fear of being reported to regulatory authorities. For
instance one of the consumers refused to be tape-recorded, stating that he was
an ex-official of the Lagos state government and as such would not want to be
implicated by the statements he may make. In this instance the researcher took
notes. Also, some of the participants exhibited characteristics that showed that
they did not want to take responsibility for giving information that may be
incorrect by trying to confirm their views with that of the participants on issues
discussed. For instance the participants below asked the researcher if his
perception was right;
Doesn’t it sound reasonable?293
Patient 10, male, line 86
In order to avoid introducing bias, the researcher maintained a neutral stand by
not answering such questions; rather the participants were reminded that they
were no right or wrong answers.
The researcher also thought that it may be very difficult to recruit the open drug
market traders as the open drug market has for a long time been a target for
crack down of medicines counterfeiting by the drug regulatory agencies and
pharmacists. It may also be difficult to recruit the open drug market traders, as
they may not want to talk to the researcher if they find out that she is a
pharmacist. This is because the traders often see the pharmacists as enemies
who do not want them to thrive in the business of medicines distribution
because they are seen as non-professionals as stated explicitly by some of the
participants below;
“Even at the level of the Lagos State Pharmacists’ Association. They interact
with us with a long spoon. They don’t want to do anything with anyone who is
not a pharmacist”
Trader 3, male, line 57-59
In order to overcome this perceived difficulty of recruiting participants from the
open drug market, the researcher sought the help of one of her colleagues who
introduced her and the purpose of the research to the traders before they were
approached by the researcher to participate in the research. This is because he
has worked in the open drug market and was known by most of the traders.
This step taken may have reassured the traders that participating in the
research will not implicate them or lead to closure of their outlets.
While on the one hand, the researcher being a pharmacist may have posed a
problem in obtaining data from groups such as the open drug market traders as
discussed above, on another hand it may have aided flow of information during294
the interview stage and the collection of information from some of the other
participants such as community pharmacists. The researcher explored a topic
in which she is not only a researcher, but could also be one of the participants
because one of the groups interviewed were the community pharmacists. In
addition, the topic explored is a topic of great interest to the researcher who has
prior knowledge of medicines distribution and regulation in Nigeria and as such
may make her more predisposed to follow discussions in this area with ease.
However, this may have led to the researcher unintentionally airing her views
about issues raised during the interviews or being judgemental about
participants’ responses to her interview questions. To overcome this, the
researcher as much as possible remained open and believed that it is possible
for others to have a different perception of issues. In addition, since the
researcher is a pharmacist, the community pharmacists may have perceived the
researcher as “one of them”. This may have made the community pharmacists
to feel more confortable participating in the research thereby facilitating the data
collection.
Furthermore, the researcher envisaged that the medicines sellers may present
medicines which they thought were of good quality if they suspect they were
being sampled for quality testing. In order to overcome this, for each of the
outlets, the researcher went with one of the sample collectors to collect the
medicines. The sample collector collected the tagged Glucophage® while the
researcher collected the cheapest generic metformin. These samples were
collected at two different times to avoid any suspicion by the medicine sellers
that their medicines were being sampled for testing. Also the sample collectors
avoided engaging in further discussions with the medicine sellers to avoid giving
any clues that they were collecting the samples for analysis.
Although it may be justifiable to sample only medicines from the private sector
for quality testing since about 60-80% of health service provision comes from
the private sector and the traditional medicine providers whose activities are295
often unregulated and non standardised (DFID HSRC, 2000), the nature of the
topic explored in the research may have influenced the decision to sample only
medicines from the private sector. This is because the researcher envisaged
that she might be exposed to some level of risk if she sampled from the public
sector. Also it may be difficult to publish the findings arising from analysis of
medicines sampled from the public sector if they are found to fail quality testing.
Even though only samples from the private sector were sampled and analysed,
some level of caution was exercised in reporting the findings of the analysis
conducted and the information given by the participants. For instance, names
of the outlets from where metformin samples were obtained were kept
anonymous and codes were assigned to the samples. Also the names of the
participants who took part in the semi-structured interviews were kept
anonymous. Comments by some of the participants as shown below indicate
that interested groups may threaten the researcher if such precautions such as
maintaining anonymity of brands and companies are not taken while writing up
the thesis.
‘Well, this one could be an insider information that I am giving you, so you will
know how to write it so that they will not come after you”
Trader 1, female, line 219-220
The researcher decided to exclude some other stakeholders such as
representatives of Sproxil and the pharmaceutical industry in order to ensure
that an independent view of the issues studied are presented. However, this
decision may have affected the outcome of the research in that the findings may
not portray the perspectives of all the relevant stakeholders in the field of drug
quality in Nigeria.
Only participants who can communicate in English were selected for the
interviews. This can be justified by the fact that it may be practically impossible
to interview non-English speakers given the cultural diversity of Nigeria as it296
may mean that the researcher will have to conduct and translate the interviews
in many different languages. However this decision to interview only English
speakers may have been influenced by the researcher being an English
speaker and as such thought to be the most convenient.
Furthermore, there may have been increased willingness to give information to
the researcher by some of the participants because of her being a fellow
Nigerian. However, this may have contributed some bias to the study through
the researcher introducing some preconceived ideas from her experience of
being Nigerian into the study in a bid to impress the participants in return. Also,
the researcher comes from the Igbo tribe; a tribe in Nigeria popularly perceived
as highly involved in the manufacture and sale of poor quality medicines. This
may have made the open drug market traders all of which were also Igbos to
feel more comfortable speaking to the researcher as shown from the comment
from one of the traders below;
“You are my sister, I will help in any way I can because I want you to come out
in good colours”
Trader 4, male, line 323-324
This predisposition of the researcher may also have influenced the researcher’s
analysis of the qualitative data as she may have unintentionally supported the
views of the traders.
As previously noted, some of the interview sessions with the patients were often
interrupted by the doctors, nurses or pharmacists and noise because most of
them preferred to be interviewed while they were waiting to see their doctor or
while awaiting collection of their medicines from the pharmacy. This also
happened with the medicine sellers who in most cases preferred that interviews
be conducted at their place of work and were often interrupted if they needed to
attend to patients and by noise as most of the outlets were located close to the297
roads. These interruptions may have disrupted the flow of the interviews in
these stakeholder categories.
The data collection took place in Lagos. The nature of roads and transportation
network in Lagos may have influenced the choice of data collection methods
used. For instance, it was more convenient conducting semi-structured
interviews rather than focus group interviews where poor transportation network
may hinder some participants from attending the focus group interviews. Also
the poor transportation network coupled with the large number of pharmacies,
which are located far apart from each other, may have delayed the data
collection. This is because the sample collectors had to travel long distances to
obtain samples from the randomly selected outlets. In order to facilitate easy
location of the outlets, the second sample collector recruited for this research
was a native Yoruba speaker who has lived in Lagos for a long time and
therefore knew the easiest way of getting to different areas of Lagos. Yoruba
language is the native language popularly spoken in Lagos.
7.6 Implications of the research findings
The findings of this research have several implications for practice and policy.
Here, the discussion on how the findings of this research can lead to change in
practice or policy is presented in the form of recommendations at various levels.
The recommendations that follow are for;
a) Government and its agencies
b) Sproxil
c) Pharmaceutical industries
d) Pharmacy practice
7.6.1: Implications for policy- Government and its agencies298
This research did not identify any counterfeits. While it is worth researching
further through larger scale studies to determine the true exent of medicines
counterfeiting in Nigeria, that no counterfeits were found may mean that even
though medicines counterfeiting is a problem and will remain a problem for as
long as people use medicines, it may be important for NAFDAC to evaluate
some of the steps being taken to ensure accessibility to good quality medicines
that are affordable. It may be worth determining if more efforts should be
geared towards startegies that prevent substandard medicines/ improve the
quality of medicines from genuine manufacturers such as ensuring good GMP
and post market surveillance rather than focusing on initating expensive
technological solutions such as the use of MAS and TruScan® aimed at
detecting counterfeit medicines, given the very scarce resources at its disposal.
Furthermore, this research showed that majority of the participants viewed
locally manufactured medicines as being of good quality and may in some
cases be better than imported medicines and that most of the poor quality
medicines are imported into the country. This means that some increase in
patronage of locally manufactured medicines may be expected at the consumer
level. It would therefore be important for government to build upon this by
putting in place measures to further encourage local drug manufacturing. Even
though there has been improvement in local drug manufacturing for instance
there are now about 150 manufacturers in Nigeria when compared to 50 that
were present in the 1990's, primary manufacturing is yet to commence in
Nigeria (Ohabunwa, 2010). The ambition of the National Drug Policy to increase
local production capacity to a level where about 70% of total production can
cater for about 60% of local drug needs and the remaining 30% exported to
generate revenue is yet to be achieved. In essence, the production capacity is
still less than 30% (Erhun etal, 2001). Government should therefore encourage
local drug manufacturing by providing manufacturing inducement such as giving
tariff concessions to them, increasing their patronage of locally manufactured
medicines as well as reducing cost of product registration by NAFDAC.299
In addition, it may be beneficial for NAFDAC to intensify monitoring at the ports
of entry since most of the poor quality medicines are imported as noted by most
of the participants. This may include increasing staff strength and vigilance at
the ports of entry of medicines into the country. Other measures such as heavy
taxation may help encourage local drug manufacturing and help directly reduce
influx of poor quality medicines to Nigeria. Bate and Boateng, (2007) and
Raufu, (2003) stated that that the majority of counterfeits come from Asian
countries like India and China. However this information may not be accurate
as any evidence behind it may be biased by issues relating to the patent right of
multinationals in countries such as Europe or America or by the fact that
counterfeiters most often do not give accurate information on the country/ place
of manufacture on the packaging of medicines thereby leading to misleading
conclusions. Therefore, while discouraging importation may help to reduce
counterfeiting on the one hand, it may hinder efforts of making good quality
generics available on another hand. Therefore, careful consideration of these
recommendations based on most pressing health care needs of Nigeria is
necessary. Other ways to encourage local manufacturing is to improve local
infrastructure such as ensuring electric power supply, good roads and water so
as to lower production costs.
Another important finding of this study was that majority of the community
pharmacists viewed generic medicines as being inferior in quality when
compared to innovator brands. This finding has critical implications for the
implementation of generic prescribing and substitution in Nigeria. Although the
National Drug Policy of Nigeria advocates generic prescribing and substitution
(Federal Ministry of Health, 2003), there is currently no legislation that
empowers generic prescribing and substitution. Previous studies have revealed
that generic substitution can have enormous benefits of ensuring access to
medicines. However if it is not done with proper explanation to the patients, it
can lead to confusion and non-adherence (Oyetunde et al., 2014). It is vital that300
appropriate policy and guidelines for generic substitution in Nigeria be put in
place to ensure accessibility to good quality medicines, which are affordable.
However careful implementation of the policy is necessary to avoid causing
confusion for the consumers and non-adherence due to ignorance and
misconceptions by stakeholders. Education campaigns aimed at enlightening
the consumers, pharmacists and prescribers is very necessary for a successful
implementation of such policies and has been shown to be successful as noted
in Portugal Pharma Profile (2008). As part of strategies to encourage generic
prescribing, government should encourage research in quality of prescribing at
country level using the ABC analysis method so that appropriate actions can be
taken to ensure appropriate prescribing. ABC analysis is the systematic study
of annual medicine consumption and cost to determine which items account for
the highest amount of expenditure (UN Millenium Project, 2005). Such
research will help to show the extent of generic prescribing and reveal more
efficient ways to ensure or improve generic prescribing and substitution in
Nigeria. Also as the first phase of this study revealed significant difference
between the innovator brand; Glucophage® and cheapest generic versions in
favour of the innovator brand, it would be important for government and its
agencies such as NAFDAC to ensure proper monitoring of generic medicines
for generic prescribing and substitution to yield optimum result. Government
should therefore provide financial support to NAFDAC in the area of staffing,
GMP inspection, quality control laboratories, enforcement and post market
surveillance. Drug regulatory agencies like NAFDAC should also seek
assistance from international organisations in drug quality assurance/monitoring
in areas it may be less competent. NAFDAC should also find ways to make
registration of medicines quicker, easier and cheaper. This will encourage
importers of medicines and local drug manufacturers to register their products
so that their quality can be ensured. It will also help to avoid situations where
unregistered medicines are distributed illegally prior to registration with
NAFDAC, exposing consumers to medicines that may be of poor quality.301
Corruption ranked first in this research as a cause of the continued existence of
poor quality medicines. Therefore, there should be increased political will by
the government to tackle corruption and enforce legislation and regulation of
pharmaceutical products. This means that the law enforcement agencies such
as the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) must become
committed to its enforcement of existing laws against medicines counterfeiting
rather than allowing “business to go as usual”. There is need for more deterrent
laws against medicines counterfeiting. Presently the maximum punishment for
offenders is the sum of 70- 3000 US dollars or 3 months- 5 years jail term
(Chika et al., 2011). This was perceived as an incentive by most of the
participants in this study rather than a deterrent. The present bill advocated by
the Director General of NAFDAC, Dr Paul Orhii for a life jail term and
confiscation of assets upon conviction and compensation of victims where injury
has been caused should be passed into law.
Furthermore, ignorance no doubt is a huge challenge and contributory to
existence of poor quality medicines in Nigeria. This is because of low literacy
rate (61% adult literacy rate) in Nigeria (US Embassy in Nigeria, 2014). This
means that a large proportion of the adult population of Nigeria are unable to
read and write. Government should seek cheaper and more effective means of
curbing medicines counterfeiting for instance through public awareness
programmes. This public awareness should not be left to NAFDAC alone but
done in collaboration with other agencies and professional associations such as
the Pharmaceutical Society of Nigeria and the National Medical Association.
Public health media campaign against medicines counterfeiting by NAFDAC,
which was applauded by majority of the participants in this study as one of the
reasons for the perceived reduction of the existence of poor quality medicines in
Nigeria, should continue. However it may be better if such campaigns focused
on avenues to make consumers or medicine users differentiate between
counterfeit and genuine medicines. As previously noted, Lybecker, (2007)
noted that the most useful form of awareness campaigns are those that help302
consumers to distinguish between fake and genuine pharmaceuticals rather
than campaigns that raise awareness of the dangers of medicines counterfeiting
which may lead to decrease in sale of medicines and reduction in access to
medicines. As part of awareness creation, NAFDAC should continue to publish
a list of medicines that are banned through their website and other media
platforms to help reduce consumer demand for such products.
Also, increased involvement of pharmacists was one of the reasons given by
participants as the reason for perceived reduction in existence of poor quality
medicines in Nigeria, government should therefore provide incentives/financial
support through giving low interest loans to pharmacists wishing to go into
production or community pharmacy practice as a way of further increasing the
involvement of professionals like pharmacists in medicines supply and
distribution in Nigeria.
NAFDAC has been actively involved in promotion of MAS. MAS is part of the
technological solutions which can help patients differentiate between counterfeit
and genuine medicines and as such expected to be useful in helping to reduce
medicines counterfeiting. The finding of this research indicates that MAS has
relatively been successful in helping patients authenticate their medicines.
However, it is important that it does not lead to lack of trust in health care
professionals like pharmacists as stated by some of the participants in this
study. It is also important to note that MAS is not immune to hacking and so
there is need to continually evaluate the service to ensure that there is no
infiltration by the counterfeiters and that it remains useful to its users. MAS also
may be limited by computer and technological illiteracy, complexity of language
in Nigeria, lack of awareness, poor phone network, dispensing practices in rural
areas and in the hospitals among other issues. Therefore, policies that may
help overcome some of these limitations such as policies that help promote
dispensing of medicines in their original packaging and enforcing rights of
consumers knowing the medicines they are being given can be promoted. In303
addition, other techniques that allow only medicine sellers to authenticate
medicines such as the use of RFID technology may yield additional benefit of
improving trust consumers/patients have in their medicine sellers leading to
better outcomes. However, this may be expensive. Hence, cheaper techniques
of detection that do not need the use of additional devices such as holograms or
colour shift inks may also need to be explored and promoted by the
government. As previously noted, aside promotion of the use of these
technological solutions, strategies aimed at promoting Good Manufacturing
Practice by the pharmaceutical industries should be promoted by NAFDAC as
susbstandard medicines may present a greater challenge than counterfeits as
this study indicates.
Even though MAS service is free to consumers, pharmaceutical industries pay
for it. It is therefore necessary for government to partner with companies in
order to help offset or supplement the cost burden of MAS on these industries
so as to ensure that cost of medicines are not increased as a result of MAS.
This is especially useful for local manufacturers that are faced with the problem
of high cost of production given the infrastructural challenge of erratic power
supply, water supply and bad roads. Any increment in cost of medicines as a
result of introduction of MAS will in the long run lead to lack of access to
medicines if consumers are unable to afford them.
Finally, government and its agencies such as NAFDAC should be increasingly
involved in the promotion of MAS in terms of creating awareness about it and
not leaving it only in the hands of the manufacturers. Presently the level of
awareness about MAS seems to be low as shown in this study. It may be
helpful if government can offset the cost of advertising MAS on the media.
However, there is need to ensure that such awareness creation do not lead to
unnecessarily promotion of medicines as this may lead to increased
attractiveness of such products for counterfeiting, thereby limiting the success
of MAS.304
7.6.2 Implications for practice- Sproxil
1) Although Sproxil has the ambition of expanding beyond the pharmaceuticals
and has ventured into authenticating medicines from different therapeutic
classes ranging from anti-malarials to antibiotics and antifungals, it may be
better to focus on drugs that are prone to being counterfeiting such as fast
moving and expensive medicines and medicines commonly used in the country
for instance medicines for endemic diseases like malaria. This may yield more
useful benefit than trying to make all medicines MAS enabled at the same time.
This is in line with the suggestion by a group of Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) students (Dedesma et al., 2011). This will also enable
Sproxil determine how well MAS works before expanding into other areas.
Further expansion can then be based on the disease prevalence and
prevalence of poor quality medicines for those diseases so that the majority of
the population can benefit from the service.
2) There is need for awareness of MAS to be created through various mass
education means and medicine sellers should be encouraged to educate
patients about MAS. The kind of MAS education advocated for by participants
in this study includes educating consumers in their native dialects and during
gatherings such as in the church, mosque or free community health programs in
addition to other conventional means of creating awareness such as through
devices like radio, television and newspapers. This study found that there is
limited involvement of medicine sellers in consumer education about MAS.
Therefore there is need for Sproxil to collaborate with NAFDAC and the
medicine sellers so that the medicine sellers can be trained on the use of MAS
and on the need to teach patients/ consumers about MAS. While awareness
creation is crucial for the expansion of MAS, there is need to ensure that this
does not lead to unnecessary product promotion. This is because product
promotion will indirectly make MAS enabled medicines attractive to305
counterfeiters and in turn limit its success. Also educating consumers on the
need to authenticate their medicines at each purchase is necessary to avoid
development of complacency, which may limit the use of MAS.
3) There is need for Sproxil to build upon some of the facilitators and positive
impact of MAS use identified from this study such as quick response to
authentication. This was one of the points noted by majority of the participants
as a factor that will encourage the use of the service. Therefore it is important
for Sproxil and the network service providers to ensure good phone network
availability so as to avoid unnecessary delays in responding to MAS users.
The perceived usefulness of MAS was described by some of the participants in
the form of impact of MAS on their purchasing behaviour and increased
knowledge about their state of health from additional health tips contained in the
authentication response message. This means that it will be good for Sproxil to
continue to give those additional health tips. Increased demand of MAS
enabled medicines since the roll out of MAS is an indication that companies that
had their products counterfeited in the past, who have signed up for MAS may
be regaining their market share back- a major objective of Sproxil. This
usefulness attribute may attract other drug industries to sign up for the service.
4) There is need for Sproxil to consider imprinting the codes directly on
medicine packages (primary and secondary packaging) instead of placing the
cards with the codes on tablet strips. Doing this will enable those who sell
medicines to authenticate them before they are sold. However, it may require
adequate collaboration with the pharmaceutical industries to ensure that the
codes/pin numbers can be printed directly on the packaging during product
manufacturing. Sproxil can also consider making the pin numbers bolder or
reducing the pin numbers in order to avoid customers mistakenly sending wrong
authentication codes/ pin numbers because they were not legible enough.306
7.6.3 Implications for practice: pharmaceutical industries
1) Even though majority of the participants in the medicine seller group stated
they sourced their medicines from places that they consider reputable such as
obtaining directly from the companies, through the medical representatives or
wholesalers so believed the medicines they stock should be of good quality.
This may be deceitful as some manufacturers/ wholesalers may be distributing
their medicines through the open market as noted by some of the participants or
through unregulated sources as noted in Spies (2003) and Law and Youmans
(2011). Pharmaceutical industries should therefore ensure that their medicines
are properly monitored by their surveillance departments while they are in
circulation so as to ensure they are not channelled in such a way that they
degrade or are exposed to counterfeiting because of their interest in making
more sales rather than protecting the public from the dangers of poor quality
medicines.
2) Even though the majority of the participants perceived the quality of locally
manufactured medicines to be of good quality when compared to imported
medicines, poor packaging of locally manufactured medicines was one of the
issues raised by some of the participants which may make counterfeiting them
easy. Therefore, there is need for local drug manufacturers to improve on
aesthetics of their products such as product packaging. This will also ensure
that they are attractive to users so as to increase their patronage both by
individuals and by the government.
3) The findings of this study that there is a significant difference between the
innovator brand, Glucophage® and generic metformin samples may be due to
several reasons. However it indicates that there is need for genuine drug
manufacturers to ensure good manufacturing practice to improve quality of
medicines. There is also need for pharmaceutical industries to ensure that they307
continue to manufacture good quality medicines that meet recommended
specification even after their medicines have been approved.
4) Pharmaceutical industries should put measures in place to ensure that there
are no situations of artificial scarcity of their products or unnecessary “out of
stock”, so as not to create room for counterfeiters to go into producing such
medicines to meet the demand for such products.
7.6.4 Implications for pharmacy practice
1) Pharmacists and other medicine sellers should properly counsel patients on
how to detect and avoid counterfeit medicines. They should also educate
consumers on how to use MAS as well as report cases of medicines
counterfeiting or adverse drug reaction to NAFDAC. Advocacy materials to
increase awareness of substandard and counterfeit medicines and how to
report detected cases should be provided by the Pharmaceutical Society of
Nigeria and made available through the retail drug outlets. This is because
reporting cases of counterfeiting or poor quality medicines can help provide
intelligence information to crack down counterfeiting. It can also help to provide
information on how best poor quality medicines can be tackled and to avert
negative consequences of poor quality medicines
2) Given the limited availability of pharmacists compared to the high demand for
medicines in Nigeria, it is necessary for pharmacists to co-operate with the
informal drug traders (patent medicine vendors and open drug market traders)
for instance in the area of providing education and training to them on drug
quality and dialoguing with them and/ their associations to see how to minimise
the existence of poor quality medicines. This is one of the recommendations by
some of the informal traders who seemed to dislike the attitude of the
pharmacists towards them. This will ensure that good quality essential308
medicines that are affordable are accessible to the public. It may also be
helpful to identify ways the open drug markets can be re-structured to meet the
standard regulations for good storage of medicines and engaging the
Pharmacists’ Council of Nigeria in monitoring and regulating how such markets
should operate. In addition to this, the licencing of the patent medicine vendors
can be replaced with the Accredited Drug Dispensing Outlet (ADDO) system
used in Tanzania where NAFDAC can train and accredit small, privately run
retail outlets by non-pharmacists to sell a list of essential medicines including
some prescription drugs in the rural and poor communities.
3) Basic training in pharmacology and rational medicines use should be
provided to informal medicine sellers such as PMVs and traders while
continuing professional development (CPD) programmes should be
implemented for pharmacists where it does not currently exist. These programs
should contain talks on how to differentiate medicines of poor quality from
genuine ones as well as tools and resources that they can use to educate
patients on medicines counterfeiting and MAS. These trainings should be co-
ordinated by the professional regulatory bodies such as the Pharmacists
Council of Nigeria (PCN) and the National Medical Association (NMA) in
collaboration with the drug regulatory authority, NAFDAC. All those involved in
selling medicines should also be encouraged to subscribe to NAFDAC for
updates on drug quality issues in the country.
4) Undergraduate pharmacy students and colleges of pharmacy should be
encouraged to learn more about medicines quality and participate in activities
geared towards reduction of medicines counterfeiting and poor quality
medicines as a whole. As a practical step to educating undergraduate
pharmacy students on drug quality, there should be a period of mandatory
industrial training during the course of their training to become pharmacists.
This will help give them first hand experience of what is obtainable in practice.
Concepts such as generic prescribing and substitution should be included in309
undergraduate pharmacy curriculum and that of other professionals like the
nurses and doctors.
5) There is need for health workers involved with dispensing medicines in
hospitals and rural areas such as pharmacists and pharmacy staff to ensure
that medicines are dispensed in their original packaging so that patients can
authenticate their medicines if they want to do so. This practice should also be
advocated as a policy in the hospital settings as it will also help to ensure that
patients become aware of the medicines they are taking. This will also help to
promote adherence.
6) Precautionary steps taken by some of the participants in this study to avoid
purchasing poor quality medicines should be promoted by professional
associations such as the Pharmaceutical Society of Nigeria. These
precautionary steps include sourcing medicines from reputable sources such as
from the manufacturers or their distributors by the medicine sellers and for the
consumers; obtaining medicines from registered pharmacies, checking the
packaging and the appearance of medicines purchased for any differences
which may indicate they may be counterfeit and cross checking the authenticity
of medicines purchased with health care professionals such as the doctors.
However it is important that the health care professionals do not unduly promote
innovator brands as medicines of good quality.
7) The Pharmacists’ Council of Nigeria should ensure that retail pharmacy
outlets are owned by pharmacists. They should find efficient ways of monitoring
to ensure that pharmacists are always present at their premises. This will help
ensure that pharmacists do not give out their licences to non-professionals so
as to obtain licensure while they take on other jobs.
8) As a way of increasing involvement of pharmacists in medicines distribution,
the Pharmacists’ Council of Nigeria in collaboration with the National310
Universities Commission should consider opening more schools of pharmacy.
This may help increase the number of pharmacists in Nigeria.
7.7 Conclusion
This chapter presented the discussion of the findings arising from the first
(analysis of metformin samples) and the second (qualitative interviews) phases
of this research. It shows that the objectives of this research were met. The
findings were compared with information from existing literature. Following this,
the researcher’s personal reflections about the research were presented.
Finally, the implications of the findings of this research for practice and policy
were presented in the form of recommendations for different stakeholder groups
in the field of medicines quality in Nigeria. This included Sproxil, the innovator
of MAS, the pharmaceutical industries, the pharmacists and other medicine
sellers as well as the government and its agencies. The next chapter is
devoted to presenting future areas of research identified during the course of
this study and the final conclusions of this study.311
Chapter 8
Recommendations for future research and conclusions
8.1 Introduction to chapter
This chapter presents research areas that may be explored in the future and
conclusions arising from the present study.
8.2 Recommendations for future research
During the course of this research, other areas in the field of medicines quality,
which may need further research were identified and are discussed below.
No counterfeits were identified from this study and this calls to question the true
extent of medicines counterfeiting in relation to other inefficiencies which may
be hindering access to good quality medicines especially in resource limited
settings such as Nigeria. Therefore, there is need for large scale studies aimed
at determining the extent of medicines counterfeiting in comparison with the
problem of substandard medicines in order to determine which interventions will
be most useful in improving quality of medicines available in Nigeria. This is
because strategies aimed at tackling substandard medicines; that is medicines
from genuine manufacturers without any criminal intent is different from those
aimed at tackling medicines counterfeiting where the medicines are intentionally
produced with the aim of deceit. If the problem of substandard medicines is
greater as this present study indicates, it may be worthwhile investing more in
implementing strategies that will ensure good manufacturing practices by
genuine manufacturers.
Also, this study was conducted in Lagos. It would therefore be useful to
replicate this study in other settings in Nigeria for instance a state in the312
Northern Nigeria given the socio-economic differences that exist between the
North and South of Nigeria (where this study was conducted) and/ or sampling
medicines from other therapeutic classes where there have been reports of high
incidence of counterfeiting like the antimalarials and the antibiotics. Also, larger
scale studies involving large sample size of innovator medicines and their
generic counterparts can be conducted to help compare the quality of innovator
brands and generic medicines. These would help to show the extent to which
the findings of this research may apply to other settings. It will also help further
inform policies on generic prescribing and substitution in Nigeria.
This study showed low failure rates for the samples from the community
pharmacies and the open drug market but was not powered to detect
differences in quality between them. It would therefore be useful to conduct
further research to detect differences in quality of medicines obtained from
informal sources such as the patent medicine vendors and the open drug
market traders in comparison with the quality of medicines from the community
pharmacies. This would help to determine the major sources of poor quality
medicines, so that adequate strategies can be put in place. It would also help
to generate evidence towards restructuring medicines distribution in Nigeria.
Furthermore, this study compared the quality of the innovator brand with that of
their generic counterparts via packaging and chemical (NIR and HPLC)
analyses. It is important to note that these tests/ analytical techniques
conducted gave indications as to whether the samples were counterfeit or of
low quality in terms of the concentration of active gradient metformin. Future
studies can include other quality tests such as dissolution tests, which will yield
more robust information on the bioavailability of the samples. Also mass
spectroscopy can be conducted to detect impurities in the samples, which
should also serve as an indicator of the quality of the medicines.313
Development of complacency by users of MAS was a major factor that was
identified in this study that may hinder its use and in turn limit its success of
reducing medicines counterfeiting. Therefore, it may be worthwhile to conduct a
research in the future aimed at detecting complacency to MAS use. This can
be done by comparing data on sale volume of MAS enabled medicines from the
manufacturers with the number of authentication messages received from
consumers within a particular period of time. Future studies could also focus on
further evaluation of MAS to detect any infiltration of the counterfeiters into the
supply chain. It would also help to provide evidence for continued usefulness of
MAS by showing how Sproxil continues to meet its objective of delivering in
social returns such as reducing the number of casualties due to counterfeiting
as a result of MAS, providing market intelligence to help intercept counterfeiters,
lowering cost of health care, reducing cost of production and increasing market
share of pharmaceutical industries. Also, it may necessary to conduct a before
and after study aimed at determining the actual impact of MAS on the quality of
Glucophage® or any other MAS enabled medicines. This can be done by
determining the quality of any MAS enabled medicine and comparing it to
reported incidence of counterfeiting for the particular medicine before it became
MAS enabled. This will help to further show the impact of MAS on medicines
quality and the trend in quality of medicines available in Nigeria. It may also be
important to conduct another research in the future aimed at determining the
public awareness about MAS and compare the results with the findings of this
study to know if there have been improvement. This kind of research would be
most beneficial if any interventions to improve awareness level about MAS are
instituted before it is carried out so that it can also show the impact of such
interventions.
Finally, the low reporting rate of cases of medicines counterfeiting encountered
by participants in this study calls for further studies to know how encounter with
poor quality medicines are handled by the consumers, medicine sellers and the
drug regulatory agency; NAFDAC. This will help identify any existing314
inefficiencies such as low reporting rate, reasons behind such inefficiencies and
how they can best be tackled.
8.3 Conclusion
This study provided evidence to show that the information given about the
authenticity of medicines via MAS may be accurate. It showed that MAS may
be successful due to how easy users perceived it is, its compatibility with the
use of mobile phone for text messaging and quick response to authentication.
MAS may be said to be useful based on its impact on consumers identified in
this study such as increased demand of MAS enabled medicines which may
lead to regaining of market share by genuine pharmaceutical industries, easier
detection of medicines counterfeiting, reduction in incidence of medicines
counterfeiting, increased confidence in medicines purchased, increased
knowledge about state of health through the tips from the response sent to
consumers and increased trust in medicine sellers.
Factors such as possible increase in cost of medicines, dispensing practices in
rural areas and in the hospitals, poor phone network, lack of time by consumers
and medicine sellers, low awareness level, complexity of language,
development of complacency by the users, consumer trust in source of
medicines and the issue of confidentiality may hinder its use. Therefore for
MAS to be more useful, there needs to greater public awareness through more
effective means such as education about MAS in different languages and
increased involvement of medicine sellers in consumer education about MAS.
Other ways noted by the participants through which MAS can be improved
include; focusing the service on medicines that are most likely to be
counterfeited, inprinting the codes/pin numbers directly on the product
packaging (primary and secondary) and reducing the pin numbers to help avoid
human error of entering the wrong numbers when customers try to authenticate
their medicines.315
This study further showed that there was a significant difference in quality
between the innovator brand; Glucophage® and generic metformin in terms of
the content of active ingredient. While this finding is worrying, the low overall
failure rate (3.9%) and that no counterfeits were detected; may suggest an
improved situation of quality of medicines in Nigeria and that while medicines
counterfeiting present some challenge, a much greater concern may be the
existence of substandard medicines. Most of the participants interviewed in the
consumer and medicine seller group perceived that generic medicines were of
lower quality than innovator brands. To ensure accessibility to good quality
medicines in Nigeria, there is need for legislature on generic prescribing and
substitution policies. However, the findings of this study reveal that such
policies will be more successful if they are accompanied by strategies aimed at
making sure that generic medicines are of good quality, bioequivalent and
interchangeable with innovator brands. Education campaigns targeting the
prescribers, pharmacists and consumers and aimed at helping to effect a
change in misconceptions of the quality of generic medicines is therefore
necessary.
All the participants in this study agreed that poor quality medicines is a problem
in Nigeria and different reasons were identified as being responsible for the
continued existence of poor quality medicines. However, very few of the
participants seem to have encountered medicines that they thought were of
poor quality. Among those who have experienced poor quality medicine, the
common response was to stop taking the medicine and/ return it to where it was
purchased. An overwhelming majority (90%) felt that the problem is decreasing
mainly due to awareness creation by NAFDAC. Other factors identified that
may be responsible for this decrease and which need to be built upon are
adoption of technological solutions such as MAS, increased pharmacists'
involvement in medicines supply and distribution in Nigeria, establishment of
NAFDAC, routine inspection by NAFDAC and effective stakeholder316
collaboration. Therefore, while identifying counterfeit medicines through
technological innovations may be useful, it must exist with other government
driven initiatives, which will ensure that incidents of counterfeiting are reported
and that counterfeiting business becomes unattractive.
Another interesting finding from this study is that majority of the participants felt
that the quality of locally manufactured medicines were comparable and in
some cases better than imported ones, with the overwhelming majority stating
that imported medicines are more likely to be of poor quality than locally
manufactured medicines. This perception of the participants may help
encourage local drug manufacturing through increased patronage of locally
manufactured medicines at the consumer level. However, there is need for the
government to provide incentives for local manufacturers and adopt policies that
will encourage local production. This may include reducing cost of registration
of medicines and providing low interest loans for local manufacturers,
increasing patronage of locally manufactured medicines for instance purchasing
medicines from them for major government programmes, improving local
infrastructure (such as electric power supply and good roads) to help reduce
cost of local drug manufacturing and increasing taxes for imported medicines.
While increasing taxes for imported medicines may help encourage local drug
manufacturing, appropriate considerations may need to be made as this may
lead to lack of or inaccessibility of good quality and affordable generics.
In addition, financial incentives should also be provided for local manufacturers
by government for instance by assisting to offset the cost of MAS for local
manufacturers so that they can be encouraged to participate in the programme
and to ensure that costs of medicines are not increased because of MAS.
Government also needs to provide financial support to NAFDAC especially in
the areas of staffing, laboratories and drug monitoring/post market surveillance.317
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Percentage of Urban Pharmacy Premises in Nigeria with Total
Number of Pharmacies in Each State
State % Urban No. of pharmacies State %Urban No. of pharmacies
Abia 80 86 Kano 77 74
Adamawa 66 38 Kastina 75 14
Akwa Ibom 60 27 Kebbi 50 7
Anambra 60 139 Kogi 80 28
Bauchi 96 22 Kwara 90 40
Bayelsa 100 5 Lagos 98 861
Benue 99 36 Nasarawa 66 22
Borno 90 51 Niger 87 54
Cross River 80 31 Ogun 77 97
Delta 70 66 Ondo 81 51
Ebonyi 100 7 Osun 80 37
Edo 93 94 Oyo 93 131
Ekiti 65 15 Plateau 87 81
Enugu 90 60 Rivers 90 125
FCT 50 159 Sokoto 100 11
Gombe 80 10 Taraba 95 11
Imo 70 63 Yobe 100 8
Jigawa 0 0 Zamfara 83 6
Kaduna 90 106
PCN, (2000) cited in Peterson and Obileye, (2002)364
Appendix 2: Nigerian pharmacy laws
Nigerian Pharmacy Laws Aim
Drug and Related Products (Registration, etc.) Decree of 1993;
Food, Drugs and Related Product (registration etc,) Act cap F33
laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004,
Prohibits the manufacture, sale, and circulation of unregistered drugs and ultimately protecting the consumers/patients from illicit
medicines. It also stipulates the procedure for applying for registration of a drug product, conditions under which information supplied by
an applicant is disclosed, and provisions for the suspension or cancellation of certificates of registration and clinical trials as well as
Penalties for failing the law
Consumer Protection Council Decree No. 66 of 1992 Makes provision of the offending company or firm or individual to protect, compensate and provide relief and safeguards to injured
customers in the event that defective products are sold to the consumers due to its failure to ensure drug distribution through proper
channels
Trade Malpractices (Miscellaneous Offences Decree No. 67 of
1992
Creates certain offences regarding trade malpractices and established a special trade malpractices investigation panel to investigate
such offences
Counterfeit and Fake Drugs Miscellaneous Provisions Act (Cap
73, Law of the Federation, 1990)
Prohibits the production, importation, manufacture, sale and distribution of any counterfeit, adulterated, banned or fake drugs. It also
prohibits persons to sell any drug in an open market without permission from the proper authority
Counterfeit and fake drugs and unwholesome processed food
(miscellaneous Decree 25 of 1999); Counterfeit and fake drugs
and unwholesome processed food (miscellaneous provision act
cap C34 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004)
Dictates locations, which are inappropriate for the sale of medicines such as the open markets, kiosks, motor parks, roadside, stalls,
premises unauthorised by the PCN or in any bus, ferry or other means of transportation. It authorises the Federal and state task forces
which are arms of NAFDAC to close illegal drug markets in Nigeria
Patent and Proprietary Medicines Vendors Licence (PPMVL) PPMVL are to be issued where there is a limited availability of pharmaceutical resource. Holders of the licence are authorised to sell
only OTC medicines
National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Act (Cap 253
LFN 1990, as amended)
Regulates controlled drug consumption
Food and Drugs Act (Cap 150 LFN 1990, as amended); Food and
Drugs Act Cap F32 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004
It provides for the regulation, manufacture, sale and advertisement of food and drugs. It prohibits the sale an advertisement of certain
foods and drugs or their use for certain diseases and other misleading practices as well as manufacture under unsanitary conditions. It
empowers inspectors and analysts to enter premises and take samples as well as to detain violators
Poisons and Pharmacy Act (Cap 535 LFN 1990) Regulates the sale, distribution, dispensing, custody and supply of drugs and poison
NAFDAC Decree 15 of 1993 (as amended) It is the decree upon which NAFDAC was created; mandating it to regulate and control the importation, exportation, manufacture,
advertisement, distribution, sale and use of food and drugs. NAFDAC also conducts necessary quality control tests. An arm of
NAFDAC, the Federal Task force was established under the provisions of the counterfeit and fake drugs (miscellaneous provisions) Act
and is mandated to regulate unregistered drug premises
Pharmacists Council of Nigeria (PCN) Decree 91 of 1992 PCN is the only body that licenses, controls and regulates pharmacy practice and pharmaceutical manufacturing in Nigeria. It provides
training in all aspects of pharmacy and is in charge of registering pharmacists. This replaced the Pharmacist Act of 1964365
Appendix 3: Summary of studies on extent of poor quality medicines
(Please note that this table is presented over 18 pages)
Author, Country,
Title/ Aim of study
Study design Methods Principal findings/conclusions Limitations/ Comments
Newton et al. (2008). Samples
from Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao
PDR, Myanmar (Burma) and
the Thai/Myanmar border. To
determine the source of fake
Artesunate in south east Asia
391 samples of genuine and
counterfeit Artesunate: Vietnam (75),
Cambodia (48), Lao PDR (115),
Myanmar (Burma) (137) and
Thai/Myanmar border (16) were
collected for analysis from larger
surveys that had been conducted in
the region beginning in the year
2000. They subjected the samples
to analysis (HPLC and/ mass
spectrometry, X-ray diffraction, gas
chromatographic analysis, pollen
analysis and detailed packaging
inspection). A subset of the samples
also underwent detailed forensic and
botanical examination
Samples were collected by convenience
sampling and random sampling (in Laos only)
and ad hoc at the request of individuals and
non-governmental organisations in the region
Sixteen different fake hologram types were
identified. Analysis confirmed that 49.9% contained
no or small quantities of Artesunate (up to 12mg per
tablet as opposed to 50mg per genuine tablet).
Some of the counterfeit Artesunate were
manufactured in China.
Artesunate collections
were ad hoc and only a
small subset of the
samples could be
analysed due to financial
constraints
Taylor et al. (2001). Nigeria.
Pharmacopeial quality of
drugs supplied by Nigerian
pharmacies.
To investigate the quality of
different drugs obtained from
retail pharmacies in two urban
areas of Nigeria, and in
instances of poor quality, to
ascertain the reason why.
581 samples of 27 different drugs
(antimalarials, antibacterials, anti-
TB, Anthelmintic: mebendazole and
anti-fungal: Ketoconazole from
randomly collected from 35
Pharmacies in Lagos and Abuja.
The collected samples were analysed by
validated chromatographic methods. The
results obtained were then compared to
pharmacopeial requirements.
48% of the samples did not comply with set
pharmacopeial limits, and this proportion was
uniform for the various types of drugs tested. The
issues identified ranged from the total absence of
active ingredients to either over or under
concentration of the active ingredient (s). Three
Chloroquine (CQ) samples did not contain any
active ingredient.
Although random
sampling was conducted.
The two urban cities
selected may not be fully
representative of drug
quality in some rural areas
of Nigeria.
Since packaging was not
assessed, some
medicines, irrespective of
their chemical content,
could have still been
counterfeit.
There were no power
calculations to arrive at
the sample size used.366
Shakoor et al. (1997). Nigeria.
Assessment of the incidence
of substandard drugs in
developing countries
81 samples were collected. 34 of
the samples were from Pharmacies
while 47 were from drug outlets.
These included chloroquine,
amoxicillin, clotrimoxazole,
tetracycline and Ampiclox®
The samples collected were analysed using
HPLC
36% of the samples did not meet set standards.
Decomposition appeared to be the cause of poor
quality in a number of samples, but poor
manufacturing was prevalent. The majority of the
poor quality samples were from non-pharmacy
outlets (43%). 2 CQ samples and one amoxicillin
sample from Nigeria did not contain any active
ingredient. The substandard Ampiclox® sample
from Nigeria was found to be degraded.
The samples were not
randomly collected,
thereby contributing some
level of bias in the findings
and conclusions made
from this study. Also, the
sample size was very
small. It was stated that
the result presented little
evidence to implicate
fraudulent manufacturing.
This statement was
however challenged since
the researchers
acknowledge that the
method employed cannot
differentiate between
counterfeit and
substandard medicines.
Also the selection of
samples based on high
cost and/ high usage is
challengeable in that it
resulted in selection of a
limited range of drugs (CQ
and 4 antibiotics, of which
3w e r eb r o a ds p e c t r u m
Verduin-Mutiganzi R and
Verduin-Mutiganzi G,
1998)
Shakoor et al. (1997).
Thailand. Assessment of the
incidence of substandard
drugs in developing countries
15 samples were collected. 5 of the
samples were from Pharmacies
while 10 were from drug outlets.
These included chloroquine,
amoxicillin, clotrimoxazole,
tetracycline and Ampiclox®
The samples collected were analysed using
HPLC
40% of the samples did not meet set standards The samples were not
randomly collected,
thereby contributing some
level of bias in the findings
and conclusions made
from this study. Also the
sample size was very
small
Maponga and Ondari (2003).
Ghana, Kenya, Mali,
Mozambique, Sudan and
Zimbabwe. Study conducted
as part of a pilot study to
determine the quality of anti-
malarials in selected African
278 Samples of anti-malarials;
Chloroquine tablets (CQT) and
sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine tablets
(SPT) were collected and analysed.
The samples were analysed by carrying out
HPLC and dissolution tests
Percentage failure of samples based on ingredient
content ranged from 20% to 67% for CQT and 5%
to 28% for SPT, and in dissolution failures ranging
from 5% to 33% for CQT and 75% to 100% for SPT.
The evaluated products
may have been
susceptible to handling
problems as they were
removed from their
original packaging. Also
some of the samples
could not be analysed as367
countries and to determine
whether the quality of the
products was related to the
level of distribution chain from
which they were collected
(district hospitals, district
medical stores, households,
vendors, pharmacies).
they were crystallized due
to exposure to high
temperature. Many of the
samples lacked the
required units for
performing all the tests. In
addition, it was not clear
which sampling technique
the country team leaders
used for collection.
Bate et al. (2009a). Nigeria.
To assess the awareness of
the problem of counterfeit and
substandard drugs among
health personnel and how this
influences their professional
behaviour as well as their
impact on regulatory initiatives
to eliminate spurious
medicines.
An informal questionnaire was
administered to 211 Healthcare
personnel in Lagos, Ondo and Ogun
states in Nigeria about their
awareness of and exposure to poor
quality medicines, patient and
prescribing behaviour. A simple
sampling protocol was used to
collect 140 treatment parks of anti-
malarial drugs (SP, Amodiaquine,
Mefloquine, Artesunate,
Dihydroartemisinin, Arthemeter-
lumefantrine, antibiotics
(ciprofloxacin, erythromycin) and
antimycobacterial drugs (isoniazid
and rifampicin from pharmacies
randomly selected from urban and
peri-urban areas of Lagos.
Ap r e l i m i n a r yt e s t i n gu s i n gT r u S c a n ®d e v i c e
was used to test ciprofloxacin. The Global
Pharma Health Fund e. V. Minilab was used to
run semi-quantitative TLC and disintegration
tests on the samples in order to determine the
presence and concentration of active
ingredient (s) in the samples.
Irrational drug use was evident. High costs of
medications seemed to be the most common
reason for the proliferation of poor-quality
medicines. Most healthcare personnel were aware
of the problem but their ability to identify and
respond to poor quality medicines differed widely.
18% of the drugs failed TLC and/or disintegration
tests.
Unavailability of reference
standards resulted in
failure to use the
TruScan® handheld
Raman spectrometer for
all the samples. The
method used to analyse
the data retrieved from the
questionnaires were
unclear. Also some of the
samples could not be
tested using the Minilab.
The movement of drugs to
different locations may
have influenced the
results.
Bate et al. (2009b). India. A
pilot study of essential drug
quality in India (Delhi and
Chennai). The aim was to
explore the extent of
substandard and counterfeit
drugs available in the market.
Random samples of 541
(antimalarial- chloroquine, antibiotic-
ciprofloxacin and erythromycin,
antimycobacterial- rifampicin and
isoniazid) drugs were collected from
52 pharmacies in urban and peri-
urban areas of Delhi and Chennai
(26 pharmacies) respectively.
Semi-quantitative thin-layer chromatography
and disintegration tests were used to measure
the concentration of active ingredients against
internationally accepted standards.
12% of all samples tested from Delhi failed either
one or both testes and were substandard. 5% of all
samples from Chennai were substandard. The
study revealed that there is a 38% chance of
obtaining a substandard medicine when purchasing
am e d i c i n ef r o map h a r m a c yi nC h e n n a iw h i l ei n
Delhi; the chances could be as high as 80% with a
range of 6% to 30% being counterfeit medicine in
any single pharmacy. In a worse case scenario,
there is a 27% chance that 20-30% would be
substandard some of which may be counterfeit
(Bate et al., 2010). There is a need for a larger
study involving pharmacies from rural, urban and
peri-urban areas, which is aimed at determining the
extent of poor quality medicines to be carried out.
This study used the
random sampling
technique, reported the
number of outlets from
which samples were
collected and the
variations between these
outlets. However, the
small sample size in this
study may have led to
inconclusive findings. The
authors acknowledged
that no forensic analysis
was conducted to
determine if the drugs
were counterfeit or sub
standard as attempts to
obtain valid samples and368
batch information from the
manufacturers proved
futile. The results reveal
that some pharmacies are
buying a large quantity of
poor quality medicines
some of which may be
counterfeit (Bate et al.,
2010). Although rural
areas were not included in
this study; poorer results
are expected in such
areas due to high levels of
illiteracy and low levels of
surveillance by the
government in these
areas.
Bate et al. (2008). Nigeria,
Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda,
Tanzania and Uganda.
Antimalarial Drug Quality in
the Most Severely Malarious
Parts of Africa – A Six-
Country Study.
195 treatment packs were randomly
collected from private pharmacies in
the major cities of six African
countries within the high endemic
band. The drugs sampled include
SP, Amodiaquine, Mefloquine,
Artemisinin and Artemisinin
Combination Therapies (ACTs).
The Global Pharma Health Fund e.V. Minilab
was used to run semi-quantitative thin-layer
chromatography (TLC) and dissolution tests on
each sample to determine the presence and
relative concentration of active ingredients
35% of all samples tested failed either or both tests,
and were substandard. Nigeria and Tanzania
(32%), Ghana and Uganda (35%), Kenya (38%)
and Rwanda (33%). Drugs originating from poorer
countries such as Africa and Asia seemed to have
higher failure rates when compared to those
originating from Europe and USA. 31% of the drugs
that were stated to originate from India were found
to fail the quality.
No forensic examination
was carried out to
differentiate between
counterfeited drugs and
substandard products.
The drugs which were
labelled as made in India
may not actually have
originated from India as
some of them were
counterfeited so may have
been bearing a fake label
also (Bate et al, 2010).
Kaur et al. (2008). Tanzania.
The aim of the study was to
assess the quality of anti-
malarials available from retail
outlets across mainland
Tanzania.
1080 anti-malarial formulations (SP,
Amodiaquine, Quinine and
artemisinin derivatives) were
collected from 21 districts in
mainland Tanzania in 2005.
Laboratory based analysis was carried out
(HPLC was used for dissolution and content
analysis).
12.2% of the samples were found to be of poor
quality. 23.5% of the quinine tablets were of poor
quality, 13.4% of the SP was of poor quality and
7.5% of the amodiaquine tablets were of poor
quality. The artemisinin derivatives all contained
the stated active ingredient when tested with HPLC
alone.
The samples were
randomly selected.369
Gaudiano et al. (2007),
Congo, Burundi and Angola.
The aim was to determine the
quality of medicines available
in the small informal markets
in Congo, Burundi and
Angola.
30 commercial tablet samples of
anti-malarial drugs (quinine,
sulphadoxine and pyrimethamine,
chloroquine and mefloquine) were
purchased from illegal vendors in
small informal pharmacies in Goma
(Congo), Bujumbura (Burundi) and
Launda (Angola)
The samples were analysed by means of a
validated liquid chromatographic method,
uniformity of mass determination,
disintegration and dissolution tests. Also there
was an evaluation of the label and packaging
characteristics of the samples.
Different kinds of problem were observed from the
study: Loose tablets, products without name
producer and country of production and expiry date.
Presence of low quantity of active ingredient was
observed in one of the samples, substitution of an
active substance with a different one in one of the
samples and low dissolution profile in 50% of the
samples.
It was not clear which
sampling method was
used in the collection of
the tested samples.
Eichie et al. (2009). Nigeria.
In-vitro evaluation of the
pharmaceutical quality of
some ibuprofen tablets
dispensed in Nigeria.
19 different brands of Ibuprofen
tablets were purchased from
pharmacies and open markets in 3
states in Nigeria. One of the
researchers posed as a ‘normal
customer’ and purchased the brands
without a prescription.
Ap r e l i m i n a r ye x a m i n a t i o no ft h eo r g a n o l e p t i c
properties of the tablets was done. The tablets
were assessed for uniformity of weight,
disintegration time and dissolution rate
according to B.P. 2003, while content
uniformity was carried out according to BP
1993. Weight uniformity was carried out by
determining the weight of twenty randomly
selected tablets from each brand using a
digital weighing balance, while the
disintegration time of six tablets per brand was
determined in distilled water maintained at 37
±0 . 5 ° C .
12 brands passed the uniformity of content, 5
brands passed the disintegration test and only 4
brands passed the dissolution test. The different
brands varied remarkably in their pharmaceutical
qualities, hence the need for a more stringent
measure to ensure compliance and consistency.
No particular sampling
procedure was employed
and only one of the
researchers purchased
the brands tested, this
could have led to some
bias in the brands
selected for testing as well
as outlets chosen for the
collection of the samples.
Nnamdi et al. (2009). Nigeria.
Evaluation of the
Pharmaceutical
Quality of Some Quinine
Preparations
Sold in Nigeria
18 different brands (6 tablets, 6 oral
liquid and 6 parenteral quinine
brands) were purchased from
pharmacies in Onitsha, Asaba,
Benin city and Warri, all in the
South-eastern Nigeria. One of the
researchers posed as a ‘normal
customer’ and purchased the brands
without a prescription
Ap r e l i m i n a r ye x a m i n a t i o no ft h eo r g a n o l e p t i c
properties of the tablets was done. The tablets
were assessed for uniformity of weight and
content uniformity. Also, disintegration time
and dissolution rate were tested according to
B.P. 2003. Weight uniformity was carried out
by determining the weight of twenty randomly
selected tablets from each brand using a
digital weighing balance, while the
disintegration time of six tablets per brand was
determined in distilled water maintained at 37
±0 . 5 ° C . B o t hp a r e n t e r a la n do r a lp r e p a r a t i o n s
were assessed for clarity, pH, specific gravity
and viscosity, while only the parenteral
preparations were assayed for content
uniformity and sterility according to BP 2003.
Am o d i f i c a t i o no ft h ep r o c e d u r es e to u ti nB P
2003 was used to assay for quinine
dihydrochloride.
Of the 6 brands of tablets tested, 4 passed the
uniformity of content test and 5 the disintegration
test, but only 2 passed the dissolution test. The PH
of 2 of the 6 brands of oral liquid preparations met
BP standards while only one of the oral liquid
preparations met BP standard for % content. 4
brands of the parenteral preparations met BP
standard for quinine content and all were sterile.
No particular sampling
procedure was employed
and only one of the
researchers purchased
the brands tested, this
could have led to some
bias in the brands
selected for testing as well
as outlets chosen for the
collection of the samples.
Also, the samples were
collected from one part of
Nigeria, which might not
be representative of the
entire nation.370
Onwujekwe et al. (2009).
Nigeria. Quality of anti-
malarial drugs provided by
public and private healthcare
providers in south-east
Nigeria
225 anti-malarials (artesunate,
dihydroartemisinin, sulphadoxine-
pyrimethamine, quinine and
chloroquine) were either purchased
or collected from randomly selected
providers from 6 towns in Anambra
state, Nigeria (3 urban; Awka,
Nnewi, Onitsha and 3 rural; Enugwu-
ukwu, Ekwulobia and Okpoko). The
sites were selected using two-stage
sampling method
The quality of the drugs were assessed by
laboratory analysis of the dissolution profile
using published pharmacopeial monograms
and measuring the amount of active
ingredients using HPLC
60 (37%) of the anti-malarials tested did not meet
the United States Pharmacopeial (USP)
specifications for the amount of active ingredients;
with the suspect drugs either lacking the active
ingredient or containing suboptimal quantities of the
active ingredient. 78% of them were from private
facilities mostly patent medicine dealers. Seven of
the quinine tablets contained only chloroquine; one
sample out of the 4 samples of dihydroartemisinin
was counterfeit. Poor quality drugs were more
common in rural areas.
The findings mean that the
poor with low socio-
economic status received
the lowest quality of
treatment as they often
buy their medicines from
the PMV and as such
urgent measures are
needed to remedy these
most disadvantaged
people in resource poor
countries who are largely
affected by the menace of
counterfeiting. The
purpose of the research
was revealed to some
hospitals and pharmacy
shops during the sample
collection, which may
have affected the samples
provided by these facilities
and may have contributed
in lower failure rates of the
samples from these
facilities as they may have
provided samples which
they perceived as good
quality for testing.
Atemnkeng MA (2007). East
Congo DR. Quality evaluation
of chloroquine, quinine,
sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine
and proguanil formulations
sold on the market in East
Congo DR.
Anti-malarial drugs (8 CQ tablet
batches, 2 CQ injection batches, 1
CQ syrup batch, 8 quinine tablet
batches, 4 quinine injection batches,
1q u i n i n es y r u pb a t c ha n d5b a t c h e s
of SP) were anonymously purchased
from pharmacies and commercial
stores in and around Kavumu,
Mudaka and Bukavu in East congo
HPLC and UV spectrophotometric assay of the
samples of tablets, injections and syrup
collected was carried out
43% of the products did not have the names of the
manufacturers. When expressed as a salt, 2 of the
CQ batches where under-dosed by about 20% and
30% respectively while as a base, only one batch
complied to set standards while the others were
under-dosed by about 30-50%. In the salt form, 2
of the 8 batches of quinine were under-dosed by
15% and 25% respectively while as a base, all the
batches were under-dosed. Four batches of
sulphadoxine samples were underdosed (91–94%).
For pyrimethamine, two batches were slightly
overdosed (106.4% and 107.6. One batch of
Fansidar contained neither sulphadoxine nor
pyrimethamine.
The findings suggest that
relatively in expensive
drugs like chloroquine can
also be counterfeited as
opposed to previously
held views.
Odeniyi et al. (2003). Nigeria
Comparative analysis of eight
brands of sulfadoxine-
pyrimethamine tablets.
8b r a n d so fS u l p h a d o x i n e–
Pyrimethamine products which
includes the innovator product;
fansidar (4 of which were registered
The assessment included the evaluation of
uniformity of weight, friability, crushing
strength, disintegration and dissolution tests as
well as chemical assay of the tablets.
All the 8 brands passed BP standards for uniformity
of weight, disintegration and crushing test. Three of
the eight brands failed the friability test. One of the
brands failed the test for content of active
Only 3 (registered by
NAFDAC) of the 8 SP
brands analysed passed
all the BP quality tests and371
by NAFDAC) were sourced from
retail pharmacies in Ibadan, Nigeria.
ingredients while one other brand did not pass the
USP specifications for dissolution test. No
significant differences were observed in the
amounts of pyrimethamine and sulphadoxine
released from the brands.
were physically and
chemically equivalent.
There is therefore a need
for post-market
surveillance in order to
ensure that new products
are equivalent
to the innovator products.
It was not clear how the
samples were
collected/sampled.
Amin and Snow. (2005). The
Quality of Sulphadoxine-
Pyrimethamine and
Amodiaquine Products in
Kenyan Retail Sector. Kenya
Ar e t a i la u d i to f8 8 0r e t a i lo u t l e t sw a s
conducted in 4 districts in Kenya
(Greater Kusii, Kwale, Bondo and
Makueni) in 2002. 116 most
commonly stocked SP and
Amodiaquine (AQ) products were
sampled from the top 10 wholesalers
in each district and then subjected to
USP tests for content and
dissolution.
The content was determined
spectrophotometrically for AQ and via the use
of HPLC for SP. Dissolution tests were carried
out with Six station Erweka DT 60 dissolution
apparatus.
47 (40.5%) out of the 116 SP and AQ samples
analysed were found not to meet USP
specifications for content and/ dissolution. About
45.3% of SP and 33.0% of AQ were substandard.
The results show that
there is a need for post
market surveillance in
Kenya to help ensure that
good quality medicines
are distributed.
Sowunmi et al. (1994).
Bioavailability of sulphate and
dihydrochloride salts of
quinine. Nigeria
Using 6 healthy male volunteers, the
absolute bioavailability of three oral
salts of quinine (600mg Quinine
(QN) sulphate capsule, 600mg QN
dihydrochloride plain tablet and
600mg QN sulphate sugarcoated
tablets to that of a standard 600mg
of QN hydrochloride IV infusion was
determined.
The drugs were administered in a randomised
crossover design.
It was found that the sugarcoated QN sulphate
tablet had no QN. There were no differences in the
bioavailability of the other test drugs.
This study further confirms
the presence of counterfeit
anti-malarials in the
Nigerian market. A very
small sample size was
used
Babalola et al. (2004).
Absolute bioavailability of
quinine formulations in
Nigeria.
The absolute bioavailability of QN
sulphate as capsule and as tablet
was compared against the IV
infusion in 12 male volunteers
Six of the volunteers received intravenous
infusion over 4 hours as well as the capsule
formulation of the drug in a crossover design,
while the other six received the tablet
formulation. Blood samples were taken at
predetermined time intervals and plasma
analysed for quinine (QN) using reversed-
phase HPLC method
Therapeutic QN plasma levels were not achieved
with the tablet formulation.
The sub therapeutic levels
of the tablet form in the
study can result in
treatment failure.372
Okeke and Lamikanra (1995).
To determine the
pharmaceutical and biological
quality of tetracycline
capsules sold in Ile-ife,
Nigeria and to evaluate their
possible contribution to
increased incidence of
tetracycline resistance.
Nigeria
6b a t c h e so ft e t r a c y c l i n ec a p s u l e s
were bought from dispensing outlets
in Ile-ife.
The samples were subjected to weight
uniformity test, test for identification of
degradation products and determination of
anhydrotetracycline, dissolution tests as well
as comparative bioavailability study. A sample
obtained from a manufacturer (Pfizer products
Plc., Lagos, Nigeria) was used as a reference
standard.
All the batches including the reference standard
passed the weight uniformity test. While the
reference standard passed all tests, the other six
batches failed all other tests (low content of active
ingredient and high levels of degradation products).
All samples of tetracycline
capsule obtained in Ile-ife
were of poor quality and
as such resulted in
significant differences in
bioavailability. This is an
important cause of
resistant strains and
treatment failure. This
resultant effect is even
worse in patients who are
poor absorbers
Odunfa O.O., Adegoke O.A.,
Onaga I.C (2009).
Pharmaceutical equivalence
of some commercial samples
of artesunate and
amodiaquine tablets sold in
Southwestern Nigeria.
15 generic brands of artesunate and
five brands of amodiaquine were
purchased from drug retail outlets in
Oyo and Osun states in Nigeria.
The drugs were subjected to identification,
weight uniformity, content uniformity, content
of active ingredient and uniformity of diameter
tests. Hardness, disintegration time and
dissolution rate tests were also conducted to
determine their bioequivalence.
Two artesunate brands contained undetectable
amounts of active ingredient and 8 other brands
contained excessive amounts, one artesunate
brand failed disintegration test. All amodiaquine
brands passed USP tests. However, one of the
brands had a poor dissolution profile by not
releasing the required quantity of drugs within 30
minutes.
The majority of the
artesunate brands were
substandard while one
brand of amodiaquine was
poorly formulated; hence
the need for continued
surveillance of drugs
entering the Nigerian
market. The tests
conducted were limited as
there was no test for
impurities
Esimone et al. (2008). In vitro
bioequivalence study of nine
brands of artesunate tablets
marketed in Nigeria.
9d i f f e r e n tb r a n d so fa r t e s u n a t ew e r e
selected based on how frequently
they were prescribed, how often and
available they were in hospitals and
community pharmacies. One of the
samples was the innovator
brand/reference drug. The drugs
were collected from 4 major towns in
Nigeria, which were taught to be
representative.
In vitro dissolution study was performed on 9
different brands of artesuante using the US
Pharmacopeia guidelines for the basket
method. Hardness and disintegration time
tests were also conducted.
All brands passes BP disintegration time tests, 5 of
the brands failed the hardness test. Significant
differences were observed in the dissolution profiles
of the brands. One of the brands had a poor
dissolution profile (releasing <70% of artesunate
within 30 minutes).
The tests conducted to
determine medicines
quality were limited, as it
did not include such tests
as tests for impurities.
However the results show
the need for drug
surveillance to ensure
their quality and
conformity with
pharmacopeial standards373
Newton et al. (2001). Fake
malaria medicine in South
east Asia. To investigate the
distribution of counterfeit
artesunate tablets in South
east Asia and identify
distinguishing characteristics
of the fakes.
104 Samples of artesunate was
procured from shops, pharmacies,
NGOs and hospitals in Myanmar
(Burma) (51), Cambodia (26), Laos
(8) and western Thailand (8)
between August, 1999 to August,
2000.
Red dye technique was used to investigate the
quality of medical products. An observer
unaware of the results from the dye test
examined some of the packages.
91% of the samples were labelled as made by
Guilin Pharma (China) or repackaged by Atlantic
pharmaceuticals (Bangkok, Thailand), 29% of all
the samples contained no artesunate; 38% of
samples from shops and pharmacies contained no
active ingredient. The results of the red dye test
and those of the observer from investigating the
packages coincided. Fakes were observed for all
the countries; fake holograms were identified on the
packages of the samples from Vietnam and
Cambodia. A variety of reliable surrogate markers
were observed and reported by the investigators.
The spread of fake
artesunates may worsen
the problem of drug
resistant malaria.
Bate et al. (2010). India. To
compare the results of Bate et
al. (2008) on the quality of
medicines in Pharmacies in
Delhi and Chennai with the
quality of medicines from
traders.
The same 5 drug types purchased
from Pharmacies in Bate et al.
(2008) were purchased from Delhi
based traders (4 different
wholesalers). Qualitative interviews
were used to investigate how
substandard medicines were arriving
at the pharmacies.
Tests for active ingredient(s), product
disintegration in warm water within 30 minutes.
As u b s e to ft h es a m p l e sw e r ea n a l y s e du s i n g
the Raman spectrometer.
7% of tested samples from the traders failed the
test of which 3.6% contained no active ingredient.
All the traders have at least some drug failures with
failure rate for each trader ranging from 1% to 18%.
The trader with a 1% failure rate had erythromycin,
which failed the tests probably due to degradation
resulting from a broken blister pack while the trader
with 18% failure rate was obviously dealing on both
genuine and fake pharmaceuticals. Traders at the
end of the continuum possessed the worst results
and accounted for the majority of the products that
contained no active ingredient. 73% of the
pharmacists stated that some pharmacists
knowingly purchased substandard medicines to
enrich themselves, over half of the pharmacists and
assistants interviewed stated that re-labelling
expired drugs with a new expiry label was the most
common form of counterfeiting. Twenty-seven per
cent said that companies readily supplied new
labels. 19% claimed their competitors bought
medicines from unreliable sources. 92% of the
pharmacists claimed that they have at least once in
the past being approached by a trader offering sub-
potent medicines.
Dissolution tests, tests for
impurities or
contamination were not
undertaken. Only field
tests were performed
meaning that precise
results could not be
obtained since proper
laboratory assessments
could not be carried out.
The findings show that the
sale of counterfeit
medicines in India seems
not to be accidental- while
some pharmacies and
traders sell only high
quality medicines; others
deal on a mixture of
counterfeit and fake
pharmaceuticals. The
study may have been
biased by the fact that the
samples were collected
from traders in one
location and may be
limited by the small
sample size. It also
shows that although some
problems could be due to
degradation due to poor374
storage, much of the
problem is due to
deliberate, illegal activity.
Wondemagegnehu (1999).
Counterfeit and Substandard
drugs in Myanmar and
Vietnam.
At o t a lo f5 0 3s a m p l e so f1 2
products were collected from both
Myanmar and Vietnam.
500 samples were sent to the WHO laboratory
for testing to determine the identity and
content of active ingredients. 214 of the 500
samples were further investigated to determine
if they were counterfeit (by tracing the label to
source).
56 (11%) failed the quality test. Information was
retrieved for 169 out of the 214 samples that were
further investigated. 18% of the 169 samples failed
laboratory tests while 22% of the remaining 45
samples of which further information could not be
obtained failed the tests. Only 6 out of the 169
samples were counterfeit; 5 were mislabelled with
respect to source but passed all laboratory tests
while one contained the wrong ingredient but was
produced by a licensed manufacturer. All six were
from Myanmar. The overall failure rate for the 214
samples was 16% which was higher than 11%; the
failure rate for the 500 samples.
The prevalence of
substandard medicines
seems greater than
counterfeit medicines in
both countries studied.
Some drugs which pass
laboratory tests may be
counterfeit; hence further
investigations are
necessary to determine
which products are
counterfeit.
Patel et al. (2009a). Drug
Quality in South Africa:
Perceptions of Key Players
involved in Medicines
Distribution.
Participants were purposefully
sampled from a South African
manufacturer, SA subsidiaries of
international manufacturers, national
distribution companies, national
wholesaler, public and private sector
pharmacists and a dispensing
doctor. Ten interviews were
conducted.
Qualitative data collection via key informant
interviews using semi-structured interview
guide.
Purchasing registered medicines from licensed
suppliers, use of Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs) and audits between manufacturer and
distributor and/ or provider were the key strategies
identified that were used to protect medicines
quality.
Effective communication
amongst stakeholders,
especially in providing
feed back regarding
complaints about medicine
quality seems to be a
potential area for further
research.375
Ogwal-Okeng et al. (2003).
Chloroquine in the Ugandan
market fails quality test.
Chloroquine tablets (50 tablets per
outlet) and injection (10x5ml
ampoules and 1x30ml bottles per
outlet) dosage forms were
purposefully, but anonymously
purchased from pharmacies and
drug shops in the four regions of
Uganda and the Kampala city (10
outlets from each region). In total;
47 chloroquine tablet and 45
chloroquine injection batches were
sampled.
The samples were assayed for content of
active ingredients based on the USP standard
using the HPLC method.
39% of the tablet samples failed the test for active
ingredient (11% with sub optimal concentrations,
28% with supra-normal amounts). 51% of the
samples of injection failed (40% with sub-normal
amounts and 11% with supra-normal amounts).
The failure rates were
high. The samples were
purposefully sampled,
creating room for bias.
Odili et al. (2006).
Identification of Counterfeit
Drugs by Community
Pharmacists in Lagos State.
Convenient sampling was used to
sample practising community
pharmacists from 17 out of 20 local
government Areas in Lagos State
using a list of registered pharmacists
from the Association of Community
Pharmacists in Lagos state.
100 copies of a 23-item questionnaire was
filled by the participating community
pharmacists.
69 questionnaires were completed. All the
respondents agreed that Nigeria has a fake and
counterfeit drug problem and 74% described it as a
major problem. Scrutiny, customers’ complaints
and Pharmaceutical company alerts were the major
means of discovering a fake drug. No respondent
stated they have ever received any help from
regulatory authorities. 81% has never reported any
counterfeit case to drug regulatory authorities rather
the most likely response was to return the product
from where it was purchased whenever they
encountered counterfeit medicines. Only 18.8% of
the respondents thought NAFDAC is very effective.
Multiple responses may
have affected the results
of the study. The small
sample size may not be
truly representative and
the use of convenient
sampling may have biased
the findings. The study
may have been limited by
the reduced response
rate- as only 69%
responded.
Nazerali, Muchemwa and
Hogerzeil (1998). The quality
and stability of essential drugs
in rural Zimbabwe: controlled
longitudinal study.
789 samples of medicines consisting
of benzylpenicillin injection,
amoxicillin, ampicillin, doxycycline,
phenylmethoxypenicillin and
tetracycline were collected from
Zimbabwe.
Level of active ingredient was determined as
percentage of stated content and whether they
complied with BP specifications.
2o u to f1 0s a m p l e so fa m p i c i l l i nt e s t e df a i l e dt h e
test for active ingredient. The aqueous formulation
of injectable procaine penicillin was moderately
unstable; loosing about 1-6% after 4.3 months
although values remained with BP limits.376
Kenyon et al. (1999).
Detection of substandard
fixed-dose combination
tuberculosis drugs using thin
layer chromatography.
13 Fixed Drug Combination anti-
tuberculosis (TB) drugs were
collected from Botswana.
The samples were tested with TLC. A
confirmatory analysis with UV or liquid
chromatography was carried also carried out.
All the samples contained the stated drug.
However, 31% were substandard (2 of the samples
had a low rifampicin content; one had excessive
rifampicin while one had excessive pyrazinamide.
Rifampicin in 7 of the samples were not relatively
bioequivalent to the reference standard.
Kayumba et al. (2004). The
quality of essential
antimicrobial and antimalarial
drugs marketed in Rwanda
and Tanzania: influence of
tropical storage conditions on
in vitro dissolution.
Essential antibiotics (amoxicillin
capsules, metronidazole tablets,
sulphamethoxazole/trimethoprime
tablets, etc) were collected from
Rwanda and Tanzania.
Dissolution tests were conducted as well tests
using HPLC based on the USP 24
specifications.
At purchase the drug content of all the samples
were within USP 24 specifications, while three
samples of the sulphamethoxazole/trimethoprim
and one sample of sulfadoxine/pyrimethamin failed
the USP 24 dissolution tests, the drug content of
one sulphamethoxazole/trimethoprim and one
quinine sample was reduced after 6 months. With
the exception of three metronidazole samples that
failed dissolution test after 6 months, all other
samples were within USP 24 dissolution
specifications. In all, 24% of the samples failed the
dissolution test.
Basco (2004). Quality of
antimalarial drugs
(chloroquine, quinine and
sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine)
obtained from illegitimate
outlets in urban and rural
areas in Cameroon used for
self-medication and analyse
the drug impacts on the
284 samples of the drugs 133
chloroquine samples, 70 quinine
samples and 81 antifolates) used for
self-medication were obtained from
132 different sources between 2000-
2001. Chloroquine and quinine used
for self-medication were obtained
from 15 malarial infected persons;
only 6 were of good quality. 8 of the
The samples were tested with a simple colour
reaction test and semi-quantitative TLC.
38% of the chloroquine samples, 74% of the quinine
samples and 12% of the antifolates were observed
to have either no active ingredients insufficient
quantities of active ingredients, wrong ingredients or
unknown ingredient (s). Most of the drugs without
packaging were counterfeit while those in packages
and blisters were most likely to be genuine.
The samples were not
representative of the
quality of medicines in
Cameroon as only a
limited class and number
of antimalarials was
included. Also only the
illegitimate sources were
sampled and this may377
patient. patients had a negative urine test
due to the use of fake or
substandard antimalarial drug.
have contributed to the
high level of low quality
medicines obtained. The
vendors provided the
drug/sample details such
as name which may have
been incorrect and could
not be verified as some of
the medicines purchased
had no packaging/labels.
Sengaloundeth et al. (2009).
As t r a t i f i e dr a n d o ms u r v e yo f
the proportion of poor quality
oral artesunate sold at
medicine outlets in the Lao
PDR-implications for
therapeutic failure and drug
resistance.
Mystery shoppers purchased
artesunate samples from 180 outlets
in 12 of 18 Lao provinces selected
using stratified random sampling by
investigators who were not involved
in sampling.
Packaging characteristics of all samples were
observed, samples were analysed using the
Fast Red Dye test, HPLC, mass spectrometry,
X-ray diffractometry and pollen analysis.
25 (13.9%) of the 180 outlets sampled sold oral
artesunate. 22 (88%) of the 25 outlets sold
counterfeit artesunate, which contained no
artesunate when chemically analysed. Package
characteristics revealed 7 different counterfeit
types. Similar results were obtained from HPLC,
Fast Red Dye test, and Mass spectrometry. Mass
spectrometry showed that the tablets contained a
variety of wrong ingredients with some (4)
containing small amounts of artemisinin ranging
from 0.26-115.7mg/tablet.
The investigators did not
perform further checks to
distinguish fake from
genuine samples.
Tipke et al. (2009).
Substandard anti-malarial
drugs in Burkina Faso.
86 anti-malarial drug samples (CQ,
amodiaquine, Sulphadoxine-
pyrimethamine (SP), quinine,
artesunate, artemether-lumefantrine)
were obtained from licensed outlets
for instance public and private
pharmacies and community health
workers and illicit places such as
markets, street vendors and shops
in the Nouna Health district in North
western Burkina Faso in 2006.
ACTs were conveniently sampled
from market places and pharmacies
in Ougadougou.
77 of the samples were analysed with GPHF
minilab procedures (visual inspection,
disintegration tests, qualitative colour tests,
semi-quantitative TLC) and re-tested with
European Pharmacopeia standards for
disintegration and UV-visible spectroscopy.
42% of the analysed samples were found to be of
low quality; 28 (23 CQ, 4 SP, 1 artesunate and 4
amodiaquine) failing visual inspection, 9 (5CQ, 3
quinine, 1SP) having substandard concentration of
active ingredient, 4 (3CQ, 1SP) failing disintegration
tests and 1 (1 SP) having no active ingredient. The
licensed and illicit markets were responsible for
10.6% and 90.0% of the medicines that were
substandard.
The small sample size and
convenient sampling
employed in this study
may have biased the
findings.378
Ofori-Kwakye, Asantewaa and
Gaye (2008). Quality of
Artesunate Tablets Sold in
Pharmacies in Kumasi,
Ghana.
17 brands of artesunate were
purchased from different pharmacy
shops in Kumasi, Ghana.
Mechanical properties (Uniformity of weight,
breaking strength, friability and disintegration
time) of the samples were determined. In
addition, colorimetric methods were used to
determine the presence of artesunate and to
assay the tablets.
No counterfeit sample could be detected. Most of
the samples possessed acceptable mass
uniformity, hardness, friability and disintegration
time. 11 (64.7%) were outside the International
Pharmacopeia content uniformity test limits while 14
failed the European Pharmacopeia test limits for
content uniformity.
The study included a small
sample size. The
sampling method used to
obtain the brands/samples
is unclear.
Atemnkeng (2006). Quality
control of active ingredients in
artemisinin-derivative
antimalarials within Kenya
and DR Congo.
24 artemisinin derivative samples
(tablets, capsules, dry suspensions
and injections containing either
artemether (AM), arteether (AE),
artesunate (ARS) or
dihydroartemisinin (DHA).) were
randomly collected from pharmacies
in Nairobi in Kenya and Bukavu in
DR Congo in 2004.
All the samples were analysed for content of
active ingredient and preservatives using
validated HPLC-UV methods according to
European pharmacopeia requirements.
All the samples contained the claimed active
ingredient. 9 (37.5%) failed the Ph. Eur
requirement for content of active ingredients; 7 were
under dosed while 2 were overdosed. Dihydro
artemisinin was the active ingredient in 57% of the
underdosed samples. Arteether injection
possessed the lowest drug content (77%). Two-
thirds of the dry powder suspensions were either
substandard or fake. Tablets varied up to 23% out
of range.
Ifudu (1989). Analysis of
street market drugs in Nigeria.
555 samples of different dosage
forms of drugs (tablets and liquid)
were obtained from open markets
and randomly selected vendors in 4
Nigerian cities; Onitsha, Kaduna,
Lagos and Ibadan. Drug quality of
486 of the samples antibiotics (83),
Antimalarials (19), antipsychotic
(24), Benzodiazepine (13),
Haematopoietic (23), Multivitamin
(52), purgatives (8), others (264)
could be obtained.
The drug packages were properly examined
against original packs if they were available.
Chemical analyses were then conducted
according to WHO guidelines for conducting
basic tests for pharmaceutical substances, BP
1980 and USP XXI 1985. The tests were
repeated where an unusual variance from the
expected result was obtained. Percentage
content between 90-120% was considered
normal, 25-89% substandard while samples
containing <25% were considered worthless.
Samples found to contain very high dose or
wrong substances were considered to be
dangerous.
486 (88%) of the samples could be analysed. Half
of the antipsychotic studied were outside the
specifications while most of the haematopoietic and
benzodiazepines were within specified limits. Other
drug groups such as antibiotics, antimalarials,
multivitamins and purgatives had two extremes e.g
60% of the antibiotics were within range while 7%
contained very high concentration of the active
ingredient or wrong ingredients while 33% were
either substandard or worthless. Except the
chloramphenicol made by PLIVA, the other brands
contained little or no active ingredient. 53% of the
antimalarials were normal, 42% were worthless or
substandard while 5% were considered dangerous.
It was unclear what impact
inadequate storage
conditions may have had
on the samples included in
the study. Also
information retrieved from
the vendors about the
medicines they sold may
not be reliable as the
vendors may not be well
informed. Irrespective of
whether medicines contain
little or large amount of
active ingredient; all poor
quality medicines stand a
chance of being
dangerous. Chemical
analyses of liquid dosage
form is not sufficient to
determine their quality as
there is need to carry out
bacteriological tests and
tests for antimicrobial379
activity in order to find out
if there has been any
degradation or
epimerisation as in the
case of tetracycline.
Bate and Hess (2010). Anti-
malarial drug quality in Lagos
and Accra – a comparison of
various quality assessments.
339 samples were collected from
Lagos, Nigeria and Accra, Ghana
between mid 2007 and early 2010.
The samples were randomly
collected in at least 2 occasions in
the cities over 30 months (3 times in
Lagos; October, 2007, December,
2008 and February, 2010) and twice
in Accra (October, 2007 and
February, 2010). Fifteen
pharmacies were sampled in Lagos
and 13 in Accra.
The samples were tested with minilabs,
Raman spectrometry and by visual inspection.
The results from the minilabs were compared
with those from the Raman spectrometry.
Only 300 of the samples could be tested with
Raman spectrometer (TruScans deployed by
the Nigerian government).
Failure rates fell to 29% of the findings in 2007 in
Lagos when minilabs were used for testing, 53%
using Raman spectrometry and 46% using visual
inspection while in Accra, failure rates fell to 54% of
the findings in 2007 with minilabs, 72% with Raman
spectrometry and 90% using visual inspection.
There was an overall improvement in drug quality in
both Lagos and Accra between 2007 and 2010.
39 samples could not be
assayed, as methods to
be used could not be
determined for the brands.
The sample size was
relatively small;
considering that only 22
samples could be
obtained from Lagos in
2007. The use of two
different methodologies in
this study is advantageous
since there are assertions
that counterfeiters are
adapting their products to
pass simple assays for
Active Pharmaceutical
Ingredients (API).380
USP/USAID (2009). Survey of
the Quality of Selected
Antimalarial Medicines
Circulating in Madagascar,
Senegal, and Uganda
(QAMSA study).
491 samples of antimalararials;
Artemisinin Combination Therapy,
Sulfadoxine-Pyrimethamine (SP)
were sampled from the three
countries. Locations of collection
included the public sector, the
regulated private sector and the
informal market.
GPHF minilab kit was used to test 444/491 of
the samples. Full scale laboratory testing was
conducted in 150 of the samples tested with
GPHF minilab and 47 other samples that could
not be tested with GPHF minilab.
The tests with GPHF minilab showed that 43% of
samples from Senegal did not meet the requirement
for visual inspection, identification, drug content or
disintegration while 12% and 6% failed quality
testing in Uganda and Madagascar respectively.
The Full scale laboratory testing conducted on a
total of 197 samples showed that 44% of samples
from Senegal failed quality tests while 26% and
30% failed tests in Uganda and Madagascar
respectively. More of the SPs (35%) failed
dissolution tests when compared to the proportion
of ACTs (20%) that failed the test. 29% of the
ACTs failed the test for impurity. ACT failure rate
was lowest (16%) in Madagascar while SP failure
rate was lowest (16%) in Uganda. There were no
significant differences in the failure rate in the
private and informal sector in Senegal (44% versus
56% respectively). In Uganda, all (11) samples
from the public sector passed the test. Poor quality
samples were found across the different regions in
the three countries. Significant differences were
observed in ACT quality across brands; while some
brands were consistently of good quality even
across the countries some were consistently of poor
quality. All the samples passed their identification
test and none lacked the stated active ingredient
(s).
The study employed a
relatively large sample
size. Lack of uniformity of
testing methods may have
limited the findings from
this research for instance
is the 47 samples which
could not be tested with
the GPHF minilab as a
result of non availability of
minilab protocols for them.
The finding that all
samples from the public
sector of Uganda passed
the quality tests may have
been due to the small
number (11) of samples
collected from the public
sector of Uganda. The
study did not conduct
further investigations to
determine whether any of
the samples collected
were counterfeit. The
study showed that the
drug quality problems in
this study seem to
emanate from source
rather than during
medicines passage across
the distribution chain.
However, this
generalisation may not be
accurate. The inability of
the minilab to identify
dissolution and impurity
failures accurately when
compared to the full scale
laboratory testing may
have affected any findings
from their use.381
Ofonaike et al. (2007). A
study of the pharmaceutical
quality of chloroquine and
paracetamol products sold in
am a j o rN i g e r i a n" m a r k e t " .
34 brands (10 brands of chloroquine
tablets, 6 brands of chloroquine
syrups, 10 brands of paracetamol
tablets and 6 brands of paracetamol
syrups) were purchased from
pharmacies and shops in Onitsha
and neighbouring towns in Asaba,
Nigeria.
The brand names, manufacturer, NAFDAC
registration status and expiry date of the
products were documented on collection.
Organoleptic properties (colour, texture, smell
and taste) and physicochemical properties
(content of active ingredient, disintegration
time, dissolution time and tablet crushing
strength) were determined. The chloroquine
was assayed using non-aqueous method while
the paracetamol was validated using
spectrometric methods. The tests were
conducted in accordance to British
Pharmacopoeia, 1993.
Seven (21%) of the drugs were not registered with
NAFDAC; 5 chloroquine and 2 paracetamol. None
of the CO and only 3 of the paracetamol products
passed the BP requirement for PH. Two imported
CQ tablets failed the testes for disintegration.
Imported chloroquine products seemed to have
higher disintegration time (Average was 15.03
minutes) when compared to locally produced
choloroquine tablets (Average was 6.27 minutes).
Only one CQ tablet failed dissolution tests. Except
for one CQ tablet with 11.6% of the stated active
ingredient, all others were within BP range of
92.5%-107.5%. All the paracetamol tablets passed
disintegration time test while 4 products failed
dissolution test. Two paracetamol products failed
test for content of active ingredient. Three CQ
products (all were locally produced) did not have
the ideal crushing strength.
No particular sampling
method was used. There
were no attempts to verify
the product label
information. The sample
size was small.
Hebron et al. (2005). The
Chemical and Pharmaceutical
equivalence of
sulphadoxine/pyrimethamine
tablets sold on the Tanzanian
Market.
11 brands of
sulphadoxine/pyrimethamine tablets
sold in the Tanzanian market were
randomly collected from commercial
drug distributors and from the
medical stores department in Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania.
Tests conducted include; hardness test,
friability, disintegration, dissolution, weight
uniformity and assay of active ingredient and
impurity.
All brands passed quality standards of USP and BP
for hardness, friability, disintegration, assay and
dissolution test, except for three brands that failed
friability, hardness or disintegration tests.
Percentage concentration of pyrimethamine ranged
from 91.04% to 100.20% while sulphadoxine
concentration ranged from 91.53% to 99.88%.
There were no significant differences between the
brands and the innovator product; Fansidar®.
None of the brands were
of very poor quality.
However a small sample
size was used so may not
be conclusive for other
brands/ samples not
included in this study. All
the brands were physically
and chemically equivalent.
Risha et al. (2002). In vitro
evaluation of the quality of
essential drugs on the
Tanzanian market.
22 formulations (paracetamol; PCM,
acetylsalicylic acid; ASA,
chloroquine; CQ or sulphadoxine
pyrimethamine; SP) were obtained
from 10 wholesale pharmacies in
Dar es Salaam and Medical Stores
Department, Tanzania.
Drug content, in vitro availability (dissolution)
and stability under simulated tropical
conditions were determined in according to
USP 24 monograph stipulations.
All the formulations passed USP standard for drug
content. Seven (2PCM, 3ASA, 2SP) formulations
were outside the USP limits for dissolution. Another
5( 3 P C Ma n d2 C Q )f a i l e dt om e e tt h ed i s s o l u t i o n
specifications after they were subjected to an
accelerated stability test under simulated tropical
conditions (75% Relative Humidity/40 degrees
centigrade) for 6 months.
Some of the tablets that
contained adequate drug
concentration had an
unsatisfactory in vitro
availability, as they could
not withstand the
simulated tropical storage
conditions. This highlights
the need for post market
surveillance to ensure that
drugs are stored at
optimum conditions.382
Lon et al. (2006). Counterfeit
and substandard antimalarial
drugs in Cambodia.
451 samples were collected by
convenient sampling in four
provinces in Cambodia; covering
about 34% of all 498 known facilities
and drug outlets. Samples collected
include; Quinine, amodiaquine,
chloroquine, tetracycline.
Physical/visual inspections, TLC and
disintegration tests were conducted.
Confirmatory tests were conducted in
accordance to International Pharmacopeia vol.
5, 3
rd ed. And USP 26-NF21.
About 79% of the outlets were unlicensed and 78%
of the samples were from the unlicensed outlets
and about 79% of the samples were unregistered
with the Cambodian Department of Drugs and Food
(DDF), 122 (27.1%) failed TLC and/or disintegration
tests; all were unregistered. However 22 samples
were from 17 legal/licensed outlets while 100 were
from 59 unlicensed/illegal outlets. Counterfeit and
substandard medicines were available in 57.9% of
38 licensed outlets and 75.2% of 133 unlicensed
outlets. The problems encountered include lack of
active ingredients, presence of wrong active
ingredients or the presence of substandard mounts
of active ingredient (s).
Although there were no
significant differences
between licensed and
unlicensed drug outlets
large proportion of
samples that failed the
quality tests seemed to be
from the illegal/unlicensed
outlets. The imbalance in
sample size between the
groups (38 licensed sites
and 133 unlicensed sites
may have led to the
greater percentage of
samples from unlicensed
tests that failed the test
when compared to the
number from licensed
outlets that failed the test.
The sample used in this
study is not representative
and therefore should not
be generalised to the
entire Cambodia. The use
of convenience sampling
may have also further
limited the findings of this
study. The researchers
also acknowledge that the
data analysis method they
used may have impacted
negatively on the study
findings.
Getu and Awot (2010).
Assessment of the commonly
prescribed antimicrobial drug,
ciprofloxacin tablets,
marketed in Tigray, Ethiopia.
Six brands of ciprofloxacin tablets
were collected from retail outlets and
drug stores in Mekelle, Tigray,
Ethiopia.
Identity tests, weight uniformity, disintegration
and dissolution tests as well as assay of the
content of active ingredient were conducted in
accordance to BP.
All the samples passed the identity, disintegration
and dissolution tests, but one brand; Ciflox® failed
to release 80% of the drug content in 30 minutes as
required by BP. All the brands contained adequate
amounts of stated active ingredient. There were
significant differences in the drug release among
the six brands in vitro (p<0.05).383
HPLC: High Performance Liquid Chromatography, TLC: Thin Layer Chromatography, CQ: Chloroquine, CQT: Chloroquine tablet, SP: Sulphadoxine-Pyrimethamine, SPT: Sulphadoxine-Pyrimethamine
tablet, QN: Quinine, ASA: Acetyl Salicylic Acid, PCM: Paracetamol; AQ: Amodiaquine; RH: Relative Humidity
Minzi OM, Moshi MJ, Hipolite
De ta l .( 2 0 0 3 ) . E v a l u a t i o no f
the quality of amodiaquine
and sulphadoxine tablet sold
by private wholesale in Dar Es
Salaam Tanzania.
Samples of all AQ and SP brands
available; 15 AQ and 18 SP were
obtained from 8 licensed wholesale
pharmacies in Dar es Salaam.
Identity, Assay for content of active ingredient
and dissolution rate tests were conducted as
described in the USP.
All samples passed the identity test, 2 (13%) of AQ
samples failed the dissolution rate test. All AQ
passed the assay for content of active ingredient. 2
(11%) and 8 (44%) of SP samples failed content of
active ingredient test and dissolution rate tests
respectively.
Osadebe and Akabogu
(2003). Assessment of quality
control parameters and
interchangeability of
multisourced metformin HCl
tablets marketed in Nigeria.
Five brands of metformin 500mg
marketed in Nigeria (Glucophage®
(Merk, Quetta), Glucophage® BDC,
metformin (Medopharm),
Glucophage ® (Ilsan), Glucophage®
(Lipha) were randomly selected from
the open drug markets and
pharmacies in South Eastern Nigeria
The samples were tested quantitatively to
know if they meet acceptable standards and
are interchangeable based on calculations
from a variation of the concept of dissolution
efficiency known as Predicted Availability
Equivalents (PAE). Disintegration time,
dissolution rates, absolute drug content and
weight uniformity was conducted for all the
brands. All tests were conducted within the
shelf life of the samples.
The study showed that there were variations in the
hardness, disintegration and dissolution
characteristics of all the five brands. Three of the
brands (BDC, Lipha and Ilsan) are interchangeable
with Merck brand, which is the innovator drug.
These three brands in addition to Merck brand
released 100% of their labelled claim within 30
minutes in Simulated Intestinal Fluid (SIF).
The total sample size for
each brand is unclear; the
random sampling
technique seems unclear.
The study was conducted
in only South Eastern,
Nigeria.
WHO (2011). Survey of the
quality of selected anti-
malarial medicines circulating
in six countries of sub-
saharan Africa (Cameroon,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya,
Nigeria and United Republic
of Tanzania).
Trained survey teams in each
country were responsible for
collecting samples according to
national sampling plans from
different levels of distribution
(including informal markets in at
least 3 geographical regions of high
malaria prevalence).
935 samples were collected between April-
June 2008 and were screened using GPHF-
minilab® kits. Based on predefined criteria,
306 samples were selected for full quality
control testing in the WHO pre-qualified
laboratory in South Africa and in the USP
laboratory in USA based on the International
pharmacopeia and USP.
28.5% of the 267samples tested out of the 306
samples that were tested in the laboratory did not
comply with pre-specified internationally acceptable
quality criteria. Nigeria had the highest number of
failed samples (63.9%).
Small sample sizes from
the individual countries
and manufacturers may
have limited the result of
the studies. However,
attempts were made to
collect samples, which will
give a representative
picture of the quality of
antimalarials in the supply
chain.
Abdi et al. (1995). Quality of
chloroquine preparations
marketed in Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania.
Following the discovery of a
negative Haskins test in a patient 2
days after ingesting chloroquine, a
survey was conducted which
involved sampling different CQ
brands from pharmacy shops in Dar
es Salaam. 9 different brands
available were sampled.
The tablets were tested for content of active
ingredient and dissolution tests in accordance
to USP XXII edition.
All the brands passed the USP content of active
ingredient test (contained >97% of CQ). 8 of the
brands passed dissolution rate test; all the 8 brand
were ordinary CQ tablets while one brand which
was sugar coated failed the test; only 39%
dissolved in 45 minutes (required minimum is 75%).384
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Actions by government bodies
Securing the
medicine and
packaging
Securing the distribution of the medicine Enhancing regulation,
infrastructure and enforcement
Increasing penalties Increasing vigilance and
awareness
Increasing international
collaboration
France:E a c h
product is
required to
have a product
code, batch
number and
expiration date
(Taylor and
Davies, 2008)
Turkey:
Includes a data
matrix identifier
in product
packages
(WHO, 2008a).
EU:T h e
European
commission
launched the
Pharmaceutical
Package; a set
of initiatives
aimed at
enhancing
medicines
identification,
reducing
counterfeiting,
enhancing
Spain: Incorporated the use of RFID tags (Taylor and
Davies, 2008)
Russia: An analyser using NIR for fast detection of
counterfeit medicines is been piloted. A system of
coded labels for authentication of medicines is been
introduced (World report, 2006)
Turkey:I n t r o d u c e dat r a c ka n dt r a c es y s t e m( W H O ,
2008a).
China:E m p l o yt h eu s eo fm o b i l el a b sf i t t e dw i t h
instruments for NIR spectroscopy, TLC, Simple colour
tests and microscopes. About 400 analytical
automobiles have been acquired by the Chinese
National Institute for the Control of Pharmaceutical and
Biological products and are in the process of
developing a desktop-sized high pressure liquid
chromatography (Mullard, 2010)
Nigeria:N A F D A Cl a u n c h e dt h eM o b i l eA n t i -
counterfeiting Authentication Service whereby a 12-
digit numerical code is sent to a free number for
verification (NAFDAC, 2010b). NAFDAC in
collaboration with Verification Technology Ltd has
launched the use of RFID solution technology to
identify and verify products, documents and other
important items (Ogbebo, 2010a). NAFDAC has
engaged in raids leading to confiscation and
destruction of fake and substandard products;
destroying over US$35, 753,014 worth of drugs found
India: Stepped up surveillance
and increase in number of
inspectors proposed (Forzley,
2005). Plans are in place to allow
drug inspectors to arrest
pharmacists involved in
counterfeiting, carry out validation
checks on drugs for export and
introduce an obligatory exporting
licensing and to conduct raids in
areas noted for counterfeiting
(Bate et al, 2010). It operates a
central drug administration and
improvement system (Forzley,
2005). It has organised chains of
pharmacies such as Apollo
pharmacy and Fortis Health
World/Religare Wellness.
Philippines:At e c h n i c a lw o r k i n g
group consisting of
representatives from the
government and industry was
created to redraft the countries
drug regulation. Its government is
engaged in training of inspectors,
law enforcement agents and those
who test drugs.
China:Am u l t ia g e n c yt a s k f o r c et o
curb sale of fake medicines as well
France: Tougher penalty
of about 7.5m Euro fine
and life imprisonment has
been proposed
India:D e a t hp e n a l t yw a s
proposed in 2003 and the
minimum fine increased
from 10, 000 rupees
(about $320) to a million
rupees (about $32, 000)
(Patwardhan, 2010).
Minimum jail term was
increased from 5 years to
10 years in 2007
(Hemalatha, 2008;
Partwadhan, 2010)
Philippines:r a i s e d
penalty for counterfeiting
from 6 months to life
imprisonment and
payment of US$25, 000
(Forzley, 2005)
UK:A d d i t i o n a lc h a r g e so n
medicines counterfeiting
have been instituted
through the theft and
forgery acts. A Jail term of
10-12 years is being
India:W h i s t l eb l o w e rp o l i c y
introduced to reward reporters
of counterfeiting cases.
However, Killugudi, 2010 cited
in Bate et al, 2010 notes that
this measure is not working.
GSI (a supply chain
organisation) in collaboration
with the Food safety and
Standards Authority of India
developed an internet/ mobile
phone-linked system for alerts
and to aid recalls of food and
pharmaceuticals (Miller, 2010)
China:W h i s t l eb l o w e rp o l i c y
was introduced; rewarding
reporters of counterfeit cases
with up to 5, 000 Yuan ($US6,
048).
EU: The ad hoc group of
European Medicines Agency
(EMEA) developed a tool
(form) for easy dissemination
of information on
counterfeiting (Wertheimer
and Norris, 2009).
Nigeria:N A F D A Ch a s
engaged the local
EU:T h eE u r o p e a nr e g i o n a lo f f i c e
provides support to countries of
south-east Europe and the
independent state of Russia,
Ukraine and Kazakhstan. It also
works with the council of Europe in
arriving at a convention to fight
medicines counterfeiting (WHO,
2008a). The European Union
parliament public health committee
is in support of new measures
against online sale of counterfeit
medicines. The first parliamentary
reading of falsified medicines was
held in September 2010.
Nigeria: The Nigerian government
is collaborating with the Indian and
Chinese governments in the fight
against medicines counterfeiting;
the Chinese government has
agreed to provide advanced
information on drugs exported to
Nigeria (Turkur, 2009). Nigeria
played an active role in IMPACT;
with the DG of NAFDAC acting as
one of the chairs and more
recently chairs the member state
mechanism on combating
substandard, spurious, falsified,
falsely labelled and Counterfeit386
supervision of
pharmaceutical
trade as well as
introducing a
stronger
auditing system
to ensure
quality of active
ingredients
used in the
manufacturing
of
pharmaceutical
products Taylor
and Craig,
2009).
Begium, Italy,
Greece, Spain,
Germany,
Ireland,
Turkey and
Serbia has an
existing or an
on-going
development of
national system
of mass
serialisation
(Lery, 2010).
Belgium, Italy
and Greece are
introducing the
use of a serial
number in
addition to the
national
product code
for each
medicine pack.
to be fake or substandard between 2001 and 2004
(Akunyili, 2005b cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010).
Between 2001 and 2006; drugs worth US$109 million
were destroyed (Edike and Obinwanne, 2006 cited in
Milissa McGinnis, 2010). The Lagos state taskforce
on counterfeit, fake drugs and unwholesome
processed foods has also engaged in confiscation and
destruction of fake drugs, sealing of premises which
are illegal and arresting of persons involved in the act
of medicines counterfeiting (The Tide News, 2008,
This Day, 2008, Akoni, 2009, Oladunjoye, 2010 cited
in Milissa McGinnis, 2010)
Sri Lanka:T h e g o v e r n m e n t b a n n e d i m p o r t a t i o n f r o m
four Indian companies who were discovered to be
dealing on substandard medicines.
Lebanon:P h a r m a c i e s h a v e b e e n b a n n e d f r o m
running home delivery of medicines by the Minister of
Health (Ghosn, 2010).
US: Wal-Mart has introduced the use of RFID
(Wertheimer and Norris, 2009).
South Africa:P u r c h a s i n gr e g i s t e r e dm e d i c i n e sf r o m
licensed suppliers, use of SOPs and audits between
manufacturer and distributor and/ or provider were the
key strategies identified that were used to protect
medicines quality in South Africa (Patel et al., 2009a).
Ghana:I n2 0 0 8 ,t h em P e d i g r e ed e v e l o p e dam o b i l e
drug anti-counterfeiting service in Ghana whereby
consumers were required to text an 8-digit numerical
code to a number for free authentication; similar
system has been rolled out in Nigeria, Rwanda and
Kenya (Mullard, 2010). An Anti Illicit Trade Coalition at
Kpone Landfill has been involved in the destruction of
counterfeit products for instance counterfeit toothpaste
(My Joy online, 2009 cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010).
Sentinel sites were established in Bolatanga, Kumasi,
as sales over the internet have
been set up. It has carried out
raids which led to arrest of suspect
persons (Mooney, 2010)
UK: The government has
produced guideline on counterfeit
drugs (Cuff, 1996 cited in Ham,
2003).
EU:T h eE u r o p e a nu n i o nh a s
established the EMEA, which
coordinates the evaluation and
supervision of medical products in
the EU. It constitutes of an expert
committee, which has an ad hoc
group on counterfeit medicines.
Nigeria:T h eF e d e r a lg o v e r n m e n t
submitted a draft resolution at the
63
rd WHA seeking for WHO’s
support in tackling its chaotic drug
distribution system and enhancing
the regional fight against
counterfeiting (Ogudipe, 2010).
The Yobe state government
formed a committee on fake drugs
in 2002 (Daily trust, 2002)
Australia:F o c u s e do ns a n i t i s i n g
drug importation into Australia
(WHO, 1997).
Lebanon:9p h a r m a c i e sa n d2
warehouses involved in selling
counterfeit drugs were recently
shut down (Ghosn, 2010).
implemented (Lay down
the law on fakes, 2010).
There are proposals for
the introduction of a
charge of ‘corporate killing’
for companies who may
have contributed to death
of patients and those who
fail to warn the public
against a counterfeit
product (Anonymous
(2003) cited in Mehta
(2006). The “disrupt and
destroy” policy have been
employed (WHO, 1997).
EU:T h eE u r o p e a n
commission has proposed
tougher penalties and
awaiting confirmations by
the European parliament
and Council of ministers
(Lay down the law on
fakes, 2010). The council
of Europe recently drafted
the MEDICRIME
convention which
constitutes an international
binding tool in the criminal
law on counterfeiting of
medical products and
other related crimes aimed
at promoting public health,
promoting border co-
operation between
authorities and
criminalising medicines
counterfeiting (Ermert for
Intellectual Property
governments at the grassroots
by organising workshops,
letting them know the need to
join the agency in the fight
against medicines
counterfeiting(Ogbebo,
2010a). It engages in
advocacy campaigns against
medicines counterfeiting
(Ogbebo, 2010a). Nigeria in
collaboration with Indian
authorities adopted the
concept of ‘whistle blower’
where a cash reward of
N200,000 is proposed to be
given to anyone who discloses
information leading to
interception of fake drugs with
ap r o m i s et om a k ei n d i v i d u a l
identities confidential (This
Day, 2010).
Cambodia:E n g a g e di np u b l i c
awareness programmes
particularly targeted at people
living in rural area at high risk
through posters, radios,
television spots and mobile
video shows educating
patients to distinguish fake
drugs from genuine products
as well as on recommended
medicines (Newton et al, 2002
and Lon et al, 2006). Its
National Malarial Control
Program (NMCP) and
Department of Drugs and
Food (DDF) communicates the
presences of counterfeit
antimalarials to the Provincial
medicines (SSFFCs) set up by the
WHO. Nigeria is also
collaborating with medical
equipment manufacturers such as
Secure pharma, sproxil and Global
PCCA and international
organisations (Turkur, 2009).
NAFDAC has entered into
partnership with the USFDA to
provide training to delegates.
NAFDAC also aims at signing a
memorandum of understanding
with India and China, which will
help harmonise strategies
employed in curbing medicines
counterfeiting (Ogbebo, 2010a).
Nigeria also shares strategies with
other countries in West African
Drug Regulatory Authority Network
(WADRAN), which they supervise,
and sponsor. WADRAN is made
up of 12 countries in West Africa.
.
US:U S F D Ac o l l a b o r a t e sw i t h
Nigeria by providing manpower
training, capacity building,
providing relevant equipment and
intelligence (Turkur, 2009). The
USP convention, 2010 identified
priority areas to support
developing countries such as
Nigeria. One of which includes
among other things supporting the
provision of adequate
infrastructures, human resources
and sufficient funds for quality
control laboratories, supporting the
establishment of a strong and
operational drug distribution387
Turkey is
implementing
the use of a 2D
matrix and the
use of a serial
number on all
packaging.
France has
passed a law
on the use of a
mandatory 2D
matrix coding.
Spain and
Serbia are
implementing a
legislation on
the use of a
mandatory
serial number
(Schwarze,
2010)
Ho, Accra and Tarkwa to help identify counterfeit
medicines (Kwei, 2006-2009). Ghana, Rwanda and
Kenya have introduced a system of drug distribution
where by drug shops are franchised to improve access
to cheap but high quality medicines as well as high
quality dispensing services. It has also helped to
ensure uniform standards among drug sellers in these
countries (Centre for Global Development, 2010)
Mali:An e wt e c h n o l o g yi n v o l v i n gt h eu s eo fc a p i l l a r y
electrophoresis to detect substandard medicines was
rolled out in Mali, late 2009. This technology has been
used in Switzerland, USA and Japan (IRIN, 2010a)
EU: The European Union in collaboration with San
Raffaele University in Milan, Italy embarked on a pilot
project- Drug in Virtual Enterprise (DRIVE) which are
involved in development of Electronic Product Code
for prescription pedigrees and resulted to significant
systems savings (Kontnik, 2003). The European
Commission lauched the Medi-Fake initiative aimed at
increasing surveillance at the borders (Taylor and
Craig, 2009
Uganda:5m i n i l a b sw e r eb o u g h tt ot e s tm e d i c i n e sa t
the point of entry to Uganda (Kariuke, 2008 cited in
Taylor and Craig, 2009)
Brazil:I n t r o d u c e dt h eu s eo fb a rc o d e dp a c k st ot r a c k
medicines (Taylor and Craig, 2009). Brazil started a 3-
year plan of drug serialisation aimed at tackling
medicines counterfeiting. Law N
0 11.903 was passed
on the 14
th of January making it mandatory for all drug
manufacturers and distributors to start the track and
trace medicines serialisation. It created the National
System of Medicines’ control which will aid the
monitoring of the drug supply chain in Brazil (The
Sproxil Blog, 2010)
Angola:T h eG o v e r n m e n tb a n n e dt h es a l eo f
US:T h e 1 9 8 8 p a s s a g e o f t h e
Prescription Drug Marketing Act
(PDMA) was the United states first
response to exposure of the
Americans to medicines of poor
quality (Anisfeld, 2007)
Pakistan: set up a task force
aimed at curbing counterfeiting.
Drug courts were also established
(Peterson and Obileye, 2002).
Vietnam is developing more
effective ways of coordination
between regulatory bodies, police,
customs and provincial authorities
in order to improve detection of
counterfeit medicines
Kenya: Established a Pharmacy
and Poisons Board which helps to
identify and destroy counterfeit
medicines as well as ensuring that
pharmacies are licensed (Maina,
2008 cited in Taylor and Craig,
2009)
United Arab Emirates:I t s
government has opened a highly
equipped laboratory to detect poor
quality medicines (Underwood,
2008 cited in Taylor and Craig,
2009)
Israel:E s t a b l i s h e da
Pharmaceutical Crime Unit to
tackle criminal activities such as
medicines counterfeiting (Taylor
and Craig, 2009).
Watch, 2010)
East Africa:T h e E a s t
African Community (EAC)
secretariat developed a
draft policy and a bill; The
anti-counterfeit bill was
passed in Kenya and
Uganda (Michael, 2010).
Kenya has enacted a law
on counterfeiting (Equinet,
2010). Tanzania has
developed resolutions
relating to medicines
counterfeiting (Equinet,
2010). Malawi is in the
process of enacting a law
against counterfeiting
which may include a 10-
year prison sentence and
K50million fine
US:T h eU SC o u n t e r f e i t
Drug Enforcement Act of
2009 proposed an
increase in the penalties
and fines for drug
counterfeiting as well as
setting a requirement for
drug manufacturers to
report any cases of
violations of authority
within 48 hours. However,
this proposal has not
made much progress.
The United Arab
Emirates, Vietnam,
Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait
and Qatar have proposed
Health through alert letters,
manual (s), annual malaria
conferences and conducting
training sessions (Lon et al,
2006)
US:U S A I Di nc o l l a b o r a t i o n
with the Rockville, Maryland-
based US Pharmacopeia
(USP) began airing the
program: Pharmacide; a 4-
minute public service
announcement on national
television in Cambodia,
Thailand, Vietnam and Laos to
publicise the dangers of
counterfeit medicines. A
similar program is underway
for the African continent.
Pakistan:E n g a g e di n
enlightenment campaign
directed at the stakeholders
(the public, manufacturers and
importers) (Peterson and
Obileye, 2002).
Indonesia and Mali have
started wide communication
campaign to educate the
public on the risks of
medicines counterfeiting
(Taylor and Craig, 2009).
Singapore: Health services
authority of Singapore is
engaged in the global
campaign against medicines
counterfeiting. An example is
its involvement in operation
system based on the Drug mart
strategy, supporting the
establishment of pharmacy chains
like CVS and Walgreen in USA to
improve access to cheap good
quality medicines (USP
Convention, 2010). The USP DQI
is aiding the improvement of drug
quality systems in 4 continents;
Asia, Africa, Europe and South
America (USP, 2010). It has also
launched a guide for drug
sampling and a guideline, which
will aid low income countries to
ensure the quality of their
medicines (USP, 2010). With the
assistance of USP, Ghana is
improving its laboratory facilities.
It has also employed the use of
minilabs for the field testing of
medicines (Bate and Hess, 2010)
Brazil:C o l l a b o r a t e sa c t i v e l yw i t h
INTERPOL (Taylor and Craig,
2009)
The US and New Zealand have
collaborated in shutting down an
illegal internet spamming
operation that sends off e-mails
containing advertisements of fake
drugs (Savage, 2008 cited in
Taylor and Craig, 2009)
South East Asia: In collaboration
with IMPACT and other agencies,
Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) is promoting a
regional network based model that
will result in more effective388
medicines and surgery and hospital tools in municipal
markets as they were discovered not to be sold under
proper hygienic conditions (Agencia Angola Press,
2009 cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010).
Egypt:W a r e h o u s e r a i d s w e r e c o n d u c t e d t h r o u g h
which a large number of counterfeit medicines were
confiscated from the supply chain (CNN, Money, 2009
cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010)
Kenya:I t s P h a r m a c y a n d P o i s o n s b o a r d h a s
launched a project in seven provinces geared towards
closing down illegal drug distribution outlets (Maina,
2008 cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010)
Tanzania:I t s g o v e r n m e n t s e i z e d l a r g e a m o u n t o f
counterfeit medicines in circulation in Tanzania
(Rugonzibwa, 2008b cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010)
Zimbabwe:P o l i c e a r r e s t s p e r s o n s i n v o l v e d i n t h e
dispensing of unregistered and expired medicines
(The Herald, 2009 cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010)
Iraq: Its ministry of health is
introducing new anti-counterfeiting
measures to tackle medicines
counterfeiting
Senegal:I n c r e a s e dm o n e t a r y
budget for curbing counterfeiting in
2006 (Milissa McGinnis, 2010)
Sierra Leone:T h e N a t i o n a l D r u g
Safety Monitoring Programme was
commissioned by the Pharmacy
board (Koroma, 2006 cited in
Milissa McGinnis, 2010) and the
Pharmacy board has been
engaged in raids leading to
destruction of counterfeit
medicines (Massaquoi, 2007 cited
in Milissa McGinnis, 2010). Its
ministry of health has also
increased monetary budget of the
Pharmacy board so that more
inspectors can be hired (Horner
and Hallam, 2009 cited in Milissa
McGinnis, 2010)
ad e a t hs e n t e n c ea s
punishment for medicines
counterfeiting (Mehta,
2006)
Peru: Instituted
imprisonment for up to 10
years for anyone involved
in selling, storing,
packaging or producing
adulterated, substandard
or fake medicines (Ruiz,
2008 cited in Taylor and
Craig, 2009)
Pangea 11 by INTERPOL
(Government of Singapore,
2009)
China:P u b l i s h e dal i s to f
websites involved in
unscrupulous activities (China
CSR, 2008 cited in Taylor and
Craig, 2009)
Peru:I t sc o n s u m e rp r o t e c t i o n
agency destroyed a large
proportion of fake medicines
and containers during a public
awareness campaign on
medicines counterfeiting
(Taylor and Craig, 2009)
regulatory and policing strategies
(Taylor and Craig, 2009)
Ghana:W i t h t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e
US government, the government
of Ghana has established drug
quality monitoring sites (Bate,
2010). Through this drug quality
program, fake coartem has been
detected in the Ghana market (U.S
Pharmacopeia press release,
2009 cited in Milissa McGinnis,
2010)
China:C h i n ah a so r g a n i s e d
several international and provincial
forums on combating medicines
counterfeiting such as the
international forum in December,
2009 held in Guangzhon and the
provincial forum in October, 2009
held in Guangdong (Yang, 2010)389
Actions by professional organisations
Securing the medicine packaging and
distribution of the medicine
Enhancing regulation,
infrastructure and
enforcement
Increasing vigilance and awareness Collabotation
RPSGB: Advocates for original package
dispensing in order to help detection of
counterfeit products.
ACPN: Destruction of fake and expired
drugs (Ogbebo, 2010b).
HDMA: The Health Distributors
Management Association (HDMA)
submitted guidelines for pharma
distribution system integrity derived from
its members' voluntary best practices. The
association is made up of 89 active
distributors and operates a Product Safety
Task Force whose mission is to develop
an industry wide plan to implement various
technological solutions such as adoption of
an emerging product track-and-trace effort
called the MIT AutoID Center's Electronic
Product Code (EPC) system (Kontnik,
2003).
The National Association of Chain
Stores (NACDS) with the help of a
consulting form Accenture develops
findings and recommendations in the area
of medicines counterfeiting.
PCN:T h e K a n o c h a p t e r s e a l e d 5 d r u g
FIP: Adoption of FIP/IFPMA
statement “Ensuring the
quality and safety of
medicinal products to protect
the patient” at the 1998 FIP
congress. FIP policy
statement on counterfeit
medicines was adopted in
Barcelona with a
replacement of it adopted in
2003 at the FIP congress in
Sidney (FIP, 2003).
NABP:I no r d e rt oa v o i d
counterfeit drugs from
entering the supply chain,
NABP (National Association
Boards of Pharmacy)
developed legislation
models aimed at fighting
counterfeiting; this was done
with contributions from
different pharmaceutical
organisations in Australia,
Canada, South Africa,
Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands
and New Zealand. Florida
took the lead by enacting
PCN: Has organised workshops and seminars on medicines counterfeiting and drug quality in Nigeria (Ogbebo, 2010b)
PSN:T h es t a t eb r a n c h e so fP S No r g a n i s es e m i n a r sa n dp u b l i ce n l i g h t e n m e n tc a m p a i g nd u r i n gi t sp h a r m a c yw e e k( E r h u ne ta l ,
2001). PSN organises meetings which provide an avenue to sharing information on drug quality in order to guide importers
(Orivri, 2009).
The National Medical Association (NMA):O r g a n i s e sam o n t h l yC o n t i n u i n ge d u c a t i o np r o g r a m m ew h e r ed o c t o r sa r et a u g h to n
drugs/drug quality. It also collaborates with NAFDAC from which it obtains the list of banned pharmaceuticals that it
disseminates to its members (Orivri, 2009).
FIP has also been involved in creating specific and practical tools for pharmacists for fighting counterfeiting; examples include
the Tools for visual inspection and Guide for Pharmacists. Several articles have been published by FIP as a means of raising
awareness of the risks of counterfeiting among pharmacists and pharmacy leaders as well as educating them. Sessions at FIP
congress meetings in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2011 were dedicated to discussions on medicines quality, which includes
counterfeiting in order to sensitize pharmacists on dangers on medicines counterfeiting (FIP, 2010).
IPSF:I P S Fo r g a n i s e di t sf i r s tA n t i - c o u n t e r f e i tD r u gC a m p a i g n( A C D C )i n2 0 0 7w i t ht h ea i mo fi n c r e a s i n gt h ea w a r e n e s so ft h e
risks posed by counterfeit medicines among students in health professions as well as providing them with the necessary
information needed as to the threats of such as criminal acts (IPSF, 2007).
RPSGB: The RPSGB and MHRA developed a guide for Pharmacists on counterfeiting in 2006 and were updated in 2008.
RPSGB also provides pharmacists with information on medicines counterfeiting and engages in patient awareness campaigns.
FIP:F I Pt h r o u g hW H P Ah a sb e e nl e a d i n gt h eI M P A C Tw o r k i n gg r o u po nc o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h eW H P At o o lk i t( ‘ B ea w a r e ,t a k e
action) for health professionals and public health advocates was developed in 2008 to aid detection, reporting and prevention of
medicines counterfeiting (Kopp, 2010). The first ‘Be aware, take action workshop on medicines counterfeiting was held in
FIP:F I Ph a s
also been
collaborating
with the
Council of
Europe ad hoc
committee
since 2004 in
the fight
against
medicines
counterfeiting.
In 2008, this
became the
Committee of
Experts on
Minimizing
Public Health
Risks Posed
by
Counterfeiting
Medical
Products and
related crimes
(CD-P-
PH/CMED).390
company depots after concerns were
raised that the companies were engaged
in the manufacture of substandard
medicines (Muhammad, 2009 cited in
Milissa McGinnis, 2010).
Medical experts in Uganda collaborates
with the Police to conduct raids in order to
confiscate poor quality medicines (The
New Vision, 2008 cited in Milissa
McGinnis, 2010).
Senate bill 2312 which
contains explicit information
on wholesaler registration
and requirements for
pedigrees (Forzley, 2005).
October, 2010 in San Jose, Costa Rica while a second workshop took place in Nigeria in November (Kopp, 2010).
France: The French Council of Pharmacists in collaboration with The French Drug Regulatory Authority developed a guide for
Pharmacists in counterfeit medicines during a campaign aimed at emphasising the risk of medicines counterfeiting. Patient
information leaflets were also produced.
Germany:A na w a r e n e s sc a m p a i g no nm e d i c i n e sc o u n t e r f e i t i n gh a sb e e no r g a n i s e db yt h eF e d e r a lU n i o no fG e r m a n
Pharmacists Association. A video clip on this was broadcasted over the internet and cinemas as well as free post cards
disseminated in public places like the restaurants and bars.
Lebanon: The Lebanese Council of Pharmacists in collaboration with the Lebanese minister of health, FIPO-WHO EMRO
Pharm. Forum and the Conference Internationale des orders de Pharmaciens Francophones (CIOPF) launched a campaign in
2008 on counterfeit medicines with the use of posters and leaflets. A guide for pharmacists was also published. They have also
issued recommendations on curbing medicines counterfeiting (Chauve, 2008).
Spain: The Association of Pharmacists in Spain and the Spanish Ministry of Health signed an agreement for a strong
collaboration in the fight against medicines counterfeiting. This included development of training materials for community and
hospital pharmacists on the detection on counterfeit drugs, establishing ways of ensuring the legality of medicine suppliers and
an awareness campaign directed towards patients on the risk of counterfeit medicines over the internet.
American Society of Health System Pharmacists (ASHP) has developed a list of strategies that pharmacists can use to
protect against drug counterfeiting. It also alerts its members and hospital pharmacy departments of cases of counterfeiting
(ASHP manual, 2003).391
Actions by Pharmaceutical industries
Securing the
medicine
and
packaging
Securing the distribution of the medicine Enhancing regulation,
infrastructure and enforcement
Increasing
penalties
Increasing vigilance and
awareness
Increasing
international
collaboration
Sanofi-
Aventis
recently
opened a
central anti-
counterfeiting
laboratory in
2008 in
France to
research on
such
techniques
such as the
use of
chemical
markers in
the detection
of counterfeit
pharmaceutic
als. (Taylor
and Davies,
2008).
VS
International
(manufacture
ro f
Ciprotab® (a
brand of
ciprofloxacin)
Sanofi-Aventis: It created an anti-counterfeiting organisation in 2005 and a central
operational coordination team and launched a team to be in charge of the analysis
of suspect products and development of a database for counterfeit drugs (Sanofi-
Aventis, 2010).
Pfizer:P f i z e rc a p s u l em a k i n gd i v i s i o nr e c e n t l ya c q u i r e dn o n - e x c l u s i v er i g h t st ot h e
Nano codes (containing encrypted information about the drug) and punched to the
surface of the medicine without altering its chemical constituent (Mullard, 2010).
Pfizer has also adopted the use of RFID in Viagra® (Wertheimer and Norris, 2009)
GlaxoWellcome launched a global anti-counterfeiting strategy and operating
procedures for its products which included monitored destruction of waste, field
monitoring for counterfeits, and security packaging earning it an award as the
winner of the Global Anti-Counterfeiting in 1998 (Kontnik, 2003). GSK announced
their adoption of RFID technology to help track, trace and authenticate some of
their products. It has also played a leading role trying to help maintain a closed
drug supply system in the US by providing legislatures with evidence of the impact
of counterfeit drugs in developing countries. Its Packaging Design and Security
Team also carries out forensic investigation of suspect products.
MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) in collaboration with various
industrial sponsors such as J & J, Abbot, Pfizer, P&G and other universities are
involved in development of Electronic Product Code for prescription pedigrees
(Kontnick, 2003).
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Association (EFPIA):
Undertook an anti-counterfeit product verification pilot project between September,
2009 and January, 2010 which showed that a product verification system based on
two dimensional (2D) data matrix at the point of dispensing was effective and
Pfizer and many other industries
are working together with
enforcement agencies to trace
counterfeiters and prosecute them
(Pfizer, 2004 in Lybecker, 2008).
Pfizer led an investigation in China
leading to dismantling of an
operation involving about 11
countries which included Britain
and Israel (Sommerville, 2005
cited in Lybecker, 2007). Due to
the tremendous increase of sales
in counterfeited drugs over the
internet and via mail order, firms
such as Pfizer Inc. and Microsoft
Corp. declared a joint effort aimed
at reducing internet sales of Viagra
(Tesoriero, 2005b). Similarly,
Google Inc. and Yahoo Inc. both
decided to limit searches
performed over the internet on
pharmaceutical advertising in the
US to licensed US and Canadian
pharmacies’ (Angwin and Bialik,
2004 in Lybecker, 2008). Interpol
via the OASIS (Operation
Assistance, Service and
Infrastrucural support), the
Operation Fiela was carried out
leading to confiscation of various
Confederatio
no fT a n z a n i a
Industries
(CTI): Seeks
more deterrent
penalties for
medicines
counterfeiting
in Tanzania;
recommending
that the 1963
Merchandize
Act be
amended
(Rugonzibwa,
2008a cited in
Milissa
McGinnis,
2010).
IFPMA:P u b l i s h e di t st e n
principles on counterfeit
medicines in order to
emphasise the scope of the
problem and make relevant
clarifications. It also
engages in awareness
campaigns on medicines
counterfeiting (Schwarze,
2010)
Pfizer: Pfizer’s senior
director of global security
and his staff train
prosecutors, judges and
detectives on the dangers of
counterfeit medicines
(Dolgin, 2010). The UK
branch of Pfizer in
collaboration with MHRA
aired a 1-minute
advertisement on medicines
counterfeiting in local movie
theatres and late-night TVs.
Pfizer also set up a
campaign website;
http://www.realdanger.co.uk/
featuring a point and click rat
catcher (Torres, 2010).
Pfizer:c o l l a b o r a t e sw i t h
other stakeholders such
as drug regulatory
authorities and has set
up a diversified
international team to
help fight the problem
(Pfizer, 2010).
GSK:G S Kp a r t n e r sw i t h
PSI in curbing
counterfeiting of medical
products and is involved
in training of Drug
Regulatory Authority
(DRA) staff from
different parts of the
world such as staff of
State Food and Drug
Administration (SFDA),
China (GSK, 2010).
PSI:c o r p o r a t e sw i t h
Interpol and shares
relevant information on
critical cases (Plancon,
2010). PSI and IFPMA
(International Federation
of Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers and392
popularly
marketed in
Nigeria has
incorporated
an u m b e ro f
anti-
counterfeit
measures to
their products
(Bate et. al,
2010).
Astrazeneca
has
introduced
several
technological
strategies to
protect their
products from
counterfeiting
(Astrazeneca,
2010)
feasible and did not increase the workload of pharmacists (EFPIA, 2010)
In 2005, Purdue Pharma LP in collaboration with a wholesaler (H.D Smith) piloted
ap r o j e c ti n v o l v i n gt h eu s eo fap e d i g r e et od o c u m e n ta n dt r a c kt h e i rp r o d u c t sa s
they move in the supply chain (Tesoriero, 2005a in Lybecker, 2008).
Abbott has a global product protection team which focuses on securing its supply
chain by employing the track and trace technologies and other saftety features,
collaborating with key stakeholders, engaging only authorised wholesalers and
advocating deterrent laws against counterfeiting (Abbott, 2010).
Both J&J as well as Abbot have employed supply restrictions in a bid to make
wholesalers source their products directly from the company rather than from other
sources, which are usually prone to counterfeiting (Lybercker, 2008). Abbot also
tried to facilitate customer access to their approved wholesalers by publicizing the
names of the wholesalers who agreed to their terms and conditions (Lybecker,
2008). Following such efforts by the industries, wholesalers have also expressed
their commitment in stopping buying and selling drugs among the secondary
wholesalers which is strongly viewed as an entry point for counterfeiters (Lybecker,
2008).
FH o f f m a n nL a - R o c h eL t din India developed a serialisation technique in 2008 to
protect all its products in India from being counterfeited (Bate et. al., 2010).
Eli lilly: Engaged in securing its supply chain (Eli lilly, 2010).
Astrazeneca:e n g a g e si nm a r k e ta n ds u p p l yc h a i nm o n i t o r i n g . I tc o n d u c t s
analysis of all suspect counterfeits of their brand and tackles the problem via a
global issues management team (Astrazenca, 2010)
Roche issued its statement on counterfeiting in April, 2009 which reaffirmed its
support to stakeholders in the fight against counterfeiting and has developed its
policy to help fight medicines counterfeiting, engages in product monitoring and
uses technology to identify fake drugs (Roche, 2009)
Merck: In a bid to ensure good management of its supply chain, Merck has
implemented terms and conditions for the sale of their products in the US, requiring
customers to purchase Merck products from authorised distributors. The firm also
publishes list of their authorised distributors and conducts a regular audit of
distributors. It has also initiated pilot projects to evaluate the use of 2d data matrix
counterfeit medicines in places like
Lesotho (Ilston, 2009 cited in
Milissa McGinnis, 2010)
The Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturer’s of America
(PhRMA) has created a five point
anti-counterfeiting strategy
comprising of; voluntary reporting
of cases of counterfeiting within
five days of discovery, concluding
of PDMA pedigree requirements,
request for a summit on anti-
counterfeiting, opposition to
importation and formation of an
anti-counterfeiting taskforce
(Kontnik, 2003).
Johnson and Johnson:i sa l s o
employing security companies in
countries such as China and India
to investigate counterfeit cases
and provide necessary evidence,
which may justify raids led by
police officials (Goodman, 2002 in
Lybecker, 2008). Between 2001
and 2003, Johnson and Johnson
established 38 criminal cases
against entities involved in
counterfeiting their products in
China when compared to just two
cases that was established in the
three preceding years before 2001
(Goodman, 2002 in Lybecker,
2008).
Astrazeneca:c o l l a b o r a t e sw i t h
other stakeholders such as PSI,
GSK: The firm has also
been involved in series of
awareness campaigns for
instance through leading US
magazines targeting
consumers
It also collects data on
medicines counterfeiting in
order to help establish the
extent of the problem as well
as coordinates and
disseminates information on
medicines counterfeiting
(PSI, 2010).
Astrazeneca: supports
increased awareness and
education of patients and
health care professionals
(Astrazeneca, 2010)
German Pharma Health
Fund (GPHF): Developed
methods of training for
analysing of about 35
frequently used finished
forms of essential medicines
Roche: educates the public
and helps to provide training
to officials (Roche, 2009).
Associations) are
collaborating with
government officials in
many countries in a bid
to establish an
intelligence network
aimed at reducing
medicines counterfeiting
(Chatterjee, 2001 in
Lybecker, 2008).
Merck:s u p p o r t st h e
work of IMPACT and EU
proposals for a new
Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement
(ACTA) (Merk, 2008).393
bar code technology and collaborates with other stakeholders in educating the
public on the dangers of counterfeit drugs and how to avoid them (Merck, 2008).
Rx 360:t h i si san o n - p r o f i tp h a r m a c e u t i c a lm a n u f a c t u r e r sa n ds u p p l i e r s
consortium launched in June, 2009 to help ensure the quality of medicines as they
move across the supply chain by adapting standards and best medicines supply
practice procedures, developing technology to ensure product security, monitoring
the supply chain and promoting shared audit program (VanTrieste, 2009)
Jiuzhonting Logistic Company:am a j o rm e d i c i n e sd i s t r i b u t o ri nC h i n ah a sa
computer quality system which contains a database of their products (Yang, 2010)
Xiangxue Pharmaceutical Company, Guangzhou, China has an anti-counterfeit
software which labels each medicine pack with a high density encryption code
(Yang, 2010)
GPHF:D e v e l o p e dam i n i l a bf o rf i e l dt e s t i n go fm e d i c i n e si nd e v e l o p i n gc o u n t r i e s
(Wertheimer and Norris, 2009)
Pharmasecure Inc:H a si n t r o d u c e st h eu s eo fm o b i l ep h o n e sf o rt h ed e t e c t i o no f
counterfeit medicines in India (Bennett, 2010). Sproxil and Mpedigree have
introduced similar systems in Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya
Novartis:N o v a r t i si sr o l l i n go u tah i d d e nd i g i t a lm a r k e rt e c h n o l o g yt h a ta l l o w s
customs officials to detect whether secondary packaging of a product is authentic
by placing it under an office scanner and sending the resulting image to the firm’s
security division for verification. The firm intends inputing this feature on all
products as well as on the primary packaging (Taylor, 2010)
DRAs, IMPACT, law enforcement
bodies and trade organisations
(Astrazeneca, 2010)
Eli lilly: Partners with government
and non-governmental
organisation and other trade
unions in order to strengthen
enforcement and raise awareness
(Eli lilly, 2010).
Dabur India has also engaged in
raids leading confiscation of fake
products (Bate et. al, 2010).394
Actions by regulatory bodies
Securing the
medicine
and
packaging
Securing the distribution of the
medicine
Enhancing regulation, infrastructure and enforcement Increasing vigilance and awareness Increasing international
collaboration
Tanzania
Food and
Drug
Authority
(TFDA):A
key resolution
in 2009 was
to introduce
the writing of
trade names
and batch
numbers on
all medicines
purchased by
or sold from
wholesale
pharmacy
outlets
(TFDA,
2009). TFDA
carries out
inspection of
Pharmacies
to help detect
unapproved
and low
quality
medicines
(Shekighend,
2009 cited in
Milissa
McGinnis,
2010).
Tanzania Food and Drug Authority:
Put a program in place for the
accreditation of drug dispensing
outlets and overseas the quality of
services and products sold in these
outlets (Centre for Global
Development, 2010)
SFDA established the National Drug
Code Management Methods to
introduce labels (a 14-digit code
number which indicates the country of
origin and manufacturer of the product
as well as the type of medicine) in
order to help monitor products in
China’s drug supply/distribution chain
(Taylor and Davies, 2008). SFDA
website recently provides link to
approved online medical service
providers (ChinaCSR, 2008 cited in
Taylor and Craig, 2009). The State
Council have purchased vehicles
equipped with TLC tool kit, NIR
Spectrometer and a computer with
drug registration software with plans
on equipping the vehicles with HPLC
(Yang, 2010)
USFDA: In December 2006,
wholesalers were required by FDA to
supply pedigrees unless they are
authorised distributors from a
manufacturer. The state of California
EDQM:H a sf o r m e daC o m m i t t e eo fE x p e r t so nm i n i m i z i n g
public health risks caused by counterfeiting medical products
and related crimes through which training programmes on
combating medicines counterfeiting has been organised.
(EDQM, 2010). It is implementing a pan-European track and
trace service for medicines involving the use of the Unique
Medicine Identifier (UMI). A challenge in using the UMI is
that if the codes get copied and reach the consumers first
before the genuine brands are scanned and sold, then
counterfeited medicines can only be detected at the point of
dispensing of the original product and may therefore be
difficult to recall the counterfeited ones from the patients
(Lery, 2010).
USFDA:F D Af o r m e da na n t i - c o u n t e r f e i t i n gt a s kf o r c ei nJ u l y
2003 in response to the growing trend of medicines
counterfeiting (FDA, 2009).
FDA's Office of Criminal Investigations' (OCI) has the
responsibility of fighting medicines counterfeiting (Kontnik,
2003). In June, 2010, the white house revealed a strategic
plan to fight medicines counterfeiting through an enhanced
IPR protection (Kopp, 2010)
WHO: WHO introduced a voluntary, confidential system to
report medicines counterfeiting (Amon, 2008). The issue of
counterfeiting was again discussed at the 63
rd World health
assembly in May, 2010; with a resolution to create a working
group on counterfeit medical products which will help to
examine WHO role in the fight to curb counterfeiting and
ensure availability of good quality medicines as well evaluate
WHO: WHO was the first to set up the
world’s first web based system aimed at
tracking counterfeiters in 2005; the Rapid
Alert System (RAS) in the Western Pacific
Region which was initiated to keep
relevant authorities abreast of
counterfeiting cases so that they could
develop measures to counter the effects
such activities could have (WHO, 2006 c).
IMPACT organises conferences on drug
counterfeiting and has a rapid alert system
for counterfeit drugs (Newton et al., 2008).
The National Drug Authority of India is
collaborating with Kenya and Tanzania to
conduct awareness campaigns on
counterfeiting (Nakkazi, 2010)
European Directorate for the Quality of
Medicines (EDQM): Developed a rapid
alert notification form, risk communication
model and model for network and single
point of contact (SPOC) and are involved
in the training of officials on ways to curb
medicines counterfeiting (EDQM, 2010)
USFDA:I n2 0 0 5 ,t h eF D Ac r e a t e da na l e r t
network between health professionals and
consumer groups in order to aid rapid
communication of any information
regarding counterfeited products as well
as developing strategies to hinder its
progression. The network is made up of
WHO: In 1992, first
international meeting on
counterfeiting was held in
Geneva which
recommended a
collaborative effort to help
curb the Problem and
defining a counterfeit drug.
Establishment of a network
for the communication of
information on counterfeit
medicines was advocated
(WHO, 1997). In 1994,
resolution WHA 47.13 was
adopted to help member
states in their effort to solve
the problem. In 1995, DMP-
DAP project was established
(assisted by Japanese govt.)
in pursuance of resolution
WHA 47.13. This led to the
to the organisation of a
workshop in 1997 with
outcomes of
recommendations for
international and national
actions against
counterfeiting, setting up of
ad a t a b a s ec o n t a i n i n g
information on anecdotal
reports from the literature
and on reports from Drug
Regulatory Authorities and
Industry as well as the395
USFDA:T h e
U.S Secret
Service’s
Forensic
Services
Division has
a
memorandum
of
understandin
gw i t hF D At o
conduct
laboratory
analysis of
drug
packaging
and labels.
FDA has also
commenced
consultations
on the use of
chemical
markers on
products in
the US
(Taylor and
Davies,
2008). In
July 2009
FDA issued a
guide for
industry in
drug anti-
counterfeiting
with focus on
the
incorporation
of physical-
chemical
identifiers into
solid oral
dosage form
for an easy
identification
of
instituted the use of pedigrees starting
from the manufacturer (Taylor and
Davies, 2008). In collaboration with
Reconnaissance, USFDA has tried to
identify area of risks and opportunities
for an increased security in the US
drug supply. Reconnaissance
organised a conference on
counterfeiting in Geneva in 2002 which
brought together several stakeholders
(Ham, 2003). The FDA sponsored the
Product Surety Project, which
identifies some areas of potential
counterfeiting, and terrorist attacks
which may be linked to some medicine
counterfeiting cases. The FDA also
has started using TruScans for an
easy detection of counterfeit
medicines (Schwarze, 2010).
WHO: In 1988, WHA adopted
resolution WHA41.16 requiring
initiation of programmes to prevent
and detect poor quality drugs (Amon,
2008). The WHO in collaboration with
the Pharmaceutical Institute of the
University of Bonn (Germany) and the
German Pharma Health Fund (GPHF)
have produced a drug testing kit as a
strategy against counterfeiting in
developing countries (Lybecker, 2008).
IMPACT in collaboration with
INTERPOL has been conducting raids
involving different countries for
instance there was an operation by
IMPACT/INTERPOL, which targeted
internet sites that sell counterfeit
medicines in 2008 and 2009. 1200
websites involved in illicit trading were
found; 153 were closed down while 12
arrests were made.
the relationship of WHO with IMPACT. The group made its
recommendations during the 64
th WHA in 2011 (WHO,
2010c) and presently a Member State Mechanism (MSM) is
in place as WHO’s strategy in combating SSFCs. The
Impact working group on regulation revised the WHO Good
Distribution Guidelines in order to make a particular
emphasis on counterfeits, developed an assessment tool to
evaluate national, regional, sub-regional situation and
identify any gaps and needs. They have also developed
guidelines for rapid response for drug regulatory authorities
in cases of medicines counterfeiting.
The working group on enforcement has its main initiatives
as establishing a single point of contact, regionally and
globally as well as facilitation of communication among
different stakeholders. It has also produced and distributed a
basic investigative tool kit manual especially for countries
with little or no expertise in pharmaceutical crime, in
particular counterfeiting. They have also been conducting
trainings and raids in different regions in collaboration with
agencies such as INTERPOL for instance are the operation
‘Mamba 1’ in East African countries (Uganda and Tanzania)
and many other agencies in early 2008 which targeted
counterfeiters of life saving medicines (INTERPOL, 2008b
cited in Taylor and Craig, 2009). Operation ‘Mamba 11’ was
conducted in 2009 and involved 3 east African countries
(Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya) (Sillo, 2010). Between July
and August, 2010, operation ‘Mamba 111’ was conducted
and it involved 5 East African countries (Kenya, Tanzania,
Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) (Sillo, 2010). There was
operation “Storm” in South east Asia from April to September
2008, involving different countries (Cambodia, China, Laos,
Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) and other
agencies. These resulted in closure of drug outlets, arrests
and drug seizures (INTERPOL, 2008a cited in Taylor and
Craig, 2009). Another operation coded as “Pangea” was
held from 16-20 November, 2009; coordinated by
INTERPOL-PFIPC-IMPACT involving 25 countries such as
Canada, Germany, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand, Singapore,
Switzerland, the UK and the USA targeting illegal internet
premises (INTERPOL, 2008c cited in Taylor and Craig,
2009). INTERPOL also coordinated operation Zambezi from
12 October, 2009 to 6
th November, 2009 involving raids in
four African countries; Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi and
Swaziland (INTERPOL, 2009). It also aims to develop an
advanced investigation manual. The IMPACT working group
on regulatory and legislative infrastructure developed
health professionals, national
organisations, consumer groups and
industry representative (Kopp, 2010). It
also launched the Safe Medicines
Partnership website,
www.safemedicines.org which has a
variety of information on medicines
counterfeiting (Writer, 2005)
WHO:A d d r e s s e dm e d i c i n e sc o u n t e r f e i t i n g
internationally in 1985 at the conference of
experts on the rational use of medicines in
Nairobi with a recommendation for a
clearing body be set up by WHO and other
international organisations in order to
collect data and inform governments on
the extent of the problem (Amon, 2008).
The IMPACT Communications working
group has developed the IMPACT
Communications Strategy. Collaborated
with WHPA to develop a tool kit for health
professionals and patients on
counterfeiting. The group has also
collaborated with Interpol to develop
strategies based on the media to raise
awareness of counterfeiting and has
produced a variety of electronic and hard
copy resource materials on counterfeiting.
The WHO IMPACT held its third annual
meeting in Tunisia to raise awareness of
the danger of medicines counterfeiting and
how best to curb it (African Union, 2010)
NAFDAC: NAFDAC engaged in re-
orientation and motivation of its staff for
positive outcome (Akunyili, 2007). Public
enlightenment campaign via jingles on the
radio and TV, alert notices about fake
drugs in the supply chain for instance is an
alert issued on fake maloxine tablets in
circulation in 2009 (Ogundipe and Obinna,
2009 cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010),
billboards, publication in national dailies on
publication of guidelines for
development of measures
the combat counterfeit drugs
in 1999 (WHO, 1999a).
Since then there have been
additional workshops for
instance in Japan and Viet
Nam. Training and country
studies have also been
carried out by WHO e.g in
VietNam and in Myannmar
on medicines counterfeiting.
An e t w o r ko f1 2 0
responsible individuals from
different ministries of health
was formed to inform the
WHO on counterfeiting
(Ham, 2003). In a bid to
crack counterfeiting, WHO
held a conference in Rome
in 2006, which led to the
Declaration of Rome and the
formation of IMPACT, which
was aimed at forming a
collaborative effort among a
range of stakeholders in
order to curb medicines
counterfeiting. The major
areas of focus of IMPACT
are legislative and regulatory
infrastructure, regulatory
implementation,
enforcement, technology
development for detection of
counterfeits and technology
transfer to developing
countries as well as
communication of risk and
innovations/strategies aimed
at curbing counterfeiting
(WHO, 2010a). IMPACT
collaborates with other
bodies such as the charity-
Pharmaciens sans
Frontieres, professional
organisations such as the396
counterfeited
products
(FDA, 2009).
WHO:T h e
IMPACT
working
group on
technology
has produced
ad o c u m e n t
covering
technologies
aimed at
protecting
medicines,
checklist to
aid
authenticatio
no fs u s p e c t
drugs by
enforcement
agencies and
conducting a
comparative
analysis of
different field
testing
methods
based on
needs of
users,
locations and
their
successes/fe
asibility.
NAFDAC:I no r d e rt om o pu pt h ef a k e
drugs already in circulation, the
Nigerian government has in
collaboration with registered
manufacturers confiscated and
destroyed expired counterfeit
medicines thereby increasing the cost
of obtaining such illicit medicines
(Naik, 2004 in Lybecker, 2007,
Akunyili, 2007). Introduction of thermo
scientific TruScan® handheld RAMAN
instrument for rapid identification of
fake and substandard drugs as well as
the introduction of the mobile
authentication service to help validate
the quality of medicines (NAFDAC,
2010a) are some of the strategies in
place. NAFDAC has also established
control points in China and India
(Ogbebo, 2010a)
National Drug Authority of Uganda:
Conducts tests on samples of
medicines in Uganda in order to
determine the extent of poor quality
medicines (Nafula, 2008 cited in
Milissa McGinnis, 2010). The National
Drug Authority in collaboration with the
Police conducts raids in Uganda to
seize poor quality medicines (Wandera
and Bagala, 2008 cited in Milissa
McGinnis, 2010)
The Zambia Bureau of Standards:
Withdraws counterfeit medicines when
discovered in Zambia (Africa News,
2009 cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010).
The National Institute for the
Control of Pharmaceutical and
Biological Products in China have
developed rapid tests for an easy
detection of counterfeit medicines
“Principles and elements for national legislation against
medical products”. It also initiated a study comparing
existing legislation used to combat medicines counterfeiting.
The Max Planck Institute is leading this and making
comparison between different countries (WHO, 2010d). The
WHO introduced the Certification scheme to ensure the
quality of medicines and established the pre-qualification list
(Wertheimer and Norris, 2009). The WHO has published a
lot of guidelines in the area of medicines counterfeiting
(Kopp, 2010)
NAFDAC: Engaged in updating of NAFDAC laboratories and
inspection of laboratories abroad by NAFDAC to ensure their
compliance to cGMP. Appointment of analysts in India,
China and Egypt who re-certify drugs for importation,
mandatory pre-shipment information before importation,
mandatory NAFDAC clearance permit prior to financial
document processing in Nigeria for all drug importers,
discontinuation of importation of drugs marked ‘For export
only’ into Nigeria by insisting on an authenticated certificate
of free sale, regular monitoring of GMP of local
manufacturers and enforcement of NAFDAC registration
guidelines (Akunyili, 2007) are some of the strategies
NAFDAC employs. Also, the designation of Calabar and
Apapa sea ports, Murtala Muhammed and Mallam Aminu
Kano International Airports as the only ports of entry for the
importation of drugs and pharmaceutical raw materials.
NAFDAC has also conducted secondary school essay
competition contests to help publicize the harmful effects of
counterfeit drugs, established consumer safety clubs in
schools, attempted to raise a NAFDAC army made up
primary school children who are taught on the advantage of
good quality products (Naik, 2004 in Lybecker, 2007, WIPO,
2008). Nigeria in collaboration with Indian authorities
adopted the concept of ‘whistle blower’ where a cash reward
of N200,000 is proposed to be given to anyone who
discloses information leading to interception of fake drugs
with a promise to make individual identities confidential (This
Day, 2010). NAFDAC has banned importation from some
Indian Pharmaceutical companies, sealed some drugs from
being imported (Chinyere, 2008 in Bate et al., 2010) and set
up an office for its regulator in India (The Economic Times,
2009 in Bate et al., 2010). NAFDAC conducted a survey
and audit of all drugs on sale in Nigeria in order to build a
medicines counterfeiting for example; the
list of counterfeited medicines,
workshops/meetings/seminars for
stakeholders (Akunyili, 2007). NAFDAC in
collaboration with Christables started a
state-to-state drug market sensitization on
15
th of July 2010, which began at the
Onitsha head bridge, Anambra state (Daily
Sun, 2010). A quarterly bulletin which
distinguishes between counterfeit
medicines, original and blacklisted
companies is usually published by
NAFDAC (Federal Ministry of Health and
World Health Organisation, 2010)
MHRA: The MHRA published its Anti-
counterfeiting Strategy for 2007-2010,
highlighting the need for an effective
communication with health professionals,
patients and drug regulatory bodies for
more positive outcomes (Taylor and Craig,
2009). The MHRA has also conducted
about 5 internet days of action in over a 2-
year period. A proposal by the MHRA to
the WHO IMPACT prompted the
conduction of an international internet day
of action in November 2008; the ‘operation
Pangea 1’. This was coordinated by
Interpol and involved different countries
such as Canada, Ireland, Israel,
Singapore, Switzerland, UK, USA,
Germany and New Zealand. Operation
“Pangea 11” was subsequently conducted
in 2009, involving 25 countries (Ahmed,
2010). Following operation “Pangea 11”,
four national awareness campaigns were
conducted and there were press releases
in the countries involved. 43 countries in 6
continents and about 109 agencies
indicated interest holding similar operation.
National Drug Authority of Uganda:
FIP, Financial institutions
such as the World bank and
consumer groups such as
International Alliance of
Patients’ Association (Taylor
and Craig, 2009).
NAFDAC:I n i t i a t e d
WADRAN in 2008 as an
avenue to share strategies
and experiences by member
states in the fight against
medicines counterfeiting as
well as promote access to
good quality affordable
generics (Akunyili, 2007).
The Uganda National
Drug Authority in
collaboration with Interpol
conducted raids which led to
the discovery of counterfeit
medicines (Ultimate media,
2009 cited in Milissa
McGinnis, 2010)
World Customs
Organisation (WCO):
WCO’s 176 member
customs have signed a
declaration to crack down
medicines counterfeiting
while ensuring access to
safe medicines via a global
initiative (Henry J Kaiser
Family Foundation
International news, 2010;
Kopp, 2010)397
(Yang, 2010)
The Hubei FDA, China and Hubei
Provincial Istitute compiled a book
for medicines testing in 2009 to aid
detection of counterfeit medicines
(Yang, 2010)
pharmaceutical database (Bate and Hess, 2010). Issues alerts on counterfeit medicines in
circulation in Uganda (Nyakairu and
Nakabugo, 2005; Bogere and Nafula, 2007
cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010).
The Medicines Control Authority of
Zimbabwe issues public alerts on
counterfeit medicines in circulation (UN
Integrated Regional Information Networks,
2007 cited in Milissa McGinnis, 2010)
Cameroon SFDA:E x p o s e d3 0w e b s i t e si n
May, 2010 which are thought to be
engaged in the sale of counterfeit
medicines and disseminating false drug
information (Kopp, 2010)398
Appendix 5: Ethical approval documents
Ethics approval document from Lagos University Teaching Hospital and Ethics
approval document from UCL School of Pharmacy, London399400401
Appendix 6: Letter to UK Customs402
Appendix 7: Temperature log for samples during transport and storage
Temperature log for samples during transport and storage (19th October 2011- 31st July,
2012)403
Appendix 8: Visual Inspection tool
1. Packaging
Any drug should be packaged in a container, which can be anything from a glass bottle to a blister pack, to a tube of glass, plastic or
metal. A folding carton bearing the label very often protects the container. Check the type of packaging and compare it to known
containers for the same drug from the same manufacturer. The packaging and the labeling of pharmaceutical products is a very
complex and expensive business. Thus, the process and the quality of packaging material are very difficult to counterfeit. This is why a
thorough visual inspection could be an important screening step for drug quality control. However, producers of counterfeit drugs are
quick to copy special labeling and holograms.
Yes No Other Observations
1.1 Container and Closure
Do the container and closure protect the drug from the outside
environment e.g. properly sealed?
Do they assure that the drug will meet the proper specifications
throughout its shelf life?
Are the container and the closure appropriate for the drug inside?
Is the container safely sealed?
1.2 Label
The information written on the label is very important. The information can be printed on a label adhered to the container, or printed
directly onto the container itself, but all information must be legible and indelible.
If there is a carton protecting the container, does the label on the
carton match the label on the container?
Is all information on the label legible and indelible?
1.2.1 The trade name:
Is the trade name spelled correctly?
Is the drug (trade name) registered in the country by the DRA (drug
regulatory authority)?
Is the drug legally sold in the country?
Does the symbol ® follow the trade name?
1.2.2 The active ingredient name (scientific name):
Is the active ingredient name spelled correctly?
Do the trade name and the active ingredient name correspond to the
registered drug?
1.2.3 The manufacturer's name and logo:
Are the manufacturer's name and logo legible and correct?
Does the logo or hologram (if applicable) look authentic?
Does it change colour when viewed from different angles?
1.2.4 The manufacturer's full address:
All manufacturers are required by international law to print their complete address on the label. Many companies making substandard or
counterfeit drugs do not have a traceable address on the label.
Is the manufacturer's full address legible and correct?
Has the company or its agent registered the drug in the country?
1.2.5 The drug strength (mg/unit):
Is the strength - the amount of active ingredient per unit - clearly
stated on the label?
1.2.6 The dosage form (e.g., tablet/capsule):
Is the dosage clearly indicated?
Is the indicated drug under this dosage form registered and
authorized for sale in the country?
1.2.7 The number of units per container:
Does the number of tablets listed on the label match the number of
tablets stated on the container?404
Yes No Other Observations
1.2.8 The batch (or lot) number:
Drugs under the same batch/lot number are expected to be equivalent. In a continuous process, a batch corresponds to a defined
portion of the production, based on time or quantity. Drugs from the same batch number should have the same history of manufacturing,
processing, packing, and coding. All drug quality control testing should be based on batch/lot numbers.
Does the numbering system on the package correspond to that of the
producing company?
1.2.9 The date of manufacture and the expiry date:
An expired drug should not be sold under any circumstances.
Are the manufacture and expiry dates clearly indicated on the label?
1.2.10 Storage information:
Are the storage conditions indicated on the label?
Has the drug been properly stored?
1.3 Leaflet or package insert:
All drug packages should contain a leaflet explaining dosage, the drug content, the adverse affects, the drug actions, and how the drug
should be taken. The only exceptions are where the packaging includes all the information that would otherwise be in the leaflet.
Is the package insert printed on the same coloured or same quality
paper as the original?
Is the ink on the package insert or packaging smudge-proof?
2. Physical Characteristics of Tablets/Capsules. All types of medicines can be and have been counterfeited from cough syrups to
injections. As mentioned above, it is important to check the packaging of these drugs. Additionally, medicines in the form of tablets or
capsules can be checked for signs of moisture, dirty marks, abrasion erosion, cracks, or any other adulteration.
Yes No Other Observations
2.1 Uniformity of Shape:
Are the tablets/capsules uniform in shape?
2.2 Uniformity of Size:
Are the tablets/capsules uniform in size?
2.3 Uniformity of Colour:
Are the tablets/capsules uniform in colour?
2.4 Uniformity of Texture:
Tablets can be film-coated, sugar-coated or enteric-coated.
Do the tablets have a uniform coating?
Is the base of the tablets fully covered?
Are the tablets uniformly polished, free of powder, and non-sticking?
2.5 Markings (scoring, letters, etc):
Are markings uniform and identical?
2.6 Breaks, Cracks and Splits:
Are the tablets/capsules free of breaks, cracks, splits or pinholes?
2.7 Embedded surface spots or contamination:
Are the tablets/capsules free of embedded surface spots and foreign
particle contamination?
2.8 Presence of empty capsules in the case of a sample of capsules:
Is the sample examined free of empty capsules?
2.9 Smell
Does the medicine smell the same as the original?
Adapted from WHO (2014)405
Appendix 9: Interview topic guide for the stakeholders
Interview topic guide for consumers
Major questions in bold, mini questions in normal font, prompts in italics and small blue font for concluding remarks
What consumers think of accessibility to good quality medicines in Nigeria
1) How will you describe a medicine that is a good quality?
2) Have you heard about any of these? Counterfeit medicine/substandard medicine/adulterated
medicine/degraded medicine
3) Do you think that this is a problem in Nigeria?
4) Do you think that the problem is worse of/better than in the past?
….Why has the situation changed?
…..What has helped/hindered?
5) How can you know that a medicine is of good quality?
…….Before taking it
……after taking it
…are you concerned about the quality of medicines that you take?
…..Do you take any measures/ make any conscious effort to know if your medicines are fake or original? (if so, what do
you do?)
……Have you/ anyone you know ever bought a medicine which you suspect not to be of good quality (can you describe
what happened-where did you buy the medicine, How did you know (physical detection/ineffective/complication, what did
you do about it and what was done?) if no go to question 6
6) What determines the brand/type of medicine that you purchase?
…on prescription
…Recommendation (who)
…Cost
…Brand/generic
..Country of manufacture (any preference of where your medicines should come from?)
…other
7) What determines where you buy your medicines?
..Public/private
..Pharmacy/PMV/drug market
..Cost
..what do you think of the quality of cheap generic? ?); are you comfortable asking for them?
..Outlet quality mark
…other
8) Are you aware of any initiative by the government (NAFDAC) against fake medicines?406
9) What do you think about these initiatives?
10) What do you think are the major challenges to fighting fake medicines in Nigeria?
11) How do you think this can be tackled (your suggestions)
Among all these initiatives, I am particularly interested in MAS.
...MAS costs money, would you be prepared to pay more for your medicines if their cost increase as a result of MAS
…what do your family and friends think about MAS
…Overall, how satisfied are you with the service? (for only those who have used it)
Perceptions and experiences of consumers about MAS
12) Have you heard of this before?
13) Have you used it? (If yes proceed for consumers who have used it if no and have heard of it find why? And
still proceed)
14) How does the service work?
15) What do you think of the service?
…..perception of quality as a result of the tag
….trust in the service
…usefulness
…ease of use
16) What potential or actual benefits/impacts do you think MAS has?
….quality authentication
….add on messages
…..your purchasing behaviour
…increased therapeutic response to treatment
….intercepting counterfeiters (have you experienced this as a result of MAS?)/reduction in counterfeiting
….increased confidence
…..adherence to medication
17) What potential problems/challenges do you think MAS has/will have?
18) Do you have any suggestions on how MAS can work better?
19) Would you like to learn more about medicines counterfeiting and MAS?
……Through which means?
*Do you have any more things to say on any issue that we discussed today?
*Do you have any questions which you wish to ask?
*I would like to fill in your details in the data sheet so that I can contact you to clarify any answers that you provided
below. It should take about 1 minute to complete.
Thank you so much for your time (participant to fill the demographic sheet immediately afterwards)407
Interview topic guide for medicine sellers
Major questions in bold,m i n iq u e s t i o n si nn o r m a lf o n t ,prompts in italics and small blue font for concluding remarks
What medicine sellers think of accessibility to good quality medicines in Nigeria
1) How will you describe a good quality medicine?
……Have you heard about any of these?
Counterfeit medicine/substandard medicine/adulterated medicine/degraded medicine/generic medicine
…..Can you define them from your point of view?
2) Do you think that these are a problem in Nigeria?
3) Do you think that the problem is worse of/better than in the past?
….Why has the situation changed?
…..What has helped/hindered?
4) How can you know that a medicine is of good quality?
…….Before taking it
……after taking it
…are you concerned about the quality of medicines that you purchase to sell/ in general?
…..Do you take any measures/ make any conscious effort to know if your medicines are fake or original? (if so, what do you do?)
..Do you only sell medicines with NAFDAC number (if so why and if not why?)
……Have you/ anyone you know ever bought or taken a medicine which you suspect was not of good quality? (can you tell me more
about what happened- where did you buy the medicine, How did you know (physical detection/Ineffective/complication, what did you do
about it and what was done? Where there any difficulties?)
…..what is the most popular form of counterfeiting/fake you have experienced?
….Are there any particular group/class of medicines mostly counterfeited (if yes, what are these or their characteristics)
4) What determines the brand/type of medicine that you purchase?
…demand
…Recommendation (who)
…Cost (branded/generic)
..Country of manufacture (any preference of where your medicines should come from?)
5) What determines where you procure your medicines?
….cost
….what do you think of the quality of cheap medicines (what of generics?)
..Outlet quality mark
…Do you think that some outlets/places stock counterfeit/substandard medicines while some stock genuine? (Do you know of any such
outlets?)
6) Are there factors that you consider before selling or recommending medicines to your clients?
…Quality
…Socioeconomic class
….Other
7) What do you think are the major challenges to fighting fake medicines in Nigeria?
8) How do you think this can be best tackled (your suggestions)
9) What roles do you think pharmacists/traders/PMVs can play to avoid counterfeiting?
…Educating patients408
….Checking thoroughly
….Other
10) Are you aware of any initiative by the government (NAFDAC) against fake medicines?
…what are these initiatives?
11) What do you think about these initiatives?
Among all these initiatives, I am particularly interested in MAS.
Perceptions and experiences of medicine sellers about MAS
12) Have you heard of this before?
13) Have you used the service? (To authenticate what you purchased/ for your patients or clients?)
14) How does the service work?
15) What do you think of the service?
…..perception of quality as a result of the tag
….trust in the service
…usefulness
….ease of use
…..increased demand and sale
...MAS costs money, would you be prepared to pay more for your medicines if their cost increase as a result of MAS
…what do your clients think about MAS
…Overall, how satisfied are you with the service? (for only those who have used it)
16) What potential or actual benefits/impacts do you think MAS has?
….quality authentication
….add on messages
…..your purchasing behaviour
…increased therapeutic response to treatment
….intercepting counterfeiters (have you experienced this as a result of MAS?)
….increased confidence
…..adherence to medication
….Other
17) What potential problems/challenges do you think MAS has/will have?
18) Do you have any suggestions on how MAS can work better?
..if yes, what are these
19) Would you like to learn more about medicines counterfeiting and MAS?
…..Through which means?
*D oy o uh a v ea n ym o r et h i n g st os a yo na n yi s s u et h a tw ed i s c u s s e dt o d a y ?
*D oy o uh a v ea n yq u e s t i o n sw h i c hy o uw i s ht oa s k ?
*Iw o u l dl i k et of i l li ny o u rd e t a i l si nt h ed a t as h e e ts ot h a tIc a nc o n t a c ty o ut oc l a r i f ya n ya n s w e r st h a ty o up r o v i d e db e l o w .I ts h o u l d
take about 1 minute to complete.
Thank you so much for your time (participant to fill the demographic sheet immediately afterwards)409
Interview guide for policy makers
Major questions in bold,m i n iq u e s t i o n si nn o r m a lf o n t ,prompts in italics and small blue font for concluding remarks
What policy makers think of accessibility to good quality medicines in Nigeria?
1) How can you describe a good quality medicine?
2) Have you heard about any of these?
Counterfeit medicine/substandard medicine/adulterated medicine/degraded medicine
….Can you define them from your point of view?
3) Do you think that these are a problem in Nigeria?
4) Do you think that the problem is worse of/better than in the past?
….Why has the situation changed?
…..What has helped/hindered?
5) Have you encountered a medicine which you think is of bad quality?
…..How did you discover this?
……How were the cases handled? (Prevention from going back into the distribution chain, contacting companies whose products are
involved before destruction of the medicines)
…..what is the most popular form of counterfeiting/fake you have experienced?
….which group of medicines do you think are counterfeited most
6) What do you think are the major challenges to fighting fake medicines in Nigeria?
7) How do you think these can be best tackled (your suggestions)
Talking about initiatives against medicines counterfeiting, I am particularly interested in MAS.
8) What do you think about this service?
…..Quality authentication
…usefulness
….ease of use
…cost
…..increased demand and sale
10) What potential or actual benefits/impacts do you think MAS has?
….quality authentication
….add on messages
…..consumer purchasing behaviour
…increased therapeutic response to treatment
….intercepting counterfeiters (have you experienced this as a result of MAS?)
….increased confidence
…..adherence to medication
11) What potential problems/challenges do you think MAS has/will have?
12) Do you have any suggestions on how MAS can work better?
Do you have any more things to say on any issue that we discussed today?
Iw o u l dl i k et of i l li ny o u rd e t a i l si nt h ed a t as h e e ts ot h a tIc a nc o n t a c ty o ut oc l a r i f ya n ya n s w e r st h a ty o up r o v i d e db e l o w .I ts h o u l dt a k e
about one minute to complete.
Do you have any questions that you wish to ask?
Thank you so much for your time (participant to fill the demographic sheet immediately afterwards)410
Appendix 10: Information leaflet for stakeholders
Information leaflet version 1 (Community pharmacists and policy makers in pharmacy)
Information leaflet December 2011
Nigeria has been faced with the problem of fake and substandard medicines. Due to this, a lot of initiatives are in place to curb the
menace. However there is a lack of systematic research on the real extent of the availability of poor quality medicines especially for
chronic diseases. Also, there are very limited studies involving exploration of issues relating to accessibility of good quality medicines
and the perceptions of Nigerian stakeholders on initiatives in place to improve the quality of medicines. Initiatives against medicines
counterfeiting may attract more support based on evidence of their impact on the users and will perform better and prevent wastage of
scarce resources if users’ experiences of the advantages and disadvantages of such interventions in practice are incorporated in their
future development as this will increase their likelihood of being responsive to the users’ needs. It is based on this that researchers at
the School of Pharmacy, University of London and Faculty of Pharmacy, University of Lagos are working together to explore the
perceptions of stakeholders on issues relating to accessibility of good quality medicines in Nigeria and the recently introduced Mobile
Authentication Service (MAS) in order to develop recommendations on ensuring accessibility of good quality medicines to the public and
make recommendations for the future deployment of such National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC)
and allied initiatives which will in turn lead to availability of good quality medicines and improvement in health outcomes. Data arising
from this research will be included in my PhD thesis and may be published in peer-reviewed journals.
Participation is voluntary and you can withdraw at anytime. If you choose to participate in the study, you will be asked to take part in the
interview with the researcher at a place and time that is most convenient for you. The estimated time for each interview is between 20-
30 minutes. However, you are free to talk as long as you wish. You may be contacted sometime after the interview to confirm if our
findings truly represent what you meant to convey in your interview. The researcher will also ask for your permission to tape record your
responses so that nothing you say will be missed out. Your tape-recorded responses will be wiped out as soon as the information is
transcribed.
To ensure that your confidentiality is maintained, your name will not be included in any reports or publications arising from this research.
Names of all participants in this study will be coded and extra caution will be taken to ensure that no one will be identified.
The study has been approved by The School of Pharmacy, University of London Research Ethics Committee and the Lagos University
Teaching Hospital Health Research and Ethics Committee.
Thank you so much for taking out time to read this information leaflet.
If you have any question about the research, please contact;
Chioma Onwuka or Prof Felicity Smith on +44(0)2078741288 or felicity.smith@pharmacu.ac.uk
Mobile number: +2348034539090
E-mail: talk2pharmchomy@yahoo.com
Dr Chukwuemeka .P. Azubuike
Mobile no.: 08033618556
E-mail: chupcazubuike@yahoo.com or Prof. David Taylor on +44 (0) 2073875693 or david.taylor@pharmacy.ac.uk411
Information leaflet version 2 (consumers, patent medicine vendors and traders)
Your medicines- Fake or Original
Most of us take medicines in our daily lives but most times we cannot guarantee the quality of these medicines we take.
Some steps have been taken by NAFDAC to help certify the quality of medicines we take. Now, we want to know if
these steps have worked or not and what can be done for us to get good medicines which we all deserve.
Thank you for taking out the time to read this information leaflet.
If you have any questions about this research, please contact;
Chioma Onwuka Prof Felicity Smith on +44(0)2078741288 or felicity.smith@pharmacu.ac.uk or
Mobile number: +2348034539090
E-mail: talk2pharmchomy@yahoo.com
Dr Chukwuemeka .P. Azubuike
Mobile no.: 08033618556
E-mail: chupcazubuike@yahoo.com Prof. David Taylor on +44 (0) 2073875693 or david.taylor@pharmacy.ac.uk412
Appendix 11: The Consent Form version 1 (for Community pharmacists and policy
makers)
Title of Study: Pharmaceutical quality and access in Nigeria; Validation of the Mobile Authentication Service (MAS) as
an anti-counterfeiting technology and exploration of stakeholder perceptions and experiences in Nigeria.
Name of Researcher: Chioma Joy Onwuka, the School of Pharmacy, University of London
Institutional Researcher: Dr C.P Azubuike. Faculty of Pharmacy, Univeristy of Lagos
Co-researchers: Professor Felicity Smith (The School of Pharmacy, University of London); Professor David Taylor (The
School of Pharmacy, University of London)
Statement of person giving informed consent:
I understand what the study involves. I understand that my participation is voluntary and will not
be disadvantaged in any way if I do not take part. I know enough about the purpose, methods,
risks and benefits of the research study and I agree to take part in it.
Name of the participant:                                          .
Signature:                                                     
Date:                                                          .
This research has been approved by the School of Pharmacy, University of London Ethics Committee and Lagos
University Teaching Hospital (LUTH) ethics committee. If you have any question about your participation in this
research, you can contact the principal investigator Chioma Joy Onwuka at her office Department of Practice and Policy,
The School of Pharmacy, University of London, Mezzanine Floor, BMA House, Tavistock Square, London, WC1H 9JP.
Her phone number is 08034539090. You can also contact her supervisors, Professor Felicity Smith Prof on
+44(0)2078741288 or felicity.smith@pharmacy.ac.uk and Professor David Taylor on +44(0)2073875693 or
david.taylor@pharmacy.ac.uk. Alternatively you can reach the institutional researcher on 08033618556 or
chupcazubuike@yahoo.com
PLEASE KEEP A COPY OF THE SIGNED INFORMED CONSENT413
Appendix 12: The Consent form version 2 (For consumers, Patent Medicine Vendors
and traders)
Title of study:F a k em e d i c i n e s ;t h eN i g e r i a ns i t u a t i o n
Name of Researcher: Chioma Joy Onwuka, the School of Pharmacy, University of London
I understand what the study involves and I would wish to take part.
Name of the participant:                                                . .
Signature:                                                    . .       . .
Date:                                                                .
If you have any question about your participation in this research, you can contact the principal investigator Chioma
Onwuka. Her phone number is 08034539090 or her contact person in Nigeria, Chukwuemeka Azubuike on 08033618556
PLEASE KEEP A COPY OF THE SIGNED INFORMED CONSENT414
Appendix 13: Demographic data sheets for stakeholders
Demographic data sheet for Community pharmacists/Patent Medicine Vendors/traders
Completing this demographic data sheet is voluntary and the data you provide will be kept in such a manner as to
guarantee your privacy.
Please mark X in the boxes or circle the answers applicable to you or fill in your answers in the spaces provided as the
case may be, you may tick more than one answer if that applies to you.
I am Chioma Joy Onwuka, a doctoral researcher at The School of Pharmacy, University of London. My PhD is
on the Validation of the Mobile Authentication Service (MAS) and exploring stakeholder perceptions and
experiences of its use linked to the quality of medicines in Nigeria
Participant characteristics
Gender: Male Female
What is your age category: 20-30 yrs 30-40yrs 40-60yrs >60yrs
Location of outlet    ..        Rural/Urban         
Number of years of practice      ..        .. 
Private data – This will also be held confidential and is just used by the researcher to contact you in case clarification is
required on any of the answers that you provide for the questions that we ask you. All responses will be stored and
analysed anonymously and independent of any private data you provide.
Your name
....................................................................................
Your e-mail address
...............................................................................................
Phone number
                      415
Demographic data sheet for Consumers
I am Chioma Joy Onwuka, a doctoral researcher at The School of Pharmacy, University of London. I am currently
conducting a study to know your perceptions, experiences and attitudes towards the quality of medicines in Nigeria and
the recently introduced Mobile Authentication Service (MAS).
Completing this demographic data sheet is voluntary and the data you provide will be kept in such a manner as to
guarantee your privacy.
Please mark X in the boxes or circle the answers applicable to you or fill in your answers in the spaces provided as the
case may be, you may tick more than one answer if that applies to you.
Participant characteristics
Gender: Male Female
What is your age category: 20-30 yrs 30-40yrs 40-60yrs >60yrs
Occupation: Employed Unemployed Retired In full or part-time education Others      .
Educational level: Illiterate Nursery school Primary school Secondary school Higher institution (Diploma,
Bachelor, Post-graduate degree, etc)
Place of residence                ..Rural/Urban                 
Your name
....................................................................................
Your e-mail address
...............................................................................................
Phone number
                      416
Demographic data sheet for Drug regulatory staff/ Policy makers in Pharmacy
Completing this demographic data sheet is voluntary and the data you provide will be kept in such a manner as to
guarantee your privacy.
Please mark X in the boxes or circle the answers applicable to you or fill in your answers in the spaces provided as the
case may be, you may tick more than one answer if that applies to you.
I am Chioma Joy Onwuka, a doctoral researcher at The School of Pharmacy, University of London. My PhD is
on the Validation of the Mobile Authentication Service (MAS) and exploring stakeholder perceptions and
experiences of its use linked to the quality of medicines in Nigeria
Participant characteristics
Gender: Male Female
What is your age category: 20-30 yrs 30-40yrs 40-60yrs >60yrs
Occupation                 
Position                    .
Number of years of practice in the field of medicines regulation and policies              .. 
Private data – This will also be held confidential and is just used by the researcher to contact you in case clarification is
required for any of the answers that you provide us on any of the questions that we ask you. All responses will be stored
and analyzed anonymously and independent of any private data.
Your name
....................................................................................
Your e-mail address
...............................................................................................
Phone number
                    417
Appendix 14: Audit trail of outlets visited to obtain samples
Community pharmacies visited NB: Names of outlets and new codes have been omitted for confidentiality
S/No.
Random
number
Location Initial code assigned (See details including full address,
quantity purchased, price and physical description of primary
and secondary packaging in a separate report)
Comment Recoded
1 336 *Ikorodu Gl336 and
Ge336
Result of Text message authentication Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about
11seconds after at 11pm on 5/12/11
2 502 *Aguda Gl502 and
Ge502
OK- Text message sent response
received after 2 seconds at 8.12am on
3/12/11
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)
3 249 *Ebute
Metta
Ge249 Supplied other brand. Does not stock Glucophage®
4 87 *Apapa Gl87 and Ge87 OK- Text was sent and response
received 4.1seconds after at 7.19pm
on 05/12/2011
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)
5 376 *Bariga Gl376 and
Ge376
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 2
seconds after at
6.04pm
Pharmacy at the location but have changed name. The Glucophage® lacked
information leaflet (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®) purchased
6 300 *Gbagada Gl300 and
Ge300
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 3
seconds after at 17.35pm
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)418
7 561 *Gbagada Gl561 and
Ge561
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immiditaely about 4
seconds after at 5.17pm
Both purchased (Glucophage® and 5 sachets of Diabetmin®)
8 144 *Yaba Gl144 and
Ge144
OK- Text message sent with airtel and
response received almost immediately
about 6 seconds after at 12.50pm
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Glumin®)
9 401 *Ipaja Ge401 Supplied only other brand (Inophage®). Said Glucophage® is finished but will have it in
the evening
10 346 *Surulere Gl346 and
Ge346
Text message sent response received
after 6 seconds at 8.14am on 3/12/11
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)
11 269 *Festac
Town
----------- Didn’t have any. Both have finished
12 47 *Ikeja Gl47 OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 4.9
second after at 9.59am on 6/12/11
Supplied only Glucophage®. Said people don’t ask for other brands so have stopped
stocking them as they get expired. Showed an example of her expired Diabex®. She
said she will order some Diabex® if needed and will call if available. She advised
against purchasing cheap metformin stating that the cheap ones have increased side
effects such as head ache.
13 12 *Ajah Gl12 and Ge12 Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 9
seconds after at 5.40pm
Both purchased (Glucophage® and 4 sachets of Diabetmin®)
14 105 *Ajah Gl105 and
Ge105
OK-Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 6
seconds after at 17.22pm
Both purchased (Glucophage® and 4 sachets of Diabetmin®)
15 211 *Anthony
village
Ge211 Supplied other brand. Didn’t have Glucophage®-finished but had another foreign brand
at a high price. He said that it is metformin from UK that his uncle did not finish taking
16 468 *Ajegunle Gl468 and
Ge468
OK- Text was sent and response
received 11.5seconds after at 7.00pm
on 05/12/2011
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)
17 265 *Ikotun Gl265 and
Ge265
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 5
seconds after at 15.53pm
Both Purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)
18 572 *Idimu Gl572 and
Ge572
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 4
seconds after at
16.21pm.
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)419
19 338 *Olodi
Apapa
Gl338 and
Ge338
OK- Text sent with etisalat response
received after 4.7 seconds at 7.27pm
on 05/12/2011
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Gluformin®)
20 66 *Festac
town
Gl66 and Ge66 Response for Gl66 received within
9seconds
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diamet®)
21 203 *Ikorodu Gl203 and
Ge203
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about
4.6seconds after at 11.06pm on
5/12/11
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)
22 476 *Egbe Gl476 and
Ge476
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 1
second after at 4.02pm
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Gluformin®); 5 satchets of Gluformin® purchased
23 413 *Ketu Gl413 and
Ge413
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 1
second after at
04.33pm.
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabex®)
24 114 *Surulere No longer a pharmacy but a photoshop so none could be bought
25 215 *Ikeja Gl215 and
Ge215
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about
14.9 seconds after at 10.34am on
6/12/11
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)
26 446 *Victoria
Island
Gl446 OK-Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 8
seconds after at 17.29pm
Glucophage® bought. They stock only Glucophage® as that is what people request
27 180 *Ikotun Ge180 Other brand bought (Glucophage® by Merck (Private) Pakistan. Sells other brand but
didn’t see it at the parking store
28 302 Satelite
town
Gl302 and
Ge302
OK- Text message sent at 6.36pm and
response received after 22.9 seconds
on 1/1/12
Both purchased (Glucophage® and and Diabetmin®)
29 184 *Ikorodu Gl184 and
Ge184
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 5.3
seconds after at 8.09pm on 5/12/11
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Gluformin®)
30 586 *Ajah Gl586 and
Ge586
OK-Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 15
seconds after at 17.58pm
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)420
31 431 *Agege Gl431 and
Ge431
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 3
seconds after at
17.56pm
Didn’t have any brand at first visit as he said people never ask for metformin and the
few times they had; it expired so they stopped buying. However, the storekeeper
promised to order it and would be available in the evening. At second visit; had
Glucophage® and Gluformin®. These were purchased. He said the medicines were
sourced from a distributor in Mushin. He went further to say of pharmacies that sell
substandard/fake in Mushin and called names. He said in such pharmacies all
medicines are stocked but the quality is the major problem
32 452 *Ikeja Ge452 Supplied only other brand (Climax® metformin). Sells Glucophage® but said it is
finished and will have it again in about 2 days
33 160 Somolu Gl160 and
Ge160
OK-Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 5
seconds after at 13.05pm
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)
34 334 *Festac
town
Gl334 and
Ge334
OK. Text message for GL334 received
after 5minutes 9 seconds
Pharmacy, still at the location but has changed name. Both purchased (Glucophage®
and Glucophage® by Merck (Private) limited, Pakistan
35 541 **Ajamgbadi -------------- Couldn’t locate
36 289 *Idimu Gl289 and
Ge289
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 5
seconds after at 15.11pm 2/12/2011)
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diamet®)
37 270 *Ikotun Gl270 and
Ge270
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 1
second after at 3.46pm
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin® 5 sachets remaining)
38 141 *Ikorodu ------------- Closed at the time of visit
39 558 *Ikotun,Lasu
rd
Gl558 and
Ge558
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 6
second after at 15.35pm
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diamet®)
40 585 *Gbagada Gl585 and
Ge585
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 1
second after at 2.38pm
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabex®); 2 satchets of Glucophage® remaining
was purchased
41 256 Ijora Gl256 and
Ge256
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 5
seconds after at 13.00pm
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Glucophage® by Merck (Private) Limited, Pakistan
42 91 *Ikorodu Gl91 and Ge91 OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about
4.8seconds after at 10.56pm on
Both Purchased (Glucophage® and Diamet®)421
5/12/11
43 514 *Ojota Gl514 OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about
11.6 seconds after at 8.20pm on
5/12/11
Supplied only Glucophage®. The pharmacist requested to see the data collector and
advised that his mum should monitor her blood glucose. He said that he sells only
Glucophage® as that is the only brand he is sure of the quality. He seriously advised
against cheap metformin, which can be fake unlike Glucophage® that now has tags to
help distinguish fake from original. Supplied 3 satchets (less 2 tablets) of Glucophage®.
Wanted to retain some for treatment of other patients as that was his last pack
44 271 *Ketu Gl271 OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about
5.1seconds after at 8.37pm on 5/12/11
Supplied only Glucophage®. The store assistant said that since inception that is what
she knows that they sell and Glucovance
45 186 *Ojodu Gl186 and
Ge186
OK- Text message of 2
nd sent and
response received late at 11.03am (not
properly times). Text message for 3
rd
sent and response received at
5minutes 8.5 seconds at 11.09am.
Both purchased (3 sachets of Glucophage® remaining and 5 sachets of Trippleace®
metformin purchased)
46 3 *Ketu Gl3 and Ge3 OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about
11.3seconds after at 8.28pm on
5/12/11
Both purchased (Glucophage® and VPL® metformin. Only 3 satchets of Glucophage®
remaining in shop and these were purchased
47 237 *Ikotun Gl237 and
Ge237
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 15
seconds after at 14.52pm
Both purchased (Glucophage® and 4 sachets Gluformin®)
48 428 *Ikoyi Gl428 and
Ge428
OK- Text was sent and response
received 4.8seconds after at 6.55pm
on 05/12/2011
Supplied both but didn’t know initially that he had any other brand aside Glucophage®;
Glucophage® bought (3 satchets) and Diabetmin® (4 satchets)
49 295 **Sari-
Iganmu
Gl295 and
Ge295
OK-Text message sent at 6.51pm
and response received after 1
minute 17.8 seconds seconds on
1/1/12
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabex®)
50 4 *Victoria
Island
Gl4 and Ge4 OK- Text was sent and response
received 5.3seconds after at 7.10pm
on 5/12/2011
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)
51 480 *Aguda Pharmacy have moved from this location422
52 333 *Ojota Gl333 and
Ge333
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about
3.5seconds after at 8.40pm on 5/12/11
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diamet®)
53 253 *Maryland Gl253 and
Ge253
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 5
seconds after at
17.20pm
Supplied Glucophage® first and later other brand (Diabetmin®) on another day. She
said that she ordered Diabetmin® by Hovid as that is next after Glucophage® in terms
of quality. She said she trusts Hovid because of their track record of quality with their
other good products that they make. According to her Hovid is a good company. She is
not sure of others so that is why she didn’t order them. She went on to say that she
prefers her medicines made in the UK or America. She said she does not use Indian
products. As Diabetmin® by Hovid is from Maylasia-that is better after Glucophage® by
Merck
54 116 *Yaba Gl116 Ok- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about7
seconds after at 18.54pm
Supplied only Glucophage®. Said that since inception that is what they stock. The
assistant was completely unaware of the existence of the other brands. She went on to
say that I am the first person ever asking for any other brand as people only ask for
Glucophage®
55 287 *Surulere Gl287 OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 16
seconds after at 14.28pm
Had only one sachet of Glucophage®. This was purchased
56 428 *Ikoyi -------------- Repeated random number
57 83 *Ikeja Gl83 OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 4.9
seconds after at 10.54am on 6/12/11
Supplied only Glucophage®. Said that is what people ask for so doesn’t sell any other
brand
58 48 *Oshodi Gl48 and Ge48 OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 6
seconds after at 14.14pm
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Gluformin®)
59 211 Anthony
village
------------- Repeated random number
60 333 Ojota ------------ Repeated random number
61 562 *Akoka Gl562 and
Ge562
OK- Text message sent response
received after 5 seconds at 7.01pm
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabex®)
62 475 *Isolo Gl475 and
Ge475
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 6
seconds after at 14.44pm
Cover up for repeated random no. Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabex®)
63 204 *Surulere Gl204 and
Ge204
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 5
seconds after at 13.49pm
Cover up for repeated random no. Both purchased (Glucophage® and Gluformin®); 2
sachets of Glucophage® remaining purchased423
64 259 *Surulere Gl259 and
Ge259
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 1
second after at 2.22pm (2/12/2011)
Cover up; Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)
65 69 *Lagos
Island
Gl69 and Ge69 OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 2
seconds after at 1.09pm
Cover up; Both purchased (Glucophage® and Gluformin®); 2 sachets of Gluformin®
remaining purchased
66 356 *Victoria
Island
Gl356 OK- Text sent with etisalat response
received after 5.0 seconds at 6.50pm
on 5/12/2011
Cover up; Had only Glucophage®. Normally stock Diabetmin® but said that at the
moment it is finished
67 99 *Ijegun Gl99 and Ge99 OK- Text message sent response
received after 6 seconds at 17.39pm
on 3/12/11
Cover up; Supplied both (Glucophage® and Diabetmin® but one satchet of
Glucophage® remaining
68 508 *Ketu Gl508 OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 4.8
seconds after at 8.15pm on 5/12/11
Cover up  .Had only Glucophage®. Said they stock only Glucophage® because of
quality. She went on to say that most cheap ones don’t have NAFDAC numbers so
they don’t sell them
69 306 *Akoka ------- Cover up; None was purchased. The store assistant said that at the moment they do
not have any brand of metformin as Glucophage® got finished. However, they will be
going to purchase medicines the next day and hopefully will have it in stock then. She
went on to explain that it is only Glucophage® that they stock as that is the only one
they can ascertain the quality using the tags. She said that all other brands without the
tags have fake so their quality cannot be guaranteed unlike tagged Glucophage®. She
strongly advised against purchasing any Glucophage® that is not tagged
70 111 *Apapa Gl111 OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 5.4
seconds after at 7.30pm on 5/12/11
Cover up; Supplied only Glucophage®. Sales lady was unaware of any other brand in
the market. She know only Glucophage®
71 73 *Agege Gl73 and Ge73 OK- Text was sent and response after
7.7seconds at 10.50am on 6/12/11
Cover up; Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)
72 415 *Ijegun
satellite
Gl415 OK- Text message sent response
received after 6 seconds at 17.36pm
on 3/12/11
Cover up; Supplied only 2 satchets of Glucophage. Said only Glucophage® is what
they sell
73 6 *Ejigbo Gl6 and Ge6 OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 6
seconds after at 17.44pm on 3/12/11
Cover up; Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabex®)
74 164 *Iju Gl164 and
Ge164
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 5.4
seconds after at 10.46am
Cover up; Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)
75 432 *Agege Gl432 and
Ge432
OK- Text message sent with Etisalat
and response received almost
Cover up; Both purchased (Glucophage® and Glucopac®)424
immediately about 11.8 seconds after
at 9.50am on 6/12/11
76 112 **Ijaniki --------- Cover up; Could not locate
77 140 *Ikorodu Gl140 and
Ge140
Ok- Text message sent 18.30pm and
response was not received until after 5
minutes 26 seconds at 18.34pm
Cover up; Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)
78 317 *Ebute
Metta
Gl317 and
Ge317
OK-Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 2
seconds after at 12.56pm
Cover up; Both purchased (Glucophage®® and Life back® metformin)
79 552 *Isolo Gl552 and
Ge552
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 3
seconds after at 2.07pm.
Cover up; Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®); Only 3 satchets of
Diabetmin® remaining purchased
80 457 *Ajao estate Gl457 and
Ge457
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 6
seconds after at 13.56pm
Cover up; Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)
81 310 *Ifako Ijaiye Gl310 and
Ge310
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about
1minute 5seconds after at 11.22am on
6/12/11
Cover up; Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)
82 254 *Ketu Gl254 OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 6
seconds after at
18.11pm
Only 3 sachets of Glucophage® remaining purchased. Sales lady said they sell only
what people ask for because if they are not bought they get expired and they loose.
They stock 2 antidiabetic tablets- Glucophage® and Glanil®.
83 577 *Ikeja Gl577 and
Ge577
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 2
seconds after at 10.59am on 6/12/11
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diamet®) 4 sachets of each
84 186 Ojodu ---------- Repeated random number
85 533 Festac Gl533 and
Ge533- loose
sachets of
Diabetmin®
OK- Text message sent at 7.00pm
and response received after 1
minute 5 seconds on 1/1/12
Both purchased (4 satchets of Glucophage® and 2 loose satchets of Diabetmin®)
86 135 Ojo Pharmacy no longer at the location
87 446 Victoria
Island
--------- Repeated random number425
88 228 *Ikotun Gl228 and
Ge228
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 6
seconds after at 17.48pm on 3/12/11
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)
89 590 *Surulere --------- Could not locate
90 520 *Ikeja Gl520 and
Ge520
OK- Text message sent and response
received almost immediately about 4
second after at
9.55am on 6/12/11
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)426
Locations at Idumota Drug market generated from the list from which to obtain samples (Names of outlets have been omitted for confidentiality)
S/N
Random
number
Location Comments S/N Random
number
Location Comments S/N Random
number
Location Comments S/N Random
number
Location Comments
15 1 C h u r c h
street
13 19 Church
street
25 167 Between
Atins
Repeated
random
number
36 80 Main
Ashogbon
21 2 0 M a i n
Ashogbon
street
14 140 Iga-
Idunganran
street
37 4 First
Ashogbon
Repeated random
number
31 3 8 I g a -
Idunganran
street
15 108 Main
Ashogbon
26 111 Main
Ashogbon
38 58 Church
street
42 7 C h u r c h
street
16 160 Main Atins 27 113 Main
Ashogbon
39 138 Iga-
Idunganran
street
Repeated random
number
51 3 3 E n u o w a 1 71 4 7 I g a -
Idunganran
street
28 74 Main
Ashogbon
40 143 Iga-
Idunganran
street
61 6 5 M a i n A t i n s 1 84 2 C h u r c h
street
29 30 Church
street
41 171 Second
Atins
71 7 5 S e c o n d
Atins
19 26 Church
street
30 20 Church
street
42 164 Main Atins
81 6 7 B e t w e e n
Atins
20 56 Church
street
31 169 Between
Atins
43 144 Iga-
Idunganran
street
94 F i r s t
Ashogbon
21 135 Iga-
Idunganran
street
32 165 Main Atins Repeated
random
number
44 108 Main
Ashogbon
Repeated random
number
10 14 Church
street
22 43 Church
street
33 59 Main
Ashogbon
45 151 Iga-
Idunganran
street
11 193 Atins end 23 136 Iga-
Idunganran
street
34 116 Main
Ashogbon
46 17 Church
street
12 109 Main 24 123 Main 35 138 Iga- 47 168 Between427
Ashogbon Ashogbon Idunganran Atins
48 197 End of
branch
Atins
54 95 Main
Ashogbon
60 135 Iga-
Idunganran
street
66 30 Church
street
Repeated random
number
49 152 Main Atins 55 121 Main
Ashogbon
61 155 Main Atins 67 129 Main
Ashogbon
50 175 Second
Atins
Repeated
random
number
56 0 ---------- - 62 117 Main
Ashogbon
68 174 Second
Atins
51 21 Church
shop
57 21 Church
street
63 17 Church
street
Repeated
random
number
69 40 Church
street
52 166 Between
Atins
58 114 Main
Ashogbon
Repeated
random
number
64 170 Second Atins
53 114 Main
Ashogbon
59 189 End of
Branch
Atins
65 103 Main
Ashogbon428
Locations and initial code of outlets visited at the Drug market (Final codes are exculded for confidentiality)
Name/Location
Code Result of text message authentication Comment (See details of primary and secondary packaging including
quantity and price purchased in a separate report)
Recoded
1) Iga-idunganra street TGLAA (1
st)
and
TGeAA (1
st)
OK-6
th sent 18.33 but no response from airtel until after 17 minutes-
18.50, 1
st sent with MTN message after 4 seconds at 6.41pm
Both purchased (Glucophage® and VPL® metformin); 84 tablets of
Glucophage at N1400 and 100 tablets of Glucophage® at N500*
2) Eko street TGeOB Only other brand purchased (Diamet®) 84 tablets for N550
3) Church street TGeS Only other brand purchased (Askaphage®)- 84 tablets at N500
4) Ashogbon street TGlPC OK-Text message sent and response received almost immediately about
5s e c o n d sa f t e ra t2 3 . 3 0p m
Only Glucophage® purchased. 84 tablets of Glucophage® purchased at
N1500
5) Ashogbon street, off
Church street
TGlRS (1
st)
and
TGeRS(1st)
OK-Text message sent and response received almost immediately about
15 seconds after at 23.24 pm
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Glucopac®); 84 tablets of
Glucophage® at N1400 and 50 tablets of Glucopac® at N300
6) Ashogbon street,
Church street
TGlRS (2
nd)
and
TGeRS
(2
nd)
OK-
Text message sent and response received almost immediately about 2
seconds after at 11.53pm
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Glucopac®)- 50 tablets of Glucopac®
purchased at N300 and 84 tablets of Glucophage® at N1,450
7) Church street TGlDV OK-Text message sent and response received almost immediately about
2s e c o n d sa f t e ra t1 1 . 3 5 p m
Only Glucophage® purchased-84 tablets for N1400
**Insisted on verifying the authenticity in front of the data collector
8) Iga-iduganran street TGlAP OK-Text message sent and response received almost immediately about
2s e c o n d sa f t e ra t6 . 2 9 p m
Only Glucophage® purchased.84 tablets purchased at N1700
9) Iga-Idunganran street TGlCP and
TGeCP
OK- Text message sent and response received almost immediately about
8s e c o n d sa f t e ra t2 3 . 4 8 p m
Both purchased
(Glucopahge® and Formet®); 84 tablets of Glucophage® at N1400 and
500 tablets of Formet® at N200
10) Iga-idunganran
street
TGLAA
(2
nd)a n d
TGeAA
(2
nd)
OK- Text message sent and response received almost immediately about
5s e c o n d sa f t e ra t2 3 . 4 1 p m
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Miformin®)
11) Enu-owa street TGlBVL
and
TGeBVL
OK- Text message sent and response received almost immediately about
6s e c o n d sa f t e ra t1 8 . 1 3 p m
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Inophage®)- 84 tablets of
Glucophage at N1500 and 50 tablets of Inophage® at N250429
12) Ashogbon street TGlHG and
TGeHG
OK. The 4
th from the left was sent but there was no response message
until after 5minutes 7 seconds (sent 14.02 pm 1/12/2011, response
message states 14.07pm
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)
13) Ashogbon street TGlUB and
TGeUB
OK- Text message sent and response received almost immediately about
7s e c o n d sa f t e r
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®). Purchased 84 tablets of
Glucophage® at N1500 and 100 tablets of Diabetmin® at N600
14) Ashogbon street TGlEZ and
TGeEZ
OK- Text message sent and response received almost immediately about
8s e c o n d s( t h e r ea r eo n l y5c a r d si np a c k )
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Metformin by Bristol)
15) Ashogbon street TGeCO Only other brand (Glucopac®) purchased
16) Atin street TGeAV Only other brand (Glucopac®) purchased
17) Off Atin street TGeIUM Only other brand bought (Diabetmin®)
18) Ashogbon street,
Isale-Eko, Lagos
TGeFD Only other brand purchased (Sanformin®)
19) Atin street TGlUJA OK-Text message sent and response received almost immediately about
8s e c o n d sa f t e ra t1 7 . 0 5 p m
Only Glucophage® purchased
20) Ashogbon street TGeTMH Only other brand (Lifeback® metformin purchased). Said it is the same as
Glucophage®
21) Onikoyi street, Old
Porter street, Lagos
TGlSNC OK- Text message sent at 4.48pm and response received almost
immediately about 2 seconds after
Only Glucophage® purchased
22) Ashogbon street TGePP Only other brand purchased (Juformin®)
23) Atin street TGlSS Text message sent and response received almost immediately about 10
seconds
Only Glucophage® purchased430
24) Ashogbon street TGlBPM
and
TGeBPM
Nil- The 4
th from the left was sent at 14.17pm on 1/12/2011 but there was
no response was received even after 25 minutes
The 5th from the left was resent at 2.29pm with another network-MTN (no
response was received even after 25 minutes)
The 2
nd was resent at 8.24am on 03/12/11 with Glo1 and response was
received after 5 minutes 9 seconds at 8.29am on 3/12/11
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diabetmin®)
25) Atin street TGlEUP
and
TGeEUP
OK- Text message sent and response received almost immiditaely about
6s e c o n d sa f t e r
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Glucopac®)
26) Iga- Idunganran
street
TGlVLI and
TGeVLI
OK. Text message sent 1.54pm (response received after 4 seconds but
response says received1.54pm).
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Gluformin®)
27) Ashogbon street TGlNMS
and
TGeNMS
OK- Text message sent and response received almost immiditaely about
7s e c o n d sa f t e ra t1 6 . 5 7 p m
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Betaphage®)
28) Iga-idunganran
street, Isale-Eko, Lagos
(3
rd)
TGLAA (3
rd)
and
TGeAA
(3
rd)
OK-Text message sent at and response received almost immiditaely
about 2 seconds after
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Miformin®)
29) Iga-Idunganran
street
TGlEMAU
and
TGeEMAU
Nil- The 4
th from the left was sent but there was no response message
even after 25 minutes (sent 2.46pm 1/12/2011)
The 2
ndfrom the left was resent at with another network-airtel (no
response was received even after 25 minutes)
The 5
th was resent on 03/12/11 with MTN and response was received
almost immediately after 5 seconds at 8.41am on 3/12/11
Both purchased (Glucophage® and Diamin®). Said both are the same
and that Diamin® may even be better in quality431
Appendix 15: Drug sampling collection form
Adapted from Wondemagegnehu, (1999) and USP/DQI, (2004)
Code no………………………/………………………….City name:
Sample information:
Name of location where sample was take from:
Street address (with telephone and fax no if available)
Type of outlet (Community pharmacy/ patent medicine shop)
Date of sampling
Drug name (trade or brand name)
Dosage form and strength
Pack size
Manufacturers Batch/ Lot no.
Manufacturing date
Expiry date
NAFDAC no.
Manufacturers name and address as written on the pack
With authentication scratch cards (Yes/No)
Price
Brief physical/visual description of sample (including description of the primary and secondary
packaging)
Name of collector (s)/Date/Sign
Labelling requirements
Brand name of drug sample (if applicable)
Generic name of active ingredient
Dosage form and strength
Name of reference standard used (as claimed on the label for instance USP/BP/IP/EP)
Storage conditions
Packaging material (for instance blister pack/card)
Is there a print on the primary or secondary packaging?
Description of dosage form
Shape (circular, oval, flat sides, other)
Uniformity of shape
No physical change (cracks, breaks, erosion, abrasion, sticky)
Other observations (no foreign contaminants/dirty marks/proper seal)
Final comments
The sample passed the basic testing (Yes/ No)
The sample failed basic quality testing (Yes/No)
If sample failed, please give reasons…………………………
The Sample is doubtful for its basic quality testing
If doubtful, please give reason (s)…………………………….432
Appendix 16: Glucophage® samples authenticated, mobile network used and time taken to receive response and response
received
S/no Glucophage®
samples
authenticated
Mobile network Time taken to receive response
(Seconds)
Result of response
received
1G L 6 6 G L O 9 O K , O r i g i n a l
2G L 3 3 4 G L O 3 0 9 O K , O r i g i n a l
3T G L V L I M T N 4 O K , O r i g i n a l
4T G L H G G L O 3 0 7 O K , O r i g i n a l
5T G L B P M G L O D E L A Y E D ( > 1 5 0 0 s e c o n d s ) O K , O r i g i n a l
6T G L E M A U M T N D E L A Y E D ( > 1 5 0 0 s e c o n d s ) O K , O r i g i n a l
7T G L E Z A I R T E L8 O K , O r i g i n a l
8T G L E U P A I R T E L 6 O K , O r i g i n a l
9T G L I S S G L O 1 0 O K , O r i g i n a l
10 TGLUB AIRTEL 7 OK, Original
11 TGLAA3rd MTN 2 OK, Original
12 TGLSNC MTN 2 OK, Original433
13 TGLNMS GLO 7 OK, Original
14 TGLUJA AIRTEL 8 OK, Original
15 GL561 MTN 4 OK, Original
16 GL105 GLO 6 OK, Original
17 GL446 AIRTEL 8 OK, Original
18 GL300 GLO 3 OK, Original
19 GL12 MTN 9 OK, Original
20 GL586 AIRTEL 15 OK, Original
21 TGLBVL GLO 6 OK, Original
22 TGLAP MTN 2 OK, Original
23 TGLAA1st AIRTEL 1020 OK, Original
24 TGLRS1st AIRTEL 15 OK, Original
25 GL265 AIRTEL 5 OK, Original
26 GL476 MTN 1 OK, Original
27 GL572 GLO 4 OK, Original
28 GL413 MTN 1 OK, Original
29 GL253 AIRTEL 5 OK, Original
30 GL431 GLO 3 OK, Original434
31 GL376 MTN 2 OK, Original
32 GL254 AIRTEL 6 OK, Original
33 GL140 GLO 326 OK, Original
34 GL116 AIRTEL 7 OK, Original
35 GL562 MTN 5 OK, Original
36 GL502 GLO 2 OK, Original
37 GL346 GLO 6 OK, Original
38 GL415 ETISALAT 6 OK, Original
39 GL99 ETISALAT 6 OK, Original
40 GL6 ETISALAT 6 OK, Original
41 GL228 ETISALAT 6 OK, Original
42 GL356 ETISALAT 5 OK, Original
43 GL428 ETISALAT 5 OK, Original
44 GL468 ETISALAT 12 OK, Original
45 GL4 ETISALAT 5 OK, Original
46 GL87 ETISALAT 4 OK, Original
47 GL338 ETISALAT 5 OK, Original435
48 GL11 ETISALAT 5 OK, Original
49 GL184 ETISALAT 5 OK, Original
50 GL508 ETISALAT 5 OK, Original
51 GL514 ETISALAT 12 OK, Original
52 GL3 ETISALAT 11 OK, Original
53 GL271 ETISALAT 5 OK, Original
54 GL333 ETISALAT 4 OK, Original
55 GL91 ETISALAT 5 OK, Original
56 GL336 ETISALAT 11 OK, Original
57 GL203 ETISALAT 5 OK, Original
58 GL432 ETISALAT 12 OK, Original
59 GL520 ETISALAT 4 OK, Original
60 GL47 ETISALAT 5 OK, Original
61 GL215 AIRTEL 15 OK, Original
62 GL164 AIRTEL 5 OK, Original
63 GL73 AIRTEL 8 OK, Original
64 GL83 GLO 5 OK, Original
65 GL577 GLO 2 OK, Original
66 GL186 GLO 309 OK, Original
67 GL310 MTN 65 OK, Original
68 GL302 MTN 23 OK, Original
69 GL295 MTN 78 OK, Original436
70 GL533 MTN 65 OK, Original
71 TGLPC GLO 5 OK, Original
72 TGLDV MTN 2 OK, Original
73 TGLAA2nd AIRTEL 5 OK, Original
74 TGLCP GLO 8 OK, Original
75 TGLRS2nd MTN 2 OK, Original
76 GL144 AIRTEL 6 OK, Original
77 GL317 MTN 2 OK, Original
78 GL256 AIRTEL 5 OK, Original
79 GL160 GLO 5 OK, Original
80 GL69 MTN 2 OK, Original
81 GL204 GLO 5 OK, Original
82 GL457 AIRTEL 6 OK, Original
83 GL552 MTN 3 OK, Original
84 GL48 AIRTEL 6 OK, Original
85 GL259 MTN 1 OK, Original
86 GL287 AIRTEL 16 OK, Original
87 GL585 MTN 1 OK, Original
88 GL457 GLO 6 OK, Original
89 GL237 AIRTEL 15 OK, Original
90 GL289 GLO 5 OK, Original
91 GL558 AIRTEL 6 OK, Original
92 GL270 MTN 1 OK, Original437
Appendix 17: Result of packaging analysis of tagged Glucophage® samples
Sample code Result of packaging analysis
GL1
Passed
GL2 Passed
GL3
Passed
GL4 Passed
GL5 Passed
GL6 Passed
GL7 Passed
GL8 Passed
GL9 Passed
GL10 Passed
GL11 Passed
GL12 Passed
GL13 Passed
GL14 Passed
GL15 Passed
GL16 Passed
GL17 Passed
GL18 Passed
GL19 Passed
GL20 Passed
GL21 Passed
GL22 Passed
GL23 Passed
GL24 Passed
GL25 Passed
GL26 Passed
GL27 Passed
GL28 Passed
GL29 Passed
GL30 Passed
GL31 Passed
GL32 Passed
GL33 Passed
GL34 Passed
GL35 Passed438
GL36 Passed
GL37 Passed
GL38 Passed
GL39 Passed
GL41 Passed
GL42 Passed
GL43 Passed
GL44 Passed
GL45 Passed
GL46 Passed
GL47 Passed
GL48 Passed
GL49 Passed
GL50 Passed
GL51 Passed
GL52 Passed
GL53 Passed
GL54 Passed
GL55 Passed
GL56 Passed
GL57 Passed
GL59 Passed
GL60 Passed
GL61 Passed
GL62 Passed
GL63 Passed
GL64 Passed
GL65 Passed
GL66 Passed
GL67 Passed439
GL68 Passed
GL69 Passed
GL70 Passed
GL71 Passed
GL72 Passed
GL73 Passed
GL74 Passed
GL75 Passed
GL76 Passed
GL77 Passed
GL78 Passed
GL79 Passed
GL80 Passed
GL81 Passed
GL82 Passed
GL83 Passed
GL84 Passed
GL85 Passed
GL86 Passed
GL87 Passed
GL88 Passed
GL89 Passed
GL90 Passed
GL91 Passed
GL92 Passed
GL93 Passed
GL94 Passed440
Appendix 18: Correlation coefficient (r) for the tagged Glucophage® samples
Sample
code
Correlation
coefficient
(r)
Sample
code
Correlation
coefficient
(r)
Sample
code
Correlation
coefficient
(r)
Sample
code
Correlation
coefficient
(r)
Sample
code
Correlation
coefficient
(r)
Sample
code
Correlation
coefficient
(r)
Sample
code
Correlation
coefficient (r)
GL1 0.999319 GL16 0.998191 GL31 0.999531 GL47 0.999025 GL63 0.999126 GL78 0.999133 GL93 0.999318
GL2 0.999319 GL17 0.99932 GL32 0.998637 GL48 0.998759 GL64 0.998466 GL79 0.999098 GL94 0.999029
GL3 0.997643
GL18 0.995604 GL33 0.998462 GL49 0.999392 GL65 0.999017 GL80 0.999371
GL4 0.999478 GL19 0.997248 GL34 0.998853 GL50 0.999387 GL66 0.999043 GL81 0.998574
GL5 0.999518 GL20 0.999228 GL35 0.999052 GL51 0.999267 GL67 0.998877 GL82 0.997175
GL6 0.99912 GL21 0.997444 GL36 0.997175 GL52 0.998347 GL68 0.998234 GL83 0.999023
GL7 0.999528 GL22 0.998713 GL37 0.99951 GL53 0.998972 GL69 0.998706 GL84 0.999393
GL8 0.997727 GL23 0.997237 GL38 0.99828 GL54 0.9995 GL70 0.998963 GL85 0.999458441
GL9 0.9989 GL24 0.999361 GL39 0.99954 GL55 0.99932 GL71 0.998055 GL86 0.998111
GL10 0.99918 GL25 0.998402 GL41 0.998929 GL56 0.999121 GL72 0.999252 GL87 0.99928
GL11 0.999021 GL26 0.998612 GL42 0.999362 GL57 0.998599 GL73 0.999158 GL88 0.998737
GL12 0.99873 GL27 0.999561 GL43 0.998039 GL59 0.999417 GL74 0.999196 GL89 0.999281
GL13 0.999171 GL28 0.996442 GL44 0.999383 GL60 0.998581 GL75 0.998844 GL90 0.999177
GL14 0.999457 GL29 0.996989 GL45 0.999327 GL61 0.99951 GL76 0.99939 GL91 0.999273
GL15 0.99677 GL30 0.999126 GL46 0.999364 GL62 0.998453 GL77 0.999638 GL92 0.996973442
Appendix 19: Result of the HPLC analysis of Glucophage®
samples containing the %concentration of metformin
calculated from the calibration curve443
Sample HPLC plot showing area under curve (chromatogram)
Concentration of pure metformin and corresponding areas under the curve444
used for plotting the calibration curve
Calibration of Metformin
Area of Metformin Concentration Average
inj 1 inj 2 inj 3 ( g/ml) Area
0
1961.2 2002.8 1982.0 36.54 1982.000
2645.6 2621.5 2633.6 48.72 2633.550
3312.9 3298.8 3305.9 60.90 3305.850
3965.5 3952.9 3959.2 73.08 3959.200
4600.4 4574.3 4587.4 85.26 4587.350
5283.8 5295.5 5289.7 97.44 5289.650
5917.3 5920.7 5919.0 109.62 5919.000
6544.3 6543.7 6544.0 121.80 6544.000445
Percentage concentration of metformin
Sample code Percentage (%)
of metformin
Result of HPLC analysis
GL1 95.78 Passed
GL2 98.53 Passed
GL3 97.34
Passed
GL4 99.81 Passed
GL5 99.84 Passed
GL6 99.22 Passed
GL7 98.86 Passed
GL8 100.19 Passed
GL9 97.66 Passed
GL10 98.79 Passed
GL11 97.60 Passed
GL12 96.12 Passed
GL13 97.52 Passed
GL14 98.16 Passed
GL15 101.11 Passed
GL16 100.85 Passed
GL17 99.98 Passed
GL18 97.89 Passed
GL19 96.84 Passed
GL20 97.71 Passed
GL21 100.18 Passed
GL22 96.15 Passed
GL23 97.15 Passed
GL24 95.08 Passed
GL25 96.41 Passed
GL26 97.85 Passed
GL27 96.61 Passed
GL28 96.67 Passed
GL29 97.48 Passed
GL30 98.08 Passed446
GL31 99.09 Passed
GL32 100.75 Passed
GL33 99.70 Passed
GL34 97.67 Passed
GL35 95.60 Passed
GL36 96.74 Passed
GL37 96.55 Passed
GL38 95.00 Passed
GL39 100.34 Passed
GL41 98.28 Passed
GL42 100.92 Passed
GL43 98.92 Passed
GL44 98.23 Passed
GL45 97.58 Passed
GL46 96.97 Passed
GL47 96.48 Passed
GL48 99.53 Passed
GL49 97.79 Passed
GL50 101.14 Passed
GL51 100.65 Passed
GL52 96.20 Passed
GL53 99.68 Passed
GL54 95.56 Passed
GL55 98.47 Passed
GL56 99.32 Passed
GL57 95.07 Passed
GL59 96.89 Passed
GL60 98.33 Passed
GL61 98.84 Passed
GL62 97.58 Passed
GL63 100.13 Passed
GL64 98.81 Passed
GL65 95.55 Passed
GL66 101.33 Passed
GL67 98.40 Passed
GL68 100.59 Passed
GL69 98.98 Passed
GL70 98.12 Passed
GL71 98.51 Passed
GL72 95.52 Passed
GL73 96.42 Passed
GL74 98.93 Passed
GL75 100.08 Passed447
GL76 100.03 Passed
GL77 96.63 Passed
GL78 101.12 Passed
GL79 101.01 Passed
GL80 98.96 Passed
GL81 96.31 Passed
GL82 97.02 Passed
GL83 95.90 Passed
GL84 100.00 Passed
GL85 99.96 Passed
GL86 96.40 Passed
GL87 96.57 Passed
GL88 97.22 Passed
GL89 97.05 Passed
GL90 99.81 Passed
GL91 98.39 Passed
GL92 97.42 Passed
GL93 97.95 Passed
GL94 99.92 Passed448
Appendix 20: Result of packaging analysis conducted for the generic
metformin samples
Sample code Result of packaging analysis
GE1 Passed
GE2 Passed
GE3
Passed
GE4 Passed
GE5 Passed
GE6 Passed
GE7 Passed
GE8 Passed
GE9 Passed
GE10 Passed
GE11 Passed
GE12 Passed
GE13 Passed
GE14 Passed
GE15 Passed
GE16 Passed
GE17 Passed
GE18 Passed
GE19 Passed
GE20 Passed
GE21 Passed
GE22 Passed
GE23 Passed
GE24 Passed
GE25 Passed449
GE26 Passed
GE27 Passed
GE28 Passed
GE29 Passed
GE30 Passed
GE31 Passed
GE32 Passed
GE33 Passed
GE34 Passed
GE35 Passed
GE36 Passed
GE37 Passed
GE38 Not analysed
GE39 Passed
GE40 Passed
GE41 Passed
GE42 Passed
GE43 Passed
GE44 Passed
GE45 Passed
GE46 Passed
GE47 Passed
GE48 Passed
GE49 Passed
GE50 Passed
GE51 Passed
GE52 Passed
GE53 Passed
GE54 Passed
GE55 Passed
GE56 Passed
GE57 Passed
GE58 Passed
GE59 Passed450
GE60 Not analysed
GE61 Passed
GE62 Passed
GE63 Passed
GE64 Passed
GE65 Passed
GE66 Passed
GE67 Not analysed
GE68 Passed
GE69 Passed
GE70 Passed
GE71 Passed
GE72 Passed
GE73 Passed
GE74 Passed
GE75 Passed
GE77 Passed
GE78 Passed
GE79 Passed
GE80 Passed
GE81 Passed
GE82 Passed
GE83 Not analysed
GE84 Passed
GE85 Passed
GE86 Passed
GE87 Passed
GE88 Passed451
Appendix 21: Correlation coefficient (r) for the generic metformin samples
Type Code r Type Code r Type Code r Type Code r Type Code r Type Code r
FG E 1 0 . 9 9 7 2 7 6 AG E 1 6 0 . 9 7 7 8 5 9 FG E 3 1 0 . 9 9 6 8 1 7 QG E 4 6 0 . 9 9 9 1 2 2 AGE61 0.998831 E GE76 0.999814
IG E 2 0 . 9 9 4 2 5 6 E GE17 0.999919 Q GE32 0.99767 A GE47 0.9977 A GE62 0.998901 A GE77 0.999081
GG E 3 0 . 9 9 7 4 6 Q
GE18 0.998968 G GE33 0.996527 A GE48 0.999733 A GE63 0.998924 A GE78 0.998661
HG E 4 0 . 9 7 1 7 0 4
E
GE19 0.999754 F GE34 0.998968 A GE49 0.999703
A
GE64 0.999232 A GE79 0.999628
EG E 5 0 . 9 9 9 8 7 8 J GE20 0.997916 A GE35 0.998844 A GE50 0.997351 E GE65 0.998236 A GE80 0.998276
RG E 6 0 . 9 9 9 4 7 7 K GE21 0.998768 A GE36 0.997232 A GE51 0.999843 F GE66 0.992498 K GE81 0.998127
DG E 7 0 . 9 9 5 7 9 A G E 2 2 0 . 9 9 8 4 7 3 F G E 3 7 0 . 9 9 8 8 1 6 B G E 5 2 0 . 9 9 2 1 0 1 GE67 A GE82 0.999641
EG E 8 0 . 9 9 9 9 3 5 P G E 2 3 0 . 9 9 5 1 2 6 GE38 A GE53 0.999501
T
GE68 0.998723 GE83
AG E 9 0 . 9 9 6 4 7 QG E 2 4 0 . 9 9 8 3 6 5 AG E 3 9 0 . 9 9 9 1 1 5 AG E 5 4 0 . 9 9 4 2 1 9 F GE69 0.997151 Q GE84 0.999273
OG E 1 0 0 . 9 8 4 3 3 6
Q
GE25 0.997292 Q GE40 0.999753 A GE55 0.999649 B GE70 0.98964 D GE85 0.984765
RG E 1 1 0 . 9 9 1 5 4 3 A G E 2 6 0 . 9 9 9 6 9 A GE41 0.998933 A GE56 0.99669 Q GE71 0.999508 B GE86 0.99148
EG E 1 2 0 . 9 9 9 6 1 7 AG E 2 7 0 . 9 9 8 9 2 Q G E 4 2 0 . 9 9 9 3 9 9 AG E 5 7 0 . 9 9 7 7 1 5 C GE72 0.99716 A GE87 0.999625
MG E 1 3 0 . 9 9 8 3 3 7 B G E 2 8 0 . 9 8 9 6 6 4 Q GE43 0.999485 LG E 5 8 0 . 9 9 8 9 2 6 BG E 7 3 0 . 9 8 5 8 6 5 AG E 8 8 0 . 9 9 9 6 5 8
NG E 1 4 0 . 9 9 3 2 3 8 B G E 2 9 0 . 9 9 2 7 0 4 F G E 4 4 0 . 9 9 6 3 9 6 A GE59 0.999617 A GE74 0.994636
AG E 1 5 0 . 9 9 9 4 8 6 A G E 3 0 0 . 9 9 6 2 8 7 AG E 4 5 0 . 9 9 8 6 1 G E 6 0 BG E 7 5 0 . 9 8 0 3 7 4452
Appendix 22: Result of NIR analysis conducted for the generic metformin
samples
Serial
no.
Sample code Result of NIR analysis
1 GE1 Passed
2 GE2 Passed
3 GE3 Passed
4 GE4 Passed
5 GE5 Passed
6 GE6 Passed
7 GE7 Passed
8 GE8 Passed
9 GE9 Passed
10 GE10 Passed
11 GE11 Passed
12 GE12 Passed
13 GE13 Passed
14 GE14 Passed
15 GE15 Passed
16 GE16 Passed
17 GE17 Passed
18 GE18 Passed
19 GE19 Passed
20 GE20 Passed
21 GE21 Passed
22 GE22 Passed
23 GE23 Passed
24 GE24 Passed
25 GE25 Passed
26 GE26 Passed
27 GE27 Passed
28 GE28 Passed
29 GE29 Passed
30 GE30 Passed
31 GE31 Passed
32 GE32 Passed
33 GE33 Passed
34 GE34 Passed
35 GE35 Passed
36 GE36 Passed
37 GE37 Passed
38 GE38 Not analysed
39 GE39 Passed
40 GE40 Passed
41 GE41 Passed
42 GE42 Passed
43 GE43 Passed453
44 GE44 Passed
45 GE45 Passed
46 GE46 Passed
47 GE47 Passed
48 GE48 Passed
49 GE49 Passed
50 GE50 Passed
51 GE51 Passed
52 GE52 Passed
53 GE53 Passed
54 GE54 Passed
55 GE55 Passed
56 GE56 Passed
57 GE57 Passed
58 GE58 Passed
59 GE59 Passed
60 GE60 Not analysed
61 GE61 Passed
62 GE62 Passed
63 GE63 Passed
64 GE64 Passed
65 GE65 Passed
66 GE66 Passed
67 GE67 Not analysed
68 GE68 Passed
69 GE69 Passed
70 GE70 Passed
71 GE71 Passed
72 GE72 Passed
73 GE73 Passed
74 GE74 Passed
75 GE75 Passed
76 GE77 Passed
77 GE78 Passed
78 GE79 Passed
79 GE80 Passed
80 GE81 Passed
81 GE82 Passed
82 GE83 Not analysed
83 GE84 Passed
84 GE85 Passed
85 GE86 Passed
86 GE87 Passed
87 GE88 Passed454
Appendix 23: Result of HPLC analysis of the Generic metformin samples
showing percentage of metformin in each sample
Sample code %o fm e t f o r m i n Result of HPLC analysis
GE1 94.06 Failed
GE2 98.37 Passed
GE3 103.36 Passed
GE4 95.03 Passed
GE5 98.57 Passed
GE6 96.06 Passed
GE7 93.80 Failed
GE8 98.29 Passed
GE9 98.16 Passed
GE10 93.03 Failed
GE11 95.34 Passed
GE12 102.90 Passed
GE13 98.28 Passed
GE14 99.75 Passed
GE15 97.49 Passed
GE16 100.63 Passed
GE17 102.28 Passed
GE18 99.26 Passed
GE19 100.84 Passed
GE20 95.55 Passed
GE21 95.0 Passed
GE22 97.25 Passed
GE23 102.03 Passed
GE24 95.76 Passed
GE25 95.85 Passed
GE26 97.39 Passed
GE27 95.83 Passed
GE28 97.39 Passed
GE29 96.35 Passed
GE30 95.27 Passed
GE31 94.02 Failed
GE32 92.85 Failed
GE33 102.69 Passed
GE34 95.09 Passed
GE35 98.01 Passed
GE36 97.79 Passed
GE37 96.36 Passed
GE38 102.13 Passed
GE39 100.97 Passed
GE40 97.23 Passed
GE41 100.37 Passed455
GE42 96.96 Passed
GE43 103.24 Passed
GE44 98.29 Passed
GE45 95.69 Passed
GE46 98.73 Passed
GE47 99.36 Passed
GE48 98.93 Passed
GE49 97.78 Passed
GE50 98.26 Passed
GE51 95.27 Passed
GE52 97.10 Passed
GE53 96.43 Passed
GE54 95.84 Passed
GE55 96.47 Passed
GE56 95.0 Passed
GE57 96.56 Passed
GE58 101.17 Passed
GE59 99.36 Passed
GE60 86.68 Failed
GE61 95.14 Passed
GE62 96.15 Passed
GE63 95.88 Passed
GE64 98.49 Passed
GE65 100.13 Passed
GE66 98.98 Passed
GE67 95.72 Passed
GE68 98.52 Passed
GE69 83.11 Failed
GE70 99.19 Passed
GE71 99.70 Passed
GE72 101.72 Passed
GE73 95.86 Passed
GE74 96.51 Passed
GE75 98.73 Passed
GE77 97.49 Passed
GE78 96.54 Passed
GE79 98.20 Passed
GE80 98.09 Passed
GE81 98.93 Passed
GE82 95.43 Passed
GE83 97.50 Passed
GE84 99.55 Passed
GE85 99.62 Passed
GE86 98.94 Passed
GE87 95.14 Passed
GE88 97.80 Passed456
Appendix 24: Coding frame/matrix used to categorise themes relating to
perceptions of stakeholders on the current situation of quality of
medicines in Nigeria
Themes/Categories
Size of the problem of poor quality medicine
Reasons for existence of poor quality medicine
Encounter with poor quality medicines
How poor quality medicines are detected
Medicines most likely to be faked
Impact of poor quality medicines
Initiatives in place
Reasons for reduction of the incidence of poor quality medicines
Awareness as an initiative against existence of poor quality medicines
How to tackle existence of poor quality medicines
Role of medicine sellers in the reduction of existence of poor quality mediicnes
Precautionary steps against poor quality medicines
Choice between generic and branded medicines
Quality of locally made medicines
Preference by country
Perception of drug quality in relation to cost of medicines
Educating consumers on generics457
Appendix 25: Matrix topics relating to perceptions of the situation of
quality of medicines in Nigeria and what is included in each matrix
Matrices What is included
Trend in the size of the problem of poor quality medicine This matrix included participant's perception of the trend
of the prevalence of poor quality medicine in Nigeria
Encounter with poor quality medicines This matrix included examples given by participants who
have directly encountered poor quality medicine or who
narrated an encounter with poor quality medicine they
know of
Reasons for existence of poor quality medicine This matrix included what participant's perceived were the
reasons for the existence of poor quality medicines in
Nigeria
How poor quality medicines are detected This matrix included methods used by participants to
detect poor quality medicines
Medicines most likely to be faked This included medicines or groups of medicines that the
participants perceived are most likely to be faked
Impact of poor quality medicines This matrix included what participants perceived as the
the impact of poor quality
Initiatives in place This included the initiatives that are in place to help tackle
the existence of poor quality medicines in Nigeria
Reasons for reduction of the incidence of poor quality
medicines
This included the initiatives participants perceived have
helped reduce the existence of poor quality medicines
Awareness as an initiative against existence of poor quality
medicines
This included how participants perceived awareness
creation as an initiative which has helped reduce the
incidence of poor quality medicines
How to tackle existence of poor quality medicines This included suggestions given by participants on how
poor quality medicines can best be tackled in Nigeria
Role of medicine sellers in the reduction of existence of
poor quality medicines
This matrix included suggestions on what persons that
are involved in the sale of medicines can do to help
reduce the incidence of poor quality medicines in Nigeria
Precautionary steps against poor quality medicines This matrix included the precautions taken by the
consumers to avoid obtaining medicines that are of poor
quality
Choice between generic and branded medicines This included the perceived quality of generic and
branded innovator medicines
Quality of locally made medicines This matrix included how the participants perceived the
quality of locally manufactured medicines
Perception of drug quality in relation to cost of medicines This included how participants perceived the quality of
medicines in relation to the cost of the medicines
Educating consumers on generics This matrix included information relating to consumer
education on generic medicines by medicine sellers458
Appendix 26: Themes and subthemes relating to perception of
stakeholders of the situation of quality medicines in Nigeria
Themes/Categories Subthemes
Size of the problem of poor
quality medicine
*Trend in the size of the problem of poor quality medicines in
Nigeria
-Encounter with poor quality medicine
-Precautionary steps taken
-Reporting cases of poor quality medicines encountered
Reasons for existence of poor
quality medicine
*High cost of some medicines
*Poverty
*Corruption
*High cost of product registration
*Low level of local drug manufacturing
*Advancement in technology
*Ignorance and lack of awareness
*Demand surpassing supply
*Lack of stringent laws and inadequate enforcement of existing
laws
*Difficulty tracing counterfeiters
*Inadequate knowledge of pharmacy graduates
*Shortage of pharmacists
*Greed
*Existence of open drug markets
*Lack of commitment by the Pharmaceutical industries
*Porous borders
*Global warming
*Poor government financing
*Lack of co-operation among stakeholders
Reasons for the perceived
reduction in the incidence of
poor quality medicines in
Nigeria
*Involvement of Pharmacists
*Establishment of NAFDAC
*Inspections by the Drug regulatory agencies
*Effective stakeholder collaboration
*Awareness creation
Perception of generic and
innovator/branded medicines
*Choice between generic medicines and innovator brands
*Perception of drug quality in relation to cost of medicines
*Educating consumers on generics
Perceived quality of locally
manufactured medicines
*Perceived quality of medicines made in Nigeria
What medicine sellers should
do to reduce the existence of
poor quality medicines
*Getting medicines from a reliable source
*Education/training
*Formation of taskforce
Impact of MAS Change in purchasing behaviour of consumers
Detection of counterfeit medicines
Provision of intelligence information about counterfeiting
Increased confidence in medicines purchased
Increased knowledge about state of health
How to improve MAS Improved awareness creation
Assistance by government and their agencies
Follow-up evaluation of MAS
PIN improvement
Network service improvement
Authentication by the pharmacists
Choice of medicines that will be MAS enabled459
Appendix 27: Coding frame/matrix used to categorise themes relating to
perceptions, attitudes and experiences of MAS
Barriers to MAS use
Change in purchasing behaviour due to MAS
Compatibility of MAS
Cost issues and MAS
Ease of use
Educating consumers about MAS by medicine sellers
How to improve MAS
Increased sale due to MAS
MAS awareness
Medicines that need MAS
Satisfaction of users
Time issues and MAS
Trust in MAS
Usefulness of MAS460
Appendix 28: Matrix topics relating to perceptions, attitudes and
experiences of MAS and themes included in each matrix
Matrices What is included
Barriers to MAS use This matrix included any information by participants
relating to issues that have prevented them from using
MAS or that may affect the use, introduction and
expansion of MAS in Nigeria
Change in purchasing behaviour due to MAS This matrix included any change in the purchasing
behaviour of the consumers due to their awareness of
MAS or since MAS was introduced
Compatibility of MAS This matrix included information relating to the similarity
between structures used by MAS and what was already
available and used in the society
Cost issues and MAS This matrix included comments relating to cost and MAS.
It included comments relating to impact of MAS on cost of
medicines, Impact of cost on further introduction and
expansion of MAS and the impact of cost on use of MAS
Ease of use This matrix included comments on how easy the
participants perceive the use of MAS and how easy it was
to use the service
Educating consumers about MAS by medicine sellers This included comments relating to any form of education
or awareness creation of MAS by the medicine sellers to
the consumers
How to improve MAS This included suggestions on how MAS can be improved.
It included comments relating to different means of
awareness creation suggested by the participants
Increased sale due to MAS This matrix included the impact of the introduction of MAS
on the volume of sale of medicines to which it has been
introduced as reported by the medicine sellers
MAS awareness This matrix included comments relating to how the
participants perceived the awareness of MAS among the
Nigerian public
Medicines that need MAS This matrix included suggestions by participants on the
type or categories of medicines which they think MAS
should be introduced. It also included any reasons they
gave for the suggestions made
Satisfaction of users This matrix included comments made by participants who
have used the service on how satisfied they were with the
service
Time issues and MAS This included comments on the impact of time on the use
of MAS.
Trust in MAS This included information on how the users of MAS
trusted the response they received when they sent the
message to authenticate their medicine
Usefulness of MAS This matrix included how useful the participants perceived
MAS is. It included comments relating to how MAS has
helped the users and the potential it has.461
Appendix 29: Themes and subthemes relating to MAS
Themes/Categories Subthemes
Barriers to MAS use Cost
Compatibility of MAS
MAS awareness
Time
Trust in source of medicine
Confidentiality
Dispensing practice in rural areas
Dispensing practice in hospitals
GSM ownership and use
Availability of phone network
Educating consumers about MAS by medicine sellers
Change in purchasing behaviour due to MAS Increased demand
Increased promotion
Facilitators to MAS use Ease of use
Compatibility
Quick response to authentication
Cost issues and MAS Impact of cost on purchasing behaviour of consumers
Cost as an incentive for MAS use
Impact of MAS introduction on the cost of medicines
Ease of use Ease of understanding instructions given
Ease of actual use of the service
How to improve MAS Methods to raise awareness
Assistance by government and their agencies
Pin /unique code improvement
Network service improvement
Medicines that need MAS
Increased sale due to MAS Increased sale due to increased confidence
Increased sale due to reduced or no counterfeiting
Increased sale due to increased promotion
MAS awareness Perceived awareness level
Ways to raise awareness
Satisfaction of users Satisfaction of users
Time issues and MAS Time needed to use the service
Time needed to educate consumers on MAS by
medicine sellers
Trust in MAS Trust in MAS
Impact/ Usefulness of MAS Detection of counterfeit/fake medicines
Reduction of counterfeiting/faking
Increased demand/sale
Increased confidence
Increased knowledge about state of health
Knowledge about quality of medicines
MAS coverage
Product tracking
Product promotion
Trust in medicine sellers